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THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE
OF
ACCEPTANCE WITH GOD.

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THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE
OF
ACCEPTANCE WITH GOD,

CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO THE
NEOLOGIAN HERMENEUTICS,

IN
Six Lectures,

PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN
IN MDCCCLXIII.

ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE LATE MRS. ANNE DONNELLAN.

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"There are two poles of all human science--the personal I, with whom all begins, and the personal God, in whom all ends."—MAINE DE BIRAN.


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TO
THE PROVOST
AND SENIOR FELLOWS
OF
TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,

This Work

IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED.



PREFACE.

“FORMERLY,” observes an eminent French metaphysician, “men admired the faith of a St. Anselm, in pursuit of intellectual light, *Fides quærens Intellectum*—at this day it is Intellect which is in pursuit of Faith.”

I have made it my study in the following Lectures to harmonize, by an appeal to Reason,* the

* For the precise signification of the term Reason, as here employed, I must refer the reader to Lect. iv. note 7, pp. 259 *sq.* Its application, in an *intuitional* sense, to the faculty “quæ rerum quasi antecessiones non ignorat” is at least etymologically correct. For *Ratio* is undoubtedly akin to *res*, as *res* itself to *hrais*, *hir*, *χείρ*, *χρῆμα*,—thus indicating the mental faculty which *apprehends* real Being, or ultimate *materies*, as the *hand* grasps material Substance. Cf. Donaldson, *Varron.* pp. 303–306.

It requires some little intrepidity, however, at the present day, to recognize, no matter how guardedly, the bare existence of such a faculty in man. To say nothing now of other famous Phenomenologists, has not the coryphæus of the Positive Philosophy himself pronounced even “psychological observation” an utterly invalid

conflicting claims of Intellect and Faith ;—to construct a Theodicy, in the first place, upon a reasonable, or *real*, moral basis, remote alike from the vicious extremes of Intellectualism and Superstition, and then to allege from the Bible satisfactory evidence that its cardinal Truth, the dogma of the ATONEMENT, is in harmonious unison with this Theodicy.

The topic was suggested by an eminent instance of “Intellect in pursuit of Faith” which has recently occurred among ourselves.

I allude to the advocacy of the Neologian Method of interpreting Scripture—an advocacy as able as it was unexpected—by the authors of the now celebrated “Essays and Reviews.” For an historical investigation of that Method enabled me to discover its ultimate principle in the philosophy of Spinoza,—a philosophy which assumes pure Intellect as its basis, and which accordingly, consubstantiating Deity with Nature, regards the religious sentiment as a superstitious vanity, and rejects with scorn the belief in a Personal God.

process, contemptuously repudiating the *data* of “internal consciousness”?

It is instructive—not to say consolatory—to ascertain the *organon* substituted by M. Comte. We must seek it, he gravely assures us, “in the observing of other people,” and—“in Phrenology”!! Upon this point Mr. J. S. Mill seems somewhat ashamed of his hero.

Neology, therefore, so far as it is true to its fundamental principle, eliminates the supernatural element from Revelation altogether, and—still further subjugating Faith to Intellect—endeavours by an idealizing process to reduce transcendental truths to the sphere of the intelligible.

Now the intellectual snare of the present day is undoubtedly to be detected in the tendency to substitute a Pantheistic “order of nature” for that Personal and miracle-working God whom the Bible at once presupposes and reveals.

To this cause, and not to anything attractive or vigorous in the Neologian Method itself, is to be ascribed the amount of attention and sympathy with which its advocacy was received in intellectual circles in England.

Hence it seemed to me by no means inopportune at the present time to scrutinize the claims of Neology upon philosophic grounds; forbearing to discuss its minute details, and rather attempting first to fix clearly, and then, by a purely intellectual process, to subvert its fundamental principle—the Pantheistic consubstantiation of Deity with Nature.

By such a process I hoped at least to neutralize the *à priori* objections to a supernatural Revelation of an intensely subtle and original thinker—“the founder,” as he has been styled by no mean authority, “of modern philosophy and modern exegesis,”

—and in so doing to expose besides the congenital vice of the Neologian Theology.

Assuming, however, the *possibility* of a supernatural Revelation to have been thus made good against the advocates of Neology, another phase of the controversy still remained ; and one, too, though scarcely so important in the abstract, yet still possessed of a much wider and more immediate interest.

The Ideologist not only questions, upon physical grounds, the possibility of Miracle and Prophecy, he also objects upon *moral* grounds to the doctrines ordinarily derived from the Bible in the way of *literal* interpretation.

Thus it became necessary, for the exhaustive refutation of his System, to establish against him not only the antecedent *possibility* of a supernatural Revelation, but also the fact, that the cardinal dogmas of the Bible are susceptible of a *literal* interpretation, open to no objection whatever upon moral grounds ; nay more, that those truths, when thus interpreted, afford the strongest internal *probability* that the Book containing them is indeed a Revelation come from God.

Had I been concerned with the former objection only, I might well have hesitated to undertake a topic already so admirably handled in the “Bampton Lectures” of Prof. Mansel. But while readily acknowledging that author’s consummate skill in

combatting the ambitious claims of a "Philosophy of the Absolute," and his immeasurably superior qualifications for such a task, I am constrained to add—and I can appeal in support of my statement to the recorded opinions of many professed metaphysicians—that in overthrowing his antagonists he has all but precipitated himself into the very abyss of Pyrrhonism;* the tenets of his School thereby creating a positive reaction in favour of Idealism, and thus affording a strong, though indirect and unconscious support to the fundamental principles of the Neologian Hermeneutics.

* Of this Pyrrhonism a single example may here suffice:—"In so far," writes Mr. Mansel, "as Morality, in its human character, depends upon conditions not co-eternal with God, but created along with man, in so far we are not justified in regarding the occasional suspension of human duties, by the same authority which created them, as a violation of the immutable principles of morality itself." The typical instances he gives in illustration of this conditioned, or phenomenal, morality, are the sixth, seventh, and eighth commandments of the Decalogue; and his special inference is, that the occurrence of "immoral commands" in a professed Revelation, if only they do not recur too frequently, so far from discrediting the Revelation should be accepted as so many "moral miracles," whose outrage of "the human law" involves "no violation of the divine principle."

The relation I have endeavoured to establish in the following Lectures between man's temporal and eternal destinies will suggest, I trust, a less objectionable neutralization for the special difficulty to which Mr. Mansel somewhat triumphantly applies this perilous solvent. At present I will only remark, that if God created humanity, and a human morality congruous thereto,

Whatever, then, may be the value of his Philosophy on the intellectual side, in sustaining against the Pantheists the *possibility* of a supernatural Revelation, it is worse than useless for those who would support, upon moral grounds, the antecedent *probability* that the transcendental Truths of the Bible, *literally* not *neologically* interpreted, are indeed DIVINE.

This inference requires some further elucidation, perhaps.

Let us consider for a moment what it is, in the course and constitution of things temporal, which causes thoughtful men most of all to desiderate a supernatural Revelation.

God reveals Himself to us directly in that con-

we must needs conclude, on Mr. Mansel's own showing, that the relation thus established between humanity and human morality, as being fixed by God Himself, is in the exactest harmony with the principles of absolute and eternal morality. And then it follows irresistibly that a violation by His command of human morality, for however brief a period, *while the conditions of humanity remained the same*, would involve a direct violation of the principles of eternal and absolute morality.

Mr. Mansel's argument, in short, comes to this, that as there was a time when human morality *did not exist*,—the time, viz., prior to the creation of "conditioned" humanity,—so its laws may be from time to time *suspended* by the mere will of its Creator; but he strangely fails to see that such suspension could only harmonize with the "divine Principle," in consonance wherewith the relation between humanity and human morality was originally fixed, *by the suspension meanwhile of this so-conditioned humanity itself*.

science which Solomon designates "the candle of the Lord" in the soul.

Directly, too, he reveals Himself in His moral government of the world.

Conscience, indeed, tells us of an absolute rule of Right, and our continuous violations thereof,—reveals an ideal perfection, and our actual and manifold imperfection ; and thus are we led, intuitively, as it were, to hope for some kindlier state in which the pure ideal may haply be realized ; to yearn after One with the power and the will to obtain for us what we know only too well we can never obtain for ourselves,—One with a divine energy to take upon him the burden of our sorrow and our sin, whereby we may look in steadfast faith for better things to come.

This yearning of the heart we turn instinctively to a supernatural Revelation to allay.

But a sterner problem still remains, whose solution it would seem the special function of such a Revelation to supply.

We have, as I said, a natural sense of Right and Wrong. We have learned from experience, both internal and external, that men are happy or unhappy in proportion as they do Right or Wrong. This is undoubtedly the principle of God's moral government, and it coincides precisely with what Conscience tells us ought to be. We also know

that if there be anything *real* in our concrete conscious Being, it is the possession of a certain controlling power over our actions, commonly designated Free-Will, which constitutes, in fact, our Personality. So far the deliverances of Natural Religion coincide exactly with the actual course and constitution of God's moral Government.

But now we are met by a difficulty of the gravest and most distressing kind. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is an enormous—I might almost say an appalling—inequality in the moral and spiritual condition of different individuals here, and this from circumstances lying wholly or partially beyond their own control.

Happiness, indeed, is rigidly and invariably attached to virtuous action ; unhappiness to vice. But this steadfast *principle* operates under the most widely-diversified *conditions* in the case of different individuals ; partly, it may be, from originally-impressed character, partly from the circumstances under which this character may be subsequently moulded and developed.

The original *processus* of imperfect Beings from the Perfect is doubtless a grave difficulty ; but one immeasurably lightened, I think, by the reflection, that to those Beings themselves a state of absolute Perfection is hardly, if at all, distinguished from absolute Nihilism ; and thus, in proportion as the

latter condition is to them inconceivable, in the same proportion may the difficulty involved in their original *processus* be held to be diminished.

Once, however, it is allowed that imperfect Beings have been generated by the Perfect, then that thus-derived moral sense which is of their very essence finds an irreducible difficulty in His "unequal ways" toward the creatures of His hand. For at the very root of human Personality lies the sense of *individual* moral responsibility, and essentially interwoven therewith the moral intuition that all moral agents, as such, stand upon an equal footing before their Creator, or—to adopt the language of Scripture on the subject—that, however their external circumstances may vary, "God is no respecter of persons." So far, indeed, as the so-called "goods of Fortune" are concerned, we are assured on all sides that the inequality in their distribution is neutralized, as a source of happiness, in a hundred different ways. But the most ingenious optimist has never succeeded in discovering an analogous compensation in regard to moral and spiritual blessings. And yet no presentation of experience is more familiar to us than the fact that some are exalted in the way of moral and spiritual advantages (with the consequent facility of obtaining what is even here the only *real* and true happiness), while others are proportionately debased, in a man-

ner abhorrent to the sense of Right implanted in our breast by God Himself.

This, then, constitutes the problem in Natural Religion which must be solved by Revelation, or not at all. And so far as a professing Revelation meets this difficulty, so far will the antecedent probability of its truth, upon *moral*, as distinguished from what may be termed, in some sort, emotional grounds, be established.

If it speaks to man, for example, of a future judgment, in which the steadfast *principle* revealed by Conscience shall be recognized, while the incidental obliquities of *temporal condition and circumstance* shall be ignored, and of *an eternal destiny to be thus determined* ; then, indeed, the internal evidence of its divine origin rests upon an irrefragable moral basis. If, on the other hand, it tells of a future judgment by which the inequalities of Time shall be perpetuated in eternity, then so far from solving, it incalculably intensifies the difficulty ; and the internal probability, upon moral grounds, of its divine origin is proportionately diminished.

These things being so, it is not too much, I suppose, to affirm that such a Theodicy as that of Mr. Mansel,—which fixes an impassable chasm between Finite and Infinite Morality, actually appealing in support of this scepticism to the very

difficulty for which we crave a solution,—with the exegetical Method he derives therefrom, which regards the transcendental Truths of Revelation as “regulative, not speculative,” overthrows rather than sustains the probability, upon moral grounds, that these Truths have been indeed revealed to man by the Moral Governor of the Universe.

And this probability, as I have already stated, it was above all things requisite to establish against the Neologian. For, on reading the Essays, and particularly those of Mr. Wilson and Dr. Williams, I easily perceived that the doctrines of the *literal* interpreter singled out by them as peculiarly offensive to the Moral Sense, and irreconcilable with “the broad and equal justice of God,” were precisely those with a direct and immediate bearing upon the problem in Natural Religion just now referred to. It became, accordingly, an object of paramount importance for me, to prove that the revealed Truths from which these doctrines had been (erroneously, as it seemed to me) deduced, not only did not require the proposed Neologian solvent in order to harmonize them with Morality, and the promptings of natural Piety, but were susceptible, on the contrary, of a *literal* interpretation which, and which alone, could afford a really satisfactory solution for the difficulty in question.

In fine, the Theodicy of the Pantheist, assuming

pure intellect as its basis, repudiates a "Deus Transiens," and the belief in a conscious immortality for the finite Being. Thus divorcing Intellect and Faith, Revelation is to him a mere natural phenomenon, useful, perhaps, in its fiction of future rewards and punishments, for promoting the phenomenal morality of the intellectually feeble, but, with this exception, rather pernicious than otherwise, as pre-supposing a Personal God, and thereby generating a superstitious, anthropomorphic idea of Deity. The exegesis derived by the Neologian from such a Theodicy consistently rejects Miracles and Prophecy, and while loudly protesting, upon moral grounds (!) against the doctrines elicited by the Predestinarian School from the Bible, yet fails to find therein a solution for what constitutes our *real* difficulty in the existing system ; save that in the denial of a *literal* Resurrection and future Retribution, it at least confines to Time the anomaly perpetuated by the Calvinistic Theology to all Eternity.

The Hamiltonian Theodicy, again, pronouncing Deity an absolute contradiction to the Intellect, reposes upon Faith, or Imagination, only. The exegetical Method thence legitimately deduced, equally with the Pantheistic divorcing Intellect and Faith, equally phenomenalizing human morality, supplies no intelligible criterion for dis-

criminating a divine Revelation from the “lying wonders” of Superstition,* and so far from checking, directly tends, by its inherent Pyrrhonism, to

* On the etymology of this important word, Dr. Smith (*Lat. Dict.*) quotes two (equally absurd) guesses of Lactantius; suggesting himself, “that the force of the word lies in the *prefix*, the root having little more than the meaning of the substantive verb; the etymol. signif. being accordingly ‘*a being excessive, excess,*’ and hence in particular, ‘*excess in religion.*’” But it is just this *particular* usage of *superstitio* that requires explanation, and in point of fact this purely religious sense is the only one in which the word occurs. The language of Sostrata in the *Heauton.* of Terence (iv. 1, 36,) suggests the real point of connexion between *superstes* and *superstitiosus*;—“*Ut stultæ et miseræ omnes sumus Religiosæ . . . de digito anulum Detraho. et eum dico ut una cum puellâ exponeret . . . ne expers partis esset de nostris bonis.*” Here the superstition of the poor mother was shewn in her “hoping against hope” that the gods would cause her child to *survive*, in which case the possession of the ring would save the latter from the loss of her patrimony. Compare with this the subsequent words of this *religiosa* to her son: “*Ita mihi atque huic sis superstes*” (Act v. 4, 7). Cf. again in the *Andrian*: “*inceptio est amentium . . . quicquid peperisset, decreverunt tollere,*” (Act i. 3, 13, 14), with Lesbia’s “*Deos quæso, ut sit superstes*” (iii. 2. 7). Also, Plaut. *Asin.* i. 1. 1, 2. These passages establish, I think, the general accuracy of Cicero’s account of the word: “*qui totos dies precabantur . . ut sui sibi liberi superstites essent, superstitiosi sunt appellati.*”

The term “superstitious,” then, is primarily predicable of those who hope for some special interruption, in their own behalf, of the general laws which constitute the *physical* Kosmos, and the propriety of this use of the word will be very generally recognized. But few, I fear, will so readily admit the applicability of the epithet to those who hope for an analogous perturbation of the yet sublimer and more God-like laws of the *moral* Kosmos.

foster the superstitious extravagance of the Supralapsarian ; thus aggravating rather than otherwise the speculative difficulty which craves a supernatural solvent.

Assuming, on the contrary, the finite agency—"the Personal I"—as the very first and steadfast *datum* of REASON, the basis for man of certainty and truth, I have endeavoured to construct thereon a rational Theodicy ; seeking to harmonize the conflicting claims of Intellect and Faith by maintaining on the one hand that conception of "a Personal God" after which Faith intuitively yearns, while guarding the conception on the other hand, by the ascription of intelligible, *homogeneous*, moral attributes, from that superstitious extravagance of anthropomorphism against which Intellect rebels.

And then I have alleged from the Bible what seems to me conclusive proof that its cardinal dogma—THE ATONEMENT—while in singularly harmonious union with such a Theodicy, still further supplies the *literal* interpreter with the only satisfactory solution for that distressing problem in Natural Religion which leads thoughtful men most of all to desiderate a supernatural Revelation.

So much will suffice to explain the general plan of the present work, and my motive in undertaking it.

The views I have maintained throughout upon

the Scriptural doctrine of acceptance with God will run counter, I fear, to those of many faithful servants of Christ, whose earnest piety is far above any praise of mine, to whose maturer judgment I would wish to pay all possible deference.

Let me at least urge in extenuation that the real, distinct Personality of the Infinite Being imperatively demands, as a correlative truth, the real, distinct Personality of the Finite ; and that the latter *essentially consists* in the possession of moral freedom and an initiative causal energy. The one doctrine stands or falls with the other ; and a clear perception of this truth is especially requisite in controverting the Neologian heresy, whose founder peremptorily denies the Personality of the Infinite Being, and rejects with scorn the moral freedom of the Finite.

Now if a Personal God, distinct from nature, is a superstitious vanity, then a supernatural Revelation is (as the Neologian holds) simply an impossibility.

Once more ;—the idealizing Method is recommended as the only mode of disembarassing the Bible of certain doctrines derived therefrom by the literal interpreter, which are offensive to natural piety and the moral judgment ; for its advocates skilfully imply that our choice, as interpreters of Scripture, must lie between Neology and Predesti-

narianism ; and they urge, too, with considerable adroitness, “our extended ethnical knowledge” as a fact which intensely aggravates, in the present day, the moral offence of the Calvinistic Theology.

It must be admitted, I think, that such arguments possess considerable weight. Our extended ‘ethnical knowledge’ has undoubtedly led many at the present day to repeat, as it were, the indignant question of St. Paul: “Is he the God of the Jews only? Is he not also of the Gentiles?” and—what is more important—it cannot be gainsaid that however the extremest supralapsarianism and the feeblest compromise of ‘conditional election to privileges’ may differ in detail, they essentially agree in *principle*.

For if it be held that one single moral agent enjoys by such election to privileges a better chance of obtaining *final* and *eternal* happiness than another *not* so elected, then the *principle* of arbitrary favour is obviously recognized ; and when once the partiality of the Judge, and His “respect of persons,” is thus asserted, the only remaining distinction between the two extreme theories is one of degree, and not of kind. Nor do I hesitate to add that, under such circumstances, the supralapsarian extreme would naturally commend itself to an

ingenuous interpreter, if only on account of its uncompromising candour and logical consistency.

Now if supralapsarianism is true in *principle*, then not only is man's moral nature (as the Pantheist holds) a sheer illusion, and by consequence the Personality of God, but the antecedent probability, upon moral grounds, of a supernatural Revelation of transcendental truths is plainly overthrown; for such a Revelation to a Being whose moral agency is a delusion, whose eternal destiny is irrevocably fixed, so far from being *à priori probable*, would be simply absurd.

That I have myself succeeded in establishing upon Scriptural evidence, and in the way of literal interpretation, an Election theory distinct in principle from the Supralapsarian, and in thus neutralizing—and far more than neutralizing—the cavils of the Neologian, it would ill become me to affirm.

Let me hope however, that even those most strongly predisposed in favour of the Supralapsarian *principle*, if they take any notice of my work, will at least candidly examine the evidence alleged, and assign due weight to the exigencies of my Polemic; remembering, moreover, that I have written, *not* for men enjoying St. Anselm's enviable faculty of subjugating Intellect unreservedly to

Faith, but for “the many unquiet souls who seek—now more than ever—an answer, solution or neutralization for the difficulty involved in certain human statements and hypotheses respecting the dealings of God with mankind.”

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LECTURE I.

ACTS, x. 34, 35.

“ Then Peter opened his mouth and said, Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him.”

MY object in the following course of Lectures is to ascertain the scriptural doctrine of acceptance with God, as indicated, not so much in the language employed by the sacred writers, as in the historical record that has been left us of the earliest diffusion of Gospel truth among the Gentiles.

I appeal the rather to the latter criterion, because the most incompatible theories have been ably maintained, as we know, upon this much-vexed question, by advocates equally deriving their proofs from the language of inspiration.⁽¹⁾

Hence a reference to recorded facts may perhaps lead to a less equivocal determination of the great point at issue.

We read in the Acts of the Apostles of an ever-

memorable promulgation of the Gospel, accompanied by a miraculous effusion of the Spirit, on the day of Pentecost. We have also, in the same Book, a detailed account of St. Paul's mission to the Gentiles, under the immediate guidance of the Holy Ghost.⁽²⁾ Now if we find, as a matter of fact, in the ordering of these events, a fixed principle of selection to have been adopted ;—if we find a certain body of men distinguishable from the other Gentiles by no doubtful characteristics to have been chosen, to the almost exclusion of the rest, to hear from the lips of those who had themselves seen the risen Lord the glad tidings of salvation ;—we shall be in a better position, I think, after a careful examination into these characteristics, to apprehend the full and decisive import of St. Peter's words—words spoken under peculiarly solemn and momentous circumstances :—"Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons, but in every nation he that feareth Him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with Him."

Of the importance, in the existing state of theological controversy, of clear and satisfying conceptions upon a topic such as this, much need not be said ; intimately associated as it is with the deeper truths of our spiritual organism, and underlying the profoundest speculations of the human soul.

There is a period—need I avow it ?—in the life of thoughtful men, when they too, like the "grand old gardener" in the infancy of time, are sore

tempted to shake off the trammels of authority, and gather for themselves the fruit of the tree of knowledge ; there comes an hour when the soul would soar thus unfettered to some lonelier height, from whence to gaze apart upon the things of earth and heaven ; would fain penetrate some inner shrine, wherein to see revealed the mysteries of both.

Whence have we come, and whither do we go ? What certain knowledge have we of ourselves—the limits and manifold relations of our being, its possible origin, its probable destiny ? Where shall we find the regulative principle of what men term Nature ? How reconcile that lavish care of hers for the species with her seeming ruthlessness toward the individual ? How elicit from her tremendous discords the hidden law of harmony ?

And finally as to the Being of beings. How may we hope to determine *His* precise relation to that so-called nature and humanity ? Is **THE ABSOLUTE** indeed impersonal—an immanent cause, consubstantial with the universe—a blind necessity, of which all finite things are again the necessary development—in human thought at length attaining to self-consciousness and reality ?

Or may we, on the other hand, apprehend in Him that scorn and bye-word of more than one great philosophical school—a Personal God ?

At no former period, I believe, have speculations such as these been associated in so many minds with the great question of a *supernatural* Revela-

tion ; never before have so many recognized the vital connexion subsisting in particular between this question and the last and loftiest of all such speculations—that which strives to ascertain the true nature and relations of the Supreme Being.

After what fashion the Idealism of Germany attempts the solution of this awful problem—with what an unflinching boldness she proposes to herself to construct a Philosophy of the Absolute, scientifically to define the exact relation of man and nature to the Infinite, you are no doubt well aware. But it may not be amiss to bring under your notice now the essential affinities of her daring constructions with that dangerous heresy, of late years promulgated amongst ourselves, which, under whatever specious title—the new Science—the science of the Idea—rational exegesis—philosophical criticism—tends insidiously to undermine the very foundations of a preternatural Revelation, spreading, in Theology's sacred name, a subtle metaphysical snare for the feet of speculative men.

It is, indeed, a trite remark, that men are apt to over-estimate the importance of the political or religious movements of their own times ; and still I cannot charge myself with exaggeration in characterizing the heresy just referred to as dangerous and insidious, nor yet in describing the theological horizon as at present more than ordinarily overcast. In past conflicts THE CHURCH, as a rule, presented an united and imposing front against

the assaults of her numerous enemies. In the present day, some of her most formidable foes may well be described as those of her own household ; and when we find the ablest amongst them applying the principles, and adopting the very language of a pantheistic philosophy, in dealing with the most sacred truths of our religion—when we find, for example, their heritage of immortality denied by one to the vast majority of Adam's sons ; thought pronounced by another to be consubstantial with the eternal I AM ; its law the source wherein to discover the ultimate basis and bond of coherence of the world—it becomes evident at once that our controversy with such antagonists cannot be dissociated from the subtleties of German Idealism, and thus ultimately involves the question of belief in a Personal God ; in a word, that if Neology is to be successfully grappled with, this topic must constitute, as it were, the arena of the conflict.⁽³⁾

And this result, after all, is no more than its genealogy would have led us to anticipate.

In the system of him who first formally developed it from the Hegelian Philosophy, "God is not a person, by the side of, and above other persons ; but the eternal movement of universal existence, which is only realized and objectified in the subject."⁴⁾ From this it is quite plain that Butler's postulate can no longer be allowed to pass unchallenged. He is indeed late-learned in controversy who supposes himself at liberty to assume

the existence of a God distinct from creation ; in fact it is in order to get rid of this "childish superstition" that Hegel himself so strongly recommends the study of Spinoza to the neophyte, as an indispensable *καθαρισμός* to initiation in the loftier truths of his philosophy. "Thought," he tells us, "must absolutely elevate itself to the level of Spinozism, before rising higher again. Would you be philosophers, begin by being Spinozists. You can do nothing without that. It is necessary, before all, to bathe in that sublime æther of the sole, universal and impersonal substance, where the soul becomes purified from all particularity, and rejects all, absolutely all, which it has hitherto believed true—you must have arrived at that negation which is the emancipation of the mind."⁽⁵⁾

Spinoza's conception, then, regarding the Supreme Being, however reluctantly the less advanced disciples of the school may admit the fact, must unquestionably be laid down as the philosophic basis, upon the stability of which the Neologian Theology ultimately rests.

And desiring as I do to join issue now with the advocates of Neology, my first effort, if I would not "fight as one who beats the air," must needs be to examine patiently the Theodicy of Spinoza and his followers, with a view to test its true scientific value ; and should I succeed, in the first instance, in demonstrating the greater reasonableness, to say no more, of an intelligent belief in the personality

of God, it will still remain for me to show that the teaching of His holy Word as to the grounds of man's acceptance in His sight, fully accords with those conclusions regarding His nature and attributes at which, by the joint aid of Reason and Experience, I had already arrived.

Nor will this—the more immediate result which I desire in the present course of Lectures to establish—be found alien in anywise to my controversy with the Neologian.

For even a cursory perusal of those treatises to which I adverted above will enable us to see that the Essayists recommend their “philosophical exegesis” by a constant reference to the Calvinistic theology; professing to relieve Revelation, as reflected therein, of its alleged antagonism to natural piety, to a higher morality, and to experience, by the aid of a Neological interpretation, and substantiating all along the necessity for such relief by the assumption—rather implied as unquestionable than stated in so many words—that in Calvinism, or some illogical modification of it, is to be found the Biblical creed of the Reformed Churches in the present day.⁽⁶⁾

Now it must be fairly conceded that this assumption is by no means an unfounded one, and that numbers even of our own clergy propound, with more or less emphasis, either purely Calvinistic views, or what, if rigorously tested, we can hardly pronounce radically distinguishable from them;

and I myself have little doubt that to the wide diffusion of this theology, more than to any other cause, is to be attributed that reactionary movement which, in protesting against the absolute enslavement of Intellect, now strives unduly to exalt her authority at the expense of Faith.⁽⁷⁾

But however this may be, I may at least affirm that so far as I can succeed in sustaining, in the way of strictly *literal* interpretation, a theory of man's acceptance with God opposed to that of the Calvinistic school, and in proportionate harmony with the conclusions of sober Reason as to His nature, and with the analogies moreover of His ordinary dealings with man, as indicated by actual experience, to the same extent I must necessarily invalidate the Neologian position that in a "philosophical exegesis" alone is to be found the "indifference point,"—as a disciple of Schelling might term it,—of Reason and Revelation.

And I am the more anxious, as a believer in the transcendental truths of Revelation, to refute this position of the Neologian upon rational principles, because it cannot be gainsaid that the Calvinist, like the Ultramontane, is in a manner bound by the necessities of his creed to consider Intellect the natural enemy of Faith, his pivot-doctrine of arbitrary election and arbitrary reprobation postulating the absolute incongruity of the divine and the human conception of Right ; now if we are pledged as *literal* interpreters to such a dogma as this, then

in controverting the Neologian we must fling aside our most serviceable weapon ; for, as the Moral Sense is of the very essence of personality, in admitting that Sense to be heterogeneous in God and man we abandon the *genuine basis* of our belief in a Personal or anthropomorphic God, and our antagonist consequently remains upon this, the fundamental point of the entire controversy, in undisturbed possession of the field.⁽⁸⁾

Let me here anticipate an objection which will, doubtless, suggest itself to many of my hearers, namely—that no believer in Revelation can hesitate in recognizing the Personality of God. Now, setting aside for a moment the vicious circle involved in this—a miraculous Revelation obviously pre-supposing a Personal God, as grace pre-supposes nature—this difficulty still remains, that the Neologian also accepts Revelation after a fashion, and the Pantheist professes to believe in God. The point at issue is the nature of that God, and *by implication, the character of the revelation.*⁽⁹⁾

Will Spinoza admit the charge of Atheism? Hear his own vaunting words—"Explicui naturam Dei." What, again, says the logic of Fichte? "Deum creavi." What the Hegelian idea? "Deus sum."

All discussion with the Neologian apart from this question is but futile skirmishing.

The Revelation is there; how are we to interpret it? Does it contain a *superhuman* element? Are

the miracles it records, the transcendental truths it announces, really preternatural, or to be reduced, on the other hand, by an idealizing process, to the sphere of the natural? The solution of these problems involves the anterior question:—Is the Perfect Being truly no more than an impersonal order of nature, attaining His highest development in man; if which be so, miracles and prophecy are simply impossible; or is He a personal, *i. e.*, as our opponents derisively express it, an anthropomorphic God?

To resume—We shall see by and by that it was a mystic desire to divest JEHOVAH of anthropomorphisms—a weak attempt to deny to man all positive knowledge of His attributes, and yet retain a belief in His distinct personality—that probably first suggested the sterner metaphysic of Spinoza.

And thus are we again warned of the grave difficulties by which, in the present controversy, the Calvinistic theology is embarrassed.

So long as the advocate of that theology had to contend merely with the inordinate Pelagianism of the Jesuit, or the self-sufficient ethics of the Arian, or the natural piety of the remonstrant Arminian, *his* mystic negation of the Divine attributes was comparatively of little moment; both antagonists still recognized a personal God; and even in controverting that vulgar Atheism which raised its impious front so boldly in the eighteenth century, the *reductio ad absurdum* was effectively supplied, according to the form which Atheism assumed, by

the Socratic proof, suppose, from final causes, or the Peripatetic from the *primum mobile*, or the ontological of St. Anselm—the broad fact of the existence of a God being the point at issue, His true nature a matter of secondary moment,—but in the present controversy the latter is the question of primary and paramount importance, with its inseparable adjuncts, the personal, individual responsibility of man, and his hope of a personal, individual, immortality in the world beyond the grave.⁽¹⁰⁾

We cannot now therefore play fast and loose with this great question. If any cherish as their dearest treasure the rational belief in a Personal God, now, more than ever, must they jealously maintain that kindred faith in the homogeneity of His moral attributes with those of man, apart from which the very conception itself of a Personal God is for man impossible and absurd.

“To be the cause of the universe,” argues the Pantheist, “God must be either its transitive or its immanent cause; for if he does not form all things *out of himself, i. e.,* as a transitive cause, he must form them *within* himself, and must consequently be the *causa immanens* of the universe. But if God, as you admit, is infinite and absolute, then outside of him nothing can exist, or be conceived to exist; the very words ‘outside God’ involve a contradiction. He must, therefore, be regarded as an immanent cause, inseparable from its effects,

“which of course destroys, at once and for ever,
“your anthropomorphic conception of a personal
“God, distinct from creation.”

Such appears to be, when compressed within the narrowest compass, the final conclusion of a too prevalent philosophy upon this subject ; and even this simple statement of the doctrine suffices to show the dangerous character of a method of Biblical hermeneutics, which, however commendable in other respects, is yet constrained hopelessly to distort the “anthropomorphic conception of a personal God” precisely in that cardinal point—the free allegiance to an absolute standard of Right—upon which the typical human personality depends.⁽¹¹⁾

And hardly less perilous, I would here observe, appear to me the conclusions of a philosophical school which, with a scepticism surpassing that of Kant, denies to Reason, whether practical or speculative, the ontological knowledge of her truest object ; discharging of all life and reality man’s conception of the Infinite, and thus reducing the rational idea of God to an empty abstraction,—alike incapable of being verified or denied—a vain and shadowy illusion, which vanishes or ever it is grasped by human thought.

In a word, if men are told by the popular theologian, on the one hand, that the revelations of the Bible regarding their eternal destinies involve the surrender of all homogeneous relation between the divine and the human standard of right, and by

the philosopher who claims to be orthodox, on the other, not only that human and divine morality differ thus *in kind*, but also that the rational idea of the Infinite is for the finite being a sheer impossibility, that God is to man a poetic symbol merely, apprehended it may be with more or less success by Faith or Imagination, but to Reason absolutely inaccessible ; the inevitable result will be, I fear, an increased absorption of our more consecutive thinkers either into that “ Church beyond the mountains” which is consistent at least in her mystic degradation alike of human Reason and her priest-created God, or still more probably into that alluring Idealism which derides as superstitious and irrational the doctrine of a personal Creator, whose stealthier acolyte, Neology, would even now extirpate, as a kindred superstition, the belief in those two essential constituents of a preternatural Revelation—Miracle and Prophecy.⁽¹²⁾

For the full and exhaustive refutation of the Neologian heresy, then, it would seem desirable to investigate the modern Pantheistic construction which gave it birth, so far at least as may enable me to detect, through an exposure of the radical vice in the Theodicy of that philosophy, the congenital weakness of its offspring, and to fortify and strengthen in the same degree what has been not inaptly designated “the preambles of our faith” ; and having secured for myself in the first instance this important vantage-ground, I shall approach in

the next place my more immediate subject, with a view to demonstrate, constructively, that the exegesis of the Neologian is as unnecessary for the true and reasonable interpretation of the Bible, as it had been already proved, refutatively, under its philosophic aspect, irrational and unsound.⁽¹³⁾

PANTHEISM has been defined by a distinguished disciple of the Hamiltonian philosophy to be "the system which denies the existence of the Finite, as Atheism rejects the Infinite."⁽¹⁴⁾ But even though we should hesitatingly admit the accuracy of such a definition in reference to some of the ancient schools, it would be impossible to accept it as a correct representation of the ambitious pretensions of Pantheism in the hands of its modern exponents.

More than two thousand years have rolled away since Heraclitus mournfully said, "We cannot bathe twice in the same stream; everything becomes, nothing remains."

The modern Pantheist reflects after the same fashion upon the problem of Being, and the last results of physical science confirm for him, with an overwhelming power, the dictum of the Ephesian philosopher.

He knows that it is a mere question of time between the steadfast rigour of the ancient hills and the delicatest tracery of cloud, now quivering athwart the ætherial deeps. He knows that the

iron-ribbed rock may even by man be prematurely dissolved—the very iron evaporated in particles impalpable to the sense as Thought itself. He feels above him, and around, the pressure of a law—a sequence—a fixed succession—call it by what name you will, it matters little while the *power* is there—from which nothing can escape, nay, in the very richest types of being making itself most keenly felt; a law of pitiless change, of remorseless death—quenching as in mockery the starry light of intellect—blighting with hideous touch the fairest of heart-treasures;—a law of exuberant life and lavish growth—eliciting from the very loathsomeness of decay forms of unutterable and tenderest beauty—rekindling the torch of Thought.

And now, pondering upon these things, he hears as it were upon the air the sweeping robes of the far-striding Necessity; in all this tragic sport with frail humanity he seems to listen to her voice repeating evermore, “Such are the trophies of my immemorial sway, and shalt thou be delivered?”

Let him then regard himself as but a transient phase of necessary being, a momentary ripple thrown up by the deep immanent cause upon the river of life. But a question still remains. The fundamental law of his own mind, that mind which alone enabled him to reflect upon these things, he finds to be a certain unific principle which will not rest content with such a solution. He has seen, indeed, and thought upon “The Many,” surging,

as some mighty ocean, with a fathomless and infinite flow ; where shall he find " The One ?"⁽¹⁵⁾

It is in no mere arbitrary denial of the Finite, but in the attempt to give a scientific solution of this venerable problem—to unify the Many and the One—to combine the still distinguished Finite with the Infinite—that we must seek for the essential characteristic of modern Pantheism.⁽¹⁶⁾

For it is of little use to accept the dogma of Parmenides, that Being is one and unchanging, variety a vain imagination ; to repeat the vaunt of Zeno, that all may be explained, if but the One be given. The problem is to reduce the two to scientific unity.

We may, indeed, like one of old, gazing with mystic eye upon the illimitable heaven, declare, and for the moment haply believe, " The One" to be God, all finite things a delusion. But against this the real thinking self forthwith rebels with a force we cannot overcome.⁽¹⁷⁾

Neither, again, can we rest satisfied with the Thalesian exclusion of the Infinite. This also contradicts the testimony of an internal witness, which will not be gainsaid—of a real, permanent self, relative and limited no doubt, but the very consciousness of which is yet given in indissoluble correlation with the Absolute.⁽¹⁸⁾

And if it were allowed me here to appeal to another tribunal, less severely scientific it may be, yet no less authoritatively true, I might further

urge that such a solution would fain deaden a yearning of the soul, which no mere effort of the intellect can wholly stifle, which even amid sense-phenomena themselves continually asserts its power. The ocean melting into the far horizon-cloud—the star into the illimitable chasms of the dim purple sky—the strange thrill, too, of certain musical harmonies, vibrating as it were to the full key note of the Universe—all these excite emotions pleasurable indeed, yet close allied to pain. Why I cannot tell, save that to the exiled soul they present unsatisfying symbols—faint memories, as a Platonist might say,—of that INFINITE, to which intuitively she feels herself akin.⁽¹⁹⁾

Nay, even from the disciples of the Positive Philosophy we may extort a reluctant evidence to the same effect. For though recognising nothing but empiric facts and laws, though considering “man’s noblest work to consist in developing the resources of the earth, man’s residence,” and regarding all ideas of a purely theological origin as chimerical, this school does not venture to deny, though declining to affirm, the existence of aught beyond the sphere of sense.⁽²⁰⁾

Here, then, is the problem which the Pantheist proposes to himself.

While true to the “primary beliefs” he can neither with the mystic deny the reality of the Finite, nor with the atheist the reality of the Infinite. Still less can he admit, with the Dualist or the Manichee,

their independent co-existence. His solution is sought in the attempted fusion of the two.

He starts with Being—abstract, undetermined substance. He flatters himself that he can apprehend this abstract essence, with the law of its development, and that, too, under a two-fold aspect; on the one side the *Natura naturans*, God as eternally and infinitely self-evolved in Nature; on the other, the *Natura naturata*, Nature as necessarily involved in and evolved by God.⁽²¹⁾

This is the true formula of modern Pantheism; the necessary and eternal consubstantiality of the Infinite and the Finite, of God and Nature; a principle first scientifically laid down by Spinoza, and attaining its highest elaboration—though hardly more than this,—beneath the intenser grasp of Fichte, and Schelling, and Hegel.

We have already seen, indeed, with what emphatic candour Hegel accepts Spinoza's theory as the ground-work of his own philosophy.

Before discussing that theory, however, it will be desirable to make a short digression in order to ascertain its author's views regarding inspiration also, and how far he was indebted for both to the rationalism of the great Rabbi Maimonides. For Colerus tells us that his first studies were the Hebrew language and the Bible, and the professed object of his earlier work—the celebrated *Tractatus*—was to define the relations of Faith and Science.⁽²²⁾

Such an investigation, moreover, will be anything but inappropriate to my proposed task ; both because there is hardly a sceptical difficulty put forward by the Essayists which has not been already far more ably handled in the *Tractatus* ; and also because their mode of dealing with miracle and prophecy exhibits the strongest affinities with that of Maimonides, while the method of the latter confessedly rests upon a conception of the Supreme Being only too legitimately developed in the *Ethica* of Spinoza into “an impersonal order of Nature.”⁽²³⁾

And here, let me observe in passing, we have a striking instance of those curious cycles which not rarely recur in the history of human thought. For as the metaphysics of Spinoza, primarily suggested by a system of Biblical hermeneutics, became in its turn the acknowledged basis of the modern Idealism of Germany, so from the latter has been rigorously developed by Strauss an exegetical method exhibiting the most marked resemblance both in principle and tendency to that very system.

Let us glance then, for a moment, at this rationalizing system (of which the famous Rabbi may fairly be described as the first formal exponent) and the Theodicy upon which it rests.⁽²⁴⁾

Rebelling against the pitiful drivelling and critical imbecility of the Jewish Doctors, Maimonides sought at all hazards to purify of anthropomorphisms the God of Revelation.

Taking the phrase "Let us make man in our image" as the basis of his theory, and assuming the word "image" to refer not to any exterior, sensible shape, but to the specific form of Deity, and asserting that specific form to be "Reason," he derives from such premisses conclusions which may be formally expressed as follows :—

i. Revelation can contain no statement irreconcilable with Reason.

ii. Any apparent antagonisms must be regarded as hyperboles, allegories, or symbols, and reduced to congruity by a rational interpretation.

iii. The measure of a commentator's success will be in direct proportion to his moral and intellectual power.

The Moré Neboukim thus agreed as to its *object* with the Summa Theologiæ, but the process was precisely reversed ; for with Maimonides the human wisdom constitutes the standard to which the Divine (i. e. the Bible) must be reduced.

This will appear more clearly from the philosophic theory of prophecy which he first attempted to lay down.

He defines prophecy to be "a divine emanation, influencing, through the medium of the 'Active Intelligence,' the human imagination." He thus, in a certain sense acknowledges its divine origin, and also regards it as perhaps the highest perfection attainable by man. But let us not be misled by these admissions. For this emanation, communicated by the pantheistic "Active Intelligence," is

with him only another name for the highest *natural* excitement of the imaginative faculty, and the true prophetic result he defines to be unattainable without the further purely natural co-efficients, integrity and intellectual power.

How completely, in fact, he reduces prophecy to what a modern Essayist would designate "an expression of devout reason," is placed beyond all doubt by the dogma that "if the Active Intelligence encounters a strong reason and a weak imagination, the result will be a philosopher, if the conditions be reversed, a magician or a false prophet." While to the enquiry : "Does a prophet see and hear God himself?" he answers almost with a sneer : "No ; the force of *imagination* cannot go so far as that."

And this view is in exact accordance with the exegetical result of his analysis of inspiration.

For imagination being the *characteristic* gift of the prophets, the commentator must bear in mind that its possessors may have been at times unduly excited by mental emotion, and must consequently apply the severe calmness of the philosopher to the reduction of their exuberant allegory ; dealing similarly of course with the Biblical record of events which seem to contradict the ordinary course of Nature ; when for example, he reads that God had prepared a great fish to swallow up Jonah, he must understand simply of the dictates of hunger what the prophet describes as the immediate act of God.

Now in adopting this rationalistic method Maimonides sought not, I am sure, to degrade the Scriptures; his object was to exalt the God of whom the prophets spake to a loftier height than their phraseology permitted—in his opinion—if *literally* understood.

The ideal standard to which that phraseology must be raised came not indeed within the intellectual grasp of ordinary men, but of those alone who by philosophy, by integrity and purity, had approached nearest to the divine model, and were thus enabled to reject as superstitious anything anthropomorphic in the scriptural representation of Jehovah.

And his guide in this “Supreme Philosophy” was Aristotle. Not indeed the Aristotle who describes Deity as the ever-active *Nόησις*, instinct with life and infinite perfections, but Aristotle as taught by Ibn-Sina, as interpreted and transformed by Plotinus.⁽²⁵⁾

Yielding to this mystic influence, Maimonides denies the possibility of any analogy between the moral attributes of God and man, or admits the existence of the divine attributes only in that *negative* sense recognized by the Hamiltonian school. Jehovah, he states, may perhaps be defined as not unholy, not unrighteous, not unmerciful, but nothing can be more impious, he too would say, than to go further than this, nothing more absurd than for man “to attempt to measure with his puny

standard the infinite justice of God ;" and the only fitting worship of that God is to be found, he thinks, in the profounder depths of inarticulate silence.⁽²⁶⁾

But however worthy the motive of Maimonides may have been, his Theosophy contained within it the fruitful germs of evil ; and I must endeavour, in the next place, to trace the legitimate development of these germs by Spinoza—one of the purest and keenest intellects that ever appeared on earth.

No one, indeed, who carefully studies the *Tractatus* can agree with Cousin and Saisset in describing Spinoza as a professed disciple of Maimonides. On the contrary, he himself characterizes his method as useless, noxious, and absurd.⁽²⁷⁾

But while speaking thus harshly, and I think ungratefully, of Maimonides, it is quite clear that however he may quarrel with his *conclusions*, he adopts his *premises* most unreservedly.

Maimonides admitted the discrepancy of Reason and Revelation, and sought to harmonize them by a rationalistic interpretation. Another celebrated Rabbi, Judah Alpakhar, rushed, Spinoza tells us, into the opposite extreme—laying down that whatever Scripture asserts dogmatically must be absolutely true, and that the vindication by metaphor and allegory must only be employed in *harmonizing Scripture with itself*, while Reason, if antagonistic, must in every case be subordinated to Revelation.

Spinoza agrees with Alpakhar that Scripture is to be interpreted by itself ; i. e., that its most

general statements, as in the case of any other book, should be collected in the first instance, so as to constitute a standard to which particular statements, if contradictory, must be reduced, allowance being made for the different times and circumstances under which the latter may have been enunciated ; he agrees too with Maimonides that very many statements in Scripture are at variance with reason ; but having before severely scrutinized the evidence upon which the Sacred Books had been received by the Jews, he rejects with indignant scorn the inference of Alpakhar that reason, “the greatest of gifts, the divine light, should be subjected to the dead letter which human malice may have corrupted”—thus he designates the canonical books—and with hardly less energy dissents from the solution advocated by Maimonides that Revelation should be brought into conformity with Reason by a rationalistic interpretation.⁽²⁸⁾

He agrees with Maimonides in regarding the imaginative faculty as the peculiar characteristic of the prophets, but he denies them superior intelligence. He agrees with Maimonides in attributing the miracles of Scripture to purely natural causes, and quotes Moses himself to shew that “signs” are no sufficient proof of the divine inspiration of a prophet ; but instead of a systematic attempt to reconcile them with physical laws by a figurative interpretation, he clearly implies that the inspired authors may have been themselves fully convinced

of their reality ; and while admitting that such alleged deviations from the established harmony of nature were useful in their way for impressing the ignorant with a pious awe, he insists that for the educated they would *disprove*, rather than otherwise, the existence of God. He agrees with Maimonides—and here we reach the kernel of the whole argument—that the anthropomorphisms of the miracle-working God of the Bible are at variance with a rational conception of Deity, but instead of calling in the aid of allegory and symbol he declares unhesitatingly that the sacred authors here also spoke in the way best calculated, no doubt, to impress the feeble intellects of the vulgar, but in irreconcilable antagonism to Truth.⁽²⁹⁾

The whole scope of the Tractatus he assures us (almost in the very words of Hamilton), is to prove that Faith and Science have two distinct spheres, and objects equally distinct ;—that of Science, Truth ; that of Faith, obedience. He regards Philosophy and Theology as essentially incongruous ; neither being subordinate to the other, each absolute in its own domain. Revelation he admits is necessary and most desirable, because reason cannot prove for all men the duty of *obedience to Nature's laws*, few indeed being capable of virtuous habits under the sole guidance of reason ; but here its value ends.⁽³⁰⁾

As for transcendental truths, he seems to consider them scarce worthy of serious discussion.

That anything should be *above* reason being obviously absurd, all scriptural dogmas of this character must be surrendered in despair. The sole function of Revelation is to give a sort of sanction to the antecedent duties of Justice and Charity ; its language, the better to serve this end, is "accommodated to the preconceived opinions and superstitions of the vulgar," but to regard it as the revealer of *Truth*, whether philosophical or transcendental, is an error resulting from a total misconception both of its origin and object.⁽³¹⁾

And now it is time to enquire what that *Truth* is which Philosophy alone can teach, which can only be discovered by accident, if at all, in the inspired volume. Beyond all question it consists for Spinoza in "the rational conception of Deity," in that Theodicy whose pregnant germs may be detected in the *Tractatus*, but which obtained in the *Ethica* its full scientific development.

It is an easy thing for an ardent admirer of the former work to declare his reluctance "to ship in the brain-built bark which carries Spinoza's metaphysical freight," but in the case of so consecutive a thinker eclecticism of this kind is impossible.⁽³²⁾

"Once grant his premisses," we may say with Coleridge, "and his deduction is a chain of adamant ;" and among the most rigidly-welded links of that chain is the connexion of his Biblical Hermeneutics with his Theodicy ; or rather—to speak with more precision—the latter constitutes the first

link, from which all his conclusions, whether metaphysical or exegetical, may be rigorously deduced.

It is difficult enough, I allow, to ascertain his own views as to the *authority* of Scripture as a rule of life ; it has been objected, for example, by a recent reviewer of the Tractatus, that while he broadly asserts miracles to be an impossibility, he yet seems to admit that the Israelites heard a *vera vox* on Mount Sinai. I have myself also noticed an inconsistency in his insisting on the *necessity* of Scripture as a means for the promotion of religion and virtue, while asserting elsewhere that the criterion of the truth of such and such passages is their accordance with the natural principles of justice and charity, and that the reality of the prophet's inspiration is to be determined, partly indeed by the signs which he wrought, but ultimately by his integrity and piety.⁽³³⁾

But the more attentively I study Spinoza, the more clearly I perceive that the clue to the solution of these discrepancies in so logical a thinker is to be found in the sharp distinction he ever puts between the vulgar and the learned. The former were to be rendered obedient by a belief in special providences, miraculous interpositions, and prophetic inspiration, and he seems to have recognized in the Bible generally a sort of natural agency for the production of such results, regarding in a kindred light the special miracles and prophecies it contains ; and hence the canon he lays down in

accepting one portion of Alpakhar's theory : " Dico "methodum interpretandi Scripturam *haud differre* "a *methodo interpretandi Naturam*, sed cum ea "prorsus convenire;" it was a natural phenomenon in short, corresponding to the natural superstition of the "profanum vulgus," to whom no doubt the sound heard on Mount Sinai was, to all intents and purposes, a *vera vox* ; the learned, on the other hand, required no such adventitious aid ; the sons of philosophy stood upon a height from whence they might look down with calm and critical indifference upon the Bible, and those simple folk whose spiritual wants it served, and this far and lonely Temple was attainable by those, and only those, who had "a soul to comprehend "the Universe," "to *know*, with an adequate knowledge, the infinite and eternal essence of God !"⁽³⁴⁾

Maimonides had pointed out the incongruities of reason and Revelation ; but in what did they consist ? Mainly in the Bible's anthropomorphic symbolism of Deity. He therefore divested the Supreme Being of all positive attributes, and applied a 'verifying faculty' to those scriptural statements which militated against such an hypothesis.

This we may regard as in some sort an intermediate condition—a transition stage—represented in our own day under one aspect by the rationalism of the Essayists, and their scarce-disguised contempt for miracle and prophecy ; under another by that

school which declares that "of the Nature and Attributes of God, philosophy can tell us nothing," and again, by the theology which represents the fundamental attribute of Justice in the Divine Personality as hopelessly antagonistic to its conception by man.⁽³⁵⁾

The ultimate stage was attained by the inexorable logic of Spinoza.

It is a degradation, argued Maimonides, to regard Jehovah as just or good according to the human standard ; to describe Him as interfering supernaturally in the affairs of man is irrational. To human reason He is at best a negation—an abstraction—to be worshipped by a mystic silence—dwelling in clouds and thick darkness—inscrutable, unknown.⁽³⁶⁾

"Deity" Spinoza would reply, "may well be "invested with attributes, may work miracles, may "inspire the prophets, in the opinion of the vulgar. "His corresponding representations in the Sacred "Books are admirably adapted to inspire with "pious dread illiterate minds ; but for one like "Maimonides, who affects philosophy, to attempt "to harmonise such representations with reason is "noxious and absurd ; noxious, because it may "weaken the superstitious yet salutary faith of the "vulgar ; absurd, because such a Theodicy is *irreconcilable with Truth*."⁽³⁷⁾

"To the Philosopher Deity is not unknown. "Such knowledge is for him piety, for him charity

"and justice. It is Life and Love, yea and an Im-
 "mortality which none beside can ever share.
 "Thought and Being are One. The soul which
 "truly thinks—the soul which *knows*—possesses
 "the divine joy, which only is real being. All that
 "is corporeal is but an image of the true; all that
 "is sensuous is fleeting and frail; the human affec-
 "tions are a fond illusion; the human will a
 "mockery. A God apart from creation,—a God
 "possessed in any intelligible sense of distinct
 "thought, of feeling or emotion, of moral attribute
 "—a God in whom freedom and necessity are not
 "synonymous—a *Personal God*, in short, is but a
 "feeble symbol, generated by Faith, sustained by
 "superstition;—the pure ideas of the soul, they
 "are of the very essence of Deity—they of a re-
 "splendent glory—immutable—imperishable—in
 "one word, God."⁽³³⁾

Here then we have arrived at the true goal of Neology—thus do we detect its genuine affinities, its legitimate conclusion.

"*Interpret the Scriptures*," writes one of its English advocates with all possible emphasis, "*like any other book*;" and again: "It may hereafter appear as natural to the majority of mankind to see the providence of God in the order of the world, as it once was to appeal to interruptions of it."
 "Θαύματα μόροις" another sympathetically suggests, while a third assures us that "the wise . . . would
 "not expect the re-appearance in another world,

“for any purpose, of a Thersites or an Hyperbolos,
 “—social and poetical justice had been sufficiently
 “done on them.”⁽³⁹⁾

It were needless to multiply quotations. What I said above I now repeat, that whoever desires to see the cavils of our modern Neologians expressed in a compendious form and with a candid force had better peruse the *Tractatus*—whoever seeks to ascertain the scientific basis upon which their method rests will find it in the theosophic construction of the *Ethica*.

To that construction I hope in my next Lecture to invite your attention ; at present I will only observe, by way of summary, that Maimonides, the first propounder of a “rational exegesis,” when he had divested Jehovah of all intelligible personal attributes still idly endeavoured to maintain His distinct Personality ; that this illusive phantom was speedily dissolved by the rigorous analysis of Spinoza into that ‘*Natura naturans*,’—that ‘immanent cause, inseparable from its effects’—that “shadow of the idol of his thought”—to which the Pantheist bows down.

And let me add just one observation more. For one who bears these facts in mind it is impossible not to perceive the support unwittingly afforded to the Neologian heresy by the Philosophy which, in this our day, laying down, as Spinoza did, two essentially distinct spheres for Reason and Faith, denies to the finite being all real knowledge even

of the attributes of the Infinite—by the congenial Theology which can only sustain its fundamental doctrine upon the hypothesis that the epithets just, merciful and righteous, predicated of the Supreme Being in the Book of Revelation, are absolutely incognizable by man.

LECTURE II.

ST. JOHN, i. 1.

“ In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”

WHEN the hero of Goethe's great poem is about to be allured by that subtle Spirit who beguiled our first parents with the promise “ Ye shall be as gods,” he is described by the poet, with characteristic skill, as engaged in an attempt to elicit the esoteric meaning of the words I have just read :—

“ Strong impulse sways me to translate the text
“ Of that most holy book, with honest feeling,
“ In the loved language of my native land,
“ The mysteries of heavenly truth revealing.”⁽¹⁾

The Neologist finds in the same words, when read by the light of the Hegelian philosophy, an adequate solution for all mysteries, proclaiming to the human race, not “ Ye shall be as Gods,” but “ Ye are very God.”

From its intimate affinities with that philosophy Neology in fact derives both its strength and its weakness.

The progress of modern science tends more and more to reduce to fixed, inexorable laws many natural phenomena—such, *e. g.* as the variation of the rain-fall and the incidence of pestilence—long attributed by pious minds to a power analogous to the human will, which may be turned by apparently casual motives from its seeming fixity of purpose, and swayed by suppliant tears.⁽²⁾

Such a result is calculated to strengthen that leading principle of Spinoza which substitutes an impersonal order of nature for an anthropomorphic God, and to the same extent, of course, to corroborate his primary exegetical dogma that Miracles, as contradicting this order, and Prophecy, so far forth as it implies any preternatural power, are simply impossible.

Neology acquires, in this way, a quasi-scientific stand-point, and the sceptical attempt to account by natural causes for the physical miracles recorded in the New Testament having broken down,⁽³⁾ it suggests to the scientific the removal of these stumbling-blocks to the natural mind, together with the transcendental truths they substantiate, in another way,—by depriving them, namely, of all objective value by a purely ideal explanation.

The order and connexion of ideas, Spinoza assures us, is identical with that of things ; why

not apply this solvent then to these miracles and truths? why not explain the Resurrection of the God-man, for example, not in the gross material sense of a human body returning to life, but *ideally*, of the quickening of humanity by its natural spirit-power? For in the beginning was the Word, the Thought, the Reason, the Life or intellectual Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world, —and the same, though clothed in flesh, and fallen into the shadows of Time and Sense, was from all eternity with God, and the same was God.

Surprise has been expressed at the transfer of Neology from the mystic Fatherland, where its reputation is on the wane just now, to sober, matter-of-fact England.⁽⁴⁾ But the way has been paved for its reception I believe, to some extent at least, by the sobriety of thought so characteristic of educated Englishmen, who, while peculiarly prone to regard with suspicion all tendency to religious enthusiasm, and to reject as untrue what savours of the marvellous, yet find themselves expected by a popular Theology implicitly to receive, upon the *alleged* authority of a supernatural Revelation, certain dogmas which can hardly be said to “speak forth the words of truth and soberness.”⁽⁵⁾

All these influences tend to generate a half-defined incredulity at the present day with regard to Prophecy and Miracle, and in the same proportion to gain a favorable hearing for that exegetical method which not merely claims to account for the

stubborn fact of the existence of Christianity by attributing the miraculous portions of the Gospel narrative to the excited imagination of ignorant men, *wishing* to find fulfilled in Jesus Christ after his death their own gross conceptions of what their prophets had spoken, but professes still further by an idealizing process to elicit the esoteric sense of the transcendental truths revealed in essential connexion with these miracles, and thus to eliminate the supernatural element from the Bible altogether.⁽⁶⁾

Such I consider the sources of strength derived by Neology from its ultimate affinities with the metaphysic of Spinoza ; but in these same affinities we can detect, I think, an irremediable weakness.

Enshrined in the inner sanctuary of the heart of man there is a natural piety whose nearer objects are his earthly parents, his kindred, and “ the land which gave him birth,”⁽⁷⁾ whose higher yearnings are toward the Great Father of spirits evermore.

There may be at times in the outgoings of this emotion toward its earthly objects a fond excess, even as on the other hand there have been found men apparently “ without natural affection.” And so with the emotion under its loftiest and noblest relation.

In some it may have been kindled by irrational excitement into an ecstatic zeal, an orgiastic Theopathy ;⁽⁸⁾ yet this, after all, is but the sad abuse of

a true and universal instinct. And, to complete the parallel, when men, shrinking from the extravagance of superstition, yield to the opposite excess which bows the knee to an impersonal God, they may indeed congratulate themselves upon the conquest of an effeminate weakness, a childish credulity, but such an intellectual condition can only be attained by trampling out the holiest and most intimate instinct of the soul.

When the human race has forgotten the meaning and the power of filial piety, when loyalty is remembered no more, and natural affection is but an unintelligible sound, then may Neology hope to become a national creed ;—but not before. For not till then will mankind surrender the kindred yearning after a God, “with whom to stand heart to heart,”⁽⁹⁾ and accept the lifeless, inane abstraction of the Pantheist in His stead.

But although from this its congenital defect Neology is certain never to become a popular belief, yet from the peculiar mode of its promulgation in England, and above all from the vital bearing of its fundamental principle upon the question of a preternatural Revelation—the theological question, indubitably, of the present day—it may not be amiss to scrutinize its pretensions now in a purely scientific point of view.

Of the fitness of such an enquiry, indeed, we may feel further assured when we remember that Spinoza, so far from being deterred by the incon-

gruity of his own conception of the Divine nature with any conceivable form of popular belief, would seem to have assumed that condition itself as the basis of his hermeneutics,⁽¹⁰⁾ plainly intimating that while for the illiterate the belief in a miraculous Revelation is possible and salutary, for the philosophical it is precisely the reverse; the latter being bound, as Strauss also insists,⁽¹¹⁾ implicitly to follow the dictates of their Intellect in the pursuit of Truth, how contradictory soever to the promptings of their religious instincts and perceptions.

Strauss, I am quite aware, belongs to the extreme left of the Hegelian school,⁽¹²⁾ but then his exegetical method is a legitimate deduction, as will further appear in the sequel, from Hegel's philosophy—indeed much that has been written by our English Neologians is only intelligible by its aid,—and both Hegel and Strauss, you will recollect, unreservedly adopt Spinoza's hypothesis of that sole impersonal Substance which by its very nature excludes the existence of a Personal God, the possibility of a preternatural Revelation.⁽¹³⁾

Thus we are not only further assured of the appropriateness of the proposed enquiry, but also ascertain the obvious direction it should take.

To Spinoza—the originator in a twofold sense of Neology—let us accordingly go back, and discarding for the time the entire force of our religious instincts, let us see whether upon purely intellectual grounds it behoves us to adopt his Theodicy, and

consequently to reject as an absurd contradiction the belief in a miraculous revelation of transcendental truths.

Spinoza reduced to a geometric form⁽¹⁴⁾ the second and a portion of the third Part of Descartes' Principia, and he afterwards dealt similarly with the first Part, embodying therein the metaphysical passages of the Meditations, and also what Descartes himself had thrown into a geometric shape at the close of the "Réponse aux premières objections."

The study of the first division of this work, with the Cogitata Metaphysica which Spinoza adds by way of appendix, is almost indispensable to the right understanding of the Ethica.

There are indeed some inconsistencies between the earlier and the later Treatises, but this circumstance in itself is not un instructive, for as the Ethica is admitted to be at once the most elaborate and the most rigorously argued of the Pupil's works, we are justified in looking to it for the true (though no doubt unconscious) tendency of the Master's doctrine,—for the genuine development of those germs which his teaching supplied upon the vital questions of the Divine and the human Personality.

To that teaching, then, I desire in the first instance to direct your attention.

Amid the yielding waters of doubt the memorable axiom '*Cogito, ergo sum*' had at length supplied the great philosopher with a solid resting place.⁽¹⁵⁾

This foundation gained, we are supplied with a criterion of TRUTH. For "whatsoever is perceived as clearly and distinctly as *cogito, ergo sum* is true."⁽¹⁶⁾

Now Thought (Def. i.) embraces all of which we are immediately conscious internally, and Idea (Def. ii.) is that form of any thought, by the immediate perception of which we are conscious of that same thought ; and by the objective reality of an idea (Def. iii.) is to be understood the entity of the thing represented by the idea, as far as it exists in the idea ; and by Substance (Def. v.) every thing which contains subjectively, or by which exists, something which we perceive ; *i. e.* some property (whether quality or attribute) the real idea of which exists in us. That Substance, moreover, in which Thought immediately inheres, is Mind, (Def. vi.) and that which is the immediate subject of extension and the attributes which presuppose it, is Body, (Def. vii.)

Once more, (Def. viii.) the substance which we understand to be *per se* supremely perfect, and in which we plainly conceive no defect or limitation, is God ; and lastly, (Def. ix.) when we state anything to be contained in the nature or conception of a thing, it is tantamount to asserting its truth in relation to that thing.

In a Scholium to Prop. iv. Spinoza argues that we perceive one idea to have more reality than another, and the idea of the supremely perfect

Being to be the most perfect of all, no less clearly and perhaps even more distinctly than the fundamental concept *sum cogitans* ; as the former not only affirm the general fact, but also the special mode, of our thinking.

As clear and distinct ideas then imply existence (for otherwise it would be quite competent for me, in violation of my fundamental principle, to affirm that *I, who think*, and *ipso facto* possess ideas, *do not exist*,) the following important theorem is laid down as an axiom : (vi.) “ In the idea or conception of anything is contained existence, either possible or necessary ;” with the comment : “ *necessary* in the conception of God or the Being supremely perfect, for otherwise that Being would be conceived to be imperfect, contrary to what He is supposed to be conceived ; possible in the conception of a limited Being.”

If we now connect Def. ix. with this axiom we shall have the formal demonstration of the famous Cartesian *à priori* argument for the existence of the Perfect Being : “ *Dei existentia ex solâ ejus naturæ consideratione cognoscitur.*”⁽¹⁷⁾

In a Scholium to this Prop. Spinoza observes that the concept of God thus involves His necessary existence as irresistibly as the concept of a triangle implies the eternal truth that its angles are equal to two right angles ; adding that upon this conception of His essence and existence depends all that knowledge of His attributes which leads men

to happiness ; and in a subsequent Lemma he asserts that the more perfect a thing is *in its nature* (*i. e.*, as he afterwards explains, *apart from all idea of a determinate producing cause*) the more and more perfect existence it involves, and *vice versâ*; further alleging that he does not here speak of beauty, or such other qualities as ignorance and superstition have invested with the name of perfections, but only of Reality or Being (*esse*) ; as, *e. g.* in substance he apprehends more reality than in modes or accidents.

The consequent corollary is : “ Whatever involves *necessary* existence is supremely perfect Being, (*ens summe perfectum*) or God.”

I can perceive an admirable force in that, to my mind, cardinal point of the grand Platonic argument, which from the immediately apprehended imperfection attaching to all sense-presentations triumphantly infers that the standard to which the mind intuitively refers them must have been pre-existent and independent of experience.⁽¹⁸⁾

I also believe that Kant, however successful in exposing the fallacy in the syllogistic form of the “ ontological proof,” was himself guilty of a serious inconsistency in granting to sense-perceptions an objective value denied to the ideas of the pure Reason ;⁽¹⁹⁾ but I am convinced nevertheless that Descartes fell into a grave and pregnant error in thus dissociating, or attempting to dissociate, the idea of God from the *data* of consciousness—in striving to deduce from the abstract concept of

Perfection, grasped by Reason, apart from experience, the necessary existence of the Perfect Being.

I readily admit that bare existence is given in Thought, and that Thought again involves the possession of ideas, which have accordingly for me a real existence, an existence more immediate, more undeniable, if you will, than any sense-presentations can claim ; but that I have the vivid idea of Perfection, or necessarily existing universal Being, apart from and prior to my apprehension of cause-relation and concrete imperfect existence I unhesitatingly deny.

That ideal standard of Perfect Being has, I am convinced, no mere "arbitrary," but a real antecedent existence in my Reason ; certainly I can discover no concrete object *in rerum naturâ* adequate to generate either the *me* or the *not-me* ; but then I *realize* it, I grasp it as a living truth, only in correlation with finite existences ;—which, however, though multiplied *in infinitum* could never constitute its efficient Cause ;—I attain, *i. e.* the necessary existence of the Perfect Being by an *à posteriori* method, and primarily as the reflex and mirror of my finite, conscious, real Being, as the irrecusable complement—if I may venture so to speak—of my imperfection.

It was the more to be regretted that Descartes, misled by the illusion of a scientific exactness, should have forsaken analytic certainty for Anselmian subtleties, when he had himself given a proof,

in his 3rd Meditation, so much more in harmony with the fundamental principle of his own Philosophy.⁽²⁰⁾

He ultimately however gave the palm to his so-called *à priori* proof, resigning himself more and more in his later works to this geometric spirit ; so much so, in fact, that the fundamental *cogito ergo sum* becomes in the *Principes* the conclusion of a syllogism, of which the major premiss would be the “common notion,” or abstract *à priori* principle, “Nothing has no quality.”

And thus he was irresistibly led to abstract the conception of Deity farther and farther from its finite type, and merge it in that of mere undetermined impersonal Existence, or simple Being. Accordingly we find him, in discussing the nature and operations of the Supreme Being, reducing the Divine Will—that autonomic power which is in man the first essential to personality,—either to a sheer caprice, uncounselled by the Wisdom and the Goodness, absolved from allegiance to the Eternal Verities, which are all alike in his opinion (and mathematical truths no less) its own arbitrary creations ;⁽²¹⁾ or else to a blind necessity, as little undetermined as the Divine understanding,—*with which in fact he identifies it*,—in other words, as the Divine Existence.

Thus once more, as God’s nature, and it alone, “involves necessary existence,” he alleges that “all things which exist are conserved by the sole power

of God ;" *i. e.* as Spinoza adds in the form of a Corollary, "God has created all things which exist, and *still continuously creates them ;*" and (Cor. ii.) "Things have no essence of themselves which can be a cause of the knowledge of God, but, on the contrary, God is the cause of things even as to their essence," and (Cor. iii.) "God is neither sentient nor percipient, for His intellect is determined by nothing external to itself, but all things flow from Him."

Thus, finally, human liberty is virtually denied. For the will is confounded, now with the understanding, now with desire, and if ever indifferent, that indifference described as the lowest grade of liberty. For "error is a mere negation" and results from the intellect not being co-extensive with the will ; and "if we contemplate the modes of volition, so far as they mutually differ, we shall find some more perfect than others in proportion as" they render the will less indifferent, *i. e. more free ;*" by which he means that man is *then only free* when he confines his will within the limits of his intellect, *i. e.* when he assents to what is clearly and distinctly perceived ; in other words, to what *he cannot but assent to.* ⁽²²⁾

It is easy to see that the human personality is destroyed, and that we are all but brought to the "immanent cause" of the Pantheist by such views of the relation between God and nature.

God the Creator is indeed asserted, and strongly asserted in words ; but the very proof of his

existence is attempted to be deduced from a quasi-mathematical "common notion." His real being is no longer the perfect archetype of the finite creature "made in His image, after His likeness," but idealized into a "*Causa sui*," a pure concept of necessary existence, nearly resembling the "*Άγνωστος Θεός*" of Maimonides, continuously creating by an arbitrary will, or else an unintelligible caprice, from moment to moment, all things that exist. And, as an inevitable result, created things are bereft of all distinctive individuality, the *vis insita* resolved into the *vis creatrix*, "this choir of heaven and furniture of earth," into "a collection of the modes of [mathematical] extension," and the human soul only not reduced to an analogous "collection of the modes of *res cogitans*" by a most precarious distinction between the unlimited will and the limited understanding.⁽²³⁾

To such a construction Spinoza, already familiar with the speculations of Maimonides, applied his keen and subtle intellect, and imparted to it—in his latest and most elaborate work,—the logical cohesion it required.

All possible and actual existence is comprised by him under the *natura naturans* and the *natura naturata*. By the former we are to understand what exists *in se* and is conceived *per se*, or such attributes of Substance as express its eternal and infinite essence, *i. e.* God so far as He is considered a free [= necessary] cause. By the latter all which

follows from the necessity [= free operation] of the nature of God, or of any one of his attributes, *i. e.* all the modes of His attributes so far as they [the modes] are considered as things which are in God, and which can neither be nor be conceived without God."

He defines Substance to be that which exists *in se* and is conceived *per se*, *i. e.* that whose concept [unlike that of modes] needs not for its formation the concept of another thing.

Attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence, and mode the affections of Substance, or that which exists in another thing [not *in se*] by which [other thing] also it [the mode] is conceived.

By God he understands absolutely-infinite Being, *i. e.* Substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses its eternal and infinite essence.⁽²⁴⁾

But an important Def. still remains, which has not perhaps been sufficiently scrutinized by his critics. "By *Causa sui*," he says, "I understand that *whose essence involves existence*, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing."

It seems to me that he here attempts to solve by anticipation the dynamic antinomies of Kant, and that too pretty much as Kant himself essayed to neutralize their force; the difference being that Spinoza dogmatically postulates—*i. e.*, claims for the intellect (*intelligo per causam sui*) the power of

conceiving—an *Essence*, which by its very nature involves *expression in modes*, or *existence*.

I think he sought to find, by the pure intuitions of Reason, beyond and apart from the illusive, because seemingly contingent, phenomena of sense, a “necessarily-spontaneous” absolute cause, infinite in itself, yet capable of being *expressed* by finite modifications, and thus, in a certain sense, their eternal and yet *finite* cause ; I say *finite*, because he refers all “particular things” back to God regarded *as finitely modified ab æterno*.

I believe that it was the endeavour to elude the force of these antinomies which led him,—originally in the “*De Intellectus Emendatione*,” and after more compendiously in the “*Ethica*”—to distinguish three kinds of knowledge ; the first derived from “opinion or imagination,” *i. e.* from sense-experience or hearsay evidence ; the second from adequate ideas of the properties of things, or “common notions ;” the third from “intuitive science ;” and then to describe knowledge of the first kind as the sole cause of falsehood, but that of the second and third as necessarily true ; defining the perfect method to be “that which teaches us to direct the mind under the law of absolutely perfect Being ;” when Reason, *i. e.*, abstracted from all sense-experiences, is brought face to face and unified, as it were, with its loftiest object, simple Being.⁽²⁵⁾

I speak with much diffidence, but from a very careful study of Spinoza’s entire Construction I

incline to think that it exhibits in the main the struggles of a strong and subtle metaphysical spirit to find the synthesis of attaching all effects on the one hand to a first *free* cause, and regarding them on the other as an infinite chain of phenomena, linked by a blind *fatality*; of assuming, again, a *necessary* existence as the basis of the series of contingent things, or conceiving this series as *indefinite*. He seems to me to have beguiled himself with the delusion not only that knowing and being are one, but also that he could conceive existence *à priori*, *apart from all concrete experience*, and thus unencumbered with contingent phenomena, intuitively grasp that self-cause which gives an Essence whose very nature it is to exist; *i. e.* a *Natura naturans*, the very conception of which (in which its essence consists) involves a *Natura naturata*; his delusion arising thus from a radical mistake as to the intellect being capable of apprehending even bare existence *à priori*,—of being competent to assert that there should be *anything* in existence rather than *nothing*—to affirm anything whose *essence* involved *existence*.

My reasons for this belief I will give as concisely as possible. I find him, in the first place, endeavouring to destroy by all the resources of his fertile genius that which gives man the first, if not the only, true idea of causal *power* as distinguished from invariable sequence—namely, his own concrete experience of the freedom of the human Will

to act or not to act ;—reducing the term itself, as distinguished from particular volitions, to a mere *ens rationis*, an empty abstraction like tenuity or lapidity,—scoffing at the absurdity of those who assert that they are free, simply because they are conscious of acting, but ignorant of the causes which determine them to action,—and defining that to be *free* “which exists by the *necessity* of its own nature alone, and is determined to action by itself alone ;” that necessary, or rather coerced (*coacta*) “which is determined by another to exist and act in a certain and determined way.”⁽²⁶⁾

Thus a first free cause is strictly equivalent with him to that which by its very nature necessarily exists and acts ; *e. g.* the relation of 1 to 2 is an eternal, independent, and *ipso facto* a necessary cognition, or mental act. The first antinomy is solved.

In the next place I find him absolutely denying final causes and the existence of contingent things *as such*, because from the very perfection of God things could not have been produced in any other way than they have been without the absurdity of supposing him possessed of a Will analogous to the fiction of the human Will, and that Will guided in its operations by some independent standard of Right. Things are therefore called evil and contingent only “in regard to the deficiency of our knowledge,” and all “particular things,” *i. e.* all the finite and determined modes of

substance, such as souls and bodies, are in this sense contingent and corruptible, inasmuch as we have only a partial, not an adequate idea of them ; but in this sense alone, for “ every particular thing necessarily follows from God and is determined to act and exist by Him, not indeed considered absolutely, nor again from some attribute of His affected by an infinite and eternal mode, but from God or some attribute so far as it is modified by a finite and determined mode ; but then this mode on the same principle must be caused by another, and this again by another, and so *in infinitum* ; and therefore,” he adds, “ God cannot properly be called the remote cause of particular things *except for the convenience of distinguishing them* from those things which follow immediately from Him absolutely considered ;” and so : “ *In rerum natura nullum datur contingens, sed omnia ex necessitate divinæ naturæ determinata sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum ;*” and this “ *ab æterno.*”⁽²⁷⁾

Now the deficiency of knowledge arises thus. “ The actual being (*esse*) or existence of the human mind is constituted by nothing else than the idea of an actually existing thing ; hence it is a part of the infinite intellect of God ; (*i. e.* a mode of God regarded under the attribute of infinite Thought) hence it perceives this or that adequately, when God has this or that idea, not so far as He is infinite, but so far as He is expressed (*explicatur*) by the nature of the human mind, or constitutes its

essence, and conversely it perceives partially or inadequately (*i. e.* regards things as contingent) when God has this or that idea not so far only as He constitutes the essence of the human mind, but so far as *together with the human mind* He has the idea of another thing also."⁽²⁸⁾

When I add that he defines the human mind as necessarily active if it has adequate, and passive if inadequate, ideas, and that Eternity is laid down as a synonym for Existence, Perfection for Reality, it will appear, I think, that his construction (if only we could accept it) would go far toward the solution of the second antinomy also ; for "error has nothing positive," and the very conception of anything as contingent is therefore a mere error or negation arising from the nature of the human mind, which derives many inadequate or "mutilated" ideas from the senses, and fancies "that a thing can be which has not been from everlasting, or otherwise than it actually is," or, in a word, "that it either can be or be conceived to be, save as in supremely perfect Being, or God."⁽²⁹⁾

Contingent things are thus wholly eliminated—they have no reality—they are bare negations—and these "particular things," as we ought rather to denominate them, or finite mental affirmations, run back in an infinitely-retrogressing causal series to that God whose eternal *essence* necessarily involves their *existence*.

I wish now, still studiously repressing the prompt-

ings of the religious sentiment, to examine the validity of this construction in a purely intellectual point of view.

It is quite legitimate in Spinoza to push the later Cartesianism to its logical conclusion, not alone to reduce Body to a collection of the modes of extension, but Soul also to an analogous collection of the modes of abstract, undetermined Thought ; and as both are different but co-ordinate expressions of the same Substance, and as "the knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of the cause," to argue that the order or connexion of ideas, *i. e.* of causes, is identical with the knowledge of things ; and hence further to infer that "God, the understanding of God, and the things understood by Him, are one and the same ; a circle, *e. g.* existing in Nature, and the idea of that circle, which also exists in God, being radically one, though expressed under the different attributes of Thought and Extension."⁽³⁰⁾

I can also see that Spinoza, with his peculiar theory of *action*, and of the essence of perfect ideas (and their equivalents, things,) being found in clear and distinct and therefore necessary affirmations, was consistent enough in describing the Divine extension as being from its very nature indivisible, the Divine thought and liberty [= necessary nature] exempt respectively, for the same reason, from the limitations of the Understanding and the Will ; in concluding, accordingly, that Deity is

Res Extensa, yet incorporeal, Res Cogitans, yet without Understanding, Free and ever-acting, yet without Will.

I can recognize, again, the grandeur of the conception which regards the *attributes* of Thought and Extension—embracing as they do a “relative-infinite” universe at whose stupendous vastness the spirit falters and the imagination quails—as, after all, two only amid the illimitable number which encompasses all other possible universes, and these again as but the immediate emanation necessarily evolved by the undeveloped Thought of God ; yea, Thought itself in this sublimest sense as nought save the mirror of that awful Being, who in His unfathomable and resolute Eternity, His immovable Immensity, His unutterably-perfect Intensity, substantiates and unifies the Whole.⁽³¹⁾

I allow, too, that he has shewn amazing subtlety and skill in first misrepresenting the causal judgment, by reducing it, with the concomitant conception of activity to a bare cognition, adequate or partial as the case may be, of infinite sequences, and in then confounding freedom and final causes with necessity, spontaneity with the absolute because self-determining processes of Nature.

I grant, finally, that nothing can be more ingenious than his constant and intricate fusion of the *Natura naturans* with the *Natura naturata*.

But while conceding all this, I have still to seek from Spinoza, and seek in vain, a solution for the

great problem really at issue — the co-existence, namely, of the Infinite and the Finite, the generation of the imperfect and relative by the Perfect and Absolute Being.

On the contrary, his construction, so far from solving, aggravates, in my judgment, the difficulty of the question. For it confines the problem, one might almost say, within the material limits of the human intellect, which it is therefore compelled to contemplate under the most incongruous aspects ; thus bringing out the original incompatibilities in sharper and more striking contrast, in proportion as the sphere of observation is the more contracted and defined.

But I anticipate.—The only Proposition in his long work, which treats formally of the *processus* of Being, is the following : “ From the necessity of the divine nature infinite things must follow (*sequi debent*) in infinite modes ; *i. e.* all the things which can fall under an infinite intellect.” His Demonstration is this : “ From the given definition of anything the intellect concludes several properties which of necessity truly follow from the same, *i. e.* from the very essence of the thing ; and so much the more as the definition expresses more reality ; *i. e.* as the essence of the thing defined involves more reality. But since by Definition vi. the Divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes, each of which moreover expresses an essence infinite in its kind, \therefore from the necessity, &c.”⁽⁸²⁾

This is an important Demonstration in many ways. For from it we infer that the essence of a thing is simply its Definition by the intellect ; and the intellect is supposed capable of apprehending thus the absolute, nay more, of so thoroughly apprehending it as to conclude that it contains within itself a necessary power of self-development, or in Spinoza's phraseology, that "its essence necessarily involves existence."

This position, above all, I desire to scrutinize, because upon its validity virtually depends the truth of his radical and most fruitful hermeneutical dogma, that miracles are physically impossible.

Its validity rests, in the last analysis, upon this one point :—whether the intellect of man, as such, has or has not the power of comprehending the *Causa sui* in its profoundest essence, of reflecting, as it were, the absolute Thought of God, by an immediate, *à priori* intuition, or, as Spinoza himself would say, by the third kind of cognition.

In the accuracy of this analysis I am confirmed by the fact that Schelling assumes as the basis of his theory just such an "intellectual intuition," and it was his earliest ambition, as we know, "to write a fitting pendant to the *Ethica*."⁽⁵³⁾

Many arguments—and those not unconvincing—have been alleged by able metaphysicians against such an inherent power in human thought. But when men speak of transcendental intuitions, and arrogate the power of gazing upon pure, undeter

mined Being, of lifting the veil of "all that is and has been and shall be," and thus grasping the law of its eternal progress, it is at least difficult for one who can pretend to no such ecstatic faculty to meet them with the arguments of common sense, however convincing they may be to ordinary minds. Hence I prefer conceding for the moment Spinoza's assumption, and endeavouring to detect its fallacy in the deductions which he has himself, in the way of discursive reasoning, elaborated from it.

When I found him indeed in a celebrated Proposition asserting that "the human mind has an adequate knowledge of the infinite and eternal essence of God," I looked with no little eagerness to his Demonstration, as though there I should surely find one to lead me by the hand into the innermost sanctuary of absolute Science, and verify to the full the lofty encomium of Hegel. But upon collecting and carefully scrutinizing the several constituents of his intricate proof I discovered it, not without chagrin, to be reducible to this : "Every idea of a thing actually existing which is perceived by the mind can only be a mode of God considered under the attribute to which that mode belongs, and *therefore* involves the knowledge of God's infinite and eternal essence, *because attributes are regarded by the intellect as expressing that essence !*"⁽³⁴⁾

The only *proof* then vouchsafed by Spinoza of the power possessed by the human mind to form the fundamental conception of his construction is

an example quite unparalleled, I believe, of the vicious circle.

Hence we must regard his method as in the exactest sense one that "builds a world upon hypothesis," and which a single contradiction in development will consequently overthrow.⁽³⁵⁾

There are several things at first sight contradictory enough in that development which Spinoza explains away with consummate skill. One discrepancy, however, he seems wholly to overlook, which I believe to be absolutely irreducible.

Let us steadily keep in view what is claimed by Spinoza for the *human* intellect; it is no less than an adequate *à priori* knowledge of not merely *existing* things, but of that *essence* which necessitates by its immanent potential activity their actual existence. Now in treating of "modes, or particular things actually existing," he tells us on the one hand that "the more we understand them the more we understand God;" and, on the other, that "all particular things are modes produced by God not contemplated as Infinite, nor under an attribute infinitely modified, but under an attribute considered to be affected by finite and determined modes;—such finite modes springing from antecedent finite modes, (the knowledge of an effect springing from and involving the knowledge of its cause), these again from other finite modes, and so on *in infinitum*."⁽³⁶⁾ From this it clearly follows that the knowledge of God, *i. e.* of the *Natura*

naturans + the *Natura naturata*, or Substance regarded not alone absolutely, but also as an immanent cause (*Causa sui*)—admits of degrees, being increased in proportion to our comprehension of “particular things;” and further that these “particular things” though retraced *in infinitum* can never give a knowledge of God save as *finite*, seeing that He is their (so-called) cause not in His absolute nature, but as finitely modified, and *this from all eternity*.”

Here we have a direct contradiction to the fundamental dogma that the mental perception of an actually existing thing involves an adequate knowledge of the *infinite* essence of God.

But this is not all. For we must not forget the account which our author is compelled by the exigencies of his theory to give of the human intellect—viz. that it is a pure abstraction, like will or tenuity, expressing merely a collection of consecutive ideas—and yet it is for this very intellect he assumes the faculty of apprehending God in His immensity and the intensest perfection of His necessarily-spontaneous nature !

The contradiction here involved is exhibited in a still stronger light by his theory of Error, which he maintains to be, like every form of so-called evil, a bare negation arising from the fact that the human mind, (the collection, *i. e.* of human volitions or ideas,) *forms part only of those infinitely numerous ideas which co-exist with it in God.*⁽³⁷⁾

And similarly in a remarkable Corollary to Prop. xi. Part ii. he broadly affirms that "the human mind is *a part* of the infinite intellect of God." Nay, as if to expose his own fallacy in the clearest possible way, in the vehemence of his opposition to the anthropomorphites he scruples not elsewhere to assert that the divine intellect (*which he identifies with the divine essence*) "has just so much affinity with the human as the dog which barks has with the celestial Sign."⁽³⁸⁾

From all this I conclude, not merely that Spinoza, like his Master, "has built a world upon hypothesis," but that he has reduced his own hypothesis to an absurdity; and above all that the necessary process of an infinite number of "particular things" in an order of adamant rigour from the Divine Nature (and the consequent impossibility of what the human intellect could regard as supernatural), is not merely not proved but disproved, if only because the essence of the *Causa sui* is alleged to consist in its *Definition* by that human intellect which is itself subsequently defined to be a pure abstraction, expressive of a concatenation of *finite* ideas forming *a part only* of the infinite Intellect, and therefore traceable to God not regarded as Infinite but as Finite.⁽³⁹⁾

In this respect, indeed, as I said above, Spinoza not only fails to solve the venerable problem of the Many and the One, to unify the Finite and the Infinite, but rather exhibits their incompatibility

in more glaring colours, by embodying both terms—if I may so speak—in the human intellect itself, which is thus presented under the irreconcilable aspects of absolute and relative, particular and universal, at once eternally-finite and capacious of the illimitably-infinite.

I am now, I suppose, entitled to assert that, even though we wholly set aside our religious instincts and perceptions, Spinoza's Theodicy does not commend itself to our acceptance ; that so far from establishing for us the intellectual absurdity of a supernatural Revelation, the hypothesis upon which his construction rests is reduced to an absurdity by the very rigour of his own deduction.

I infer, moreover, from the preceding discussion that the genuine, though unconscious, *tendency* of Spinoza's philosophy, and of those Cartesian germs which he more congenially than Malebranche has developed, is towards Atheism rather than a finite-denying Mysticism ;⁽⁴⁰⁾ that his reduction of the Divine Essence to its *à priori* intellectual apprehension by man has discharged it of living reality, has brought the ENS REALISSIMUM, in short, to the verge of that NOTHINGNESS, with which his panegyrist, Hegel, ultimately identified it. A warning to us (let me here observe) of the danger incurred by those who would build a Theodicy upon any other basis than the finite Personality, of the consequent risk involved in the attempt to invalidate that Free-Will in which the *reality* of the latter consists.

This inference will be further confirmed, I think, by a rapid glance at the more strictly practical portion of the *Ethica*. For, strange as it may sound, Spinoza does give practical rules of life, and that too with the same imperturbable complacency wherewith he repudiates free-will alike in God and man ; nay more, he talks of virtue and vice, of good and evil ; stranger still, if not of immortality, at least of some souls continuing eternally in being after they have ceased “ to affirm the existence of their bodies,” and thus of retribution, in a certain sense, in the life to come.

In the ensuing attempt to give something like a connected view of his opinions upon these all-important topics, I shall employ, as far as possible, his own words.

“ Perfection consists in Being ; the essence of
“ man in the actual effort to conserve his own Being.
“ His primary affections are reducible to three—
“ Desire (or *conscious* appetite) Joy and Sorrow.
“ Desire referred to the mind alone is called Will ;
“ to mind and body together, appetite. Being
“ tantamount to the effort of self-conservation, it
“ also may be defined as the essence of man, from
“ the nature of which essence necessarily follow
“ what things subserve its conservation, and to the
“ doing of these same things man is accordingly
“ determined. Joy and Sorrow are the passions
“ by which the mind passes to a greater and a less
“ perfection respectively. And from all this it is

“ clear that we attempt, wish for, desire nothing
 “ because we judge it to be good, but that we judge
 “ it to be good because we attempt, wish for, and
 “ desire it.”

We now know the meaning of the term “ good,” and its negation, “ evil,” in the system of Spinoza.

“ Now *the highest effort* of which man is capable
 “ is ‘ cognition of the third kind’—those pure intuiti-
 “ ons or *real actions*, that supreme mind-potency
 “ —whereby Reason apprehends necessary truths
 “ under their eternal aspect (*sub specie æternitatis*),
 “ *i. e.* apprehends actual existences as involving
 “ their eternal essences ; and such knowledge ne-
 “ cessarily generates the intellectual love of God,
 “ which love (and which alone) is therefore eternal,
 “ and a phase of the infinite love wherewith God
 “ loves himself.”

Thus we learn in what the energy of *virtue* consists, and its equivalent, happiness.

“ Though the mind can imagine nothing, nor yet
 “ remember past things, unless while its particular
 “ body continues to *exist*, yet in God is necessarily
 “ given the idea which expresses under the aspect
 “ of eternity the *essence* of such and such an
 “ [existing] body, and hence the human mind can-
 “ not absolutely be destroyed, but something of it
 “ remains which is eternal.”

In this way, lastly, do we ascertain our author’s opinion upon the nature of *everlasting life*.

Just upon this point it is next to impossible to

grasp Spinoza's proof; it seems, however, to be made out somewhat as follows :—

“ God is [by hypothesis] the necessary cause, in
 “ a general sense, both of all essences and all ex-
 “ istences, and therefore, of course, the cause of
 “ both the essence and existence of this or that
 “ particular body.”

“ The *essence* then of a particular body (which
 “ is involved in the affirmation of its actual *existence*
 “ by the mind) must be conceived by the essence
 “ of God itself, and that by an eternal necessity,
 “ and its concept as such is necessarily given in
 “ God, and so is eternal. Now the object of the
 “ idea [in God] which constitutes this or that
 “ human mind is its body, (*i. e.* a certain mode
 “ of extension actually existing) for otherwise the
 “ ideas of those affections of its body *which it un-*
 “ *questionably experiences* would not be in God so
 “ far as He constitutes that particular mind, but
 “ something else, which is absurd.”

Hence Spinoza concludes (rather inconsistently
 for an *à priori* speculator) that “ the idea [in God]
 “ which expresses the *essence* of Body, essentially
 “ appertains to the human mind. But as we can-
 “ not assign duration (measured by Time) to the
 “ mind, save as it expresses the *actual existence* of
 “ the body (*i. e.* its duration measured by Time)
 “ therefore as the *essence* of Body is conceived by
 “ an *eternal* necessity, and essentially appertains to
 “ the human mind, there is a something (*aliquid*)

“essentially belonging to that mind which is
“eternal.”⁽⁴¹⁾

It is obvious that throughout this elaborate disquisition (of which I have given the briefest possible sketch) we have a repetition of the fallacy already pointed out. For the human mind is again regarded under a twofold aspect ;—on the one hand as a res particularis, or eternally-finite mode, *existing in Time*—a fact due to its union with, and consequent affirmation of, the *existence* of a body, or mode of extension in Time, which imparts to it certain impressions producing transient memory and imagination ;—on the other hand as *an eternal essence*, capable of affirming the *essence* of Body, and as such co-essential and con-substantial with the Absolute.

It is rather with the theosophic tendency of Spinoza’s practical inference, however, that I am now concerned.

That inference is, that the more the mind habituates itself to regard “particular things” under their eternal aspect, *i. e.* as modes [or actually *existing* developments] of the eternal and infinite essence [or intellectually grasped attributes] of God, the higher will be its virtue or potency, the more imperishable cognition, or real Being, it will retain when it ceases to affirm the body as a thing actually-existing, *i. e.* when the body dies and memory and imagination perish.

For the ignorant man, he says, who derives what feeble knowledge he possesses from vague expe-

rience, and the transient affections of his actually existing body, can never gain true serenity of mind ; and as memory and imagination perish with the body, his soul, when it ceases to suffer [*i.e.* to be the subject of the affections of an existing body] ceases to be ; while the wise man, *as such*, is never perturbed, and conscious of himself, of things, and of God by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but enjoys the peace which passeth all understanding for evermore.

“ And if,” adds Spinoza, “ the path which I have pointed out may appear exceedingly arduous, nevertheless *it can be found*. And arduous verily it must be, seeing that it is so rarely found. For if their salvation were easy and could be discovered without great toil, how could it possibly happen that it should be neglected by almost every one ? But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.”

It is curious that these closing words of his long and elaborate Treatise should so transparently reveal its inherent weakness.

For here Spinoza tells us how he has discovered for himself with immeasurable toil the path which leads to everlasting life. Nay more, he exhorts us to follow ; appeals to us as to beings capable of accepting or rejecting moral suasion, of choosing this path or that, of scaling, as he too had done, certain far and difficult heights, but bathed in the solemn splendours of eternal Peace.

Even granting then that man's highest good, his virtue, his happiness, his true life here and hereafter, consists in that intellectual love of God which contemplates phenomena as eternal forms, fixed once and for ever by nature's immutable decree, yet with the finite soul herself confessedly rests the power of regarding things thus under the form of eternity, or not.

The incongruity of such a result as this is beyond measure enhanced when we remember that the very essence of all Spinoza's fundamental truths consists in their necessary Definition by the finite Intellect. For thus, existences and essences alike, immemorial Substance and THE SUPREME Himself all ultimately depend upon the perversity or ductility of the human mind in reference to Spinoza's teaching !

Common sense, after all, vanquished abstract speculation ; and the theorist who had reduced all things in heaven and earth to an interminable series of irrevocable modes, had denied contingency, had mocked at moral freedom, had scorned the belief in final causes, and an anthropomorphic God, ends at last with a fervent practical appeal to certain eternally-fixed modes of Extension and Thought, as though *they* had the spontaneous energy of determining whether to regard God, the Kosmos, and themselves as contingent or as necessary, as though *they* had the irrecusable power of pursuing one all-creative line of thought in pre-

ference to another as though *they*, in short, enjoyed a moral potency such as the most earnest advocate of the *Imperium in imperio* of Conscience never dared to postulate for the finite will.

I have only now to add, that the moment Spinoza thus appeals to human souls, that moment he recognizes in them active faculties, and a real, substantial unity. And when such qualities are assigned to these co-essential, co-eternal modes of Substance, what then remains, I would ask, for the Absolute Being, the ENS REALISSIMUM, the CAUSA SUI, which spontaneously evolves, and by its very perfection unifies the whole ?

I will just illustrate its value by an adaptation of his own words. That awful Name then becomes—as the purely abstract sum total of so many real, finite, modes—an unsubstantial illusion, one of those phantasmal *entia rationis*, like will, or intellect, or lapidity, arbitrarily hypostatized by the vulgar !

In plain language, it is annihilated.

LECTURE III.

ACTS, xvii. 30, 31.

“And the times of this ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth all men everywhere to repent; because he hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by that Man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised Him from the dead.”

WE have now seen the radical defect in Spinoza's Construction; his attempt to unify the Finite with the Infinite reducing him to the extremity of embodying both Terms, materially as well as formally, in that human Intellect which he himself defines as a purely abstract designation for a series of the finite modes of Thought.

We have further ascertained that the tendency of his system under its moral aspect also is to absorb the Infinite in the Finite, to reduce the ENS REALISSIMUM once more to one of those unreal abstractions, like tenuity or lapidity, arbitrarily hypostatized by the vulgar.

Upon this result I take my stand ; for I have shewn that Hegel and Strauss both adopt Spinoza's primary hypothesis, which denies directly, and *à priori*, as it were, a Personal God, and by inference a supernatural Revelation. If, then, I have detected an irreducible contradiction in Spinoza's Construction, I am at once entitled to pronounce its off-shoot, Neology, under its philosophic aspect, irrational and unsound.

When laying down the broad statement, however, that Neology stands or falls with Spinozism, it is only right that I should point out how naturally the application of the latter to revealed truth eventuated in the Neologian hermeneutics, and, as an indispensable preliminary, that I should trace with some distinctness the peculiar movement of the later Idealism, the influences contributing thereto, and the successive phases of its progress.

That this movement, however ambitiously conducted by the later "lords of thought," was in the main one of development only, we are justified in inferring at once from their own formal statements.

But the soundness of such an inference will become still more obvious, I think, if we keep steadily in view the following features of Spinoza's philosophy:—

I. His primary conception of an intellectually-grasped, impersonal, infinitely self-determining *Causa Sui*, penetrating beneath the subtlest phenomena to the veriest essence of undetermined

Being,—so strikingly suggestive of Fichte's absolute self-posing Ego.

II. His method, which, distrusting experience wholly, and deducing all science from certain assumed *à priori* cognitions, anticipates with singular exactness the “intellectual intuition” of Schelling.

III. The consequent identification of the order and mutual connexion of ideas—or *causes*, as he sometimes characteristically calls them—with that of things, by which he all but attained the final Hegelian interfusion of Thought and Being.⁽¹⁾

In the qualifying phrase I have just employed we may best detect, perhaps, the point at which the two systems, while starting thus by a common method from a common principle, ultimately diverge.

With Spinoza a certain dualism is retained throughout; the ever-surgings of determined Thought and Being are nominally phenomenal indeed, and “*actual existences*” rather than essences, but then they appear, after all, as two clearly-conceived expressions of essential Deity, and as such not only heterogeneous in themselves, but also eternally distinguishable from and co-existent with Substance.⁽²⁾

With Schelling and Hegel, on the contrary, the one tide was absorbed into the other, and that, too, essentially as well as actually; and in such homogeneous fusion even the shadowy phantom is dissolved to which—contemplated in some sort apart

from and prior to modal development — Spinoza vouchsafed the name of Deity ; for God is simply “ the Idea,” with a more or less developed *consciousness*, permeating all ; a result, let me add, quite in harmony with the opinion expressed above, that while Spinozism attempts in vain to unify the Finite with the Infinite, its genuine though unacknowledged tendency is to eliminate the latter rather than the former.

This intenser elaboration, this absolute identification of Thought and Being, of Subject and Object, of God and Nature, has been well described as at once an off-shoot from, and a reaction against, the scepticism of Kant.⁽³⁾ For he would have men believe that of the two elements of Science, the Subject (*i.e.* the human mind) and the Object (*i.e.* Things or Beings), the latter must be surrendered by pure reason ; which, therefore, to the question of questions, “ Is there a God ? ” can at the very most reply, “ It is possible.”

It would be quite out of place for me here to attempt even a summary of the argument by which the great metaphysician endeavours to save religion and morality from this engulfing scepticism ; how he labours to prove that the *à priori* concept of the practical Reason, DUTY, possesses an objective value those of the speculative Reason cannot claim, inasmuch as sense-phenomena, *e.g.* are referred only remotely and hypothetically by Reason to such concepts as Cause or Substance, whereas moral *obli-*

gations are *immediately* and *absolutely* referred to the concept of Duty, and as such, too, withdrawn from the sphere of that fatalistic law of anterior phenomena which governs the realm of experience; how, once more, Duty thus communicates its objectivity not alone to Liberty (thereby assuring the existence of a moral Being), but also to the religious concepts, God and a future life, which, no longer mere arbitrary ideals, in this way become invested with reality.

I would only observe that here, at least, he seems to have exposed himself to the charge of "an unparalleled inconsistency,"⁽⁴⁾ for the objective existence of God as a moral Cause is asserted merely as the *necessary condition* of the realization of that perfect harmony of happiness and virtue (a harmony independent of man, and in this life impossible) in which the sovereign good resides; nay more, certain Divine attributes dogmatically determined upon the same subjective hypothesis.

That he was himself, indeed, fully conscious of the inconsistency involved in such a Theodicy may be gathered from the following remarkable confession: "To say the truth," he writes, "the impossibility we find in conceiving the perfect harmony of happiness and virtue as possible, without supposing a moral cause of the world, *is purely subjective*."⁽⁵⁾

When Kant, then, with his own hands, undermined the only scientific proof he recognized for the real existence of a Personal God, it was not

surprising that his pupil, Fichte, should reject such an anthropomorphic dogma altogether, and recall in its stead Spinoza's "impersonal order of nature," under which, in a loftier and sterner way, virtue and happiness might be eternally harmonized, and the irrecusable moral law with a rigorous and, as it were, impersonal inflexibility maintained.

Again, from Kant's fundamental position, that the so-called laws of nature are but the forms of our own intelligence applied to phenomena, and that the constant error of metaphysicians had been to detach these laws from their true principle—the human mind—and transport them into things, *i. e.* objectify them, Fichte reasons fairly enough, that as Things are nothing save what Thought makes them, it is Thought which, in fact, creates and constitutes all that is. And he urges with much force against his Teacher, that when the latter denies the production of anything in Thought, except as the sequence of experience and sense-phenomena, he assumes as real what upon his own hypothesis (*viz.*, that Science is confined to the subject) the mind does not and cannot know to be such; thus making the essential condition, if not the first principle of Science (these *data à posteriori*, to wit,) external to itself.

From the Subject, therefore, and from it alone, Fichte deduces all things.

But how is the reality of the Ego itself ascertained?

Let me attempt to indicate, however feebly, his subtle proof.

In the mathematical sciences Kant had discovered an exceptional solidity, because their object was, not to know "things in themselves," but merely to develop certain *à priori* notions of the human mind. Algebra, *e. g.* finds the matter of its equations not in any supposed essences or sense-phenomena, but in purely ideal quantity and abstract number.⁽⁶⁾

Fichte accordingly takes up the so-called fundamental equation, $A=A$. He, too, discovers in it a necessary truth, but a truth necessary as to its *form* alone ; its *matter* is purely hypothetical. It is, therefore, not primitive. Its analysis evolves the higher and absolute truth $Me=Me$. Here we have a proposition which determines and, if I may so speak, substantiates the relation of A to A ,—which is necessary both in matter and form, which is absolutely real.

We have grasped the absolute *Ego*, or God ; the true and real principle of all Science ; the Creator of all that is. This seems extravagant language ; but consider a little. This self-asserting *Ego* confessedly exists as an absolute and immediate truth. How does it, as such, exist ? By its inherent and spontaneous power of self-limitation. It exists for itself by self-limitation. It *poses* itself by *opposing* something not itself, *i. e.* the *non-ego* which it implies. And this its power of

opposing the *non-ego* to the relative *ego* at once proves it to be infinite and absolute. Here then we have attained the one true homogeneous principle, constituting as members of itself, separate and yet identical, the three essential objects of thought,—Man, Nature, and God. It was a favorite saying of Kant, that as the earth and the stars, in defiance of a time-honoured theory, do truly move round the Sun, so Being, long unduly exalted, must henceforth be subordinated to Thought. Fichte's deduction was, that the *Ego*, possessed of a spontaneous and infinite activity, by thinking and posing itself in opposition to the *non-ego* which it implies, generates itself and all beside. "Deum creavi" was the last word of his philosophy.

How do we now stand in relation to Spinoza? He, rejecting beforehand the hypotheses of Malebranche and Berkeley, had pronounced the co-existence of the Cartesian *res cogitans* and *res extensa* impossible, save when both are regarded as phenomenal and eternally modified expressions of one ultimate impersonal substance.⁽⁷⁾ Fichte, adopting and thoroughly metamorphosing the scepticism of Kant, assumes subjective thought, under the type of the absolute *Ego*, as the *ens realissimum*, the *Causa sui* itself, embracing in its infinite expanse Man, Nature, and God. And the same fatal flaw, let me here observe, which I detected in Spinoza now re-appears in Fichte, however speciously he essays to gloss it over by a verbal juggle ; for sub-

jective thought is again presented to us as at once determined and undetermined, finite and infinite, relative and absolute. To resume :—

The actual tendency of Spinozism was to absorb Deity into His co-existent developments, Man and Nature ; that of Fichte's subjective Pantheism to absorb co-existent Deity and Nature into Man.

Facilis jactura Dei we may not uncharitably exclaim in reference to the Idealists. But external nature is an awkward fact which will not so easily submit to the dogmatism of a theory, and nature, except as an ideal phantom, had been banished by the theory of Fichte.

To re-establish her Schelling recalled to a certain extent the dualism of Spinoza. He differs from Fichte by assigning a co-ordinate reality to Thought and Being,—to the *ego* and the *non-ego*. But while thus releasing the latter from the trammels of Fichte's subjective ground-principle, he establishes between it and Thought a far more intimate relation than Spinoza's system allowed. Man, though free, is not the sport of chance. He acts under absolute laws. *So does nature*. Therefore nature, by the intelligence involved in obedience to law, claims kindred with humanity ; one subtle and congenial tide of thought thrills through every nerve in her illimitable frame, "sleeping in the plant, dreaming in the animal, wakening in man ;" the Universe, in fact, is but an infinite series of homogeneous forms (as Leibnitz however, and for

that matter Aristotle too, had taught long before), developed under the triple pulse of expansion, subsumption, and reason-potency, into an ever-increasing perfectness.⁽⁸⁾

But while man and nature are thus intrinsically homogeneous, their *self-conscious* development is in proportion to their respective predominance in thought and being ; and as there is thought in all being, being in all thought, so must their ground-principle be at once objective and subjective, real and ideal.

To this absolute subject-object Schelling gave the name of Deity, and—need I add?—it is in humanity we are to discover the final perfection. To quote his own words, “man is the hero of the eternal epic composed by the divine intelligence.”

For the apprehension of this principle Schelling could only postulate, after the manner of Spinoza, a transcendental “intellectual intuition ;” neither could he, without the aid of that homely experience which he too affected to despise, account for the unequal distribution of Thought and Being, nor even with its aid determine the seemingly arbitrary law of their “processus,” or development.

In an absolute *à priori* construction this was indeed a grave defect, and Hegel undertook to remove it.

He seems to me to have taken up as it were the Kantian dialectic, which proves contradictory pro-

positions equally true, and from the very abyss of the resultant scepticism to have elicited at once the principle of Science, and the law of its development; finding in every—the very simplest—proposition, not alone an essential but an actually constitutive contradiction, whose necessary (?) evolution ultimately yields reality.⁽⁹⁾

Being, in its remotest undetermined phase, is thus identical with its opposite, nothing; here are thesis and antithesis (the Idea *in* itself and *out of* itself); and the necessary synthesis (the Idea *in* and *for* itself) of this antinomy is Becoming, which at length gives real determined Being, or Quality.⁽¹⁰⁾

To absolve his construction, moreover, from dualism, and the arbitrary distinction left by Schelling between the objects of Thought and Thought itself, Hegel adopts, instead of the duplicate terms Thought and Being, one only—"the Idea," or God.

The science of this Idea is called Logic, which determines its laws; the development, as we have seen, Reality, in the knowledge of which Science consists; and the fundamental law is the identity of contradictories.

Is this fundamental law subversive of common sense? Quite otherwise. Common sense requires a belief in the identity and diversity of the soul and body; in the co-existence of the divine prescience and the human will; nay more, in the personality and infinity of God Himself, His visibility

and invisibility ; in His creation of the world out of nothing ; above all, in His becoming Flesh.

The same law is illustrated by the Sciences in a thousand ways. Take "light," for example. We cannot conceive it apart from its opposite—darkness ; it encloses this contradictory element within itself, and engenders it in the very act of realising itself, in the act, *i.e.* of producing effective light, or colour.

In the human mind, again, we discover simple apprehension, which gives us the idea in itself,—the understanding, by which its contradictory elements are distinguished and opposed,—and lastly, the Reason, which harmonizes them, and thus gives the idea in its final stage, "in and for itself."

We can trace this process clearly enough in humanity also. Man exists first in a confused and undetermined way (the idea in itself). Soon there ensues an antagonism of instinct and reason, nature and will. Good—to be *really* good—at once requires and excludes the notion of evil ; the contradiction thus evolved between instinct and reason (the idea out of itself) is harmonized by the fact, that instinct is reason ignorant of itself, and in the ultimate fusion of the two (the idea in itself and for itself)—in the essential unity of their respective objects, virtue and happiness,—their fundamental identity, and, at the same time, the truth of Hegel's logic, is triumphantly established.

To ascend a little higher ;—Philosophy and

Religion are confessedly contradictory. But here again we have a mere intellectual contradiction which it is the function of Reason to synthesize. Both one and the other exhibit the operation of the same great law of development. In the case of Religion we find "the idea in itself" in the Oriental system, where man is alike ignorant of himself and the Object of his worship ; the Kosmos, man and God forming a confused whole, Nature. The Greek system is the idea "out of itself," where God is divided in an endless polytheism, opposed to man and to Himself. The third great moment, "the idea in and for itself," is found in Christianity, generated by the Oriental and the Greek, reproducing and identifying them. God, unknown to Himself in the clouded symbolism of the East, opposed to Himself in the conflicting powers of Olympus, returns upon Himself in Christianity, and in the act assumes self-consciousness and self-possession.

We are told on the other hand of certain mysteries inherent in Christianity. Apply the philosophical analysis of Hegel and they are solved at once. The profoundest of them all,—the doctrine of the Holy Trinity,—is the very principle of logic symbolized. The Father, the idea in itself,—the Son, the idea in its second moment, its visible manifestation,—the Spirit, the idea in its final stage, recognizing itself as identical throughout. For the three moments are truly enclosed in the

bosom of the Father, though as yet in a purely ideal form—i. Being or Power, ii. The Word, or Thought generated by Being, iii. Love proceeding from and combining the two. This ideal is realized by Creation, the Kingdom of the Son. It is reunited to its first principle by the Spirit, whereby the finite knows itself infinite, man knows himself to be God ; for the history of humanity reflects that of God, as a living logic (ideas and things being absolutely identical) ; in it God realizes Himself.⁽¹¹⁾

And thus it is the evident function of Philosophy, so far from conflicting with Religion, to demonstrate *logically* what she can only *dogmatically* assert ; so far from subverting, to *realize* the Kingdom of the Spirit by proving its mysteries to be but the absolute laws of things, and thereby to identify those intellectual contradictions, the finite and the infinite, God and Man.

Upon this philosophy it was that Strauss established his pantheistic Christology, by which not merely the authority of the Bible as a *supernatural* Revelation is repudiated, but the whole life of the Saviour upon earth is relegated to “the meteoric regions of idealism ;” the *moment* of confusion (or idea *in itself*) having its spontaneous expression in the Evangelists, the *moment* of contradiction in the negations of history and science, the *moment* of identity in the Hegelian reconciliation of Science and Religion.⁽¹²⁾

For from Hegel’s logic he easily deduces that

when God is spoken of as a Spirit, so far forth as man is spirit there is no possible distinction between them ; that God, once more, possesses no actuality (or *existence*, as Spinoza would term it) in his pure infinity or spirituality, but only when He shuts Himself in finite spirits, even as the finite spirit then alone apprehends eternal Truth (attains, in Spinoza's phrase, the intellectual love of God), when, returning upon its original self, it is immersed in the abysmal depths of the cognate co-essential Infinite. Hence, too, he derives the more familiar doctrines that Christ is to the educated mind no actual, historical person, but an abiding idea, combining God and Humanity—"the man-in-God and God-in-man"—that this Humanity, or the genus, man, is the true miracle-worker, the sinless one, through faith in whose death and resurrection the individual man is justified ; is made partaker, *i. e.* of the divino-human life of the genus at large, through the quickening influences of the idea of Humanity in itself.⁽¹³⁾

And in strict accordance with such strange chimæras we are even now assured that "by Adam's fall we must understand merely the circumscription of our spirits in the limits of flesh and time ;" by Regeneration, an "*awakening* of the forces of the soul ;" by the Resurrection of our Lord, "a spiritual quickening ;" by the kingdom of God, "the *realization* of the divine will in our thoughts and lives ;" "in which expression of spirit,

under its actual and formal aspect—akin generically to creation—we attain the truest conception of what vulgar theologians describe as ‘the Word made flesh ;’ for whosoever abides in love, abides in God and God in him.”

And should any one with simplicity enquire what we are to understand by the word God in the above definitions, let him know that “thought is consubstantial with the Being of the Eternal I AM ; that in being, becoming and animating, in substance, thought and conscious life, we find the expression of a Triad, which may also be designated as will, wisdom and love ; as fountain, stream and united flow ; as Father, Son and Spirit ; that in Jesus actually, but in mankind ideally, we must look for the express image of the Father.”⁽¹⁴⁾

To criticise the philosophic system which alone gives us the esoteric meaning of these dark sentences does not fall within my province.

I have been rather concerned to indicate its historic relation to Spinozism on the one hand and Neology on the other, to verify the pedigree in which it was originally presented to you as the daughter of the former and the parent of the latter.⁽¹⁵⁾

The weakness indeed of Hegel’s attempted *à priori* passage from the abstract to the concrete (responding to Spinoza’s *necessary* modal development) has been relentlessly exposed in the bitter sneer of his rejected Master : “Hegel’s idea,” says Schelling,

“one cannot tell why, but probably tired of its
“mere logical existence, takes it into its head to
“resolve itself into its *momenta*, in order to explain
“Creation.”⁽¹⁶⁾

The extravagance of his assumptions too has been amply displayed both by Schelling and others.

But there is, notwithstanding, one point in his construction which I feel called upon to scrutinize somewhat rigorously ; partly because of its direct bearing upon the great question of a supernatural Revelation, and partly because upon it Hegel professes to deviate from Spinoza.

I allude to the precise aspect under which Deity is presented in his system.

For he charges Spinoza with neglecting the modern principle of Subjectivity, and thereby reducing the Divine Being to a mere abstract necessity ; I wish, then, to ascertain whether Hegel has made any real advance upon Spinoza's impersonal, self-developing *Causa sui*, which (at once finite and infinite, relative and absolute) I have described above as containing the germ of Fichte's absolute subjective idealism.

I am fully entitled, too, to demand of Hegel the precise nature of that Idea, or logical notion, upon which he bestows the Holiest Name ; for professing an absolute Science, he claims, of course, an adequate knowledge of the Divine Essence.

His reply is not devoid of ambiguity.

“The idea of Being,” or “Being,” must be contemplated first in its primitive state, while as yet

undeveloped, in those constitutive laws which *Logic* reveals, or rather as equivalent to its opposite, Nothing, according to the great fundamental law of identity in contradiction,—as “God in Himself.”

In the next place, under the necessary operation of this same law, it is seen developing itself, *i. e.* laying bare its enclosed element of contradiction; a process which the *Philosophy of Nature* conducts for us across the boundless scale of phenomena, during which stage it is the idea “out of, at variance with, ignorant of itself.”

Lastly, it is to be regarded as “returning upon, becoming conscious of, and at unity with, itself,” something after the manner of Schelling’s subsumption, and is then mind,—the idea “in and for itself;” the science of which synthesis is the *Philosophy of Mind*.

This “profoundest analysis,” as it is termed, with an air of superior wisdom, by the Neologian writer from whom I have recently quoted,⁽¹⁷⁾ plainly reduces us to one of two alternatives:—to regard Deity either as the Idea in itself, or as the Idea in and for itself; either, *i. e.* in the primitive or in the final stage of the *processus*.

Of the former alternative Oken has given us the true formula; for Being, or Deity, is then confessedly equivalent to Zero; and I am almost inclined to agree with Heine, that it was a wholesome dread of the civil power which deterred Hegel from stating his real opinion more explicitly to this effect.⁽¹⁸⁾

Be this as it may, there is certainly no subjectivity in a conception of Being so undetermined, so purely abstract, so stripped of every form of existence as to be the precise equivalent of Nothing.

Assuming the other alternative, contemplating the Idea, *i. e.* after it has thus started from Zero and acquired full vitality and perfection by the infinite repetitions of its primitive evolution, we are committed to the curious absurdity, that what is posited as the Absolute or Perfect Being is compelled, by an inexorable dialectic law, to disintegrate and differentiate itself ere it can (by returning finally upon itself as God or Infinite Mind) attain vitality and a consummate Perfection.

But waiving this objection, I now merely enquire what increased *subjectivity* attaches to Deity, as such, in this its final stage of development ?

To such a query, "None whatever" is the only possible reply. The *word* Deity remains as a sign, but the thing signified has lost all subjective reality. The infinite mind is a mere abstract name for the infinite series of individual minds into which it has been disintegrated ; *they*, indeed, are invested with a subjectivity so intense that they can even comprehend individually the eternal process of the Idea, but then they successively decay, they fail, they die, when others, with an equal subjectivity, appear ; finite, they severally comprise the infinite ; manifold, they severally enclose the *ens simplicissimum* ; essential Deity, they severally perish !

“The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God;” and when that awful Being is, in words, asserted to possess a subjective concrete individuality, and yet so essentially unified with the innumerable creatures of His hand as to form their purely abstract aggregate, the potential term for their possible actuality; nay, to become self-conscious with each, with each to sicken and die, then indeed, even against Hegel, one cannot but recall the pithy aphorism of Hobbes, that “words are the counters of wise men but the money of fools.”

To sum up the results of the preceding discussion: When once Spinoza was betrayed into granting *reality*, in any sense of the word, to his determined attributes and finite modes, that moment the reality of his absolute undetermined Substance vanished, and his attempt to unify scientifically the Infinite and the Finite at once broke down; and when Fichte, adopting and transforming the scepticism of Kant, sought to evolve all Being and all Knowledge from the Subject, he did so only by the virtual negation of both God and Nature; and if the *processus* of Schelling suggested, and the Hegelian dialectic systematized, the identification of Nature and Man, yet the Infinite still remained un-fused, un-reduced, un-unified—the passage from the unconditioned to the conditioned still unbridged.

And thus, after manifold wanderings of thought, we are brought back to the original impotency, to

conclude as before that the so-called unification of the Many and the One is but another name for the absorption of either of the two into the other ; that Pantheism encloses, and by its very nature must develop, the germ either of that Mysticism which denies the human Will, and therefore the real, personal existence of the Finite, or the thinly-veiled Atheism which finds in eternally-modified Substance, or Reason-potency, or generic Humanity, the unfathomable fulness of self-conscious, self-possessing Deity.

Let me add, that the grand movement of Indian and Alexandrine Pantheism has ever been in the former direction,—practically deadening individual responsibility, energy, and growth ;⁽¹⁹⁾ while that of the modern Occidental School, reflecting in some sort the independent spirit of the age, now exhibits an equally pronounced tendency towards Atheism.

I think, too, that Spinoza may be regarded as a fair representative of the transition period.

By birth and education a Jew, he yet had caught the note of freedom which in his day aroused the slumbering thought of Christendom ; had been with blasphemous curses excommunicated by his brethren for the assertion of that right of private judgment which Oriental apathy knew not, nor cared to know ; and while reviving in his theory of eternally-developed attributes the mystic emanations of Plotinus, he had yet subverted, as we have seen, his own fundamental hypothesis, by the very

earnestness of his practical appeal to the hearts and consciences of those "eternally-fixed modal expressions of substance" for whom he wrote.⁽²⁰⁾

I believe, finally, that if Hegel infused aught of subjectivity into his conception of Deity, he did so simply by pushing to its logical extreme the atheistic *tendency* already contained in Spinoza's construction. In that he not alone claimed for the finite intellect a suicidal faculty of conceiving the Infinite materially as well as formally, but also absolutely transubstantiated the one into the other, and this by a process at once absurd and logical ; for the finite and the infinite mind are contradictory terms, and as such, by his fundamental dialectic law, identical ; and his subjective God is but the interminably multiplied image of that fantastic idol described by the Roman poet, "*Naturæ deus humanæ, mortalis in unum Quodque caput,*" than which nothing can be more absurd.

I trust that I have thus far made good my proposed task ; that I have sufficiently traced the connecting links between the philosophy of Hegel and the Neologian theories of inspiration and exegesis ; and further proved the essential identity of the former with Spinoza's construction.

If so, and that my criticism of that construction is valid, then I am entitled to assert the greater reasonableness, to say the least, of man's primitive belief in a personal God distinct from His works, and therefore to pronounce the Neologian rational-

istic method philosophically unsound, and its advocates, *so far forth as they are true to their first principles*, the very reverse of rational.⁽²¹⁾

For disregarding for the time the powerful argument for the Personality of God supplied by the religious instincts of mankind, I have ascertained that while Reason, counselled by that experience which Pantheism vainly affects to deny, gives with irrecusable force the Perfect Being and the imperfect, the finite and the Infinite, their scientific unification remains a problem which has baffled alike the dialectic subtleties of Hegel and the geometric of Spinoza.

In my subsequent Lectures I hope to shew that this method is *unnecessary* too, that our choice, *i. e.* in Biblical interpretation does not lie between it and Predestinarianism, as its English advocates have assumed throughout. So far from this, it seems clear to me that while Neology represents under its philosophic aspect the Occidental, Predestinarianism revives—and in a most repulsive form—the Oriental phase of Pantheism ; both striving after an unattainable unity, the one by the virtual denial of the Infinite Personality, the other of the Finite ; and both accordingly to be regarded as vicious extremes, in the mean between which, if anywhere, Truth is to be found.⁽²²⁾

Nor does the familiar proverb of the meeting of extremes fail of illustration in the teaching of these schools upon the great problem of the genesis of

the imperfect and sinful by the Perfect Being in whom both profess to believe ; in their common distortion of those consolatory truths which His Word reveals concerning the relations subsisting for man between the fleeting and the permanent, the earthly life and that which is to come, between Eternity and its "mobile image," Time.⁽²³⁾

Upon this topic, the most vitally-important in its practical bearings, as in its speculative character the most deeply interesting upon which the human mind can dwell, I desire now, in proof of the foregoing assertion, and as a fitting conclusion to this portion of my subject, to say a few words.

Casting our eyes upon the phenomena presented by Experience, and contemplating the problem of Being under this its narrower aspect, we find ourselves surrounded by difficulties, all tending to confirm the common Pantheistic notion of an impersonal or arbitrary, rather than a moral and intelligible order of things,—to estrange us from faith in a righteous and sympathetic Father, and present in His stead a stern and inexorable Necessity, as the ultimate principle and main-spring of the Universe.

Let us examine for a moment the action of what, by a sort of pious euphemism, we call Nature.

We perceive on every side certain types of her development, generic forms of Being for whose conservation she provides with lavish exuberance ; nay, with an apparent wastefulness of resources that

betrayed one of our profoundest thinkers into the suggestion of an analogy which would seem subversive of morality and natural piety in exact proportion to its truth.⁽²⁴⁾

With all this care for the species, how does she deal with its individual members? Physically, their value in her eyes is apparently as nothing.

Some she suffers to fulfil a few short cycles of her eternally-revolving wheel, wherein to gather consciousness of powers scarce maturing ere they have begun to decay; upon others an unwitting, it may be, or inevitable transgression of her implacable laws entails pitiless suffering, untimely death.

Again, she gives to man profuse capacities for happiness, intense affections, emotions deep and tender, nor fails to provide for each a corresponding object. And here at least, it will be said, we may hope for some approach to sympathy from the Great Mother. Alas! who amongst us has "left his youth behind," and failed to know that herein she but spreads before him, for the furtherance of her larger ends, a Sicilian feast, over which the fatal sword is suspended evermore; that man's adaptation for intenser pleasures is but another term to designate his capacity for intenser pains. Here, then, once more, we find the well-being of the individual sternly subordinated to the so-called "higher laws;" and thus we have confronting us an unintelligible amount of physical evil, with its adjunct mental

distress, inflicted by some higher and to all appearance unsympathizing power.

It would be well if this were all. There still remains the dark problem of moral evil. I do not mean so much its existence generally, but rather those inequalities, congenital or otherwise, in its distribution, which seem to involve a contemptuous disregard for the good (*i. e.* in this instance, the moral well-being) of this or that individual as compared with that of the species.

To express the same ideas in metaphysical language ;—we are pressed to account to ourselves for the “fall of the Absolute”—for the development of the Unconditioned and Perfect Being into imperfect and endlessly-conditioned forms ; a knot which Pantheism, unable to solve, cuts, as we have seen, by slightly-modified hypotheses of the *necessary* inherence in Being of an infinitely-diversified activity ;—hypotheses ambitiously purporting to be *à priori*, but whose most essential notions,—of activity, *e. g.* and concrete life,—are simply unacknowledged loans from the *data à posteriori* of Experience.⁽²⁵⁾

Now even apart from Revelation I think I can see that the existence of Evil, metaphysical, physical, or moral, *considered in the abstract*, is not inconsistent with, and under one phase at least demands, the belief in a Personal God, the moral Governor of the Universe.⁽²⁶⁾

While far from adopting as an adequate solu-

tion Malebranche's theory of the "necessary simplicity of the Divine ways," so keenly criticised by Bayle, as implying what Bolingbroke styles "an absorption of God's moral in his natural attributes," I can readily acquiesce with the great Leibnitz, in regarding every evil as the necessary condition of a greater good, and his consequent inference that, "when we take into account every kind of good, metaphysical, physical, and moral, God will be found to have realized the greatest possible good."⁽²⁷⁾

As to metaphysical evil or imperfection (which in point of fact involves the other two), unless we accept the delusion of the Oriental Sankhyist or the Calvinist, and deny to man a distinct personal essence, we must admit that the created moral being, as such, is necessarily imperfect, and therefore subject to physical defect, which is pain—to moral defect, which is sin; and having learned the impotence of Reason to account for the passage from the abstract to the concrete, to explain why *anything* should, as a matter of fact, exist rather than *nothing*, we may well shrink from dogmatizing *à priori* upon the goodness or badness of such an exercise of the Perfect Being's power, from intemperately vilifying, as too many well-intentioned people do, His work; and rather recognize in imperfection a condition not only, from the nature of the case, inevitable, but also tending ultimately to a richer, fuller good, and apart from which, in-

deed, the very term Perfection would be, to our conditioned intellects, an unintelligible sound.

And returning to the sphere of experience, I am able, with regard to physical evil, to arrive slowly, it may be, but surely, at the conviction that, if every element be taken into account, if the good things of this life be fairly weighed against the bad, bright-eyed hopes against despair, the quick thrill of joy against the sullen throb of pain, a certain calm content, too, against the austere labour which at the call of Duty gives it birth, the preponderance of the former will still attest the goodness of the Lord.

And, lastly, as to moral evil I ought perhaps only to repeat what I have already said, and what in such discussions has been strangely overlooked, that while I cannot, on the one hand, comprehend the procession of the imperfect from the Perfect Being, yet neither, on the other, can I conceive of good apart from evil; that progress is for me a relative word; that the intelligent conception of a Universe in which all things should lie in one uniform level of absolute perfection is for me impossible, for therein virtue would be the precise equivalent of inertion, motion of rest, being of nothing, life of death.⁽²⁸⁾ But I will go further than this, and humbly thank my God that even by my clouded eye there should be now discernible far more of healthy growth than of decay, far more of pious kindliness than wanton cruelty, of homely virtuous energy

than stagnant vice ;—that in the moral world, too, evil is but the necessary condition of a greater good.⁽²⁹⁾

But when I leave this abstract view of the subject and consider particular instances, when I take up the case of this man or that, then, I confess, anomalies press upon me of a most startling and bewildering kind.

Not to enlarge now upon the partial pressure of physical and mental suffering, I can perceive an inequality in moral and spiritual things which perplexes me still more. I can see many living and dying surrounded by every accessory tending to promote, many by every accessory tending to deaden and destroy, all spiritual life and growth in virtue ; and that social organization which is an irresistibly determining law of the species, fraught with incalculable and apparently inevitable moral evil to multitudes of its constituent members.⁽³⁰⁾ I can even see not a few instances of congenital depravity, of evil habits quite unconsciously contracted, which seem to baffle all curative agencies whatsoever.

This, then, constitutes my real difficulty ;—to reconcile, not the existence of moral evil generally, but its anomalous distribution, with the belief in a God whose judgments of old are righteousness and truth.

Here my own reason leaves me resourceless.

I turn to the great thinkers of former days. The

best and wisest cherish the belief in the soul's immortality and a future retribution, but they leave unsolved the difficulty which most perplexes me.

The few true worshippers are to attain, say they, a better life, the many thyrsus-bearers to be visited with punishments more or less grotesque ; there is to be no *advance* in the condition of the mass,—rather the reverse,—no equitable consideration for their extenuating circumstances ; the enigma of their original genesis by a God just and merciful remains unsolved.⁽³¹⁾

My own reason fails to untie this knot ; the wisest of heathen philosophers give me no essential aid.

Yet have I one resource still left.

It is a book revealing truths which my unaided reason could never have attained.

It tells me of a Gospel,—*i. e.* of good tidings for mankind, for such is really the meaning of the original word,—it tells me of One whose form is like unto the Son of God, who hath brought life and immortality to light,—of One who hath come down from on high to fetch me, to take me out of many waters,—whose tender mercy is over all his works.

I spring to the hope that in this gospel, this assured immortality, is to be found the long-sought clue ; that the efficient cause of those perplexing anomalies is but transient, that death is but the threshold of a higher life, in which men shall be

no longer tempted by the startling incongruities of the present dispensation to forsake their Heavenly Father for the Scepticism of scornful indifference or of despair.

But I am going on too fast. The oracle indeed has spoken, but I must not forget that its utterances have been variously interpreted,—nay, still continue to engage conflicting schools in grave and eager controversy, albeit some 1800 years have rolled away since it has ceased to speak.

Of two of these hermeneutic schools I ventured to affirm just now that the principle upon which they relied was philosophically unsound, and that while severally representing the vicious extremes, to one or other of which that principle, consistently pursued, must lead, they yet converged, as extremes proverbially will do, in their misinterpretation of those most solemn voices of the oracle which speak to man of the relation subsisting for him between Eternity and Time.

I have since pointed out, with plainness of speech but befitting reverence, I trust, that which in the course and constitution of things temporal tends most of all to perplex and trouble me, that which most of all desiderates for its solution supernatural aid.

A few words now will suffice to shew how both these schools would fain make void my faith in better things to come, how Revelation in their hands fails to shed one ray of light upon my sorest difficulty.

How does Neology, for example, deal with this distressing problem? One of its recent exponents hints, indeed, at the probable absorption, in the ages to come, of what he is pleased to designate "neutral souls," and the re-appearance in conscious life of the few true worshippers alone; but he knows, or ought to know, that in this feeble compromise he is as false to the ground-principle of his system as to the Platonic theory which he caricatures.⁽³²⁾

Another, with more candour, assures me, like certain babblers of old, that the Resurrection is past already,—with more candour, I say, and with infinitely more consistency; for the right faith of his "philosophic creed" is not in the enduring consciousness of this soul or of that, be it virtuous, neutral, or vicious, but in the immortality of humanity at large;—an immortality as of the forest-leaves, as of the ever-gushing fountain, in which all distinct personality is dissolved by death. In plain words, his creed perpetuates throughout all generations, for the individual man, the anomalies which press upon him here, with a force at times well-nigh intolerable. Such is the Neologian Gospel, truly "a gospel of death."⁽³³⁾

And what, in the next place, is the solution offered by the Predestinarian? Is he at all disquieted by these oppressive anomalies? Does he, perhaps, look to the Redeemer's world-embracing sacrifice for a clue to these terrible enigmas? Oh!

no. He boldly takes the anomalies themselves as the basis of his calculation, and in his manipulation intensifies and exasperates them a thousand-fold ; alas ! why say a thousand-fold ? The ratio is terribly indefinite—it is that of a few short years to the unimaginable cycles of Eternity. He speaks not, like the faltering Neologian, of a re-absorption of imperfectly-developed germs into the bosom of the Great Father. His is a conscience more robust. The few true worshippers, according to his creed, by an arbitrary election are holy upon earth and happy after death ; the many thyrsus-bearers, by a parallel decree, are vicious upon earth, and after death shall be condemned by the Great Father to pay the penalty of their involuntary genesis and the actual transgressions it entailed.

And should one haply remonstrate, that the moment *punishment* is spoken of as the eternal and remorseless requital for the inflexibly predestined transgression of beings thus generated, that moment *justice* ceases to be predicable of their Progenitor ; that the moment we fail to look, with steadfast faith in the Redeemer's sacrifice, to the great future for a reduction of the bewildering anomalies which confront us here, that moment the black abyss of Pyrrhonism yawns beneath our feet ;—then, indeed, is the triumph of the Predestinarian complete ; fearlessly then he plunges into that abyss, and revels in its mystic gloom ; tells us, if he adopt the tone of the pietist simpleton,

that our reason is ruined, our moral sense hopelessly deranged ; or should he affect philosophy, then he reminds us that the Absolute is for us incognizable, the Infinite an unintelligible negation,—that as the human mind can only think the relative, human morality must be (in cleverly-distorted Kantian phrase) relative and phenomenal merely ; and therefore, as divine morality is absolute and eternal, that nothing can be more presumptuous than for finite beings to attempt, with their puny standard, to measure the infinite justice of God.⁽³⁴⁾

Fatuous man ! who perceives not that if in morality the Finite be thus posited in sharp antithesis to the Infinite, if the eternal distinctions of right and wrong be for him thus incognizable, if he can *know* nothing to be essentially and eternally “more true than false, more fair than foul, more good than bad,” then the very ground of his faith and hope has been cut away from under his feet. For how can he any longer *know* whether what is vice in Time may not be virtue in Eternity, whether what seems Truth to the finite may not be false to the Infinite Intelligence, whether the very luxury of bliss he dreams of upon earth as his predestined heritage may not prove the fierce intensity of an unimaginable agony in heaven, whether “the Written Word” itself may not be a predetermined mockery? Nay, if finite morality differ, as he consistently

asserts, from infinite morality *in kind* as well as in degree, then such appalling results can no more remain for him a question of evenly-poised incertitude, *the presumption must lie wholly in their favour.*⁽³⁵⁾

These, again, are the issues—incompatible alike with morality, and piety, and common sense—to which the predestinarian method of interpretation (sustained so far by the Hamiltonian Theodicy) is committed; these the relations between Time and Eternity, between the phenomenal and the real,—these, in fine, “the glad tidings of great joy for all people,” elicited by its exegetical canon from the voices of the Oracle.

I hope in the sequel to supply satisfactory proof that if we reject the predestinarian hermeneutics we are not therefore bound to accept the Neologian; to bring before you certain Scriptural facts which establish the existence in the domain of Grace of laws equally impartial, equally intelligible, with those that dominate the world of Nature; to deduce therefrom the irresistible inference, that acceptance with God in Eternity shall proximately depend, not on the arbitrary imputation of an absolute perfection, but upon the actual conduct of each moral agent, estimated by the precise amount of moral freedom he individually enjoyed, and by the conditions, whether favourable or adverse, under which it was exercised in Time.

At present I will only observe, that the language of my Text seems to indicate, and not obscurely, the same consolatory relation between Time and Eternity, as a direct result of the incarnation and sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ.

God, saith St. Paul, conniving at the ignorance of those who have never heard of a Redeemer's name, shall judge the world in righteousness by that Man whom He hath appointed. This, once and again, he states to be his *Gospel*, thus far, at least, solving for us the awful mystery of the God-man taking our nature upon Him, of His having been in all points tempted like as we are, of His sounding to its lowest depths our frail humanity ; even that *as man* He might not only succour us when tempted, but *as man* also He might be our Judge.⁽³⁶⁾

“ Deep answereth to deep,” and if we would possess our souls in peace, in that judgment we should also seek a clue for the mysterious anomalies which perplex us here ; humbly but steadfastly assured that *there* the species shall lose its importance, the individual alone shall be regarded,—that there, at length, the MORAL shall triumph over the PHYSICAL, the PERSONAL over the IMPERSONAL.

And if the idle word shall be remembered, neither shall the cup of cold water be forgotten in that day.

And if one endowed on earth with the loftiest

spiritual gifts — faith to remove mountains, prophecy to speak with the tongues of angels — may haply be rejected, yet may the crucified thief be deemed worthy of the joy of his Lord.⁽⁸⁷⁾

The mysterious depravation resulting from the disobedience of the first Adam has been more than neutralized, as we know, by the perfect obedience of “the Lord from heaven.”

The gift of the Spirit which He thereby also obtained for men is one unequally distributed, like every other gift of God, but for whose use He himself assures us a strict account shall hereafter be required.

Thus whosoever shall be accepted in that day shall owe such acceptance to the Redeemer’s perfect work,—but for which, in Eternity as in Time, “the fathers had eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth been set on edge;” while the rejected shall bitterly confess that to their own wilful transgression is their condemnation due, and to that alone; for as individual moral agents shall they be judged, and according to that which they had, not that which they had not.

In what that rejection, in what that acceptance shall consist, let us not presumptuously attempt to determine. Among the older Jews the destruction by the flood of the giant-race, with whom the Spirit of God had so long striven in vain, supplied a symbol for the future punishment of the wicked

—those ancient Rephaim who still wailed beneath the waters, whom the prophet's marvellous imagery pourtrays as rising from their thrones to hail the advent of an impious King, now become weak as they.⁽³⁸⁾

With the Jews "of the second Temple," again, the type was found in the unquenched fires of the thrice-polluted vale of Hinnom.⁽³⁹⁾

And to express the bliss of the redeemed, the poverty of sensuous symbol is likewise of necessity employed.

Undying melodies shed by golden harps,—a voice as it were of many waters, throbbing from aisle to thrilling aisle of the celestial temple; or, again, the fiery brilliance of all precious stones, flashing back the shadowless radiance of Him who is that temple's light, the intensest splendour of its quenchless glory!

For us let it suffice to know that in that world there shall be conscious life for all, that there it shall be better for the good, and worse for the wicked; and if that knowledge is to possess for us its full practical value, if the doctrine is to command a rational and vital belief,—not that chronic lethargy of "otiose assent," as dangerous, perhaps, to the higher order of intellects as the fever-fit of doubt itself,—then to know, too, as a truth intelligible and unquestionable alike, that if the inequalities of Time are not (as the Neologian teaches) final, far less shall they be perpetuated in eternity;

that our individual destinies shall be there determined by no foregone conclusion—no mockery of justice;⁽⁴⁰⁾ that no place shall be found for arbitrary love, or its dread but inseparable shadow, arbitrary hate, with Him who “cometh to judge the earth, with righteousness to judge the world and the people with his Truth.”

LECTURE IV.

JOB, xiii. 15, 16.

“ Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him : but I will maintain my own ways before him. He shall be my salvation.”

WE are assured by one of the keenest observers of life and manners that there is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. The truth embodied in these words is capable of considerable amplification.

The great majority of mankind cannot, indeed, hope for that buoyant tide, which, if caught, will bear them on its flood to the haven of renown ; but, on the other hand, a certain amount of advancement is possible for all ; and, in the battle of life, this is attained, as a rule, by those who carefully mark, and habitually avail themselves of the opportunities within their reach, and thus gradually acquire a controlling power over that force of

circumstances which seems to regulate the destinies of weaker men.

It is by no means uncommon to hear one whose life has been a failure attribute his want of success to every cause but the true one ; to inexperience, for instance, to the bad example of others, to the neglect of his friends, and, above all, to a combination of unfortunate circumstances ; a more candid retrospect would detect the true cause in his disregard, whether from the love of pleasure, or from sheer indolence, of certain golden opportunities, which, when seized, are sure to fructify a hundred-fold, when lost, cannot recur ; from neglecting, in short, to take at the flood that tide, which, in the qualified sense above suggested, leads on to fortune.

Action is the normal condition of Being,⁽¹⁾ and the Creator, with His wonted beneficence, has invested many things with interest and high value in the eyes of men, thus enabling them to escape the misery of an objectless or a mere animal existence. *Power*, of whatever kind,—be it social, physical, artistic, political, intellectual,—hereby becomes, in itself and in its accessories, a desirable thing ; its opposite the reverse. It is pursued, unconsciously perhaps, even by those who affect to despise it. It is attainable, of course, by different individuals in almost infinitely different degrees ; yet one law pervades this diversity,—the necessity to success of individual exertion. None are by circumstance so high, and none so low, as to be incapable of some

progress in power, some retrogression ; and all alike have the result, to a certain determinate extent, placed by God in their own hands.

I say to a certain extent, because the faculties of finite creatures are necessarily restricted, both in themselves and in the sphere of their operations. All I mean to assert is this, that within these limits, prescribed ultimately by the Infinite Being, His finite creatures, possessed of will and choice, hold their advancement or deterioration in their own hands. The distinction hereby postulated between absolute and relative causal power may seem unimportant at first sight, but it is not really so ; for a want of discrimination upon this simple point has led, I think, to very serious error, and a vast amount of confusion of thought, as well in other things as, above all, in theological controversy.

For here is sure to occur the general necessitarian objection, that to claim for man an independent, and, as it were, initiative power, is “*contrary to reason*, which recognizes in every act the necessity for an antecedent cause.”

And particularly in theology we are assured, that “human liberty, or a power to act or not to act, to do this or another thing, under the same causes, is atheistical and impossible ;” and, again, the great Calvinistic authority upon this subject does not hesitate to assert, that “the scheme of “free-will (by affording an exception to that dictate of common sense which refers every event

“ to a cause) would destroy the proof, *à posteriori*,
“ for the being of God.”⁽²⁾

It is a sort of lurking impression of this kind, I have no doubt, which commends, if not the Calvinistic theology, at least some more or less feeble modification of it, to so many pious minds ; a feeling that independent action in man is an impossibility, that its assertion directly tends to Atheism.

It may be well, then, to examine here the real value of this floating impression, and in doing so, I shall freely avail myself of the general results already attained in the discussion of the Pantheistic philosophy.

Let me premise, however, that my argument shall be directed rather against those predestinarian theologians who recognize the existence of a Personal God, than against the necessitarian philosophers, of whom I cannot predicate with certainty any such belief. With the latter I am not now concerned, and though in direct antagonism, so far as absolute predestinarianism is concerned, with the former, our common belief in a God, Infinite, and yet distinct withal from Creation, may so far define the conditions of the question as to admit the hope of its decisive solution.

In discussing the profound metaphysical problem of the co-existence of the Finite with the Infinite Being, I pointed out that the attempted unification of the two by the Pantheist must ultimately precipitate us either into that Mysticism

which annihilates the finite personality, or the virtual Atheism which denies the real, personal existence of the Infinite.

Now, closely analogous to and merging in this higher problem is the co-operation of the Finite and the Infinite Will.

How the Infinite Being could have created the Finite without either diminishing from or adding to His original Perfection is to the intellect of man an insoluble enigma. That he has created it, and that His own Being, with all its perfections of Omniscience, Omnipresence, and similar attributes, remains still a metaphysical necessity, are conclusions which we have seen, I think, to be incontrovertible.⁽³⁾ In the same way, the co-existence of the Finite Will with the Infinite is to the intellect a contradiction perhaps, and yet to deny the real existence and operation of the one or the other must lead either to the Mysticism or the Atheism which Reason, chastened and informed by experience, equally repudiates.⁽⁴⁾

The imperfect being then confessedly exists by the side of, and without impairing or diminishing in ought the irrecusable perfections of the Absolute Being ; the Finite Will, by an analogy which it is impossible to invalidate, exists by the side of, and without detracting in ought from the Omnipotence, Omniscience, or other attributes of the Infinite.

Why the Perfect Being should have created the imperfect, and why he should have determined

upon the precise degree of imperfection attaching to the latter, and neither less nor more, we cannot tell, but we know by an irresistible intuition that the fact is so. *How* again he communicated to that Being an existence distinct from His own we cannot tell; the essence of life and its primitive causal process—for all the notable speculations of the Hegelian school—remains as yet, at least, an undetected mystery; that He has done so is an admitted fact, while His own independent and infinite existence is a truth also admitted by my opponent, and which so far from contradicting Reason, Reason, in the truest sense of that much-abused word, imperatively demands.

Why and how He should have communicated an initiative and independent Will to the finite Being is alike unknown. To assert, by parity of reasoning, that experience proves Him to have done so, might be termed a *petitio principii*; but this I do most strenuously affirm, that the *à priori* objection to such an assertion urged by any believer in a Personal and Infinite God, possesses not a whit more weight than a general objection against the distinct co-existence of the finite and sinful Being with the admittedly existing Infinite. In the one case, however, the evidence of experience and common sense proves irresistible to all save a few visionaries; the supersensuous nature of the other, by precluding such evidence, has too often

opened a door for the wildest excesses of Mysticism.⁽⁵⁾

I have already directed your attention to the curious affinities discoverable between the otherwise conflicting schools of Pantheism and Predestinarianism. In the denial by the latter system of the independent finite Will, we may at once detect another of these dangerous approximations ; for every argument alleged by the Calvinist against the real existence of a finite will may be retorted by the Pantheist in corroboration of his own dogma of the impossibility of a *Deus transiens*—a Personal God—distinct from Creation.⁽⁶⁾

The analogy I have suggested may be impugned upon the plea that the distinct existence of the finite Being, which experience reveals, is not precisely parallel to the independent existence of the finite will. But it is quite exact enough for my argument. The real personal individuality of the finite Being, if not synonymous (as I believe it to be) is at least essentially interwoven with his possession of a Will ; if the one, therefore, be thus essentially distinct from the Creator,—a *surrender of which distinction commits us at once to the Deus immanens of Pantheism*,—then so must the other ; and if essentially distinct, then from the very necessity of the case, independent and free.

I say, from the necessity of the case, because it is obviously impossible to conceive of a distinct Will which is not, by its very nature, essentially

and radically independent so far forth as it exists, —and as such, possessed, within the prescribed limits, of an initiative causal power.

And this brings me to the pith and marrow of the entire question. Such an assertion of human liberty, I am told, is “atheistical, and contrary to that dictate of common sense which refers every event to an antecedent cause.” The force of this reasoning I shall readily admit when my opponent gives me anything like an intelligible *à priori* definition of what he terms a First Cause. We have seen the result of the Pantheist’s contempt for experience, and assumption of an adequate knowledge of the possibilities of things. If we would avoid being betrayed into his suicidal inferences, let us shrink from emulating such *à priori* dogmatism.

The necessity of the causal judgment has been wisely withdrawn by the profoundest of our modern thinkers from the domain of discursive reasoning and logical demonstration.

We must be content to accept it as one of the “primary beliefs,” as an immediate intuition of Reason.

But of this I am convinced, that its *realization* by the mind as such, depends in the first instance upon internal experience of the obedience rendered by the volitions to the finite Will ; the latent truth thus actualized being fortified subsequently by that habitual observation of external orderly

sequences into which Hume vainly attempted to resolve it.

Of this, too, I feel assured, that with the expanding consciousness of our own *incompleteness*, and, *à fortiori*, that of all other empirically-given agencies, Reason, relying upon the truth already realized in the concrete as upon a steadfast basis, suggests and ultimately compels the belief in a no less real Absolute Cause,—*i. e.* in a Cause whose relation to the finite the logical faculty cannot define, (the Absolute standing in no intelligible *logical* proportion to the Relative) *i. e.* once more, *in an infinite causal Power co-existent with the finite.*⁽⁷⁾

The co-existence of the Finite and the Infinite Will is thus only a subordinate phase of THE ONE MYSTERY, whose irreducible elements mature Reason, counselled by experience, compels us to accept as parallel, and (so far as we can judge) indissolubly correlated realities.

A subordinate phase, I say, but to the believer in a supernatural Revelation, and the “Personal God” which it presupposes, one of the very last importance.

As no imaginable co-acervation of finite causes can ever yield that absolute cause which Reason (however illogically) craves, so does the *living reality* of this her largest and loftiest intuition well forth from the fundamental concrete intuition of the finite Will, apart from which the causal judgment—with that sublimest Truth which it evolves—had

been to man as sound to the deaf, or colour to the blind. And as it is this causal power that constitutes man a moral, personal agent, even so it is from this that he springs to the cognate conception of a Personal God.⁽⁸⁾

It is the function of Reason (as distinct from reasoning) to realize for man two co-existent verities—the Finite and the Infinite Being. Their scientific unification Pantheism has ever striven to attain, but only to precipitate its followers down the steep of logical inference into the gulf either of Mysticism or of Atheism.

When claiming therefore for the finite Will an initiative power, I renounce thus far the false and dangerous paths of Pantheism; I turn from her barren logic to the fruitful intuitions of Reason.

But in doing so I humbly admit my inability either to define *à priori* causal power, or to demonstrate the necessity of the causal judgment; I profess not to explain the logical relation of the finite causal agency to the Infinite.

I only know that Reason realizes both these truths for me, and the latter in *essential*, though illogical, connexion with the former.

Do I then, in claiming an initiative power for the human Will, “destroy the proof *à posteriori* for the existence of a God”? Far otherwise.

I place it upon a *real* instead of an illusive basis. For if the finite causal power be indeed an illusion, then the Absolute Cause, which apart from it were

to me simply an unintelligible sound, an impossible conception, must be *à fortiori* an illusion, and the remorseless scepticism of Hume my only legitimate alternative.

Do I invalidate in any degree that proof? Quite the reverse. I but relieve it from the fatal flaw which the dialectic subtlety of Kant detected in it when alleged in the way of logical argumentation.

For in *this* process there must ever be more in the conclusion than in the premisses; finite effects can never give,—in logical relation,—an Infinite Cause.⁽⁹⁾

These considerations will enable us, I trust, to set aside as invalid the *à priori* objections to an initiative power (within prescribed limits) in the finite Will, and to more than exonerate the dogma from the atheistic tendencies with which it has been so rashly charged.

It was a thing to be expected, indeed, that Hegel should confound Logic with Metaphysics; let us, warned by the failure of such a splendid intellect, shrink from attempting to reduce the necessary intuitions of Reason to a scientific unity.

Assuming this abstract objection, then, of the necessitarian theologian to be at least completely neutralized, we may resume the consideration of human conduct under its concrete aspect, as indicated by actual experience.

With her for an assessor, and the judgment thus unbiassed, the decision of the question cannot remain long doubtful.

The practical truth of man's free-will is inscrutable, no doubt, and like the cognate intuition of a Divine First Cause, incapable alike of demonstration or definition,—for “in the image of God made He man,”—but the irrecusable axiom, “I ought, therefore I can,” evolved by his most intimate, most profoundly conscious experience, still assures the unprejudiced man that he possesses, in his finite sphere, an initiative power of individual action, which exalts him to the dignity of a responsible moral agent.

And when, after such introspection, he consults the phenomena of the external world, he finds this primitive judgment abundantly confirmed.

For,—to resume now my former line of argument,—the more closely we compare the existing condition with the antecedents of any one of our fellow-men, the more clearly do we recognize the truth that, after every legitimate allowance has been made on the score of favourable or adverse circumstances, his own individual action or inaction remains still an essential element of that his actual condition.

And the same law holds good, and is, perhaps, even more conclusively verified in the history of nations, the latter affording so much greater facility for correct generalization.

Let us recognize, on the one hand, the existence of an initiative causal power in the finite Being, and then, how numerous soever the disturbing

forces may be, how complicated the interpenetrating influences from within and from without, still *obligation* remains for men individually and in the aggregate, and all social and political duties repose upon a steadfast basis ; on the other hand, let us eliminate this power, and the result can only be a social and political chaos, which, as a continuous condition, *is contrary to experience.*⁽¹⁰⁾

We find, then, a certain *κόσμος* existing as a fact in the external moral world ; subject, indeed, like that of the physical creation, to rude convulsions at times, but still re-asserting its dominion over the reluctancy of mere brute force and baser instinct, and invariably triumphant in the end in such Olympian conflicts with the rude Titanic powers ; the vital principle, the only intelligible basis, of this *κόσμος* being the sense of individual obligation, and the latter presupposing and demanding—as at once its measure and its source—the mysterious power we designate Free-will. And this external experience is but a reflex of internal, which finds in free-will a primary and irresistible *datum* of consciousness.

Thus from abstract reasonings and the teachings of experience we seem equally justified in concluding that, however obscured at times, there does exist a moral no less than a physical order of the Universe, under which what we may term in the most general way good or evil, benefit or injury, progress or retrogression, follows upon such and

such a course of action ; or—to express the same truth in a more concrete form—that God impartially rewards and punishes every man in this life according to his independent action under given conditions.

I stated above, however, that these conditions vary in this world to an almost infinite extent. There are, on the one hand, internally, diversities of faculties, and again, shades of originally-impressed character in man, proverbially co-extensive with the endless modifications of his physical type ; while, on the other, the multiplicity of external circumstance and alien influence under which each individual acts, and which tends materially to deepen his characteristic lines whether for good or evil, is indeed past calculation. Hence while there is the strictest impartiality in the proportionate sequence of rewards and punishments, it is evident that their actual incidence is modified to an enormous extent by these conditions, lying wholly or in part beyond the control of the individual agent ; indeed, the perturbations extend so far, that the innocent at times seem to suffer and the guilty to escape the penalty due to their misdeeds.⁽¹¹⁾

And yet the Creator has imparted to us an instinctive sense of Right, corresponding with, and supplementing, as it were, our intuitive sense of personal, individual responsibility, and the free-will upon which it depends ; and in these congruous

intuitions, lying thus at the very root of our moral nature, He deigns to teach us that He is no respecter of persons,—that every individual born into the world is, morally at least, of equal value in His eyes. The rude perturbations, therefore, of divine order incident to the individual in this life, not to mention now the incompatibility of virtue and perfect happiness under the existing dispensation, has led at all periods of the world's history to a conviction more or less profound, that the life and fortunes of the individual do not end here ; that there is a world beyond the grave, in which the inequalities inherent in the present "*concordia discors*" shall be rectified, its anomalies eventually disappear ; in which there shall be a requital in the way both of rewards and punishments, determined not merely as now by the internally and externally conditioned conduct of the agent, but by an equally impartial regard to the conditions themselves under which he acted, and for which he was individually as irresponsible as for the fact of his own existence.

This conviction of natural piety has been fortified at sundry times and in divers manners by supernatural revelations from the Supreme Being, and finally by Him who brought life and immortality to light, who led a mighty capturer captive, and triumphed over Death. And it is important to observe that these revelations predicate *justice* of the Deity, not alone as one of His ordinary perfections, but more emphatically and more especially in re-

ference to the righteous sentence to be pronounced by Him upon every man at the last great day of account ; the epithet being apparently applied by the sacred penmen in a simple and intelligible, and not in a double-tongued or non-natural sense.⁽¹²⁾

Thus does Revelation respond to natural piety in representing Deity as a Personal, or anthropomorphic God. On these grounds most of all do we trust that what we are forced to pronounce inequalities and perturbations in the system under which we now live, are not to be accepted as the veritable and everlasting conditions of the moral Kosmos, but merely as its transient obliquities. By such a presentation of our future Judge as of one acting like ourselves in free (but perfect) allegiance to the immutable obligation of intelligible Right does Scripture confirm, in the doctrine of a future state, the sustaining hope of earnest men throughout all generations.

At this conception of Deity the Pantheist scoffs. The doctrines of free-will and a personal immortality he rejects with a consistent scorn ; a “free necessity” in God and man is the sheet-anchor of his philosophy.

And yet I think we have seen that, even apart from the powerful counter-evidence supplied by the religious instinct of mankind, his philosophy breaks down completely before the intellectual difficulty which it professes to solve ; upon which ground I did not hesitate to pronounce the Neologian herme-

neutics to which it has given birth to be, in a purely intellectual point of view, irrational and unsound.

But I have undertaken to shew that Neology is unnecessary too ; that the difficulties of which the Ideologist professes to relieve the Bible are to be found only in the misconception of its teaching by a popular theological school ; that its cardinal doctrine of a future state is not an aggravation but a solution of those anomalies in the existing constitution of things which have proved the stronghold of Scepticism, and Pantheism too, in every age.

The popular theology just referred to assumes as its philosophic basis the impossibility of a finite causal power. This position I have endeavoured in the present Lecture to overthrow, by a special application of the conclusions already attained in controverting the fundamental principles of Pantheism.

But the process of my argument was not meant to be destructive merely. It sought also to build up, upon the ruins of the Pantheistic Construction, some solid bulwark against Scepticism ; to establish a *real, i. e.* a reasonable belief in the distinct Personality of the Supreme Being.

Forewarned of the suicidal element in all *à priori* methods, it recognized as the only genuine basis for the reality of a Personal God, that of the finite moral nature.

This basis once accepted, not only was necessitarianism overthrown, but the homogeneity also of

the Divine and human Conscience established, as a matter of course.⁽¹³⁾

For it would be in the last degree frivolous and absurd to argue, *à posteriori*, to the reality of a Personal God (such as the Bible at once presupposes and describes), and yet renounce the cognate reality of the finite personality ; and this we must inevitably do if we surrender that of the finite Will ; or if, again, we deny the homogeneity of divine and human morality, on the sceptical plea that the one is absolute and eternal, the other phenomenal and relative, *i. e.* in plain words, *unreal*.

The question, then, to be determined now is whether this *rational* conception of Deity harmonizes so far with the *scriptural* doctrine of man's future destiny as to show that the Neologian method is exegetically as unnecessary as it is philosophically unsound.

In this rational Theodicy, let me here repeat, I start from the reality of the finite Being, as from a primary intuition of Reason. I spring from this by a metaphysical necessity to the realization of an Absolute Being ;—the absolute Ego, as Fichte clearly saw, being given in the Relative. I ponder anxiously upon this fundamental intuition of finite being. The deeper my introspection, the profounder becomes my conviction that its essential reality depends upon its moral element, *i. e.* its personality, or free causal power. AGO ERGO SUM. Then does Reason irresistibly invest with kindred

qualities the Absolute Being also, *i.e.* it realizes for me a Personal God.⁽¹⁴⁾

The truth of this Theodicy is indirectly but powerfully supported by the fact, that the common sense of mankind has ever inclined to a similar conception of Deity, under the influence of the so-called "religious instinct;" an instinct good and true in itself, but which, being developed apparently in inverse proportion to the intellectual faculty, is prone to degenerate into irrational superstition.

Now, it is upon the innate force of the *moral* element in my Theodicy that I rely, to enable me to hold the balance fairly between the vicious extremes of Pantheism and Pyrrhonism; to shun alike that mere intellectualism which denies a Personal God, and that superstition to which the undue excitement of the religious sentiment is so apt to lead.⁽¹⁵⁾

But it is just here,—let me freely acknowledge it,—that my Construction receives a grievous shock.

Looking forth upon the creations of the Absolute Cause, I find in them abundant practical proof, indeed, of finite free-will and the moral sense which it involves; I can recognize, too, as a moral agent, the imperative necessity of trial, if there be any virtue,—of failure, if there be any praise,—of evil, if there be any good; but I also discover, what I cannot even thus reconcile with my theory, a most startling inequality in the conditions, both temporal

and spiritual, of the different moral agents by whom I am surrounded.

Then Pantheism tempts me, with the cold glitter of her starry eyes ; whispers that my "realities" are sheer illusions, at once the progeny and the nemesis of unreasoning superstition ; points to her intellectual shrine, that pondering there the remorseless law of ceaseless change for all save the pure *impersonal* cognitions of the Soul, I may, with a certain grand despair, learn to accept the present life as *final* for the conscious individual, momentary ripple that he is, thrown up by the immanent God upon the surface of the awful Ocean of Life,—the play-thing for an hour of an inscrutable, inexorable Fate.

And Scepticism too solicits me, with still varying plea, to renounce as visionary that basis of a real and enduring morality upon which I had relied ; now urging me to the brink of universal Doubt as a solvent for my difficulty ; now bidding me forswear intellect and the moral sense alike, and resign myself to the credulous Faith that can invest a Personal God with moral attributes wholly unintelligible, if not in direct antagonism to my own.⁽¹⁶⁾

And if I turn to the "Written Word," seeking a kindlier solvent for my perplexity, I find that my counsellors have pre-occupied the ground.

Pantheism, in Neologian garb, meets me there. She seems to place man,—it may not be denied,—in the very fore-front of Nature's grand and solemn

march, but it is the species she thus exalts, leaving the unequal lot of its individual members a problem still unsolved ; for to the latter she vouchsafes an immortality from which all personal consciousness has disappeared,—a phantom compared wherewith the piteous ghosts of the heathen poet's shadow-land were substance and reality itself. *Idealizing* the Bible's solid truths, and living, personal agents, she accordingly assigns the Ascension, the Resurrection, the Life Eternal to her true God-man, Humanity. She substitutes "an impersonal order of Nature" for Him to whom the heart still yearns in "the sublime familiarity of prayer."⁽¹⁷⁾

And Scepticism, again, is represented by that theology which not alone subjects all moral agency "to the one Spirit's plastic stress,"⁽¹⁸⁾ but claims to find in the Written Word conclusive proof that finite reason and morality are but a vain delusion. This theology does not deny to the individual man a conscious immortality, but it perpetuates for him throughout Eternity, and in an intenser form, the predestined inequalities of Time. In it the individual is not sacrificed to the species, but the species is fore-doomed to form a background, as it were, of lurid desolation, whereby the white-robed felicity of a few arbitrarily chosen individuals may be thrown into bolder relief. Thus my difficulty is now aggravated, not relieved.

Once more, therefore, and with redoubled force, the question presents itself, whether the Theodicy

I profess, and seem constrained by Reason to accept, may not only be proved consonant with the utterances of Revelation, but also find in them a solution, instead of an aggravation, of the difficulty with which, I candidly confess, it is embarrassed.

An anxious question this, and of the gravest moment. For most intellectual men, if reduced to accept one or other of the exegetical methods just described, would incline, I believe, to the Neologian ; would lean toward the extreme rationalism which denies a Personal God, rather than toward the superstitious dogma which so terribly distorts His aspect, that at the picture he himself has drawn the boldest propounder of that dogma stands aghast in horror.⁽¹⁹⁾

More prevalent now, perhaps, than ever before is that "metaphysical heresy" of an impersonal order of Nature, which betrays itself in Theology in the decided tendency to *idealize* the "objective truths" of a more primitive Creed. And nothing, I suppose, could be better calculated to foster such a tendency than the repulsive form under which Predestinarianism presents the God of the Bible, and the doctrine of a future state.

Hence the polemical importance of the Neologian assumption, that between Ideology and Calvinism our choice, as interpreters, must necessarily lie.

And hence, again, my earnest desire to adduce from the Bible such proofs as intellectual men can

readily accept of the fallacy of this assumption ; to satisfy independent thinkers that the fundamental *scriptural* doctrine of man's acceptance with God is in perfect harmony with a *rational* Theodicy.

To this portion of my task I shall now address myself ; and before alleging the proofs just referred to, let me endeavour to define, as exactly as I can, the position which I seek to establish by their aid.

It seems to me that the Gospel scheme of Salvation may be regarded under two distinct aspects,—the one transcendental, the other easy of apprehension to all,—which it has been the constant tendency of theologians to confound, even as Logic and Metaphysics are confounded in the Construction of Hegel.

It will be but a direct corollary from the conclusions arrived at in the foregoing Lectures, that we may *reasonably* recognize the co-existence of such elements, though not in logical relation ; for they but present us anew that distinct, duplicate causal agency which, if there be any truth in these conclusions, Reason accepts as a metaphysical necessity.

Denominating, for convenience sake, the one of these the ultimate, and the other the proximate cause of man's acceptance with God, it becomes obvious that the former, if thus transcendental, must be carefully discriminated as a distinct reality from the latter, by all who have learned to detect the logical fallacies of Pantheism.

Now, what is this ultimate cause which in theo-

logy responds, as it were, to the Absolute of metaphysics?

Upon this point, I suppose, all Trinitarians are agreed. It is, of course, the Redemption of the finite Being, the atonement for all sin, original and actual, the satisfaction for all imperfection, the "gifts for all men, yea, even for His enemies," effected by the objective sacrifice of the Saviour of the world.

The various attempts which have been made to *explain* this regeneration of the species only serve to exhibit in a stronger light its transcendental nature. It is rather to be accepted as a truth, parallel in some sort with the generation of the imperfect Being, and equally inscrutable; and the ecstatic "apprehension" of its mystery to which some pretend, should be regarded, I think, as equally delusive and presumptuous with that "intellectual intuition" whereby Schelling sought to grasp the absolute principle of things.

We may conclude, then, that in the FUNDAMENTAL DOGMA of Revelation we have (as was, indeed, to be expected) a transcendental Truth; an ultimate, or absolute, causal power given, whose relation to the proximate we can apprehend neither by ecstasy nor by discursive reasoning.⁽²⁰⁾

So far the issue to be proven is simplified considerably. For it now comes to this:—Granting that the absolute cause of man's salvation has been revealed, has its logical relation to the proximate

been dogmatically revealed also, or, on the contrary, are both one and the other recognized in the Bible as distinct, co-existent realities ?

The Pantheistic interpreter, denying the co-existence of finite and infinite realities, cannot entertain this question at all. In his eyes, man, so far forth as he is spirit, is identical with God.

Predestinarianism is less consistent. Asserting on the one hand, the reality of an Infinite God, distinct from finite Beings, it denies, on the other, the possibility for the latter of a free will, *i. e.* of a real, personal, causal power. Professing to subordinate the moral agency of the Many to the One in logical concatenation, and blinded by the factitious rigour of such a chain, it fails to detect the absurdity of deducing finite effects, by such a process as this, from an absolute cause, which, by its very essence, excludes the possibility of causal, or, for that matter, any other conceivable *logical* relation.

From this radical error, let me observe, arise those practical contradictions which the Calvinist Divine, when brought into contact with the realities of life, is fain, for all the boasted logical coherence of his system, to conceal beneath a tissue of the feeblest mysticism.

This I merely remark in passing. The actual question now before us is, whether the relation of the ultimate to the proximate cause of man's acceptance with God is *revealed* in Holy Scripture in accordance with the Calvinistic hypothesis, and

as such to be accepted by all who receive the statements of Revelation as matters of fact, and not mere allegory or parable. We have to ascertain, in short, whether the transcendental causal power is there dogmatically pronounced to generate the finite moral agency in the same stringent process with which a fixed quantity of motion, suppose, in one ball is held to be transferred to another upon which it impinges, or whether *both* are recognized as real, coexistent, and essential causal conditions of the final result.⁽²¹⁾

Keeping this issue steadily in view, I can see but three radically distinguishable theories of the application of the *opus operatum* to the finite being, which can be maintained by the literal exponent of Scripture as contrasted with the Ideologist.

i. The Predestinarian Divines, assuming that they are entitled to pronounce "foreknowledge absolute" incompatible with finite free-will, endeavour to elicit from Scripture a dogmatic scheme in rigid harmony with this fundamental illusion.⁽²²⁾ The imperfection of man is a fact. So is the Redemption. The final punishment of the wicked is also a revealed truth, and the final blessedness of the redeemed. The eternal destiny of every man must therefore have been eternally decreed by a God possessed of absolute foreknowledge. The vast majority of mankind are therefore foredoomed to everlasting perdition, the remainder to everlasting bliss.

To reconcile the latter to Himself it was further

eternally decreed by Jehovah that his Son, assuming a human life for a few years, should sacrifice it by a death of shame. The salvation of these 'vessels of mercy' from the fate of the 'vessels of wrath' is effected by an ecstatic apprehension (called Faith) of the efficacy, and individual application to themselves, of this sacrifice.

Such "saving faith" is pre-eminently the gift of God ("by grace ye are saved"); arbitrarily bestowed, of course, and when bestowed irresistible and indefectible. From the particular moment of its bestowal it imparts a quality to all the actions of the recipients, intrinsically distinct from their conventional estimation.

Hereby prepared on earth, "as clay in the hands of the potter," these vessels of mercy, saved by their faith, shall be rewarded with eternal life; all others shall be condemned for their want of faith, as eternally determined, to everlasting misery.⁽²³⁾

ii. The Universalists—whose numbers, I believe, are rapidly increasing—also hold that the benefits of Christ's passion shall be applied irrespectively of individual action, but that they shall finally be extended to Adam and all his posterity without exception; for as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive. That there shall be a final restitution of all things; for the vessels of mercy and of wrath were all—to quote the apostle's phrase—included in unbelief by God in this life, that in

the life to come, through the all-sufficient sacrifice His Son, He might have mercy upon all.

iii. The third theory deals with the question thus : The human intellect is incapable of an absolute science. It cannot therefore determine the logical relation between absolute fore-knowledge and finite free-will. Neither does the Bible reveal it. The moral life of man on earth is real, not phenomenal, and its conditions serve as a probation for one to come. He has therefore *a distinct personality from that of his Creator*, and possesses accordingly a certain determinate amount of moral freedom, by the exercise of which a character is imparted to his actions here, which shall form an essential element in determining the sentence to be pronounced upon him hereafter. However unequal God's ways may appear on earth, He shall be found no respecter of persons in the day of judgment. For the efficacy of the Atonement extends *potentially* to all men, rendering possible not only their final salvation, but also whatever degree of moral and spiritual excellence they may, at any time or under any conditions, have attained. And though these influences to good, these strivings of the Spirit, have been to all appearance most unequally distributed, yet in whatever degree conferred, man has an independent power of cultivating or neglecting them, of improving or quenching their operation in his soul. And though, once more, the amount even of this independent power varies

much in different individuals, and is endlessly modified by external circumstance, yet according to his individual action under these prescribed conditions, within these prescribed limits, shall each be accepted or rejected by that righteous Judge who Himself appointed them as his sphere of action upon earth ;—accepted to the Christ-purchased inheritance of a joy which none that “ knows the plague of his own heart ” could impiously presume to claim as a *reward* due to the weak and faltering performance of his duty here ; rejected to the endurance of such punishment as his sins, so far forth as they have been wilfully committed, may deserve.⁽²⁴⁾

Now it is quite plain that the first and second of these theories agree in denying the *reality* of the finite moral agency, for they both represent the eternal destiny of individuals as due to the Absolute cause alone, quite irrespective of their conduct while on earth. Each professes, however, to find this relation (if such it may be called) of the ultimate to the proximate cause dogmatically revealed in special texts of Scripture.⁽²⁴⁾

The third as plainly recognizes the eternal and essential reality of both the ultimate and the proximate cause. It finds strong support in the practical *consensus* of mankind, and the analogy of God’s ordinary moral government. Its advocates, however, relying too much, perhaps, upon that very *consensus*, have been accustomed, for

the most part, to appeal somewhat vaguely to the general tenour of Scripture, in preference to grappling with the special (but conflicting) texts upon which their opponents respectively rely.

They also appear to me to have overlooked the evidence supplied by some remarkable events recorded in the Bible, which not only confirms their own position in the most striking way, but also furnishes a clue, at least, for the harmonizing of those conflicting texts to which the Predestinarian and the Universalist so confidently appeal.

I hope in the sequel to glance at what seems to me to be the common source of that widely-diverging error which has betrayed the latter into their one-sided interpretations of isolated texts.

But my first object shall be to avail myself of the proofs just referred to against those who advocate the Neologian hermeneutics on the ground that the theology of the literal interpreter necessitates "a denial of the broad and equal justice of the Supreme Being;" who find in the present state of ethnical knowledge "an urgent demand for some solution of the difficulty involved in the asserted relation of God in Christ to the myriads upon myriads of non-christian races;" who maintain, finally, that "our traditions" [*i. e.* the Calvinistic dogmas] "regarding the eternal punishment of those not extricated by the saving faith of covenant mercy from the effects of Adam's sin, *fairly declare to us the words and inferences from Scripture.*"⁽²⁵⁾

That there are in the present day many “unquiet souls,”—to adopt the phrase of the writer whom I have just now quoted,—who require some “answer, solution, or neutralization for the difficulties” attaching to the predestinarian theology, I do not for a moment deny. It is unquestionable, too, that such men may be predisposed to a certain extent, by the motives and influences I have already set forth, to adopt the Neologian assumption that between Ideology and Predestinarianism the choice of an interpreter must lie, and may thus incline yet more to that which is really dangerous in the philosophy upon which the Neologian depends—the substitution, namely, of an “impersonal order of nature” for a Personal God, with the inevitable rejection of a supernatural Revelation.⁽²⁶⁾

They may fail to draw near, in the way He hath Himself ordained, to Him who still waiteth to be gracious, by the neglect of those preternatural means of grace placed by His mercy within their reach as baptized members of the Church of His well-beloved Son,—may disregard those truly golden opportunities, for their use or abuse of which He will assuredly take account of them at the last day.⁽²⁷⁾

Desiring to counteract such motives,—to neutralize such influences,—and writing for men of this stamp, with whom one fact outweighs a thousand arguments, I shall endeavour to overthrow the assumption of the Neologian; and that, too, by

proofs contained not so much in apostolic discussions, from which we know that the most inconsistent deductions have been triumphantly derived,⁽²⁸⁾ as in certain recorded facts, which, occurring at a most critical period in the spiritual history of the world, and affording a singularly clear manifestation of the Spirit's actual dealings with man, they may perhaps regard, with me, as a decisive criterion for determining the scriptural doctrine of acceptance with God.

LECTURE V.

ST. MATTHEW, xxv. 29.

“For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance, but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.”

IN the parable from which these words are taken we may find, I think, much to corroborate the views I ventured to express in my last Lecture as to the proximate grounds of man's acceptance with God, and the criterion by which he shall be judged at the last. That his moral freedom, namely, is a reality, not an illusion, and shall constitute the precise measure of his responsibility ; that by his conduct here, under prescribed conditions both internal and external, his everlasting destiny shall be determined ; but that for these conditions, lying wholly beyond his own individual control, and depending ultimately as they do upon the mysterious dispensation of the Judge Himself, he shall not be held accountable in that day.

It is evident that such a theory postulates the independent action of the human will, as opposed to the fatalism of the Predestinarian. I found it requisite, therefore, to consider the validity of the necessitarian objections, upon philosophical grounds, to the possible freedom of the finite will ; and to this end I naturally availed myself of the results already arrived at in my scrutiny of that Pantheistic Construction which constitutes the acknowledged basis of the Neologian Theology ; for a very little reflection suffices to shew that the co-operation of the Finite with the Infinite Will is but a phase of the more general problem of the co-existence, as distinct realities, of the Perfect Being with the Imperfect—the Absolute with the Conditioned.

The co-existence of the latter, Reason, informed by irrecusable Experience, compels us to admit as a fact incapable of logical expression, no doubt, yet incontrovertible ; and with this admission Pantheism, and that strange theology to which it has given birth, simultaneously collapse.

For after all, when the Pantheist, attempting the scientific unification of the Finite and the Infinite, ridicules the conception of a *Deus Transiens*, and seeks by his *Deus immanens* to reduce all things in Heaven and Earth,—human action and sentiment of course included,—to the rigour of an adamantine fatalism, he merely cloaks his ignorance under an arbitrary phrase.⁽¹⁾ The origin and *modus operandi*

of this *Deus Immanens* still remain a problem, in endeavouring to solve which by an *à priori* method he has brought well-merited ridicule upon himself. And similarly, when the Supralapsarian denies with the Pantheist the possibility of independent action in the human will, because every event, as he says, must have a cause, his vaunted principle, if pressed to its legitimate *logical* conclusion, would deny to man the belief in an Absolute Cause, seeing that the existence of the latter would remain, like the *Deus immanens* of the Pantheist, a link in the fatalistic chain, and nothing more,—an event still to be accounted for.⁽²⁾

Repudiating such illusive speculations then, lest, as “broad-browed Verulam” warns us, “we should become giddy looking too long upon these turning wheels of vicissitudes,” it seemed our highest wisdom to recognize spontaneous action in the Finite and in the Infinite Being as primitive and parallel Truths, incapable of demonstration alike in themselves and in their mutual relation ; to accept the intuitive teaching of internal Experience, that man is a moral agent, a responsible being, and possessed, as such, of an independent power of action,—exerted, however, within prescribed limits, and under fixed conditions.

I further directed your attention to some of the external evidences for the fact of human spontaneity, and the individual progress or retrogression in power (of whatever kind) corresponding thereto

in that order of things under which we live ; shewing how such progress, such retrogression, in the ordinary dispensations of Providence, depended to a certain determinate extent upon the action of every man under the conditions to which he is subject ; upon his management of the talents confided by “the Great Taskmaster” to his independent use.

The circumstances of this life are indeed so varied, the relations so complicated and far-extending, the influence of class and party and nation so powerful, and so frequently exerted in a corrupt and insolently capricious way, that too many have been led to question the moral Government of the Universe, to exclaim with the poet :⁽³⁾

“ If there is battle, 'tis battle by night, I stand in the darkness.
Here in the *mêlée* of men, Ionian and Dorian on both sides ;
Neither battle I see, nor arraying, nor king in Israel,
Only infinite jumble, and mess, and dislocation.”

But this is a weak and dreary scepticism. For though individual energy seems at times to be overborne,—though the prizes in the battle of life frequently appear to be but ill-bestowed,—though we somewhat heedlessly employ the terms fortune and misfortune, as if some blind fatality determined the destinies of the good and the bad, the virtuous and the vicious alike,—yet no one who has closely and patiently observed human action and its results can fail to have detected a steadfast principle underlying all these anomalies ; can fail to have discerned, even with regard to external advantages in

this life, the amazing influence of individual exertion.

In reference to progress of a higher kind,—intellectual culture, for example,—all must recognize that influence, I need hardly add, as an essential element of success.

It would appear, then, to be at once our most practical and most reasonable conclusion that, though the circumstances of individual men may vary almost indefinitely, yet He by whom these conditions have been ultimately fixed, imparts to each an independent, initiative causal power within these limits, upon the exercise of which his progress and well-being, in regard to temporal things, to a definite extent, depends.

But now the important question arises, whether we are to limit this dispensation to the things of Time, or to find in it, on the other hand, an instructive and decisive analogy for spiritual dispensations also, and man's eternal interests.

And when controversialists urge that there is the greatest and most undeniable partiality in the treatment of individuals here,—and that not merely in reference to temporal but also to spiritual advantages,—shall we therefore concede to them that the divine and the human conceptions of right are plainly irreconcilable and heterogeneous ;⁽⁴⁾ or, on the other hand, shall we repudiate such a doctrine as we would the impieties of a Pyrrho, and rather discover in these very anomalies the strongest possible

support for our belief in a future state, in which such partiality shall disappear; in which each man's destiny shall be determined,—for a period compared with which his sojourn here sinks into absolute insignificance,—according to his individual action upon earth,—so far forth as it was independently exercised? and shall we therefore infer that as God permits or causes—I shall not quarrel about a word⁽⁵⁾—the progress and well-being of his creatures here to depend, in the main, upon their individual action under given conditions, even so shall it be at the end of the world? But with this all-important distinction, that whereas here, from the perplexing yet not wholly unaccountable necessities of the case,⁽⁶⁾ the disturbing elements are so numerous, the complications so intricate, the conditions so diversified, as seriously to modify, and at times even to neutralize, the direct effects of individual energy or individual apathy, hereafter, on the contrary, these disturbing elements shall lose their power, these complications shall be resolved, these diversified conditions shall be equitably reduced, and the past action of each, individually, shall constitute an essential element in determining the award, so far, (and only so far) as that action was independent and practically free.

Such at least seems to be the lesson inculcated by the parable; for while the circumstances and advantages of each of the servants mentioned in it are widely distinct, yet the final award is described

as the result of their independent action ; and the recognized advantage attaching to virtuous energy in the things of this life is employed as a symbol of its value in relation to the interests of the life to come. And it is plainly implied that the well-known fructifying power with regard to a man's temporal advancement of money prudently invested, of opportunities carefully improved, of abilities strenuously cultivated, affords a true and instructive parallel for determining the law of his spiritual progress also and growth in grace.

I know how unsafe it is to theorize upon detached portions of the Bible, or to draw general inferences from the casual particulars of a parable, but still I cannot believe that our divine Master could have stooped to convey a moral at variance with what he knew to be the real facts of the case ; or by practising, like some modern preachers, an unworthy mental reservation, that he could have addressed men as responsible, and therefore free moral agents, while all the time aware that the wills and consequent actions of his hearers were not in any sense free, but hopelessly enslaved, and the parallel which he thus plainly and forcibly suggested an unmeaning mockery, or something worse.⁽⁷⁾

In the truth of this conviction I am further confirmed by the contemplation of some facts recorded in the New Testament, which, occurring at a most critical period in the spiritual history of

the world, supply us with an admirable criterion for the determination of the question at issue ; affording, as they do, the strongest *practical* confirmation of the moral conveyed by our Lord in the parable ; that those, namely, who make use of such *spiritual* advantages as the Providence of God places within their reach are elected by Him for the reception of still higher privileges ; that in the domain of grace there are fixed laws of deterioration and of growth, of progress and decay, corresponding in principle to those which regulate the things of the natural world ; that here too the human will acts freely, although within divinely determined limits ; and that while the latter are as completely beyond the control of the individual man as his original creation, yet from his independent action in the sphere thus circumscribed results at once the precise amount of his moral responsibility to his Maker and Judge, and his consequent acceptance, or rejection by Him, in Time and in Eternity.

Here let me remind you that with the ultimate potential cause of man's acceptance here and hereafter—the transcendental change wrought in his destinies by the true objective sacrifice of his Saviour—I am not now concerned, but only with what Scripture reveals, as to the principle upon which that sacrifice shall be applied to the determination of this or that man's final condition in Eternity. Whether we are to believe, with the

Universalist, that its inestimable benefit shall finally extend to all mankind without distinction ; or to an absolutely predestined few, alike irrespectively of their real, personal, agency on earth, according to the Predestinarian ; or,—which is the only remaining alternative,—to “a great multitude, whom no man can number, of all nations, and people, and kindreds,” in strict accordance with the independent conduct of each,—whatever his nation, kindred, or people,—in the sphere of operations, and under the conditions, prescribed by the Judge Himself.

The question at issue is *not*, in short, whether any finite being, created by his Maker, with imperfect and limited powers, is capable, theoretically or practically, of *meriting* unlimited and unalloyed happiness or misery ;—there is no need of embarrassing the subject with such a daring speculation as this ;—but simply whether a man’s conduct in Time shall form an essential element, (according to analogy,⁽⁸⁾) in determining his destiny throughout Eternity ; the decision in each case being made, not by the standard of an impossible perfection, but in equitable and intelligible conformity with all the circumstances and conditions, both external and internal, of each individual. If such is the tribunal before which we shall appear, then so far as man’s future judgment is concerned, he must be regarded as, to a certain determinate extent, a free agent.

If, on the other hand, the decision of the Judge upon the final destiny of any, the least of his creatures, shall be proximately determined, in ever so slight a degree, by conditions over which the latter had no possible control, then that Judge,—in apparent contrariety to the repeated declarations of His own Revelation,—must be regarded as “a respecter of persons.”⁽⁹⁾ Then Supralapsarianism, as the Neologian adroitly assumes, will be the only creed which a *literal* interpreter of the Bible can, with the slightest regard for consistency, adopt,—the strange hermeneutics of the ideologist the only resource left for those in whose eyes the “horribile decretum” of the Predestinarian is an insuperable offence, the sentimentalism of the Universalist a dangerous illusion against which the broader teaching of Revelation and a more masculine morality emphatically protest.

If, finally, not alone the constant doctrine of our divine Master, but also the plainest, most substantial, most matter-of-fact Scriptural proofs can be alleged in support of the third hypothesis above alluded to, which regards the *opus operatum* of the Second Adam as to be applied, not to all indiscriminately, as the Universalist, nor to a few elected arbitrarily—quite irrespective *i.e.* of any real personal agency,—as the Calvinist, but potentially indeed to every child of the first Adam, while the final issue shall yet be determined by the independent action of each under prescribed condi-

tions ;—then the objections urged by the Neologian against the possibility of a literal interpretation harmonizing with a rational Theodicy, with morality, and our “extended ethnical knowledge,” will be, I think, substantially refuted,—his fallacious assumption that the choice of the interpreter must needs lie between Predestinarianism (or some feeble modification of it) and Ideology abundantly and intelligibly disproved.

With a view simply to disprove this assumption, to refute these cavils, and not by any means as a weak and wanton assailant of my Calvinistic brethren, I desire now to direct your attention to these proofs.

Our blessed Lord's parting injunction to his apostles was that they should preach the Gospel to every nation, and make converts to that practical religion inaugurated by John the Baptist in direct antagonism to the predestinarian faith of the Jew, and authoritatively confirmed by Himself ;—an injunction formulated in the pregnant words : “ baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”⁽¹⁰⁾

They were further directed by Him to tarry at Jerusalem, until endued with power from on high for the better fulfilment of their great work. Now we cannot but be struck by their apparent neglect of this solemn injunction. For there was no attempt made to evangelize the Gentiles,—as we, at least, would understand the phrase,—until long after the

bestowal of this power; and even then the task was commenced in obedience to a special commission given by God to Paul and Barnabas, neither of whom had received the original command from our Lord. We have indeed on record the visit of Peter to Cornelius, and the consequent baptism of the latter. But this narrative rather increases the difficulty than otherwise; for the language of Peter on the occasion itself, and in his subsequent allusions to it, plainly shews that in his opinion,—endued though he had already been with power from on high,—a miraculous and thrice-repeated vision, and a supernatural effusion of the Holy Spirit were required even to justify his own proceedings in the matter.

I do not see any satisfactory solution for this difficulty except that derivable from St. Luke's narrative of the memorable events of the day of Pentecost.

We there read that there were sojourning at Jerusalem Jews, devout men, “out of every nation under heaven.” An enumeration of these nations follows, harmonizing accurately enough in its geographical details with the triple dispersion of the Jews. I allude, of course, to the dispersion of the Ten Tribes, whose descendants Jerome describes in his own day as still dwelling in the cities and mountains of the Medes;—the Babylonish captivity, from which many never returned to the land of their fathers, while their posterity acquired great wealth and influence, and could boast of their Chaldee

Paraphrase, and their famous R. Hillel ; — and, lastly, the dispersion consequent upon the lapse of Judæa to Ptolemy Lagus at a much later period, eventuating in the great Jewish colony at Alexandria for whose use the LXX. version was made.⁽¹¹⁾

That the word κατοικοῦντες refers to a temporary sojourn rather than permanent residence is plain from the context ; and any objection to such a rendering derivable from its ordinary classical usage is neutralized by the fact that the Seventy unmis- takably employ it in the former sense in their rendering of the prophet's words : " Hast thou also brought evil upon the widow, μεθ' ἧς ἐγὼ κατοικῶ μετ' αὐτῆς, by slaying her son."⁽¹²⁾

It is almost certain that the Jews mentioned had come up from their various homes to attend the Passover, and actuated by the same "devoutness" which had prompted the discharge of this duty,—a duty, let me observe, not imperative upon those dwelling beyond the bounds of Palestine, and entailing much trouble, danger, and expense,—these pious men had remained in the city in order to celebrate the feast of Pentecost also ; thus even in her desolation remembering Zion, and the holy pavilion of the Tabernacle, the dwelling of the Highest, of which He had said, " My name shall be there."

But we are further informed that this numerous body consisted of Proselytes as well as Jews ; the

clause in which this is stated, from the particles employed, most naturally referring to the entire catalogue.⁽¹³⁾

Now, who were these Proselytes ? According to the statement of Maimonides, which has been very generally adopted, they constituted two distinct classes. The one, "proselytes of righteousness," who were circumcised, and baptized in the presence of Triumvirs (even as the blessed Trinity appeared at the baptism of Jesus of Nazareth), and thus bound to observe the law of Moses. These Gentiles were henceforth regarded as *regenerate* ; to such an extent, indeed, that what would have previously been incestuous, were now supposed to be, in the judgment of the Rabbis, perfectly legitimate matrimonial connexions in their case.⁽¹⁴⁾ The other, "Proselytes of the Gate," who were not circumcised, but were obliged notwithstanding to observe "the seven precepts of the sons of Noah."

By a reference to this classification of Proselytes, I may remark incidentally, some commentators would explain the injunctions laid upon the Gentile converts by the First Council of Jerusalem ; that the latter, namely, were accounted liable to the conditions of the Noachic, or patriarchal, though not of the Mosaic Covenant.⁽¹⁵⁾

But there are good reasons for believing that Maimonides' evidence on this point is not disinterested ; and we have the express statement of a much earlier Rabbinical authority, that "no one is named

a Proselyte unless he be circumcised.”⁽¹⁶⁾ Hence we may fairly conclude that the word Proselyte in the New Testament refers to those Gentiles who had been admitted by circumcision to the Mosaic Covenant, and to those alone.

It is quite plain, then, I think, that the best solution for the difficulty above alluded to, with respect to the immediate evangelization of the Gentiles, is to be derived from what the Sacred historian has left on record of these pious sojourners at Jerusalem. Peter,—that Cephas whereon the Church was to be reared,—preaches the Gospel of Jesus Christ to a mixed multitude “from every nation under Heaven,” consisting partly of Jews, partly of Gentile Proselytes, and in this way fulfils, as far as he then understood it, the parting injunction of his divine Master.

Here, therefore, we have a most striking illustration of our Lord’s maxim, “To him that hath shall be given,” in the true meaning of those words. For these pious sojourners, first of all among the Jews of the dispersion, not alone heard the glad tidings of salvation, but had the message supernaturally confirmed by the evidence of their own senses. These men, first of all among the Gentiles also, being thus convinced, were baptized into the name of Christ, and through Him brought nigh to God.

The latter had had, in the dispersion of the Jews, and the widely-extended synagogue worship throughout the then known world, spiritual oppor-

tunities placed with their reach, of which,—though there was much to discourage such a course,—they had, from a sincere love of piety and holiness, availed themselves; forsaking the licentious rites of Heathenism, and voluntarily adopting instead the pure and self-denying worship of Jehovah. And *both*, although permitted by established usage to sacrifice where they pleased, yet, in stricter compliance with the letter of the Mosaic Law, had now come up, as the tribes of old, to pray for the peace of Jerusalem, to pay their vows within her Temple's sacred walls unto the Most High.

And verily they had their reward.

The antecedents of these converts to Christianity are the more worthy of notice in connexion with my present subject, because the conversion of the three thousand on the day of Pentecost by the preaching of Peter is almost proverbially employed as a stupendous example of an instantaneous and, as it were, miraculous change of heart and feeling and hope and thought, and attributed, of course, to the arbitrary and capricious operation of the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, it would be hard indeed to discover a more accurate illustration of our Saviour's teaching that they are blessed who hunger and thirst after righteousness, and shall be filled; that, in order to fructify, the word preached must fall upon an honest and good heart.

But we are not without further and no less striking evidence of the same nature.

Although Maimonides may have been mistaken in his distribution of Proselytes into two distinct classes, of whom the uncircumcised were members as it were of the patriarchal covenant with Noah, whose symbol was the far extending rainbow, and as such admitted, in his expressive language, beneath the sheltering wings of the Most High,⁽¹⁷⁾—yet we have indisputable evidence in the New Testament itself of the existence of a large body of men, who, without adopting circumcision and the ceremonial law, yet believed in the true God, and constantly attended both the Temple and the Synagogues.

Of this class we have occasional mention in the Old Testament. To it belonged the Kenites, *e. g.* and the Rechabites, the descendants of Hobab, Moses' father-in-law, who, though worshipping the one true God, yet rejected the Mosaic ritual.⁽¹⁸⁾ But in later times, after the establishment of Synagogues, they seem to have become more distinctly organized, and to have regularly attended the Synagogue Services; and though permitted for obvious reasons to offer sacrifice where they pleased, yet, for the most part, they preferred doing so through the priests at Jerusalem.⁽¹⁹⁾

In this connexion we have an interesting and suggestive allusion to them in the New Testament, when our Lord is described as expelling the money-changers, with those who sold sheep, oxen, and doves from the Temple. For these men pursued

their unholy traffic, not, of course, in the inner Temple, to which the Jews and Proselytes alone had access, but in the outer court appropriated to the Gentiles ; and in this circumstance appears the full significance both of our Lord's act,—miraculously performed on the occasion of his first public visit to Jerusalem,—and of the quotation (given in full by St. Mark alone) by which he justified that act : “ My House shall be called a House of prayer *for all nations*, but ye have made it a den of thieves.”⁽²⁰⁾ For hereby He rebuked the presumptuous bigotry of those who forbade a common access in prayer to the common Father, and actuated, not alone by their greed of gain, but by a desire to express contempt for all who were not in formal covenant with God, thus desecrated that part of the Temple to which the latter were restricted.

In this authoritative act of our Lord we have, in short, a most instructive proof of His deep-rooted aversion to what we might proleptically designate the Calvinistic superstition of the Jew.⁽²¹⁾

To return :—In the Acts, these Gentile worshippers are repeatedly alluded to as a distinct and well-known class, under the titles “ φοβούμενοι,” or “ σεβόμενοι τὸν Θεόν,” and recognised under these designations as constituting a portion of the regular worshippers at the synagogues. They were not then in formal covenant with God, and a Jew would not scruple therefore to characterize them as unclean, or profane, in contradistinction to the ἄγιοι or Israelites.⁽²²⁾

Being thus aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenant of promise, they would be regarded also as, in a certain sense, ἄθεοι, and without hope in the promises which, before the revelation of the Gospel mystery, were presumed by all the Jews to belong exclusively to the children of the circumcision. Hence, too, they were divided in the Temple from the Jews and Proselytes, and even from the court of the women and the lazarettoes, by that mid-wall of partition, upon which was inscribed, "Let no uncircumcised person enter."⁽²³⁾ But notwithstanding all this, while thus afar off from the Holy of Holies and the overshadowing wings, they were brought nigh in a still deeper sense by Him—the Redeemer of the world—who broke down the mid-wall of partition, and abolishing in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances—of circumcision, *e.g.* and external rites—made in himself of twain one new man, and preached peace to them that were afar off and to them that were nigh. And thereby—no more strangers and πάροικοι, but fellow-citizens with the Saints—they were builded together with the believing Jews as οἰκεῖοι in Christ; a building harmoniously framed, a spiritual Temple of God, a sanctuary in which Jew and Greek, male and female, bond and free, were no longer formally kept apart, but all gathered together in one in and through Christ Jesus.⁽²⁴⁾

The terms of the foregoing description I have

borrowed, as you are aware, from St. Paul's Epistle to the Saints, or general body of believers, at Ephesus; whom he describes as predestinated by God to an inheritance in Christ, and receiving the seal of that inheritance in the Holy Spirit of promise. But am I correct in this identification? in assuming that the Church at Ephesus consisted mainly of men who had been habitual attendants at the synagogues and occasional worshippers in the Temple?

The very phraseology employed by the Apostle would seem decisive evidence upon this point; for the metaphor, so well and harmoniously sustained throughout, would have been quite unintelligible to those ignorant of its source—the Synagogue and Temple service of the Jews.

But the account given in Acts xviii. of the founding of that Church by St. Paul excludes all doubt upon the matter.

We there read that on his arrival at Ephesus the Apostle found certain disciples who had been instructed by Apollos “after John's baptism,” and thus prepared, as it were, for a higher indoctrination in the religion of Christ. On referring to the preceding chapter, we find it expressly stated that Apollos had taught in the synagogue at Ephesus.

To these converts, on their profession of faith in Christ and their baptism, Paul imparts the miraculous gift of tongues, and immediately after we read that he entered into the synagogue, and spake boldly for the space of three months, disputing and per-

suading the things concerning the Kingdom of God. The school of Tyrannus, to which he subsequently withdrew the disciples, and in which he continued to preach for two years or more, was no doubt what the Jews term a Beth Midrasch, or synagogue in a private house ; nor do we hear of his public ministrations at any other place in Ephesus.⁽²⁵⁾

Such then was the origin of the Ephesian Church, and an attentive perusal of the entire account of Paul's missionary journeys to the Gentiles fully establishes the conclusion that such was elsewhere also the system he pursued in communicating the glad tidings of salvation ; that, as the Apostle to the Gentiles, he preached in every city to those who attended the synagogues, and, with one or two exceptions, to none besides. Nay more, these exceptions themselves, from the peculiarity of their circumstances, prove rather than invalidate the rule by which I suppose him to have been guided.

When at Athens, *e. g.*, we read that he not only conversed with the Jews and the *σεβόμενοι* in the synagogues, but also with those whom he casually met in the market place. But then the reason for this unusual course is stated to be that "his spirit was stirred within him when he saw the city full of idols." He was moved, that is, to deviate from his ordinary method by observing the inhabitants, as he afterwards expressed it, feeling after and ignorantly worshipping God. That this is the real purport of the passage appears from the exordium

of his famous address : "Men of Athens, I perceive that ye"—not as the E. V. "in all things are too superstitious," but certainly as Alford renders : "in every point of view carry your religious reverence very far."⁽²⁶⁾ The course then pursued by the Apostle of the Gentiles at Athens was clearly abnormal, and the attendant circumstances confirm rather than otherwise the position I seek to establish. It is also worthy of notice that his address, though a remarkably able one, seemed to have produced upon the Athenians who had not availed themselves of the higher spiritual advantages afforded by the synagogue service in their city, a very different effect from that consequent upon Peter's Pentecostal speech to those who had been living up to the privileges placed by the Providence of God within their reach.

It would be impossible for me to enter now into minute details. But this I can safely assert that the more attentively we peruse the record left us by St. Luke, the more abundant illustration we shall find of what he himself expressly states—viz. that in St. Paul's fulfilment of his special and heaven-directed mission to the Gentiles, *his manner was* to preach the Gospel in the synagogues.⁽²⁷⁾

I may direct your attention, however, in particular to the visit of the Apostle to Antioch—subsequently one of the great local centres of the Church—where his exhortation in the synagogue is given at length. For in it we have the two

classes of synagogue-worshippers distinctly addressed both at the commencement of his speech : “ Men of Israel, and ye that fear God,” and a little later : “ Brethren, children of the stock of Abraham, and whosoever among you feareth God ;”—here with the important addition : “ To you is the word of this salvation sent.”

That the Gentiles are those intended by this descriptive phrase is placed beyond all question by the subsequent narrative, where *the Gentiles* request that the same words may be spoken to them on the next Sabbath also.⁽²⁸⁾

And if you may here perhaps recall the passage where Paul on the opposition of the Jews, in whose synagogue he had preached at Corinth, is said to have declared that from henceforth he would turn unto the Gentiles, let me remind you how upon that occasion he entered the house of Justus, “ who lived hard by the synagogue,” and was himself one of the *σεβόμενοι*, while in the very next place he visited, he resumed, we are told, his wonted practice, and “ entered into the synagogue of the Jews.”⁽²⁹⁾

The general inference derivable from these facts assuredly is that the dispensations of God in spiritual things are not arbitrary or capricious, but precisely analogous to his ordinary dealings with the creatures of His hand ; where progress or retrogression essentially depends, not upon what weak

men call luck, and Calvinists predestination, but, to a certain determinate extent, upon independent individual exertion under given circumstances. And thus does Revelation, interpreted literally, and quite apart from ideological extravagance, confirm by evidence of the strongest and most substantial kind the theory advocated in my last Lecture regarding the relation of man to God in Christ ; a theory which meets whatever cavils the Neologian is able to advance against a literal exegesis, by exposing the fallacy of his assumption that our choice as Biblical interpreters must lie between Predestinarianism (or some feeble modification of it) and the system of hermeneutics which he himself adopts.

The further bearings of this inference in its controversial aspect I cannot at present discuss. Rather would I turn for a moment from "the strife of tongues" to His grand and simple utterances who spake as never man spake ; rather would I now recall His teaching upon this of all questions the most deeply momentous, the most lightly regarded by the sons of men. How in that lively image of the future judgment no trace is to be found of ecstatic intuition, of transcendental apprehension, or other mystic extravagance. How plain all is, how practical, how homely. How he, who from his own sloth and perverse folly had neglected the spiritual privileges vouchsafed, was deprived even of that which he seemed to have ;—for faculties

unused have but a seeming and no real value⁽³⁰⁾ ;—
how to him who by his independent action had
turned those privileges to profitable account, it
was said by the great Taskmaster in that day :
“ Well done, good and faithful servant, enter thou
into the joy of thy Lord !”

LECTURE VI.

PHILIPPIANS iii. 10.

“That I may know him, and the power of his Resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings.”

THE facts brought under your notice in my last Lecture fully establish the Scriptural recognition of an independent causal power in the finite Being.

Such at least is the general inference to which they legitimately lead.

It still remains for me to test this inference a little more closely in its controversial aspect, and this not alone by meeting a possible objection to its validity, but also by suggesting a clue for the harmonizing of those texts upon which the conflicting theories of the Predestinarian and the Universalist respectively rely.

Before doing so, however, it may be well to take a rapid survey of the ground already traversed, so as to bring under your immediate cognizance both

the exigencies of the position I desired to maintain, and the mode in which I have dealt with them.

In discussing the question of a supernatural Revelation, Spinoza long ago declared that Faith and Reason had their respective spheres ; but that their common object was to promote morality, which consisted in the love of God and of one's neighbour.

Such a theory necessitated, of course, the distribution of mankind into two distinct classes, the philosophic and the vulgar.

For the improvement of the latter in that phenomenal morality which passed away with the present life he candidly recognized the value of the Bible. For, reflecting as it did the highest conceptions in the way of Theodicy of which the unreasoning multitude were capable, it stimulated the practical action of that religious sentiment which worships, with a superstitious dread, the anthropomorphic God it has itself created.

For the guidance of the former the purer light of Reason was alone required. Her disciples soon learned to distinguish the real from the phenomenal, and to reject as gross illusions all save those irreducible impersonal cognitions which the intellect was *free* to grasp, and therefore grasped *necessarily*. These men accordingly repudiated, as a mere chimaera, the free-will of vulgar moralists, and, of course, the Personal God whom superstition believed to be analogously a free moral Agent, and à

fortiori the Revelation supposed to have been supernaturally communicated by Him.

For them Deity and immortality consisted in the apprehension of those cognitions, which alone were *real* and *eternal*.

To such views as these the Sceptical Philosophy is directly antagonistic in some respects, in others curiously akin.

Its phases are numerous. It now resolves causation into succession, affirming the so-called necessity of the causal judgment to be the mere result of an habitual(external) observation of orderly sequences. Now it abruptly divides human Reason into two parts, denying to the ideas of the one all objective reality. Now, positing the Absolute and the Infinite as counter-imbecillities of thought, it pronounces Reason's loftiest object to be utterly incognizable by her. Now it declares finite morality heterogeneous to divine, and boldly relegates the former to the sphere of the relative and the phenomenal.⁽¹⁾

These systems are diametrically opposed on the question of the human apprehension of an absolute science. They agree in divorcing, though in different ways, Intellect and Faith, and in denying (with one grand but inconsistent exception) the objective reality of human morality.

There are two conflicting exegetical schools in the present day, the Predestinarian and the Neologian, which may be regarded as the theological

representatives, to some extent, of these philosophical systems.

The Predestinarian theology borrows, indeed, from both. In denying to the finite Being an initiative causal power it adopts to the full the necessitarian principles of Pantheism; it postulates, on the other hand, the Pyrrhonism of the sceptical philosophy in the cardinal doctrines of Election and Reprobation which it professes to find revealed in the Bible. Fixing, by means of these doctrines, an impassable chasm between man's moral nature and that of the God of Revelation, it is compelled to regard Intellect as (not the handmaid, but) the slave of Faith.

Neology, a genuine and more consistent daughter of Pantheism, idealizes the objective truths, and even the historical personages of the Bible; rejects miracles and a Personal God; accepts as final the perturbations of the existing moral system, with those consequent inequalities in the temporal and spiritual condition of individuals which Predestinarianism perpetuates throughout Eternity, and in this way professes to relieve Revelation of the scandals attached to it by the vulgar Theology. It recognizes the paramount authority of Intellect over Faith.

Desiring to join issue with the Neologian, I proposed to establish against him the following propositions:—

- i. That his system is philosophically unsound.

ii. That it is unnecessary, even for those literal interpreters who repudiate the scepticism and necessitarianism of the predestinarian Creed.

It was thus obviously incumbent upon me to detect, in the first place, the weakness of the Pantheistic Theodicy, (relying upon which Neology rejects a Personal God) and construct one in its stead upon a *real*, *i. e.* a reasonable basis, eschewing the vicious extremes of Pantheism and Scepticism, of intellectualism and superstition ; and, 2ndly, to allege satisfactory evidence from the Bible itself that its fundamental truths admitted of a *literal* interpretation in perfect unison with such a reasonable Theodicy.

To make good my first position, I examined the *Ethica* of Spinoza at considerable length, and from a purely intellectual stand-point. I succeeded, I trust, in proving that his *à priori* method involved a fatal contradiction, the human intellect being distinctly and formally posited as at once finite and infinite ; and further, that both in his and the cognate systems of the great German Idealists, the Finite and the Infinite were reduced to scientific unity only by the virtual annihilation of either Term, and their adherents thus committed either to the Oriental Mysticism of the Alexandrian, or the Atheism which is unhappily more characteristic of the Occidental Pantheistic school.

Hence it followed that the pretensions of the

Idealists to an Absolute Science were vain indeed ; and hence, again, that the philosophic basis of Neology was unsound.

But however consonant such results might be with the conclusions of the Sceptical, or, as its later professors would designate it, the Critical Philosophy, I could derive from them but little help, indeed, toward the construction of such a Theodicy as my polemics imperatively required.

I could not accept, for example, the teaching of Kant ; for when he attempts to save morality and religion by granting to the concepts of the practical an objective reality withheld from those of the pure Reason, he exhibits the spectacle of a man by gigantic but fruitless effort endeavouring to escape the meshes which, with a fatal subtlety, he had woven for himself ; and thus whatever of real basis for a Theodicy the one portion of his great work supplied, his own hands had already undermined in the other.⁽²⁾

Still less could I agree with the inference of Hamilton, that a Deity distinct from Creation—a Personal God—is a fitting object of Faith, perhaps, reflected with more or less purity in the manifold creeds prevailing among men, but certainly not of Reason.⁽³⁾

Such a conclusion would have been peculiarly disastrous for me, as it would have brought me back precisely to the ground-principle of Spinoza's hermeneutics. I had had a grave warning, too, of

the legitimate tendency of this divorce of Intellect and Faith in the notable expedient of "Moral Miracles," recently applied, with only too much consistency, by a distinguished disciple of the Hamiltonian philosophy as a solvent for certain immoralities alleged, and by this author *admitted* to exist in the Inspired Volume.⁽⁴⁾ Spinoza himself could hardly have desired stronger testimony than this in support of his identification of Faith and Superstition, and consequent rejection of the Personal God of the Bible.

The basis of a rational Theodicy, then, remote alike from Pantheism and Pyrrhonism, was still to be sought.

I had already ascertained that the Finite and the Infinite Beings, if objective realities, were incapable of scientific unification.

Assuming their mutual relation to be consequently illogical, was I justified, notwithstanding, in pronouncing them Realities, *i.e.* Entities objectified for me by REASON?

To determine this I naturally rejected the fallacious *à priori* method of the Idealists, and seriously asked myself what it was, amid the ceaseless flow of ever-fleeting phenomena, both internal and external, which gave me that idea of permanent reality I unquestionably possessed.

The deeper my introspection, the profounder became my conviction that it was given me in the intuitive apperception of my own existence, the

very root of which I found to consist in a causal power incapable alike of demonstration or logical *discernment*,—in a word, transcendental.⁽⁵⁾

I remembered that the Coryphæus of the modern sceptical school had endeavoured to resolve the causal judgment itself into the result of an external observation of orderly sequences ; to me, however, it seemed quite plain that this was emphatically to confound the *post hoc* with the *propter hoc*, that a million such observations were as incapable as a single one of originating, however they might confirm, my idea of causal *power*.

The objective *reality*, then, of my own concrete Being I felt entitled to assume as the fundamental *datum* of Reason, that reality consisting, moreover, in a self-asserting causal power.

I thus grasped a *noumenon*, a thing in itself, a real Being ; neither did the apprehension involve a paralogism,⁽⁶⁾ for the process was intuitive, not logical ; the distinction of Subject and Object had here no possible place ; there was here a realization of Reason in its purest, truest sense.

But this power, which was thus of the very essence of my Being, I simultaneously knew to owe allegiance to an absolute Law of Right, which it could neither obey without satisfaction nor outrage without compunction. Thus I became conscious of Duty, and knew myself to be a moral, personal Agent.

Causal power, and that power owing allegiance

to sovereign Right, here was my first Reality. Reflecting on the Being thus immediately given, I at once perceived that its essential causal power was physically conditioned, as well in many other ways as, above all, in the fact, that though self-asserting, it was not self-evolved ; that though it essentially enclosed, and in such wise yielded the idea of *real* causal power, that power had been communicated ; and thus did its own concrete reality necessitate the idea, short of which it could not rest, of an Unconditioned Causal Power, of a real ABSOLUTE, all-evolving, self-evolved.⁽⁷⁾

But while thus asserting my realization of an Infinite Cause, I was far, indeed, from claiming an absolute science. On the contrary, I acknowledged all through my ignorance of the "*processus*" of the conditioned Being from the Unconditioned,—the relation between them I admitted to be transcendental. I only maintained that Reason gave me the two realities in indissoluble correlation, that I was as profoundly assured by her of the being of a God *as I was of my own existence*.⁽⁸⁾

Here an objector may possibly urge that I have been all this time disputing about words ; that I have merely substituted the term Reason for what the Hamiltonian school, for example, would designate Faith, as the primal source of my belief in God.

No doubt it is difficult verbally to distinguish Reason, in the sense I have employed it, from

Faith. But it is not impossible ; and the special point which I desire to establish against the Neologist, the real existence, namely, of a *Personal* God, itself embodies the distinction.

Let me turn aside for a few moments, and endeavour to elucidate my meaning upon this, to me, all-important point.

There is in man an emotional sense of dependence, there is an instinct of prayer, and these generate in his breast the belief in a God,—“Jehovah, Jove, or Lord,”—whom he invests with the all absorbing attribute of physical Power ; this instinct, or emotion, I take to be what the Hamiltonian philosophy designates Faith, and assumes as the basis of its Theodicy.⁽⁹⁾

The *reality* of such a basis I deny ; it is reduced from the real to the phenomenal by the very superstructure attempted to be reared upon it ; so much indeed is openly avowed by the author recently referred to, when he grants to human morality a purely phenomenal value.⁽¹⁰⁾

For the *reality* of the finite Being whose emotional instinct is thus assumed as the basis of the Hamiltonian Theodicy, consists, as we have seen, in his intuitive realization of his own *distinct* causal power, and this power, *as given thus by Reason*, is essentially moral,—obliged, *i. e.*, by Duty.

If this moral element, which is thus of the very essence of human Personality, be *phenomenal*, then the conclusions of Spinoza are, I firmly believe,

irresistible ;—the finite personality is an illusion. If, on the other hand, it be *real*, then,—but only then,—is the human personality realized as an entity distinct from the correlated absolute causal Power ; then,—but only then,—is the latter given by REASON as a distinct Personality, as an Independent cause, and yet a Personal God,—obliged, *i. e.*, by Duty.

Such, then, is the distinction between the Theodicy of Reason and that of Faith ; the one “ignorantly feels after” a Higher Power, the other realizes a PERSONAL GOD.

And well may I designate this demarcation of Reason and Faith an all-important one.

For it alone enables me to apprehend the enduring reality of the finite Consciousness, the homogeneity of human and divine morality.⁽¹¹⁾

It alone enables me thereby to derive from Revelation an intelligible solvent for the distressing anomalies of the present life, in the great dogma of a future Judgment, which, ignoring these anomalies as so many phenomenal obliquities, shall confirm, at once and for ever, the reality of the finite causal power,—of the fundamental principles of human morality.

It alone enables me to find in these very perturbations a strong and clear and independent confirmation for this Scriptural dogma of a conscious future for the soul. If that soul be *real* in its physical energy alone, while its moral action is

transient and illusive, then all analogy corroborates, with an appalling force, the Pantheistic doctrine of a Deus Immanens, and constrains me to pronounce it, as I might the chrysalis or the butterfly, a mere momentary phase of necessary, impersonal, Substance. If, on the other hand, it is a moral power, finite, yet real in itself, and so far homogeneous with a Personal God, then its present sphere of conscious action cannot be accepted by Reason as *final*, for these perturbations effectually mar that perfect harmony of happiness and virtue which Reason (as distinguished from superstitious Faith) knows to be the Supreme Good.⁽¹²⁾

Finally, it alone enables me to reconcile the conflicting claims of Intellect and Faith. The merely intellectual are ever prone, in their dread of Superstition, to depress the religious instinct, and incline proportionately to the Deus Immanens of the Pantheist. The blind votaries of the religious instinct are ever prone to superstition, ever ready to confound the attributes of Jehovah with those "of Chemosh, or such fabled Deities."

Spinoza has determined, with a resolution which never falters, a desperate steadfastness which never quails, the Divine Ideal of the merely Intellectual. In his Construction, of which Neology is the exegetical representation in the present day, human morality is illusive and phenomenal.

The excesses of "Theopathy" in every age demonstrate the perils of the opposite extreme, in

which Deity responds to an emotional sense of dependence, His physical attributes being accepted as paramount and intelligible, His moral nature pronounced to be not even cognizable by man.

In the Reformed Churches, Calvinism is the best, because the most consistent, representative of this extreme. Its fundamental dogma also resolves human action into an illusion, denying the possibility of its only real basis, Free-will.

The point of contact for these extremes is thus found in their common repudiation of the eternal reality of the finite Personality. They agree, too, in the divorce of Intellect and Faith.

To me it seems the loftiest function of Reason to maintain the equipoise between these conflicting forces in the soul, and that she best discharges this function in such a Theodicy as that which I have attempted, however feebly, to construct.

For she therein assumes, as a steadfast and real basis, the finite Personality, conscious of its own rights, and those of others ; and in indissoluble connexion realizes the co-existent Infinite,—the absolute Cause,—not as a capricious, or at best *unintelligible* physical Power,—the common error of the Pantheist and the Sceptic,—but as an homogeneous Personality, conscious of kindred Right.⁽¹³⁾

In this, then, I repeat, consists the distinction (assuredly no mere verbal one) I would place between Reason, regarded as the foundation of a

Theodicy, and Faith. And in this distinction is to be found the special character of the Theodicy I profess.

A Theodicy, not resting, like that of Descartes, upon the visionary *à priori* concepts of Perfection; not arguing downwards, like the Pantheist, from the Unknown to the Known; not postulating syllogisms, like the Sceptic, to arrive by paralogism at the primitive, intuitive reality,⁽¹⁴⁾ nor applying a cold and barren logic to dissociate two living truths, nor presuming to pronounce the Unknown heterogeneous to the Known;⁽¹⁵⁾ but starting from that real Free-will, whose living power no discursive reasonings, however subtle, can practically paralyze in man,—in which his Personality consists,—and springing from this real basis, by an intuition hardly less immediate, to the kindred reality of a PERSONAL GOD.

To return from this long digression;—Having thus secured a Theodicy reposing upon a real basis, remote alike from the extremes of Pantheism and Pyrrhonism, of Intellectualism and Superstition, it only remained for me to allege from the Bible satisfactory proof that its fundamental doctrines admitted of a *literal* interpretation in perfect unison with this *rational* Theodicy.

Here I was brought, of course, into direct antagonism with the Predestinarian theology, as it was the avowedly irrational dogmas of this exegetical school that supplied the Neologian with his strong-

est arguments in favour of an ideological interpretation.

Now, in approaching this part of my subject, it struck me at once that the regeneration of man, as revealed in Scripture, presented an exact parallel for what my previous controversy with the Neologian philosophy had established as to his original genesis. There the Perfect Being had been recognized, indeed, as the Absolute Cause of the Finite, but His relation to it (as transcendental, not logical) was yet held to admit, and in my Theodicy actually postulated, its real Personality.

And so the Redeemer's Perfect Work seemed to be laid down in Scripture as the absolute cause of man's regeneration, and yet the causal relation of the *opus operatum* to the finite moral agency to be so far transcendental as fully to admit of what my Exegesis required,—the Finite Being's real Personality.

My object, therefore, obviously was to maintain the truth of this parallel,—to afford intelligible evidence from Scripture of the recognition by its Great Author of the reality of that finite morality which both the Predestinarian and the Neologian concur in regarding as phenomenal.

And I thought that this object would be best attained if I were able to allege conclusive Scriptural proof of the subsistence of an exact and intelligible analogy between the regulative laws of human progress, or retrogression, in the domain of Nature

—extending only to the temporal—and of Grace, extending to the eternal destiny of man.

Here, of course, as in my Theodicy, the reality of the finite free-will was assumed ; and on the truth of that assumption the value of the analogy I sought to establish ultimately depended.

I had already detected, however, upon purely intellectual grounds, the fallacy of the Neologian *à priori* objections to this finite causal power. And I now showed how much more untenable such objections were for the Predestinarian, professing as he did to believe in the distinct Personality of God.

And more than this,—in the very process of determining the dominant law of Man's temporal progress I elicited *positive* evidence for the reality of the finite causal power, by consulting that hard practical Experience whose teachings none but a mere visionary could call in question. The lesson supplied was to this effect :—that in the constitution of things, as actually ordained by God, we find a constant homage paid to the majesty of justice and right, in the clear, intelligible meaning of these words ; that the temporal destiny of men and nations is not the sport of some capricious, unintelligible Will, but responds to their exercise of that moral freedom which is at once the measure of responsibility and its source ; that amid the most distressing anomalies, the harshest discords, we can still detect,—if only we be patient and trustful,—an undertone of harmony, thrilling along the grand

and solemn chords of Nature's macrocosm, pervading no less surely—though less clearly heard be- times—the microcosm of man.

And thus, as amid the versatility of Nature's works, the seemingly wanton exercise of her generative powers, there yet remains a certain specific order she may not transgress, even so, however varied the conditions, however perplexing the relations and complicated influences under which men and nations act, Right still asserts its ultimate dominion over Might; in this result especially exhibiting its supremacy, that upon the *legitimate* individual exercise of given faculties, far more than upon arbitrary external circumstances, depends the comparative progress, the real well-being, of both.⁽¹⁶⁾ And although, for the virtuous exercise of these faculties, harsh inequalities of circumstance seem indispensable, that still an equal law remains for all; that certain opportunities are placed within the reach of every man, which, if turned to account by his independent energy, possess a determinate fructifying power, while, if they be neglected, the corresponding faculties become proportionately deadened and demoralized; a dispensation characterized with his wonted depth of wisdom by our divine Master in the words: "To him that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance, but from him that hath not shall be taken even that which he seemeth to have."

Such being the lesson derivable from experience

as to the steadfast principle upon which individual progress depends in this life, it would seem to follow that the unequal circumstances under which it operates constitute the phenomenal and transient element; that its basis, on the other hand,—the finite causal power,—against the reality of which no valid *à priori* arguments could be urged, was thus further proved, *à posteriori*, to be permanent and real. If therefore I could only substantiate, by conclusive *Scriptural proof*, my hypothesis of an exact analogy between the regulative laws of natural and spiritual progress or decay, of acceptance with God in Time (where unequal circumstances seem inevitable) and in Eternity (where the discipline of Time may no longer necessitate them⁽¹⁷⁾) then the Theodicy constructed upon that very basis would not only be disembarrassed of the Sceptical cavils founded on the obliquities of the moral system under which we now live, but also proved to be in harmonious unison with the teaching of Revelation, *literally* interpreted, upon the relation of the Absolute Cause of Man's Redemption to the finite causal power.⁽¹⁸⁾

For greater precision I next selected one out of the only three distinguishable theories which a *literal* interpreter could derive from Revelation upon this its fundamental dogma. That theory at once met all the objections of the Neologian to the predestinarian Theology, and also recognized to the full the reality of the finite Will.

I sought then from Scripture, literally interpreted, to prove in its support, that this central force round which, albeit in eccentric orbits, the destinies of nations and of men revolve, extends in its operation to their spiritual progress also. And I turned for such proof to facts which Scripture records, as though there, if anywhere, likely to find a criterion satisfactory to those for whom I wrote; those young and enquiring minds, who may be disposed too hastily to accept the fallacy of the Neologian, that between Predestinarianism (or some inconsistent modification of it) and the exegesis which he himself recommends, our choice, as Biblical interpreters, must lie.

I thus ascertained that at a most critical time in the spiritual history of man, when there were displayed the clearest evidences ever afforded of the Holy Spirit's operations, these operations were proved to be neither arbitrary nor guided by an unintelligible Will; but in strict accordance with the maxim of our Lord just now quoted, in strict accordance with the Psalmist's strikingly prophetic words: "To him that ordereth his conversation aright will I shew the salvation of God."

I found it left on record, in the first place, that of all the Dispersion a very large number were converted to Christianity upon witnessing the miraculous events of the day of Pentecost, and that the recipients of this signal blessing consisted partly of Jews,—who, at a time which tried the

faith of many, had consistently kept the ways of the Lord, and had not forsaken their God,—partly of proselytes to the Mosaic covenant from every nation under Heaven, who emulated their piety and zeal, and in preaching to whom the Apostles evidently supposed that they were fulfilling the parting injunction of their risen Lord.

In the second place I ascertained, that when Paul was subsequently commissioned by a special revelation “to shew the salvation of God” to the Gentiles in their native lands, an unmistakeable preference was shown to one class,—a numerous one, no doubt, but still only a fragment of the entire number,—that he preached to them, to the almost exclusion of the rest.⁽¹⁹⁾

Seeking what, if any, were the characteristics of this class, I found that they were men who had voluntarily renounced the licentious rites and easy morality of Heathenism, and were technically described in the New Testament as those who “feared” or “worshipped God;” that they had so far cast in their lot with a despised and vanquished people, whose religious system ran counter to their own habits and prejudices and pleasant vices, with nothing to commend it save its comparative purity and truth. In a word that having had spiritual opportunities placed within their reach, in the widely extended synagogue-worship of the Jews, they had taken advantage of them, and had thus

gained acceptance and admission to still more intimate relations with God.

Such facts proved, if anything could, that the law of progress in things temporal established by Experience, had its exact parallel in the law of spiritual progress revealed by the Bible ; the finite free-will being recognized as the *proximate* cause of man's advancement or deterioration, acceptance or rejection, by both.

And thus, as in the construction of a Theodicy Reason had realized for me an Absolute Cause, *personally* distinct from the finite and created Being, even so did Revelation present to Reason in the grand doctrine of that finite Being's regeneration, two distinctly co-existent and real agencies, the one absolute and ultimate, the other proximate and relative.

Thus, lastly, were the conflicting claims of Faith and Intellect harmonized by Reason in Natural and Revealed Religion ; the key-stone of the arch which bridged the chasm fixed between them by Pantheism and Scepticism alike, being found in the *reality* of the finite causal power, and of the morality which it involves.

So far for my retrospect of the ground already traversed.

What now remains may be despatched in very few words.

To the general inference deducible from the facts

just brought under your notice I know but of one objection that can be made. It is one which I ought to apologise, perhaps, for formally discussing here, but it seems necessary to do so for the completeness of the argument. It may be, and indeed has been implicitly, urged that these signal spiritual blessings were not bestowed, that these nearer relations with God did not ensue, and conversion to Christianity did not occur, because the recipients were God-fearing and righteous men antecedent to their faith in Jesus Christ, but that they were antecedently possessed of these qualifications because of their subsequent *conversion* in the Calvinistic sense of that term ;⁽²⁰⁾ of their sudden and spasmodic subjection to an ecstatic influence which they were equally unable to resist, or by any other process to attain ; which, when thus bestowed, capriciously and irrespectively of their antecedents, rendered their previous as well as their subsequent actions pleasing and acceptable to God.

Now setting aside all that I have hitherto laboured to establish—viz. that an objection of this nature arrogantly assumes with the Pantheist the *à priori* impossibility of spontaneous action in the finite being ; that it directly contradicts common sense, and our experience of God's ordinary moral government, and the constant teaching of our divine Master ; disregarding all these considerations,—and they ought surely to possess for us no little weight,—we can find in the words of Revelation

itself the most distinct refutation of such an objection that can well be conceived.

For precisely to the case of these God-fearing men apply those words of Peter, which formed, as you may remember, the text of my opening Lecture: "Of a truth, I perceive that God is no respecter of persons, but in every nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with Him." These words were spoken in reference to Cornelius, who is elsewhere technically described as "one that feared God" with all his house, whose prayers and alms, we are expressly told, were received by God as a testimony of his moral worth, and led to that mission of Peter which resulted in his conversion to Christianity.

Cornelius either had undergone the ecstatic influence above alluded to prior to the angel's visit, or he had not. If he had, then having been on the Calvinistic hypothesis thereby absolutely *assured* of his eternal salvation, he had no need to send for Peter in order "to hear words whereby he and all his house *might be saved*;" if he had not, then, in his case, his antecedent piety and righteousness, if there be any truth or meaning in the words we read, was the *proximate* cause of "acceptance with God," and no less in the case of those other God-fearing Gentiles, to whom Paul, as the apostle of the uncircumcision, afterwards was sent.

To him and to them, as to the Jews and proselytes on the day of Pentecost, a marked preference

was shewn ; and the grounds of that preference are stated, with a clearness and precision which defy all hermeneutical subtlety or subterfuge, in the miraculous revelation he received.⁽²¹⁾

Nor should we forget, in estimating such subterfuges, Peter's significant words when subsequently alluding to this very case : " And God, *which knoweth the heart*, bare them witness, giving them the Holy Ghost, even as unto us ;" while for determining the *nature* of this acceptance, we have the comment of the Church of Jerusalem : " Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted *repentance unto life*."

We may also advantageously compare the language employed by Paul in addressing the saints, or general body of believers, at Ephesus, whom he describes as predestinated to the adoption of children by God ; this Church consisting, as I have already shewn, of those God-fearing men, typified by Cornelius, to whom Paul had preached in the Ephesian Synagogues. Repentance unto life, then, and the *ὑποθεσία*, were vouchsafed to those who had gained acceptance with God ; and this acceptance the typical case of Cornelius indisputably proves to have been the result of no *subsequent* ecstatic intuition, capriciously bestowed, and irresistible in its effect.

From the express words, then, and the recorded facts of Scripture, we may safely infer that the law of progress resulting from independent individual

action obtains no less in spiritual than in temporal things ; that in the former also talents are bestowed, opportunities offered, advantages of the most varied character placed within the reach of men ; and that upon the use of these *proximately* depends their acceptance with Him who neither irresistibly coerceth, nor yet capriciously prepareth, but “ who knoweth the heart.”⁽²²⁾

And thus does Scripture, literally and intelligibly interpreted, supply what I may term a practical criterion, decisively supporting that theory of man's acceptance with God, through the Redeemer of the world, which both recognises the reality of the finite will, and also furnishes a comprehensive answer to the cavils of the Neologian.

Let me now offer a few suggestions, arising out of the disquisition just concluded, toward the better understanding of that famous Epistle to which the other two of the three theories referred to above—though mutually destructive—with equal confidence appeal.

I find that the very latest decrees of the Tübingen school deign to endorse the opinion of all Christendom in attributing the Epistle to the Romans to St. Paul. But with regard to the class or classes addressed in it, and the main object with which it was composed, there is still, as you are aware, among Theologians of every grade, a wide diversity of opinion.⁽²³⁾

To me it seems evident that the Church at Rome

was founded by those "strangers of Rome," Jews and Proselytes, whose conversion to Christianity on the day of Pentecost I have brought prominently under your notice ; and I have no doubt that it was largely recruited from the ranks of those pious Gentiles who attended the synagogue worship in that city.⁽²⁴⁾ This its constitution solves nearly all the difficulties connected with the former question, while the second is not only answered, but illustrated to a great extent, by the consideration that the founders were men strongly and devotedly attached, as I have already pointed out, to the Mosaic economy.

For it is manifest that in a church founded by men indebted for their first knowledge of Jesus Christ, as we have seen, to their punctilious observance of the Mosaic Law, what has been called the Judaizing party would have had much to countenance their peculiar views. The dangerous *tendency* of these views is to be measured by the energy, or vehemence rather, by which St. Paul opposes them in all his Epistles. That such vehemence should have culminated in his address to a church founded as that at Rome had been is only, then, what an acquaintance with the circumstances of her origin would have led us to expect.

Attachment to the Mosaic Law was, indeed, excellent and praiseworthy, but like all things human, it was liable to abuse ; and with the Jews, in the time of our Lord, this abuse had been exhibited in

a most dangerous exaggeration of what we may designate the *formal* advantages appertaining to the Abrahamic Covenant.

Thus it seemed to have been a settled conviction in the mind of many influential Jews of that day that God was bound *in justice* to make the Israelites, or "saints" (for such, as we have seen, is the Rabbinical interpretation of the word), together with those admitted by circumcision beneath the sheltering wings, partakers of the Messiah's Kingdom ;—to justify them, and make them reign with him as kings and priests for ever ; that judgment was for the world without, not for the house of God—the descendants, *i. e.* "of Jacob, whom He loved." The grounds of this assurance were apparently four-fold :—1stly. The meritorious works of Abraham. 2ndly. Their knowledge of God and of His law, for "in the Lord should all the seed of Abraham be justified." 3rdly. Circumcision ; and lastly, those dead works of sacrifice which were regarded as a sufficient atonement for occasional violations of the Mosaic Law.⁽²⁵⁾

Hence, when the Forerunner came "to turn the hearts of the disobedient to the wisdom of the just," the fundamental lesson he inculcated was a complete *μετάνοια* with regard to God, an utter renunciation of the idea that lineal descent from Abraham ensured salvation, an absolute necessity for individual works consistent with such a radical change of mind regarding their relations toward God.⁽²⁶⁾

And quite in keeping with this was the doctrine of the Saviour himself. For example, he impresses upon Nicodemus the necessity of regeneration to the Jew,—purposely adopting phraseology with which Nicodemus, as a Master in Israel, and one, therefore, who had often acted as Triumvir at the baptism of Proselytes, ought to have been familiar, however little he could understand the necessity to one by birth an Israelite, of what that ceremony typified.⁽²⁷⁾

So does He upbraid those who in rejecting John's baptism, when he came to them in the way of righteousness, rejected the counsel of God toward themselves.

So, too, does he recall the very metaphor employed in this connexion by John : "Every tree which beareth not good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire."

And, again, the constant theme of the apostolic preachers was : Repentance towards God, and consequent faith in the name,—the religion, as we would say,—of his Son Jesus Christ, whose one sacrifice, once offered,—followed by his supernatural Resurrection,—through its world-wide atonement enabled God to be just to his covenant-people, and yet the justifier (without distinction between Jew and Greek, and apart from all legal sacrifice or covenant-claims) of every one who believed that God had raised up Christ from the

dead, and obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine which he had delivered.⁽²⁸⁾

This doctrine, so completely antagonistic to the absolute predestinarianism of the Jews, was what St. Paul designates "the offence of the cross," for the preaching of which he sustained at their hands such constant and otherwise unaccountable persecution.

Now, we cannot suppose that *all* the Jews were guilty of the crimes laid to their charge in the second chapter of Romans, any more than that all the Gentiles committed, habitually or otherwise, the abominable sins enumerated in the chapter preceding. Very far from it.⁽²⁹⁾ But that such was the *tendency* of this phase of Judaism, nay more, that some of the Jews did actually commit such crimes, and yet believed that they should be saved by the meritorious works of Abraham, by circumcision and legal sacrifice,—that while making their boast in the law and their knowledge of God they yet caused His name to be blasphemed among the Gentiles by breaking of the law,—is abundantly evident; and it is no less plain that this Judaizing party desired to restrict the benefits of Christ's death and passion to those who by submitting to circumcision acknowledged, as it were, the validity of their extravagant claims.

I think if we keep these facts steadily in view, it will enable us to avoid the erroneous conclusions

drawn both by the Universalist and the Predestinarian of modern times from this Epistle.

The task which the Apostle had to perform was far more difficult than one unacquainted with the high predestinarian doctrine of the Jews would suppose.

He knew that the antinomian tendency of such a creed was quite incompatible with that practical religion which required men, forsaking the dead sacrifices of the law, to offer their bodies a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, as the reasonable service of those risen with Christ to newness of life. But then to prove this he had to attack all the Jews' most cherished dogmas; the meritorious works of Abraham,—their covenant relations towards God, involving knowledge of Him and of His Law,—the essential necessity of circumcision for salvation,—the validity of legal sacrifice.

And to do all this in the face of the incontrovertible fact that the Jews were the saints,—the elect,—beloved for the fathers' sake; so long foreknown, predestinated, adopted, glorified;⁽³⁰⁾ so long possessed *de jure* as they thought, and, at all events, *de facto*, of the adoption to sonship, the glory, the law, the promises; whose father Abraham, as St. James assures us, was justified by his works, and so obtained the promise that he, as progenitor of the Messiah, should be the heir of the world.⁽³¹⁾

How then does he deal with this grave difficulty? How acquit the covenant God of the still re-

peated charge of *injustice* in failing to justify the elect ?

Not, indeed, with the cold precision of a scientific treatise, where every phrase coheres so logically as to supply the safe basis of an infallible dogma. Quite otherwise. The logical process is disturbed throughout, not merely by his well-known peculiarities of style, but (if I may so speak) by a strong and deep emotion which will not calmly hear of such imputations against the righteousness of Him, whose alleged injustice to the Jew was, indeed, but the overflowing of His wealth of mercy, and wisdom, and goodness, toward the entire human race ; of Him, who, to quote his own far-reaching inference, had concluded all, in covenant and out of covenant alike, in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all.

No doubt, in one of the lines of this high argument, St. Paul employs phrases directly sustaining the Supralapsarian hypothesis, when he assails, *e. g.*, the Jews' exaggerated notion of the merits of Abraham and the elected Israel, and leaves for several verses unanswered the cavil : " Why doth he yet find fault, for who resisteth his will ? " and only then indirectly exposes its weakness by a bold quotation from Isaiah : " All day long have I stretched forth my hands unto "—not an *unresisting*, but—" a disobedient and gainsaying people." ⁽³²⁾

No doubt, again, he does draw magnificent parallels in reference to the first and second Adam,

which seem directly to assert the final salvation of all men, irrespective of their conduct while on earth ; nor can anything be more pitiful than the perverted ingenuity of verbal criticism by which some commentators seek to distort their grand and simple symmetry.⁽³³⁾

Yet if we desire to be sincere and candid critics, we must, when deriving formal dogmas from the Apostle's argument, qualify these absolute and conflicting statements by a fair regard to that main design which they were intended severally to subserve ; and this was, as we have seen, to break down the predestinarian assurance of the Jew, by shewing, on the one hand, the delusive basis upon which it reposed, by magnifying, on the other, in the way of contrast, the all-sufficient merits of Christ.

And I do think that the result of this most comprehensive canon of interpretation for "the hard sayings" of St. Paul, will be found not merely to shew the one-sided character of both the Calvinistic and the Universalist inference, but also to substantiate in the strongest way that third theory of acceptance with God, which I have advocated throughout these Lectures ;—that the Christian covenant, namely, was made between God and the *entire* human family, but that its benefits shall finally apply, without respect of persons, to those alone who have acted here according to the light given them by God, who have earnestly availed

themselves of such spiritual advantages as His Providence had placed within their reach.⁽³⁴⁾

At least I may appeal in its support to the solemn truths with which the Apostle prefaces the entire discussion, as though to preclude the possibility of either of his two subsidiary lines of argument being wrested by the unlearned and the unstable to their own destruction; when with emphasis he assures us that God will render to every man, whether Jew or Gentile, according to his works, forasmuch as "He is no respecter of persons."

AND now I trust my younger brethren will "suffer the word of exhortation," while I endeavour for one moment to impress the moral derivable from this protracted discussion.

Your studies here are for the most part purely intellectual; their great end, whether dealing with necessary or contingent subject-matter, the attainment of Truth, in the way of precise and logical induction.

But man is not pure intellect.

He has a practical moral energy, whose ideal he knows cannot be realized under the conditions of the present life; he has strong and deep emotions. And those philosophers who deny the essential and permanent reality of these his constitutive elements, or claim such reality, perhaps, for the impersonal cognitions of the intellect alone, belie Reason itself.⁽³⁵⁾

For the very first *datum* of Reason is the finite personal, or moral agent, and in indissoluble association therewith she supplies an Infinite God, yet of kindred Personality; thus fulfilling the desire of that emotional piety which yearns not for Father and Fatherland alone, but for the Great Father too, who is in Heaven.

We have, then, a divine Philosophy, which will not be approached by the pure intellect; and the attempt to apprehend its teaching through that medium, apart from the guidance of the moral and religious instincts, must end,—as it has ever ended,—in disastrous failure.

This, therefore, is my counsel:—In the first place, that you cultivate and cherish those instincts with all diligence, if only to neutralize the preponderance which in your case particularly the purely intellectual constituent is calculated to acquire; and secondly, in estimating the objections which are now—some openly and with almost derision, some more insidiously—alleged against the fundamental truths of Christianity, that you consider how far the constructions offered by such objectors harmonize with REASON; how far, *i.e.* they take a fair and legitimate account of all the constituent elements of the Finite Being.⁽³⁶⁾

Examine these sceptical authors if you will, to what school soever they belong; their candour and their good intentions freely admit; allow, too, the fullest weight to their destructive criticism,—to the

logical difficulties involved in the recognition of a Personal, or, as they would scornfully say, an anthropomorphic God. But do not stop here. Examine their constructions no less rigidly, and judge for yourselves how far they embrace *all* the facts of the case, how far they respond to the ascertained realities of man's moral and spiritual, no less than his purely intellectual organism.⁽³⁷⁾ And I think you will find, after all, in the Bible, prayerfully and diligently studied, literally and thoughtfully interpreted, the ONE CONSTRUCTION which,—recognized as it has been by many a giant intellect,—at once excludes superstition, and yet fulfils the loftiest and purest, the most intimate and tenderest yearnings of the Soul.

And now for a moral of a more practical kind. In tracing Neology up to the Pantheistic Philosophy which gave it birth, one of my strongest motives was to detect, as it were at the fountain-head, its doubly perilous ethical tendencies ; to show that so far as it is true to its ultimate principles it must both generate a belief in absolute fatalism, and deny to the finite Being a conscious immortality.⁽³⁸⁾

The latter of these doctrines was condemned long ago as profane babbling in the very book which the Neologian professes to interpret.⁽³⁹⁾ The former is favoured unfortunately by the opinions—more or less explicitly held—of an influential body in the Church, who regard the conception of spontaneous

agency in Man as atheistical, and assign the essential character of his actions to a fatalistic supernatural influence. For this cause I sought the more earnestly to bring before you the strongest Scriptural proofs that man is a free moral agent to a certain definite extent, and that his conduct here, as such, shall form an essential element in determining his future and eternal destiny.

“What is evil?” asks a well-known writer of the present day, and here is his daring but quite consistent answer: “Evil is nothing—a mere transient phase, at best, of evanescent Being.”⁽⁴⁰⁾ “What” asks another, “is your vaunted free-will?” And here is his solution: “It generates physical results, and acting thus upon matter, from matter, by the universal law of the persistence of force it must derive its origin. It requires daily to be renewed—by the Spirit of God perhaps? oh! no—“by nutrition and rest. It is in correlation with so much food and drink and sleep.”⁽⁴¹⁾

Let it be your wisdom, on the other hand, now in the hey-day of exuberant youth, when “The Finite” woos you with a thousand spells; when the bright tints of earthly hope are unsubdued as yet by the shadow of some great sorrow; when there are passionate yearnings and the subtle thrill of purple-plumed Desire,—let it be, I say, your wisdom to recognize in evil a terrible reality; to regard that transcendental power of Free Will as correlative to a stern and enduring responsibility;

to ponder habitually such and such lines of thought, to calculate such and such lines of action, not in relation to your fleeting existence in Time alone, but to that conscious life which shall reflect it through Eternity.⁽⁴²⁾

Once more,—and this is the end of the whole matter,—Remember that the *object* of our divine Philosophy is to know the only true God, through Jesus Christ whom He has sent. “That I may know Him,” saith the Apostle, “and the power of his Resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings.” To know Him in whose frail body dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead ; in whom we realize the Truth which Intellect can never apprehend ; in whom we find the long-sought link, binding in co-existence the Finite with the Infinite,—that mighty God, that everlasting Father, who, when He had taken upon Him to deliver man, did not abhor the Virgin’s womb.

“To know Him and the power of his Resurrection.” How He thereby brought life and immortality to light ; traversing, in the loneliness of his Omnipotence, the valley of the Shadow of Death ; obtaining gifts for men, yea, even for his enemies, that the Lord God might dwell among them.

“To know Him, and the fellowship of his sufferings.” Grasping thereby, although with tremulous hand, a clue to the awful mystery of Pain and Sin. How God, who spared not His own Son, doth not willingly afflict the children of men ; how in the

impenetrable essence of things there lurks some dark and terrible necessity to be neutralized by such a sacrifice—by it alone !⁽⁴³⁾

In this chastened spirit, as reverent disciples of this divine Philosophy, and the Book in which it is revealed, let it be our highest wisdom to contemplate the great problems of Being. And so, realizing in humble Faith these transcendental truths—His holy Incarnation, His death and passion, the coming of the Holy Ghost ;⁽⁴⁴⁾ affording intelligible proof of the vitality of that Faith by daily endeavouring ourselves to follow the blessed steps of His most holy life ; to emulate in our imperfect way the perfect obedience of the Forerunner ;—we too, what time the race is ended, and the conflict o'er, may hope for acceptance with Him, who is our common Father and our God.

NOTES.

NOTES.

LECTURE I.

Note 1, page 1.—This remark is not to be confined to the Calvinistic and Arminian theories. The controversy as between Calvinist and Arminian most persons would regard as destitute alike of interest and practical advantage. Some freshness, however, has been imparted of late years to this well-worn subject in the revival of Universalism; a system which declares that *all men* shall finally gain acceptance with God, irrespective of their conduct here. Such a creed differs from the Arminian, in granting to human morality a purely phenomenal or temporary value, and in extending the benefits of the Atonement equally to all the sons of Adam. It agrees with the Calvinistic scheme upon the former point, but differs, of course, upon the latter. By some considerable modifications of the Arminian view, these three theories respecting the grounds of man's "acceptance with God" may be regarded, I believe, as exhaustive for the *literal* interpreter of Scripture. I have endeavoured to present them in this exhaustive form in my fourth Lecture (pp. 133, *sq.*). In note 24 of the same Lecture those texts, moreover, are referred to upon which the Universalist principally relies.

On the existing prevalence of Universalist views Mr. Cazenove thus writes: "A greater number of profound and philosophic essays on the subject [of eternal punishment] have been published during the last thirty years than at any previous epoch, and men so differently trained as Dr. Cheever, Mr. Spurgeon, Bishop Ellicott, Canon Wordsworth, the Lutherans Erbkam and Müller, Roman Catholics from France, Italy, and Spain (Nicolas,

Passaglia, Balmes), are all to be found uttering solemn and emphatic warnings against the perils of Universalism."—*Essay on Universalism and Eternal Punishment*, p. 35. (Reprinted from the *Christian Remembrancer* for April, 1863.)

In this way the subject of these Lectures acquires, as I said above, a fresh interest (polemically) for the student of Revelation. But it has still to be considered under another and yet more serious aspect. The upholders of the three theories above referred to profess to interpret the Bible *literally*; there yet remains the *ideal* interpretation of the Neologian, which, as the exegetical representative of Pantheism, raises an *entirely new* issue;—*viz.*, the possibility of a *supernatural* God, and, by implication, of a supernatural Bible, of transcendental dogmas, of a conscious immortality for the finite Being. With the revival of Universalism there has now appeared, in fact, a new modification of what has been well named the "metaphysical heresy." For Neology is simply the exegetical application of the principles of Pantheism. It is to this Neologian phase of the controversy that I have principally addressed myself; and those aware of the wide diffusion of Pantheistic opinions among educated men at the present day, will readily admit, I think, that my subject is in this way invested with an immediate interest and very grave importance.

Note 2, page 2.—I wish this point—"the immediate guidance of the Holy Ghost"—to be particularly noticed; for upon it depends the entire (controversial) value of the facts upon which I rely. Those against whom these facts are quoted (in my fifth Lecture) recognize with me the *supernatural* character both of the revelation given to St. Paul, and of the events recorded as having occurred upon the day of Pentecost; they must therefore allow their decisive value as a criterion of "the mind of the Spirit" upon the point in question.

Note 3, page 5.—The passages here referred to are well known.—*Vide* "Essays and Reviews," pp. 206 and 88. To the latter passage in particular I am indebted, I confess, for my first clue to the genuine parentage of that "tentative scepticism" which characterizes, in a more or less developed form, the writings of the Essayists.

"The profoundest analysis of our world," writes Dr. Williams,

“leaves the law of Thought as its ultimate basis and bond of coherence. This thought is consubstantial with the Being of the Eternal I AM. . . . But the divine consciousness or Wisdom, consubstantial with the Eternal Will, *becoming personal in the Son of man*, is the express image of the Father; and Jesus actually, but also mankind ideally, is the Son of God.” The words I have here italicised raise for us at once, in their connexion with what precedes and follows, the question of the distinct *existence*, as contrasted with the Pantheistic *image-expression*, in humanity, of a Personal God. On this suggestive passage, indeed, I have framed, as it were, the general plan of my Lectures. Before discussing the question of “acceptance with God,” it was obviously requisite to fix, as clearly as the circumstances of the case would admit, the meaning of the principal term. On the subjectivity (or non-subjectivity rather) of Deity in the Hegelian system, cf. Lecture iii. p. 85 *sq.*, and particularly the quotation in note 18, from Stirling’s “Secret of Hegel.”

Note 4, page 5.—Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, vol. ii. p. 505, *sq.* And to the same effect: “The personality of God must not be conceived as individual, but as an universal personality (*allpersönlichkeit*), and in place of personifying the absolute, we must learn to conceive of it as personifying itself *ad infinitum*.” And again: “God is omniscient, because He embraces all finite intelligences, who, in their sum total, represent all possible degrees of knowledge.”—*Glaubenslehre*, vol. i. p. 575.

Note 5, page 6.—Quoted by M. Saisset, *Modern Pantheism*, vol. i. pp. 10, 11. The reference here and elsewhere in these notes is to the (anonymous) English Translation of M. Saisset’s work.

Note 6, page 7.—I cannot do more here than illustrate this by a few quotations: “The wide spread of ‘negative theology’ in England is owing not so much to the influences of German literature as to a spontaneous recoil . . . from some of the doctrines to be heard at church and chapel.” “We are told that to know and believe in Jesus Christ is in some sense necessary to salvation. In what relation does the Gospel stand to those millions of whose very existence our forefathers little dreamed? . . . The fine distinction we hear drawn between covenanted and uncovenanted mercies amount either to a distinction without a

difference, or to a denial of the broad and equal justice of the Supreme Being. . . . The solution afforded by *Rom. i. 14, 15*, would involve the rejection of a variety of doctrinal statements hitherto usual, Calvinistic and Lutheran theories on the one hand, sacramental and hierarchical on the other."—*Essay on the National Church*, pp. 151, 153, 157. And again, p. 205: "We shrink from Calvinism and Augustinianism, not because of their perceiving how few . . . attain the adoption of sons, but because of the inferences which they draw concerning the rest whom they comprehend in one mass of perdition." Immediately after follows, *as the only solution for the difficulty*, the suggestion of a Pantheistic absorption of neutral souls into the bosom of the Universal Parent. Cf., also, Dr. Williams' "Review of Bunsen," p. 81, and the note there. *Vide infra*, Lect. iii. note 14.

Note 7, page 8.—This reaction seems due in a great measure to what is called "the spirit of the age," which exhibits itself most strikingly perhaps in individual self-assertion. The English nation rebelled in former days against the infallibility of the Pope; individual Englishmen now rebel against the infallibility of the framers of the xxxix. Articles. To such self-assertion Calvinism is antagonistic. The moral judgments of men must accept its "Decrees" without murmuring and without questioning. The very justification offered for those decrees (*sc.* that they tend to the glory of God) is not only monstrous in itself and abhorrent to natural piety, but postulates a truly *sovrän* contempt for all that both natural piety and the moral judgment would regard as due by a Creator to His creatures.

Note 8, page 9.—The importance of this position has been fully pointed out in Lect. iv. p. 115, *sq.*, and Lect. vi. p. 174, *sq.* Here I will only observe, that the point really at issue between those who acknowledge and those who deny a Personal God seems to be this: Whether DEITY be a Physical or a Moral Power;—a question which Jacobi seeks to answer in the well-known formula: "Nature (Physis) conceals God; man reveals God."—*Werke*. iii. p. 425. The subject is ably discussed by Mr. Mansel, *Aids to Faith*, Essay i. But he appears to me to have pressed the analogy too far (as Jacobi himself also does) when he says, in arguing for the possibility of miracles: "We have evidence also

of an *elasticity* in the constitution of nature, which permits the influence of human power on the phenomena of the world to be exercised or suspended at will, without affecting the stability of the whole. We have thus a precedent for allowing the possibility of a *similar* interference of a higher will on a grander scale. . . . Such interferences, whether produced by human or by superhuman will, are . . . the work of an agent who is *independent* of the laws of matter, who therefore neither obeys them nor disobeys them." (The last two italics are my own.) To me it seems that the human Will can produce a certain spontaneous impression upon matter (as *e. g.* in the instance quoted by Mr. Mansel from Fichte's *Die Bestimmung des Menschen*), but certainly not *in violation* or *independence* of its ascertained laws. The essence of a *miracle*, on the other hand, consists (for man) in the *violation* of those ascertained laws by a supernatural power; and so the parallel, or analogy, fails. I fully agree, indeed, with what Mr. Mansel says upon the necessity of recognizing the independent (to a certain limited extent) action of the finite Will. But I do not believe that that *independence*, so far as Nature's laws are concerned, implies more than a power of acting under them in one way rather than another; I do not believe, for example, that A, in throwing a stone in a different direction from B, acts independently of the law of gravitation; or that A can, by the mere exercise of his will, throw a stone farther than B, unless he be endowed (by nature, or that second nature, habit) with greater *physical* power. Returning to the original question, "Whether DEITY be a physical or a moral power," I would rather answer it in this way: "Man, under ascertained natural laws, can and does act in one way rather than another upon purely moral grounds." "God acts upon purely moral grounds in one way rather than another, and with an absolute control over humanly-ascertained natural laws."* Such is my conception of a Personal or anthropomorphic God. I believe that, in their relation to *physical laws*, man and Deity may well be regarded as heterogeneous, but that their homogeneity in relation to the irrecusable moral law is indispensable for the intelligent conception of a Personal God. It is

* Cf. "Secundum leges accuratas constanter co-operans [sc. Deus], nisi ubi aliter agere bonum est."—SIR I. NEWTON.

hardly necessary to add that the Pantheist, to whom Deity is a purely physical conception,—a “free necessity,”—denies the very possibility of “final causes” and a finite free-will.

Note 9, page 9.—If Deity be a purely physical power, and the human belief in moral agency an illusion, a *supernatural* Revelation, given upon moral grounds by Deity, is, of course, equally an illusion. On the “pre-supposition” cf. “The *existence* of God can be known by natural reason, as is said in Rom. ch. i. [*i. e.*, not only His eternal *power*, but also his eternal *goodness*] and such truths are not properly so much *articles of faith* as *preambles* to those articles; our faith pre-supposing natural knowledge, as grace pre-supposes nature.”—Aquinas. *Sum. Theol.* Quæst. ii. Art. iii.

Note. 10, page 11.—Those who deny the Personality of God consistently repudiate the freedom of the finite will, and the doctrine of a conscious future existence for the finite individual. Upon this subject, cf. Lect. iv. pp. 121, *sq.* The famous theistic proof from final causes, which Kant characterizes as “the oldest, the clearest, and the best adapted to the reason of most men,” is attributed by Socrates (in the *Phædo*) to Anaxagoras. Aquinas assigns the first place to the Peripatetic proof, “*quæ sumitur ex parte motûs.*” That of S. Anselm, (*Proslogium*, c. 2, 3) revived by Descartes, rests upon the assumption that the idea of the Perfect Being involves His existence. We shall see bye and bye in what sense Spinoza identified Being with Perfection.

Note 11, page 12.—The Calvinistic Theology undermines in a twofold direction the belief in a Personal God; first, by that dogma of absolute predestination which reduces human morality to a phenomenal illusion; secondly, by pronouncing the Divine conception of Right to be directly antagonistic to the human. Cf. Calvin’s well-known words: “I inquire again, how it came to pass that the fall of Adam, independent of any remedy, should involve so many nations, with their infant children, in eternal death, but because such was the will of God. Their tongues”—*i. e.*, of those whom he ironically calls ‘*pious* defenders of the justice of God’—“so loquacious on every other point, *must here be struck dumb*; it is a dreadful decree (*DECRETUM HORRIBILE*),” &c. Cf. on this subject Graves on ‘Calvinistic Predestination;’ Discourse i. p. 43. I quote the above passage, because it dis-

tinently implies that the "Decretum horribile" is *intelligibly* and *directly* antagonistic to natural piety and natural justice. For those who hold such views to describe the God of Revelation as a Personal or anthropomorphic Deity is plainly absurd. And yet there is no solid resting place between this Theodicy and that of the Pantheist who identifies God with nature.

Note 12, page 13.—In other words, if God is absolutely incognizable to man in his moral attributes; if, as Mr. Mansel tells us (*Limits of Religious Thought*, pp. 39 and 206), divine and human morality are heterogeneous, and absolute morality (and therefore a moral God) a contradiction in terms; then our choice must lie between that Faith which hesitates not to believe with Newman, *e. g.*, that Deity may be shut up in the Wafer-box, and that sheer Intellectualism which derides with Spinoza, *e. g.*, the religious sentiment, and the Personal God of its worship, as gross superstitions. On the Hamiltonian Theodicy cf., by all means, M. Saisset, *Modern Pantheism*. art. "Objections of a Pyrrhonist," vol. ii. pp. 54–76. In Appendix A. I have given some extracts from this article, though I feel that in merely giving extracts I have detracted much from the force of M. Saisset's argument.

The vital importance of the moral element in the Theodicy of a Christian is fully set forth, Lect. iv. p. 126.

Note 13, page 14.—For the phrase "preambles of our faith" cf. *supra*, note 9.

Note 14, page 14.—The quotation is from Mr. Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought," Lect. v. p. 148.

Note 15, page 16.—Cf. "From the human mind, not from outward experience, we must derive that 'similar causes will produce similar effects.' But this requires to be always checked rigidly by experience, being probably only an operation of the so-called unific Principle, the first and most essential law of our Intellect The history of Science is but a series of warnings against the aberrations of the human intellect when surrendered to the uncontrolled influence of this its fundamental law. It ought ever to be checked by faith, or belief in testimony."

"Is not the universe pervaded by an omnipresent antagonism, a fundamental conjunction of contraries, everywhere opposite, nowhere independent?" *Whewell*.

Note 16, page 16.—It will be seen further on, that while Pantheism ever struggles after this scientific unification of the Many and the One, the *tendency* of its professors from Spinoza downwards has been to un-realize, if I may so speak, the latter rather than the former. On the other hand Mr. Mansel thus writes: "Pantheism or Atheism are thus the alternatives offered to us according as we prefer to save the infinite by the sacrifice of the finite, or to maintain the finite by denying the existence of the infinite."—*B. Lect.* p. 54. And this, I must admit, appears to be the opinion commonly entertained respecting Pantheism. A careful student of Spinoza will find *existence* regarded as the necessary finite *expression* ("externalization," I suppose Hegel would call it) of the Infinite *Essence*.

Note 17, page 16.—"Τὸ γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥστε κατὰ τὸν Παρμενίδου λόγον συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἅπαντα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὄν." *Arist. Metaph.* ii. 4, 30. "Ἐδόκει δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν ἄπειρον εἶναι, καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον, καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ ἐν ὁμοίον ἑαυτῷ καὶ πλήρες· κίνησιν τε μὴ εἶναι, δοκεῖν δὲ εἶναι." *Diog. Laert.* ix. 24, (with this cf. *Lect.* ii. p. 54). "The state of his (Xenophanes') mind is graphically painted in that one phrase of Aristotle's: 'Casting his eyes upwards at the immensity of Heaven, he declared that *The One* is God.'"—*Lewes. Hist. of Phil.* p. 37.

Note 18, page 16.—According to Aristotle, *Met.* i. 3. Thales held that the *ἀρχή* was water; and as he also distinctly states that the old Physicists make no distinction between matter (*ἡ ὕλη*) and the Moving Principle, or Efficient Cause (*ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως*), Thales seems liable to the charge of Atheism. This charge Mr. Lewis (naturally) repudiates.—*Hist. of Phil.* p. 6. In the second sentence of the paragraph to which this note refers my meaning may be best explained by a reference to the starting-point of Fichte's Construction. On this cf. *Lect.* iii. p. 75.

Note 19, page 17.—Those who have *experienced* the sensations here described will perhaps agree with me as to their psychological source. Those who have not will of course regard the solution I suggest, and the 'authoritative' testimony derived from such a solution, as mere moonshine. And yet an able writer, (to whom reference has been made in the preceding note) when pronouncing as it were the funeral oration of Philosophy (*i. e.* of

Metaphysics as distinguished from Science) thus remarks: "Ignorant indeed must the man be now-a-days . . . who has never been *thrilled* by the revelations of the Microscope and Telescope." Whence this emotional thrill, if not because these instruments, by revealing the *unreality* of all sense-suggested limitations, elicit in an intenser degree the soul's latent sympathy with what Pascal calls "the Infinite above and the Infinite below?" On the other hand, we must not forget the Materialist who "swept the heavens with his Telescope, and found no Deity there."

Music under certain conditions produces for the ear a sensation akin to that effected for the eye by the microscope and telescope. A physiologist would probably be able to suggest at least one more kindred analogy.

Note 20, page 17.—"Positive philosophy does not go so far on questions of absolute ideas, of the origin and end of things; it declares itself simply incompetent. It is neither for matter nor mind, neither sceptical nor believing. Is there a God, a providence, a future life? It neither affirms nor denies. It has nothing to say to the matter."—Saisset, *Mod. Panth.* i. 18.

"All opinions of theological origin . . . are radically illusory. The personal activity of man must no longer waste itself on mutual hostilities, but set itself peaceably to carry forward the work of developing the resources of the earth—man's residence."—Comte. *Cat. of Pos. Phil.* p. 5.

Note 21, page 18.—"Per naturam naturantem nobis intelligendum est id quod in se est et per se concipitur; sive talia substantiæ attributa quæ eternam et infinitam essentiam expriment; hoc est Deus, quatenus ut causa libera consideratur. Per naturatam autem intelligo id omne quod ex necessitate Dei naturæ, sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur; hoc est, omnes Dei attributorum modos, quatenus considerantur ut res, quæ in Deo sunt, et quæ sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt."—Spinoza. *Ethices, Pars i. Prop. 29. Schol.*

Note 22, page 18.—" . . . simulque Fidem a Philosophiâ separare, quod totius operis præcipuum intentum fuit." *Tract. Theopol.* cap. xiv. 5. "Me meæ causæ satisfecisse puto, quod ostenderit, qua ratione philosophia a theologia separanda sit, et in quo utraque potissimum consistat, et quod neutra neutri ancilletur, sed quod unaquæque suum regnum sine ullâ alterius

repugnantiâ obtineat, et quod denique ostenderim . . . absurda incommoda et damna quæ secuta sunt ex eo quod homines has duas facultates miris modis inter se confuderint, nec accurate inter ipsas distinguere, unamque ab aliâ separare sciverint.”—Cap. xv. 43.

Note 23, page 19.—An anonymous translator of the Tractatus with a certain quaintness thus observes: “His (sc. the translator’s) attention was recalled to it lately, first by Bunsen’s Biblical Criticisms, and then by Essays and Reviews, in which he seemed to meet with many things that were already familiar to him in the Tractatus.”—*Introd.* p. 17. To verify the statement in the Text would be, in fact, to transcribe the greater portion of Spinoza’s work. I may refer the reader, however, especially to the chs. on Prophecy; The Election of the Hebrew Nation; The Divine Law; Miracles; The Interpretation of Scripture; Theology and Reason, and The grounds of our belief in the authority of the Sacred Scriptures.

Note 24, page 19.—For the following description of Maimonides’ views I am largely indebted to an able article by M. Saisset on the Philosophy of the Jews.—*Revue des deux Mondes*, 15 Janvier, 1862.

I may mention here that Maimonides was an Andalusian Jew of the 12th century, and that his opinions are quoted with respect by Albert le Grand and Thomas Aquinas.

Note 25, page 22.—Cf. Aristotle *Met.* xii. 7, 8, 9. *Nic. Eth.* vii. 14, 15, and x. 8. The eternal, according to Aristotle, can never be potentially what it is not actually. The cause of change must be a being eternally acting; and which therefore cannot be conceived as having a power to act prior to the exercise of that power. This first cause = God, necessarily Intellect, ever active, living (for the activity of intellect is life) immaterial (having neither finite nor infinite extension) . . . without parts, impassive too, and unchangeable; requiring an unchanging object of contemplation, therefore eternally contemplating Himself.—Cf. *Encyclop. Brit.* article “Metaphysics,” *sub. init.* Maimonides was taught in the Arabic School, and—M. Saisset thinks—not by Ibn-Rosch (Averröes) but Ibn-sina (Avicenna). On the ‘prophetic gift,’ consult his *Moré Neboukim* (*Dux per-*

plexorum) vol. ii. p. 333, *sq.*; and on 'Biblical Miracles,' vol. ii. p. 355. On the necessity of *intelligence* as a solvent for prophecy, vol. ii. ch. 47. A good and accessible edition of Maimonides is a desideratum. I first made his acquaintance in Selden's "De jure naturali,"—a ponderous tome whose perusal afforded me, I confess, far more toil than profit. It contains, however, some valuable information respecting the Jewish Proselytes.

Note 26, page 23.—"The Infinite is known to human reason merely as the negation of the finite; we have no rational means whatever of determining what is the nature of the Infinite Being."—Mansel's *B. Lect.* p. 179. "Of the nature *and attributes* of God in His Infinite Being Philosophy can tell us nothing."—*Ibid.* p. 265. Cf. also *B. Lect.* vii. p. 230; and *Preface to Third Ed.* (to which the quotations in these notes refer) pp. xiii. *sq.* The *cultus* approved by Maimonides recalls the Aristotelian *τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία*; A trace of the same train of thought is exhibited in one of the few passages where Spinoza forgets the calmness of the philosopher, and positively *rails* at "those insane persons who dream that Deity is delighted with Music (!)"—Cf. Genesis, xxiv. 63, and the marginal reading.

Note 23, page 27.—"Adde quod omnem certitudinem, quam vulgus ex sincerâ lectione, et quam omnes aliam methodum insequendo, de sensu Scripturæ habere possunt, plane iis adimit. Quapropter hanc Maimonidæ sententiam ut noxiam, inutilem, et absurdam explodimus."—*Tract.* cap. vii. 87. This quotation, and the long disquisition which it concludes, is sufficient to show the incorrectness of M. Saisset's main position that the exegesis of Spinoza was derived from that of Maimonides. In fact, it is hard to believe that M. Saisset could have ever read the *Tractatus*, except in the most superficial way. M. Cousin is committed to a still graver error. Not only does he eventually assign the *philosophy* of Spinoza, as well as his exegesis, to Maimonides, but even writes of him as follows: "Spinoza is essentially a Jew. The God of the Jews is a terrible God. When he prayed to Jehovah, he prayed sincerely in the spirit of the Jewish religion (!). He was an Indian mouni, a Persian soufi, an enthusiastic monk, . . . resembling most of all the unknown author of the 'Imitation of Jesus Christ.'"—*Phil. Frag.* article

Spinoza. How any man possessing the slightest acquaintance with Spinoza's mind could have written of him thus, is to me quite inconceivable. But it has been the destiny of Spinoza to be misrepresented.

Note 28, page 24.—"Ex his facile colligimus ante tempus Machabæorum nullum Canonem sacrorum librorum fuisse, sed hos, quos jam habemus, a Pharisæis secundi templi . . . præ multis aliis selectos esse et ex solo eorum decreto receptos . . . Quod autem Maimonides, R. Abraham, et alii statuunt hujus concilii præsidēs fuisse Hgezram, Danielelem, Nehemiam, &c., ridiculum figmentum est, nec alio fundamine nituntur quam Rabbīnorum traditione, qui scilicet tradunt, Persarum regnum xxxiv. annos stetisse, non amplius."—*Tract. cap. x. 43.* (I ought to add that this entire chapter should be carefully read by any one who would form a correct estimate of the validity of Spinoza's criticism). "Et quæso quis mente aliquid amplecti potest, reclamante ratione? Quid enim aliud est mente aliquid negare quam quod ratio reclamat? Et profecto non satis mirari possum, quod rationem, donum maximum et divinam lucem, mortuis literis et quæ humana malitia depravari potuerunt, submittere velint, et quod nullum existimetur scelus contra mentem—*verum Dei verbi syngraphum*—indigne loqui, eamque corruptam, cæcam, atque perditam statuere; at maximum habeatur scelus, alia *de literâ et verbi, Dei idolo* cogitare. Pium esse putant rationi et proprio, judicio nihil fidere, at impium de fide eorum dubitare, qui nobis libros sacros tradidere; quod idem mera stultitia est, non pietas . . . Sed longe absit, quod religio et pietas rationem, aut quod ratio religionem sibi ancillari velit, et quod utraque suum regnum summâ cum concordia obtinere nequeat."—*Ibid. cap. xv. 10.* On his refutation of Maimonides' Theory, cf. *Tract. cap. vii. 75–87.*

Note 29, page 25.—"Nam totam prophetarum certitudinem his tribus consistere ostendimus; i. distinctâ et vividâ imaginatione. ii. signo. iii. animo ad æquum et bonum inclinato . . . et primum prophetus tantum constare poterat. Quare tota nostra de Revelatione certitudo in reliquis duobus tantum, nempe signo et doctrinâ fundari potest et debet. Quod quidem Moses, Deut. xviii. expresse docet. Cf. quoque Deut. xiii. . . . Quare nos

etiam *hâc tantum de causâ Scripturæ, i. e. ipsis prophetis, credere tenemur, nimirum propter doctrinam signis confirmatam.* . . . De veritate autem et certitudine rerum, quæ solius sunt speculationis, nullus spiritus testimonium dat præter rationem, *quæ sola veritatis regnum sibi vindicavit.*—*Tract. xv. 30, sq.* “Quidquid igitur in SS. adulteratum est aut mendosum, id tantum in reliquis contingere potuit, videlicet in unâ ant alterâ historiæ ant prophetæ circumstantiâ, *ut populus ad devotionem magis commoveretur*; vel in uno ant altero miraculo, ut philosophos torquerent; vel denique in rebus speculativis. . . . Sed ad salutem parum refert sive talia depravata sint, sive minus.”—*Cap. xii. 40.* “Vulgus tum Dei potentiam et providentiam quam clarissime constare putat, quum aliquid in naturâ insolitum . . . contingere videt. Existimat scilicet, Deum tam diu nihil agere, quam diu natura solito ordine agit, duas itaque potentias numero ab invicem distinctas imaginantur, sc. potentiam Dei, et potentiam rerum naturalium. Opera itaque naturæ vocat miracula . . . et ea tantum audire gestit, quæ maxime ignorat, quæque propterea maxime admirantur.” “Longe igitur abest, ut miracula, quatenus per id intelligitur opus quod ordini naturæ repugnet, nobis Dei existentiam ostendant; *quum contra nos de eâdem dubitare facerent* Ex quibus concludere possumus miraculum, sive contra naturam sive supra naturum, merum esse absurdum; nec in SS. per miraculum aliud posse intelligi, quam opus naturæ quod captum humanum superat aut superare creditur.” . . . “Ostendimus rationes propheticas, sive quæ ex revelatione formantur, non elici ex notionibus universalibus et communibus [sc. veris], sed ex concessis, *quamvis absurdis*, et opinionibus eorum quibus res revelantur, sive quos Spiritus Sanctus convincere vult;(!) ut Paulus *e. g.* cum Græcis erat Græcus, Judæus cum Judæis.” . . . “Quare non dubium quin omnia in SS. narrata naturaliter contigerent, et tamen ad Deum referuntur, quia Scripturæ non est res per causas naturales docere, sed tantum eas res narrare quæ imaginationem late occupant, idque eâ methodo et stylo qui melius inservit ad res magis admirandum, et consequenter ad devotionem in animis vulgi imprimendum.” . . . “Hac de causa Scriptura de Deo et de rebus *admodum improprie* loquitur.” “Quidquid enim contra

naturam est, id contra rationem est, et quod contra rationem, id absurdum est, et proinde etiam refutandum." . . . "Igitur ad miracula SS. interpretandum . . . necesse est opiniones eorum scire qui ipsa primo narraverunt, ne confundamus res quæ revera contigerunt cum rebus imaginariis et quæ non nisi representationes propheticæ fuerunt; ut quod Deus (summum ens) a cælo descenderit," &c. "Refert denique Hebræorum phrases et tropos scire, cf. Zech. xiv. 7; Esaiam, xiii." &c. Cap. vi. 1, 10, 29, 36, 44, 49, 51, 56. On the denial of superior intelligence to the Prophets, cf. *Tract.* cap. xiii. 1. See also *infra*. Lect. ii. note 13.

Note 30, page 25.—Vide supr. Note 22, p. 18. Cf. "Hic expresse monere volo circa utilitatem et necessitatem Sacræ Scripturæ, quod ipsam permagnam statuo. Nam quandoquidem non possumus lumine naturali percipere quod simplex obedientia via ad salutem sit, sed sola Revelatio doceat, id ex singulari Dei gratiâ, quam ratione assequi non possumus, fieri, hinc sequitur Scripturam magnum admodum solamen mortalibus adduxisse. Quippe omnes absolute obedire possunt, et non nisi paucissimi sunt qui virtutis habitum ex solo rationis ductu acquirunt, adeoque nisi hoc Scripturæ testimonium haberemus, de omnium fere salute dubitaremus."—*Tract.* cap. xvi. 44, 45. "Porro quoniam Moses clare docet Deum esse zelotypum, nec ullibi docet Deum carere passionibus, hinc plane concedendum, Mosem hoc ipsum credidisse aut saltem docere voluisse, quantumvis hanc sententiam rationi repugnare credamus."—Cap. vii. 22. A comparison of the former of these quotations with the concluding passages of the *Ethica*, will show that in the *Tractatus Spinoza's* views do not appear in their matured development. This incongruity Meyer in his Preface to the *Ethica* candidly admits. But neither he, nor any other commentator that I know of, has offered a satisfactory solution for the inconsistent statements in the *Tractatus* itself regarding the authority and value of Revelation.—Cf. *infra*, note 34.

Note 31, page 26.—The extracts already given from the *Tractatus* will enable the reader, I trust, to decide whether it be worth his while to consult the volume for himself. I shall henceforth accordingly content myself with mere references in verification of the statements in the text. On the present paragraph, cf. *Tract.* vii. 43; xiii. 7, 8; xiv. 3; ii. 52, 53.

Note 32, page 26.—Cf. *Tract.* cap. xiii. 4, 6. In a note to ch. vi. 17, Spinoza thus anticipates the “*Causa sui*” of the *Ethica*: “As one who does not rightly know the nature of a triangle knows not that its three angles are equal to two right angles, so one who has but a confused conception of the divine nature fails to see that it pertains to the nature of God *to exist*. But that the nature of God may be conceived by us clearly and distinctly, it is necessary that we attend to certain most simple notions (common notions as they are called), and to connect with them those which pertain to the divine nature. And then it becomes clear to us, first, that God exists necessarily and is everywhere; and at the same time it is apparent that all things which we conceive involve the nature of God, and are thereby conceived; and finally, that all things which we conceive adequately are true.’ This note is given in explanation of the statement that “as the existence of God is not known *per se*, it must necessarily be concluded from *Notions* so firm and fixed that by no conceivable power can it be disturbed;” and this again in proof of his general proposition that “we can understand neither the essence, nor the existence, nor the providence of God from miracles, but far better on the contrary from the fixed and immutable order of Nature.” This ‘*geometric*’ Theodicy has been fully discussed in my second Lecture. The quotation in the text will be found in the Translation of the *Tractatus*, *Introduction*, p. 15.

Note 33, page 27. Cf. *Tract.* cap. viii. 11, 12. It will be seen presently that Coleridge’s often-quoted dictum must be received with some reservation. In fact I shall be able to prove, I trust, that the very rigour of the deduction overthrows the premiss. The preceding note suffices to shew the connexion between Spinoza’s geometric conception of the Divine Essence, and that denial of *supernatural* agency upon which his exegetical principles wholly rest. The reviewer, to whom allusion is made in the Text, is Mr. Matthew Arnold. “A word more about Spinoza.” *Macmillan*, Dec. 1863.

Note 34, page 28.—Cf. *Tract.* cap. vii. 6; and on the *vera vox*, cap. xiv. 35, 36. See also cap. xiii. 29, cf. *Ethica*, Prop. 47, Part ii.

Spinoza evidently regards the (intellectual) knowledge of Deity as a special privilege,—a *divinum donum*, as he terms it,—which constituted in fact a *generic* distinction between the learned and “the vulgar.” This conception gives us, I am persuaded, the real clue to his opinions regarding the authority of Revelation. That there is a broad distinction between the two classes, none can deny. But it is a difference of *degree*, not of *kind*. All men have by nature ‘the religious sentiment’ which *yields*, if I may so speak, the primary anthropomorphic element in their conception of Deity, side by side with the intellectual faculty which tends to eliminate that element; (if Deity be omnipresent, for example, intellect at once rejects the possibility of his distinct personality, &c.) The mistake of Spinoza (and his followers) consisted in his ignoring the religious sentiment altogether,—thus flying in the face of that very Nature whom he reveres so humbly. The co-existence of these elements in man suggests many interesting speculations, in connexion with the prevalent distinctions of Creed, and especially of external *cultus* even among professing Christians. The Reformation, for instance, was in the main a protest against the superstition (and consequent immorality) generated by a Theodicy from which the intellectual element had long been studiously excluded. The Roman Catholic cultus had faithfully reflected this Theodicy, and it was not unnatural that in the public worship established by the Reformed Churches the claims of the religious sentiment should have met with scant recognition. But it is far too powerful an instinct to be suppressed by Act of Parliament. Hence its continuous self-assertion in our own country either in the approximation to Papal ceremony of the reserved, aristocratic, High Church party, or in the subordination of the Service proper to the exciting “evangelical” sermon in which the pious of the middle ranks find pleasure and profit, or in the reckless exposure of his own spiritual organism in extemporaneous prayer and preaching, by which the Methodist minister seeks to stimulate the devotion of a still humbler class.* The *spasmodic* assertion of the religious senti-

* The kindred origin of these apparently heterogeneous manifestations is detected at once in their extreme forms of development. For the mysterious spiritual value attached by the Tractarian to the participation in a morally

ment in what is now designated 'Revivalism' gives additional evidence of the inapplicability of our existing services to the requirements of the vulgar and uneducated.

The main object, I suppose, of *public* worship is not alone to maintain a solemn national recognition of the majesty of God, but also to stimulate the growth of *private* or individual piety by the subtle action of sympathy. This object has been strangely overlooked in our ordinary services. There are in these services, as ordinarily conducted, many prayers and passages from Scripture repeated by the officiating clergyman, either alone or in dialogue with the clerk; there is Psalmody (*verb. sat.*); and then a sermon by a man for the most part of refined and cultivated taste, who therefore in his dread of superstition appeals under protest, as it were, to the religious sentiment of his hearers, and would as soon walk naked through the market-place as present them with that exquisitely vulgar display of his own "experiences," in which the Heroes of Revivalism seem to luxuriate and—*plebecula gaudet*. Now such a service may perhaps be adapted to the educated few, but it does not take sufficient account of the masses. To this cause, humanly speaking, (coupled with that chronic ulcer—absenteeism) is probably to be attributed the partial failure of the Irish branch of the Established Church. To this cause also we may assign the enormous amount of Dissent in England, and a good proportion, perhaps, of the comparative immorality and materialism prevalent there among the lower orders.

It is easy to speculate thus; still easier to detect abuses; but difficult indeed to suggest practicable remedies. Still such speculations may occasionally supply useful hints to abler men; and they tend at least to foster a spirit of mutual forbearance; to soften that *odium* so unhappily suggestive of the epithet *theologicum*; to remind us that the wildest excesses of Revivalism and Tractarianism are probably traceable to some want of *elasti-*

insignificant (= *impersonal*) ordinance; and by the Calvinistic-Evangelical to the gratuitous profession of his own personal nothingness, (= *moral insignificance*) are widely diverging, but kindred expressions of that Mysticism,—or tendency to absorb the finite personality, (= *moral-agency*), in the Infinite,—which is generated by the undue excitement of the religious instinct.

city in our Established System, and indicate at all events the vitality of that religious instinct for which the intellectualism of Spinoza, however pure and refined, were indeed a most miserable substitute.

It should never be forgotten, too, that however studiously our blessed Lord conformed to the worship of the Temple and the Synagogue, He yet failed not to preach to "the masses" in the most informal way; nay, even frequently employed upon such occasions, in reference to a future world, those images of "fire unquenchable," "undying worm," and again, "outer darkness and gnashing of teeth for cold," in contrast with the feasting and mere sensuous enjoyment of the admitted guests, which were so well adapted to the capacity of those whom at such times he specially addressed.—Cf. *infra*. Lect. iii., note 39.

Note 35, page 29.—Cf. *supra*, note 26. What I wish here to express is, that the natural *tendency* of Neology is the same as that of Calvinism, and—shall I say—Manselism; (I mean, of course, for the intellectual). For all three *tend* to sever the mysterious bond which connects the Finite with the Infinite Personality, and thus to lead most consecutive thinkers to Spinoza's "Impersonal order of Nature." The few in whom, from exceptional causes, there is a strong religious instinct by the side of a cultivated intellect, will rather incline to ultramontane views. There have been great jubilations latterly upon the spread of Roman Catholicism on the one hand, and extreme scepticism on the other, in a Continental city, long regarded as the impregnable fortress of the predestinarian theology. On the baneful influence of "Calvinism" in relation to "modern doubt," an able article will be found in the Christian Remembrancer for January, 1863; see especially pp. 32, *sq.* On this subject Mr. Cazenove thus writes: "It is Boston, the Puritan metropolis of the West, the seat of the sternest New England Calvinism, that is now the home of Pantheism and Universalism. Because Dr. Hopkins, and other eminent preachers in New England, made the number of the redeemed infinitesimal, therefore does Boston rush from saying that scarce a soul is saved to asserting the salvation of all."—See ch. xxviii. in Mrs. Beecher Stowe's 'Minister's Wooing.'

Note 36, page 29.—Mamionides opposed superstition, as M. Saisset tells us, on the principles of Avicenna, Spinoza on those of Descartes. Saisset regards Spinoza's system as a "corrupted," Leibnitz as an "extravagant" Cartesianism.

Note 37, page 29.—Cf. *Tract. cap. xiii. ad finem.* I ought perhaps to remark here that Spinoza employs intellect and reason as synonymous terms.

Note 38, page 30.—A full exposition of these opinions will be found in *Lect. ii. pp. 46, sq.*

Note 39, page 31.—The passages quoted will be found in *Essays and Reviews*, pp. 377, 349, 115, and 206. On the last passage cf. *Lecture iii. p. 100*, and the note there. The few quotations in the Text afford a very inadequate idea, of course, of the close similarity in the exegetical principles of Spinoza and the Essayists. I must, as before, refer the reader to the *Tractatus* itself. The essential affinities of the writers will then alone be fully recognized. Any one, for example, who reads Spinoza's chapter, "*De interpretatione Scripturæ*," will find it hard to believe that it has not supplied the frame-work, and something more, for the synonymous Essay of Professor Jowett.

LECTURE II.

Note 1, page 33.

"These withering thoughts, do what I will,
They come—the fountain of the heart is chill.
—Then the heart seeks support and light from heaven.
And such support and light—oh, is it given
Any where but in the New Testament?
Strong impulse," &c.

" 'IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE WORD,'—alas!

The first line stops me—how shall I proceed?

'The word' cannot express the meaning here—

Once more,—‘IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE THOUGHT,’—
 Was it then *thought* that has created all things?
 Can Thought make Matter? let us try the line
 Once more—‘IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE POWER.’—
 This will not do— . . . oh, help me, Holy Spirit,
 I’ll weigh the passage once again, and write
 Boldly,—‘IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE ACT.’”
 —“Cease, teasing dog, this angry howl,
 These moans dissatisfied and dull,”—&c.

Goethe’s *Faust*, pp. 77, 78.

Spinoza has been described as “the burning-glass at which Goethe collected his poetic fires.” “Spinoza spoke of God” writes Mr. Maurice, “as an actual being, to those who fancied him a name in a book. The child of the circumcision had a message for Lessing and Goethe, which the pagan schools of philosophy could not bring.” Mr. Arnold with more reason, I think, accounts for Goethe’s sympathy on the score of Spinoza’s self-sufficing stoicism and denial of final causes. He quotes from M. Van Vloten,—‘who has recently published at Amsterdam a supplementary volume to Spinoza’s works’—as follows: “By keeping the name of God, while he did away with his person and character, Spinoza has done himself injustice . . . Long ago as he lived he had even then reached the point to which the post-Hegelian philosophy and the study of natural science has only just brought our own times. Leibnitz feared lest those who did away with final causes should do away with God at the same time. But it is in his having done away with final causes, *and with God along with them*, that Spinoza’s true merit consists.” To this conclusion Mr. Arnold demurs. But if final causes are ‘done away with,’ and absolute fatalism maintained, I confess I do not see the theistic value of those “wings of a genuine sacred transport, of an immortal longing” with which Mr. Arnold invests his hero. The believer in a Personal God ascribes to Him the supremest majesty of Intellect (Spinoza’s ‘beatific vision’), but he also invests Him with attributes apart from which that majesty of intellect is only a more “sounding name” for an impersonal order of Nature. However much Goethe may have admired the two Spinozist ‘ideas’ specified by Mr. Arnold, he certainly seems to take more account of the reality of human *feeling* than

Spinoza's construction would permit. It is the intellectual Faust who to poor Margaret's question : "Dost thou believe in God?" replies as follows :—

"Forbear, my love ;
 Who can say truly ' I believe in God ?'
 —Ask it of priest or of philosopher,
 And the reply seems but a mockery
 Of him who asks . . . and who can *feel*,
 And with self-violence, to conscious wrong
 Hardening his heart, say, ' I believe Him not' ?
 The All-embracing, All-sustaining One,
 Say doth He not embrace, sustain, include
 Thee?—me?—Himself? Bends not the sky above? . . .
 Am I not here gazing into thine eyes?
 And does not All, that is—seen and unseen, mysterious All—
 Around thee and within, untiring agency,
 Press on thy heart and mind?—
 Fill thy whole heart with it—and when thou art
 Lost in the consciousness of happiness,
 Then call it what thou wilt,
 Happiness! heart! love! GOD!
 I have no name for it—*Feeling is all*.
 Nature is but an echo of the voice
 That rings through all—a vapour hiding Heaven."—Pp. 235, 6.

I have no doubt the much-disputed passage regarding "The Mothers" in the second Part of Faust refers to Spinoza's attempt to grasp pure Being, and that the solution of Heinrich Krüger is the true one. Hartung tells us expressly that the verses, a few of which I here subjoin, recalled to his mind Steffens's account of Spinoza.

Mephist. "But there are means—reluctantly do I
 Unveil a higher Mystery—Goddesses
 Angust enthrone themselves in loneliness.
 PLACE none around them, glimpse of TIME still less,
 They are the MOTHERS . . . For their homes you may scrape deep
 Under the undermost." . . . *Faust.* "The road?"
M. "There's no road . . . Road to where
 I warrant suppliant never bent in prayer! . . .
 There solitudes whirl round in endless eddy.
 Canst grasp in thought what no words can express—
 Vacuity and utter loneliness? . . .

. Formation, Transformation,
 Eternal Play of the Eternal Mind.
 With semblances of all things in creation
 For ever and for ever sweeping round
 'Tis done; to have accomplished it is thine—
The first to venture on such bold design.
And now, as the magician bids, the clouds
Of waving incense shape them into Gods."

I have quoted in both instances from Dr. Anster's inimitable translations. The italics are my own.

Note 2, page 34.—The reader will observe that I say "*tends to reduce,*" &c. If Science could prove to man that the laws of Nature are absolutely irreversible, then the conclusions of an absolute fatalist like Spinoza or Calvin would appear irresistible, —the instinct of prayer equally a delusion with the figment of free-will. But we must be careful not to confound the *possibility* with the *probability* of a change in that order of Nature of which, after all, we have a purely *empirical* knowledge. Now experience *equally proves* that men are capable of being improved by discipline, and one who has reflected at all upon what is passing around him must feel that the ordinary immutability of Nature's laws is, if at times a severe, yet unquestionably a most admirable discipline for beings like ourselves. Hence it seems *equally deducible* from "the facts of experience" that this discipline is *intended*. This once conceded, final causes follow as a matter of course; and from this again, the supremacy of the moral over the physical in the Ultimate Cause—in other words, the Personality of God. But such a conception of Deity at once admits the possibility of an alteration in the merely physical order of things for the purposes of moral discipline; the only postulate being that the phenomena revealed by Experience in the moral, are *equally* valid for beings like ourselves with those in the physical sphere of our observation. The opposition then does not lie, with regard to the possibility of miracles, between experience and testimony, but between our experience of moral and physical phenomena. Our knowledge of the former I believe to be more *real* far; but even supposing these two forces to be equally balanced, the religious sentiment with the instinct of prayer,—

which are no less *data* of Experience, and attest the Personality of God,—ought to be sufficient to turn the scale for a candid enquirer.

Mr. Mansel has happily pointed out the *moral* origin of the very terms ‘law,’ ‘order,’ and ‘cause.’—*Aids to Faith*, i. 20.

Note 3, page 34.—“Common sense revolted at last, even in the studies of German professors, against the clumsily elaborate explanations by which miracles were converted into natural events. A fresh hypothesis had to be made for each occurrence, and it was at last perceived that such a multitude of strange natural phenomena crowded into the narrative of a few years, and gratuitously assumed for the mere purpose of evading the obvious meaning of the story were really far more improbable than the miracles themselves.”—*Essay on the Evidences*, by the Bishop of Killaloe. *Aids to Faith*, ii. 11. Cf. *Aids to Faith*, i. 13; and Mill on the ‘Mythical Interpretation of the Gospels,’—p. 93, note.

Note 4, page 35.—*Aids to Faith*, Essay iv. 27.

Note 5, page 35.—By the Fall, we are told, man became “dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body;” his will so entirely destroyed that henceforth he was “utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to evil.”—*Confession of Faith*, chap. iv. And the *Formula Consensus* thus describes the same event: “Intima, pessima, profundissima (instar cujusdam abyssi) inscrutabilis et ineffabilis corruptio totius naturæ humanæ.” We must remember that the Fall was absolutely predetermined by God. The picture has, of course, another side. Those “particularly redeemed” are by the same decree faultlessly perfect. The children of God *cannot sin*. If such statements were only made by some obsolete “confessions of Faith” or living fanatic ranters, but little controversial importance would be attached to them. But we are compelled, as it were, to re-open the controversy when we find them repeated by influential, and even philosophical writers of the present day. To take but a single example;—Mr. Mozley lately published a work on ‘Augustinian Predestination,’ favorably reviewed by Prof. Frazer (who welcomes its considerate appreciation of the profound ideas of Calvin

when compared with the intolerance of many Anglican Churchmen toward these venerable doctrines, as suggesting a hope of better times), and described by Mr. Mansel as "throwing considerable light on the true bearings of the predestinarian controversy, and especially valuable as vindicating the supreme right of Scripture to be accepted in all its statements, instead of being mutilated to suit the demands of human logic." Mr. Mozley's "solution" is a very simple one. He holds that *contradictory* propositions are equally guaranteed by consciousness, and that we should not therefore feel offended at what he calls the self-contradictions of Scripture. Hence he finds no difficulty in the predestinarian doctrines. It is not, however, to this work that I now so much desire to call attention as to one subsequently published, as a pendant to it, on the doctrine of Regeneration. The following extracts will suffice to exhibit the "sobriety and truth" of his views upon the "*phronema sarkos* in them that be regenerate:" "Conversion," he says, "undoubtedly precedes regeneration, and is the condition and qualification for it; but conversion is only change for the time being, regeneration is this change made *constant and eternal*. The converted man, on being admitted to baptism and made regenerate, is supposed to have entered into a new state altogether, in which he is *for ever removed from his former sins and corruptions*, has put off the old man, and become a new creature, *and a citizen of Heaven*. As a converted man simply, he could change again, and fall away; but as regenerate he cannot change or fall. It is *his very nature* now to be holy and good; . . . he has left this lower for Mount Zion and the city of the living God," &c., p. 59. There is a difficulty indeed found by some in the rather indiscriminate application of the term 'regenerate' by the sacred penmen. On this Mr. Mozley remarks with a charming simplicity: "*All addressed as regenerate cannot be really sinless, for that is contrary to fact.*" But this only serves to illustrate afresh the signal value of his inimitable canon: "Scripture is not afraid of contradicting itself."—*Preface*, pp. xi. and xxi.

I ought in fairness to add that Mr. Mansel seems distressed at "the painful void left by Mr. Mozley's theory on the philosophical side, as it apparently vindicates the authority of revela-

tion by the sacrifice of the laws of human thought." It is curious to hear such a complaint from Mr. Mansel. "Quis tulerit Gracchos," &c.

Note 6, page 36.—"As it was from the current ideas of the Palestine Jews exciting in their hitherto upright and clear-headed subject a mixture of ambition and fanatic delusion (such is Strauss's odious hypothesis regarding his alleged 'pure individual') that the first conception of Jesus as the Messiah was derived,—so from the ideas of his early followers, subsequent to his death and *imagined* resurrection, arose the contemplation in him of the great mystery of godliness "God manifest in the flesh." "The deep distress of the times caused the followers of Jesus to contemplate his wrongful sufferings with the energy of individual application to themselves; while the thought of his fancied resurrection comforted them with a hope in themselves of similar support and eventual triumph. Hence the belief in the vicarious sufferings, the meritorious sacrifice, the conquest over the grave, the glorification and eternal reign of their Redeemer." "In § 13 of his Introduction Strauss desires his readers to call to mind 'the powerful religious satisfaction' which the belief in a dead and risen Messiah afforded to 'those who felt their need of religion,' as one solid ground for presuming that the resurrection, with other miracles, was the mere offspring of such persons' credulity."—Mill's 'Mythical Interpretation of the Gospels,' p. 53. Strauss pronounces the Eclectic Christology of Schleiermacher a failure; the attempt to hold the archetypal character in Christ conjointly with the historical being, in his opinion, a vain one, and his inference (§ 147) is, that "the latter of these two elements falls to the ground as a natural residuum, while the former as a pure sublimate mounts upward to the ether of the ideal world." He proceeds accordingly on Spinoza's principle, that "to know Christ after the flesh is not the matter necessary for Salvation, but that we must think far differently of that eternal Son of God, *i. e.* God's eternal Wisdom, which has manifested itself in all things, and above all in the human intellect."—(Ep. 21, *ad Oldenburg*). "What," says Strauss, "shall not the idea of the divine and human nature be real in an infinitely higher sense,

when I apprehend the whole of humanity as its subject of operation, than when I set apart a particular man as such? Is not the incarnation of God from eternity a truer thing than one in an exclusive point of time? Luther has already set bodily wonders below spiritual, which are the true high miracles; and shall we possibly feel more interest in a few healings of the sick in Galilee, than in the wonders of the life of mind the incredibly increasing dominion of man over nature, the irresistible might of *the Idea*, [*i. e.* Hegel's 'man divinised'] against which no masses of the idealess can oppose an enduring resistance?"—Strauss, vol. ii. 769. And again: "If we recognize the incarnation, the death, and the resurrection, in which the double negation makes an affirmative, as the eternal cycle, the endless pulse of divine life ever returning into itself, *what can be attributed of separate or special interest to an individual fact, which exhibits this process only in a sensible manner?* In the outward fact our [enlightened] age will be conducted merely to *the idea*,—in the individual to *the race at large*—for its Christology; a dogmatic theology which, in handling the topic of Christ, rests in him as an individual, is no dogmatic theology, but a sermon."—*Ibid.* p. 770.

Note 7, page 36.

"When I was wont to meet her
In the silent woody places
Of the land which gave me birth."—*Tennyson's Maud.*

Is it too much to suppose that the poet indicates here the profound connexion subsisting between two of the more immediate objects of human *pietas*?

Note 8, page 36.—This 'odd but convenient term' the Bishop of Killaloe tells us, in his masterly Essay on the Evidences, was applied by Hartley to describe the excesses of a nation "drunk with religious enthusiasm."—*Aids to Faith*, ii. 6. The word would seem to be of patristic origin.

Note 9, page 37.—"The man who does not hold Christ's earthly life, with all its miracles, to be as properly and really historical as any event in the sphere of history. . . I do not conceive to be a Protestant Christian. And as for that Christianity which is such according to the fashion of the modern philoso-

phers and Pantheists, without a Personal God, without any individuality of man, without historical faith—it may be a very ingenious and subtle *philosophy*, but it is no Christianity at all. Again and again have I said that I know not what to do with a metaphysical God, and that I will have no other but the God of the Bible, who is *heart to heart*.”—*Leben Niebuhr's*, Theil. ii. 344.

Note 10, page 38.—*Vide supra*, Lect. i. p. 27.

Note 11, page 38.—Cf. Morell, *Hist. of Mod. Philosophy*, vol. ii. p. 202, *sq.*

Note 12, page 38.—“On se demanda avec anxiété si ces doctrines étaient véritablement la conséquence légitime de l'enseignement de Hegel. L'école se divisa sur la réponse à donner. C'est de cette époque que date la classification qui y distinguait une droite, une gauche, un centre, des extrêmes. On divine où siégeait l'auteur de la *Vie de Jésus*. Cependant la gauche se vit débordée par la révolution à laquelle elle avait travaillé, et le radical de la veille devint le modéré du lendemain.”—*Hegel et l'Hégélianisme*, par M. Edmond Scherer.

Note 13, page 38.—Schaller and other professed Hegelians have protested against the legitimacy of Strauss's deduction from their Master's system. But the words of Hegel himself, quoted by Dr. Mill (p. 35) from Strauss (vol. ii. 768) seem decisive. Michelet also, in his *History of the latest German Philosophy*, (vol. ii. 650 and 653) gives two passages equally convincing. In one of these, proceeding from the assertion that Humanity is the present God, Hegel so *mythicizes* the leading events in our Lord's life as to represent them as “no *individual*, but a divine and eternal history.” Hence he infers, by the way, that “the holy Scriptures may be treated as profane writings,” for “what the Spirit does is *no history* . . . it is not *past*, but *absolutely present*.” Michelet also formally denies Hegel's belief in the immortality of the soul. Vol. ii. 640.

Spinoza has been styled by St. Arnaud “le fondateur de l'exégèse et de la philosophie moderne.” The more I study Spinoza, the more do I feel inclined to recognize his claim to the title.

Note 14, page 39.—“Discipulo cuidam suo,” as Meyer tells

us in his Præfatio, from which I have also borrowed the subsequent statements in this paragraph. In corroboration of the two succeeding paragraphs I gladly quote the following testimony, which I did not meet with until after the Lecture was written: "The fruits of his solitude were the *Abridgment of the Meditations of Descartes*, with an Appendix, in which he first disclosed the principal points of his own system. This is a very interesting work. It contains the most accurate and comprehensible account of Descartes ever written; and the Appendix is curious, as containing the germ of the *Ethica*." G. H. Lewes, *Hist. of Philosophy*, p. 389. And again, correcting Dugald Stewart's very inaccurate statement "It was in little else than his *physical principles* Spinoza agreed with Descartes; for no two philosophers ever differed more widely in their metaphysical and theological tenets," Mr. Lewes says: "Spinoza differed from Descartes in a few points and agreed with him on most; the differences were only those of a *more vigorous logical development* of the principles both maintained."—*Ibid.* p. 395. With this I may be allowed to compare the conclusion at which I had myself arrived after a very diligent perusal of both those earlier treatises and the *Ethica*: "To such a construction Spinoza . . . applied his keen and subtle intellect, and imparted to it—in his latest and most elaborate work—the logical cohesion it required."—Lect. ii. p. 46.

Note 15, page 39.—Mr. Mansel,—*B. Lect.*, note 25, p. 87,—refers to Cousin, Bartholmèss and Veitch, as having established the non-syllogistic nature of the Cartesian *cogito, ergo sum*; and at the close of the same note he hazards the statement, that "the rejection of consciousness, as the primary constituent of substantive existence, constitutes Spinoza's point of departure from the principles of Descartes, and the fundamental error of his system." He need not, at all events, have had recourse to modern writers to ascertain the non-syllogistic nature of *cogito ergo sum*, for Spinoza himself thus comments upon it: "Verum enimvero circa hoc fundamentum hic apprime notandum, hanc orationem 'cogito ergo sum' non esse syllogismum, in quo major propositio est omissa. Nam si syllogismus esset, præmissæ

clariores et notiores deberent esse, quam ipsa conclusio *ergo sum*; adeoque 'ego sum' non esset primum omnis cognitionis fundamentum, præterquam quod non esset certa conclusio; nam ejus veritas dependeret ab universalibus præmissis, quas dudum in dubium auctor revocaverat. Ideoque *cogito ergo sum* unica est propositio, quæ huic, *ego sum cogitans*, æquivalet." Spinoza then points out very clearly how in the *cogito* were necessarily included the *modi cogitandi*, dubitare, intelligere, affirmare, negare, velle, nolle, imaginari, sentire. How far Descartes himself forsook this *fundamentum*, and substituted in his Theodicy mere abstractions for the real *data* of Consciousness, will appear in the sequel.

Note 16, page 40.—"Hâc igitur detectâ veritate simul etiam invenit OMNIUM SCIENTIARUM FUNDAMENTUM, ac etiam omnium aliarum veritatum mensuram ac regulam; scil. '*Quicquid tam clare ac distincte percipitur quam istud verum est.*'"—*Prin. Phil. Cartes.* p. 24.

Note 17, page 41.—Here is the actual Demonstration given by Spinoza: "It is the same thing to say that something is contained in the nature or conception of something, as to say that that very something is true of that thing (by def. ix.). But necessary existence (by axiom vi.) is contained in the conception of God. Therefore it is true to say of God that necessary existence is in Him, or that He himself exists."—*Princ. Phil. Cartes.* p. 37. Spinoza's Scholium to this Prop. is interesting, containing as it does the germs of that purely *intellectual* conception of Deity, which is the true basis of his philosophy.

Note 18, page 42.—Cf. especially: "Αναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τῶν χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενόησαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεέστερα. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει πον εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου, ὅτι ἔστιν, ἐι ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκείσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτα εἶναι ὅλον ἐκείνο, ἔστι δὲ αὐτοῦ φανλότερα."—Phædo. 19.

I do not, of course, hereby commit myself to the Platonic theory of the pre-existence of the soul of A. B. or C. in a state of consciousness. The question is not whether imperfect sense-phenomena *remind* the soul of perfect ante-natal ideas, but

whether she possesses perfect ideals which are *suggested* indeed by such phenomena, but from their very perfection incapable of being attributed wholly to that imperfect source. If, for example, no concrete equals fulfil my ideal of equality, and I notwithstanding attribute my ideal to the *data* of external experience, shall I not manifestly be chargeable with the fallacy of finding in the effect more than is given in the cause? The *ὅπως προσγιγνομένη* (to use a Platonic phrase) of such *ἐπιστήμη* I do not presume to explain, but the fact of the existence in the soul of such ideals, antecedent to and therefore independent of the experience which *awakes* them, if I may so speak, seems to me, for the reason assigned by Plato, to be incontestable. The speculation is of great interest in its bearing upon the possibility of the "ontological proof," which would appear to be thus relieved, to a great extent, of the objection that it contains more in the conclusion than in the premises. For if there exist in the soul such real ideals as even the most perfect sense-phenomena cannot satisfy, and, *à fortiori*, cannot have originated, to what source can Reason legitimately assign them save the perfect, *supersensible*, *real* Being, whose existence is thus irrefragably guaranteed? On the Platonic doctrine referred to above cf. Lewes, *Hist. of Phil.* p. 189, and the quotation from Ritter given there.

Note 19, page 42.—That is, Kant asserted that a knowledge of things *per se* (*Dinge an sich*) was, in the present state of our faculties, impossible; and therefore Ontology. Sense-perceptions, though to us utterly unreal—pure *phenomena*—are thus regarded by him as *involving* real underlying existences. The noumena we *must* believe to be there, else there were no phenomena, and they *must* be different from ourselves, else how could we be affected by them? And consciousness, whose veracity Kant recognizes, assures us that we are thus affected. Now if Kant assumes, as the very basis, one might almost say, of his system, existences whose reality we are assured of by our senses—(how far we *know* the nature of these things *per se* is a different question)—it does seem most inconsistent in him to describe Deity as to the pure reason nothing more than the arbitrary realization of a subjective ideal. Why should the postulate of our senses be necessary and real, that of our Reason arbitrary and visionary?

Note 20, page 44.—M. Saisset thus refers to the Cartesian theistic proofs: “The psychological proof requires nothing but some simple *data* of consciousness,—that I exist in so far as I think, that I feel that I am imperfect, and that I have the idea of perfection; and with these a principle equally simple, viz., that the idea of infinite perfection cannot have a finite and imperfect object for its cause [*i. e.*, that the *Idea* of perfection necessarily infers as its cause the existence of a Perfect *Being*]. Descartes is well satisfied when he compares his own demonstration with the common proofs, subject as the latter are to so many exceptions from those who reject the authority of the senses, tradition, and final causes. But in proceeding to consider it by itself he finds something wanting in point of simplicity. His geometer’s ideal is not perfectly filled up. For this proof, however simple, is after all only founded on experience. I think, I exist, I feel my imperfection, are extremely simple truths, but truths of observation. To find a proof quite independent of such relative conditions, geometrical, absolute, wholly *à priori*, we have but to consider the idea of Perfect Being in itself, *abstracting from the subject which thinks it*, and to operate upon this idea as geometers do upon the idea of a circle or a triangle. Thus, *given* the concept of the Perfect Being, this concept, *by its very definition*, includes all perfections [with this cf. *infra*. Lect. ii. p. 56]. Since existence is evidently [‘necessarily’ Spinoza would say] a perfection, it therefore also includes existence. Consequently the existence of Perfect Being results solely by laying down the concept of the Perfect Being. It is demonstrated *à priori* with all the rigour of a geometric process. Here Descartes is so delighted with his success that he exclaims: ‘Though all my conclusions in the preceding Meditations should turn out to be untrue, the existence of God must now pass in my mind with the same certainty I have hitherto accorded to mathematical verities.’—*Meditations*, i. p. 313. In this demonstration there is thus a kind of struggle between two opposite methods, all his reasonings *appear*, indeed, to have a common basis, the idea of the Perfect Being, but fundamentally there are two radically distinct demonstrations, that of the third Meditation which sets out from a fact of consciousness, and that

of the fifth which sets out from an abstract conception. The former, according to Descartes' own expression (*Réponse aux premières objections*, i. p. 395) proves God by His effects in the latter, instead of the natural and spontaneous movement of a soul which seeks after God, I find a geometer who reasons upon general axioms and abstract definitions, or rather a scholastic philosopher who pretends to make a Being start from a definition, the concrete from the abstract, the real from the possible."—*Essay on Pantheism*, i. pp. 33–36, and 54, 55. On the reduction of the *cogito ergo sum* to a syllogistic form, cf. Descartes, *Principes*, i. 11, 52.

Note 21, page 44.—"To will, to understand, and to create, is one and the same thing in God, without precedence of any one."—*Letters*, vi. p. 368. "Because it was His will that the three angles of a triangle should necessarily be equal to two right angles, for that cause this prop. is true, and so on with everything else."—*Med.* ii. p. 349.

Note 22, page 45.—Cf. Spinoza's *Prin. Phil. Cartes.*, pp. 46, 47, for the quotations in the paragraph 'Thus once more;' and for those of the succeeding one, cf. pp. 48, 49, 50. The entire Scholium to Prop. xv. is well worth reading.

Note 23, page 45.—Cf. Descartes, *Meditations*, ii. p. 61, i. p. 286, and *Principes*, i. p. 53. In the last of these passages he assigns to every substance one principal attribute, that of the soul being *thought*, while that of the body is *extension*. Moreover the only *real* qualities he grants to matter are (mathematical) extension, form, divisibility and motion. But these are reducible ultimately to extension alone, which thus becomes the entire *being* of bodies, so he consistently defines matter as "a collection of the modes of extension." In the Schol. referred to in the preceding note Spinoza discusses at length, and with complete approval, the distinction between the limited understanding and the unlimited will, (but for which distinction, he says, 'we should never fall into error'); but he eventually discarded this factitious distinction, and reducing both intellect and will to the rank of mere abstractions, regarded souls and bodies as analogous and eternally-fixed modes of one common substance. For Descartes' belief in the Personality of God, see the noble passage

at the close of the Third Meditation: "It seems to me very reasonable to pause here," &c. On the Cartesian "modes of extension" see below, note 35.

Note 24, page 47.—These Definitions form the prelude to the First Part of the *Ethica*, that of the *Causa sui* standing first, which for convenience sake I have quoted last.

Note 25, page 48.—Cf. *Ethica*, *Pars* i. *Prop.* vii. "It appertains to the nature of Substance to exist."—*Demons.* "Substance cannot be produced by anything else (by *Cor. Prop.* vi); it will therefore be its own cause, *i. e.* by *Def.* i. its essence involves existence, or, it appertains to its nature to exist."—*Prop.* xi. "God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which *expresses* its eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists."—*Demons.* "If you deny it, conceive if you can that God does not exist. In that case (by axiom 7 'whatever *can be conceived* as not existing, its essence does not involve existence') his essence does not involve existence. But this (by *Prop.* vii.) is absurd, \therefore &c." . . . (It will help the reader much, I think, to bear in mind that essence and existence are distinguished (verbally) by Spinoza, and that the latter seems to be equivalent with him to the mere *modal expression* of the former. The Scholium on *Prop.* xi. throws much light upon this).—*Prop.* xxviii. "Whatever particular thing, or whatever is finite and has a determined existence, *cannot exist nor be determined to operate, save by another cause which is also finite and of a determined existence*; and this cause again cannot exist, &c., unless it be determined to exist, &c., by a finite and determined cause, *and so in infinitum.*" The Demonstration is too long to quote. But it will be found fully to establish the position that Spinoza regarded Deity as *finitely* modified *from all eternity*. His distribution of our cognitive perceptions is given in Part ii. *Prop.* xl. *Schol.* ii. He illustrates his meaning thus. "Three numbers are given to find a fourth, which may be to the third as the second to the first. Merchants at once multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first, not yet having forgotten what they learned without demonstration at school, or because they have found it come true in the case of the simplest numbers, [knowledge derived from vague experience or opinion] or from

the force of the demonstration of Prop. 19, Book vii. of Euclid's Elements, *i. e.* from the common property of proportionals [knowledge due to the possession of 'common notions' and adequate ideas of the properties of things]. But in the simplest numbers such knowledge is needless. Given, *e. g.* 1, 2, 3, and every one sees that the fourth proportional is 6, and this too far more clearly, because we infer the fourth itself from the proportion itself which we see the first bear to the second *by one intuitive glance*" [intuitive science].—Cf. also *De Emend. Intel.* ii. 287.

Note 26, page 50.—While Kant asserted that for the senses there are only contingent phenomena, he yet admitted the *possibility* of a necessary Being, a first free Cause, the real source of all phenomena. Spinoza appears to me to assume such a Being not as a *possibility* but as an immediate and irresistible intuition derived from the only *primitive* source of truth, viz. "cognition of the third kind," or "intuitive science." And the main design of the *Ethica* is, I think, to invalidate the force of the objections to such a theory embodied in the Kantian antinomies. How far I have succeeded is establishing this, I must leave to the reader to decide, only requesting of him not to form his decision before he has thoroughly studied the *Ethica* itself. With the quotations cf. *Part ii. Prop. xxxv. Schol.*, and especially *Part i. Prop. xxxii.* "The Will cannot be called a free cause, but necessary only." —*Demons.* "The Will is only a certain mode of thinking, like the intellect, therefore each volition cannot exist nor be determined to action save by another cause, and this again by another and so *in infinitum*. But if the Will be considered infinite, it must also be determined to exist and act by God not so far as he is substance absolutely infinite, but so far as he has an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought. However then it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by which to be determined to exist and act, therefore by Def. vii. ("That is *free* which exists by the sole *necessity* of its own nature, and by itself alone is determined to act; that *necessary*, or rather coerced, which is so determined by another thing") cannot be called free, but necessary or constrained. —Cor. i. "Hence it follows that God does not operate *ex liber-*

tate voluntatis.”—Cor. ii. “Hence too that Will and Intellect *are so related to the nature of God as motion and rest*, and, absolutely, as all natural things, which (by Prop. 29) must be determined by God to exist and act in a certain way. . . . And although, *given* Will or Intellect, infinite results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be said to act from the freedom of the will a whit the more than on account of those (also infinite) results which follow from the freedom of motion and rest. Wherefore Will pertains no more to the nature of God than other natural things, but it is related to that nature in the same way as motion and rest and all other things, which we have shewn to follow *from the necessity of the divine nature*, and to be by the same determined to some particular existence and operation.” I again find, with much satisfaction, some confirmation for my views in the following pithy note of Mr. Lewes on Spinoza’s Def. of the *Causa sui*:—“This is an important Definition, as it gets rid of the verbal perplexity hitherto felt relative to ‘an endless chain of causes.’ The doubter might always ask the cause of the first cause in the series; but here by identifying cause and existence Spinoza annihilates the difficulty.”—*Hist. of Phil.* p. 397.

Note 27, page 51.—Cf. *Ethica*, Prop. xxxiii. and the Scholia. In the latter Scholium he discusses the subject of the Divine Perfection, and the consequent impossibility of the *indifference* of the Divine Will; a doctrine, however, which he regards as one degree less absurd than that of those who regard Deity as acting ‘sub ratione boni,’ as if, *i. e.*, “there were some external mark at which Deity aimed—some exemplar which in his operations he sought to copy.” Spinoza has handled this topic in a most masterly way, and in his happiest style. And in this Scholium and those to Prop. xv. and xvii. he has made it abundantly clear that between his own Theodicy,—which reduces Deity to the emptiest abstraction,—and that advocated in these Lectures,—which regards Him as acting in free (but perfect) allegiance to an absolute and independent standard of Right,—no intermediate position is tenable for one moment. The remaining quotations are from *Part i.* Prop. xxviii. *Scholium*, Prop. xxix. Prop. xxxiii. *Schol.* 1 and 2. *Part ii.* Prop. xxxi. *Coroll.*

Note 28, page 52.—Cf. *Part. ii. Prop. xi. Coroll.* Spinoza is so conscious here of his outrage upon ‘common sense’ that he entreats his readers to suspend their judgment until they have heard all he has to say. A plain admission this that he regarded his readers as capable of being convinced by argument, and that he felt himself to have had a certain purpose in view in writing as he did.

Note 29, page 52.—Cf. *Part i. Def. viii. and Prop. xv. Part ii. Prop. xxxiii. Part iii. Prop. i. Part ii. Prop. xvii. Schol.* with the Appendix to *Part i.*, in which the doctrine of ‘final causes’ is combatted with singular skill. From this I shall make but one extract: “If all things,” asks an objector, “have followed from the most perfect necessity of the nature of God, whence so many imperfections in nature?” “The perfection of things is to be estimated,” Spinoza replies, “from their nature and potency alone, not from their effect upon the human sense, or their adaptability or the reverse to human requirements. And if any enquire why God did not so create men as that they should be governed by the guidance of Reason alone, I only reply, it was because material was not wanting to Him to create all things ranging from the highest to the very lowest grade of perfection, or to speak more properly, because the laws of his own nature were so ample as to suffice for the production of all things which can be conceived by some infinite intellect.” I make this quotation because it illustrates what I have urged against Spinoza at the close of this Lecture. He here, in fact, shifts his ground to answer a particular objection; and he evidently feels it necessary to do so, because his own obvious motive in writing the *Ethica*, (cf. *supra*, note 28) involved the admission that those *not* guided by Reason were not only less perfect than others but were also susceptible of improvement;—an admission fatal to his general theory that “nothing can be which has not been from everlasting, nor otherwise than it actually is.” Laying down as he does that Eternity is synonymous with Existence, that Time, Measure and Number are nothing but *entia imaginationis* (here again anticipating Kant to a certain extent), that contingency and error are mere *negations* (similarly due to the imperfection of our cognitive faculties), that Perfection is therefore only

another name for *Reality*, it was but natural for him to take as it were a stereoscopic view of the One and the Many, to regard them as eternally and irrevocably *fixed*. The denial of final causes is in complete harmony with such views of the Universe. So also is the ascription of our notions of imperfection, and free will, and intellect, to the tricks of our imagination. But then Spinoza had recognized the possibility, and claimed for himself the possession, of intellectual *perfection*. Hence on his own showing there *did actually and really exist* human minds less perfect than others, and those minds, too, capable of rising to a higher state of perfection if only they would hearken to his counsel. To say, then, that such minds were generated by the "necessary perfection of the divine nature" was plainly to use words without any meaning; for he thus laid down *admitted and real* imperfection as a necessary emanation from Perfection. Hence his shifting of his former ground, and obvious admission that the words perfection and imperfection convey to his mind ideas neither *clear* nor *distinct*, in other words that *those ideas* (according to his fundamental Cartesian criterion) *are false*, and by consequence *his entire construction*. No man, whatever his philosophy, can account for the generation of imperfection by Perfection; but the difficulty is enormously enhanced for the Pantheist, and that in two ways. First, because he claims an adequate knowledge of the eternal essence of God, thus *pledging himself* to give an intelligible *à priori*, account of the genesis in question; and, secondly, because he (in theory) denies final causes, and with them the possibility of moral and physical progress or discipline. Hence his recourse to a convenient *necessity*;—a poor device, surely, to mask his absolute ignorance.

I wish here to offer a somewhat parallel suggestion to one already made in this disquisition. Spinoza renders it once more irresistibly evident, that between the absolute denial of final causes and individual free-will on the one side, and the unqualified assertion of the freedom of that will and consequent possibility of moral progress or retrogression on the other, no intermediate position is for a moment tenable.

Note 30, page 53.—Cf. *Ethica, Part i. Axiom iv.* (the true meaning of which Mr. Hallam has quite misapprehended. *Vide*

Lewes, *Hist. Phil.* p. 399.) *Part* ii. Prop. vii. *Coroll.* and *Scholium*.

Note 31, page 54.—Cf. *Part* iii. Prop. i.—“Our mind does some things, suffers some things; *i. e.*, as far as it has adequate ideas, so far it necessarily does some things, and so far as it has inadequate ideas so far it necessarily suffers some things.” See also *Part* i. Prop. xi. xii., and especially the Scholia to Prop. xv. and xvii. His idea seems to be that as God and his attributes are eternally and essentially one, He is infinite extension and yet incorporeal, in that He is indivisible; and similarly infinite thought, and yet exempt from all limitations of the understanding, in that He is indivisible. In *Part* ii. Prop. ii. he states expressly, “*Extensio est attributum Dei, sive Deus est res extensa;*” and similarly concerning Thought in Prop. i. But then he denies positively that extension can be divided *except in imagination*, it not being composed of parts in any other sense than a mathematical line is composed of points, discriminating in this way the Infinite Absolute from both the Infinite Relative (which is unlimited but yet *determined* in its essence; exemplified in the *attributes*, infinite thought and infinite extension), and a still lower Infinite, (such as, for example, a finite and yet infinitely divisible line); and solving thus such quasi-mathematical puzzles as those quoted by Mr. Mansel from Werenfel’s “*De Finibus Mundi.*” Mr. Mansel’s solution of these puzzles is characteristic: “The so-called infinities and infinitesimals of the mathematicians denote magnitudes which bear no relation to any assignable quantity. They are thus apprehended only in reference to their inconceivability.” *Bamp. Lect.* ii. note 15. Spinoza’s *classification* of the Infinite will be found in one of his letters to Meyer.

Note 32, page 55, Ethica, i. Prop. xvi.

Note 33, page 56.—Quoted by Saisset, *Mod. Pan.* ii. page 8.—According to Schelling, “Philosophy commences when ordinary knowledge terminates.”—*Neue Zeitschrift für Spec. Physik*, ii. 34, quoted by Lewes, *Hist. of Phil.* p. 592.

Note 34, page 57.—*Ethica*, ii. Prop. xlvii.—I believe that I have fairly and fully represented Spinoza’s so-called demonstration of this proposition, with the truth or falseness of which his entire

construction stands or falls. If I have failed, it has not been for want of diligent scrutiny; but his references are so numerous to former "proofs" and deductions, and the relations of the latter are so complicated, that the analysis of the main argument is a very difficult process indeed.

Note 35, page 58.—Cf. Butler's Analogy, Introduction.—"I intend," writes Descartes, in describing his physical method, "to explain effects by their causes, and not causes by their effects." And again: "I frankly confess that I know no other matter of corporeal things than that which can be divided, figured, and moved in all kind of ways; *i. e.*, what geometers call quantity, and take for the object of their demonstrations. . . And so long as by this means we can account for all the phenomena of nature—as may be seen by what follows—I think we should neither receive nor desiderate other principles in physics."—*Principles of Phil.* ii. p. 64. Contrast with this the Newtonian dogma: "All which is not derived from phenomena should be reputed as hypothesis; and hypotheses, of what nature soever they be, have no value in natural philosophy." On the "οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς" in reference to moral science, cf. Butler, *Preface to Sermons*.

Note 36, page 58.—Cf. *Ethica*, Part v. Prop. 24. Part i. 25, *Coroll.*, and *Demonst.* of Prop. 28. The 'fundamental dogma' mentioned in the ensuing paragraph will be found *totidem verbis* in Part ii. 45. For the reduction of Will and Intellect to mere *entia metaphysica* see Part ii. 48, *Schol.*; and for the absolute identity of the two terms, ii. 49. *Coroll.* It will be remembered that the *Ethica* commences with a Definition by the human Intellect of the CAUSA SUI, and that in that Definition its essence is subsequently alleged to consist.

Note 37, page 59.—*Ethica*, ii. Prop. 45. 48, *Schol.* 33. 35. 11, *Schol.*—The identity of the Will and the Intellect is asserted, Part ii. Prop. 49. *Coroll.*

Note 38, page 60.—*Ethica* i. 17, *Scholium*.—This comparison is also made by Spinoza in the 'Appendix.'—Part ii. xi., § 3.

Note 39, page 60.—To pronounce miracles *à priori* impossible postulates an *à priori*, absolute, and infinite knowledge both of the essence and of every possible *modus operandi* of Deity.

Such knowledge the human intellect cannot possibly have, if it is, as Spinoza asserts, a mere abstract term to designate certain concatenations of eternally retrogressing *finite* modes of Thought. The force of this objection to his dogmatism will be increased by remembering, that for him all *action* consists in clear mental affirmation.

Note 40, page 61.—Cf. Lect. i., note 14.—“Let those,” writes Malebranche, “who imagine that nature is the principle of ordinary effects, and who judge of all things by the impression they make upon their senses, stop short in admiring extraordinary effects; *they* have need of miracles to raise themselves to Thee. But let those who own that *Thou art the only cause of all things* adore without ceasing Thy wisdom, in the simplicity and fecundity of Thy *WAYS*.”—*Meditations Chretiennes* viii. 22. I have quoted this passage as it shows how the denial of the finite Will tends so far to the Pantheistic denial of the *distinct* Personality of God as to render (theoretically) questionable, (if not impossible), *supernatural* agency. The decidedly *mystic* tendency of Malebranche’s Cartesianism does not require special verification.

Note 41, page 65.—For the statements in pp. 62–64, I must here be content with a general reference to Parts iii. iv. and v. of the *Ethica*; only assuring the reader that I have spared no pains in endeavouring to ascertain Spinoza’s views, and present them in something like an intelligible shape.

LECTURE III.

Note 1, page 71.—*Ethica*, ii. Prop. 7.—“The order and connexion of ideas is identical with the order and connexion of things.” *Demons.*: “This is plain from axiom 4, part i. For the idea of everything caused depends on the *knowledge* of the cause of which it is the effect.” *Coroll.*: “Hence it follows that God’s power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting; *i. e.*, whatever follows from the infinite nature of God

formally, all that follows objectively in God from the idea of God in the same order and connexion." The meaning attached by Spinoza to the terms 'formally' and 'objectively,' he explains at length in a note on Descartes' fifth axiom.—"The objective reality of our ideas requires a cause in which that same reality may be contained, not only objectively but formally." One of his illustrations is that a printer is the objective, but the author the formal cause of the words in a book; another, that a man's face contains formally what the picture of that face contains representatively. *Vide 'Princip. Phil. Cartes.' Axiom ix.* Cf. also the extracts I have given from Mr. Stirling's 'Secret of Hegel,' *infr.* Appendix B.

Note 2, page 71.—The epithet *clearly conceived* should have its due weight here. For it is a fundamental maxim with Spinoza that whatever is clearly conceived by the mind is true, and therefore *real*. This involves the admission (fatal to his unification theory) that certain *existences*, which he distinguishes formally from essential substance, are *real*. For he goes so far as to maintain that "the first thing which constitutes the actual being (*esse*) of a human mind is nothing else than the idea of some *particular thing actually* existing," and that "the object of the idea which thus constitutes a human mind is a body, *i. e.*, a certain *actually existing* mode of extension, and nothing else."—*Ethica* ii. Prop. 11 and 13. But "particular things," as we have seen, are *finite* modifications AB ÆTERNO.

Note 3, page 72.—"Kant prepared the way for the absolute identification of Thought and Being. The history of this principle, of which Germany is so proud, is an infinitely curious study. We see it *born* from Kant, *developed* in Fichte, *transformed* in Schelling, and attaining its *fullest maturity* in the system of Hegel."—Saisset, *Mod. Pantheism*. vol. ii. p. 13. It may be well here to repeat that in this sketch of German Idealism, I have largely availed myself of M. Saisset's able and most interesting 'Essay.'

Note 4, page 73.—Cf. Mansel's *Bamp. Lect.* p. 201.

Note 5, page 73.—*Critique of the Practical Reason*, Book ii. ch. ii. § 8.

Note 6, page 73.—Cf. Saisset *Mod. Pantheism*. vol. ii. pp. 3-5.

—On the succeeding paragraphs cf. Lewes, pp. 578–580, from whom I shall make but one short extract; “On Kant’s *assumption* of Substance as a necessary basis of accidents Fichte remarks: ‘If you cannot *know* Substance, your assumption, *as the mere product of your reason*, is simply *another form of the activity of the Ego*. It is *you* who assume; and you assume *what you call* Substance. Substance is nothing but the *synthesis of accidents*, and it is a mental synthesis.’”

Note 7, page 76.—Malebranche’s assertion that Reason does not assure us of the actual existence of bodies, but merely of the idea of extension with its manifold modes, follows naturally enough from his celebrated theory of our seeing all things in God (who is pure Spirit). Berkeley, again, would seem to reduce extension—so far at least as *man* can know it—to a mere creation of thought. Spinoza sought to explain the co-existence and intimate union of thought and extension by the hypothesis of an underlying common essence whose co-ordinate and necessary expressions they are, and were, and had been from all eternity.

Note 8, page 78.—“The following great ideas, which constitute all the force and riches of Schelling, come from Leibnitz:—(1) The principle of the *universal homogeneity* of substances. (2) The law of *continuity*, according to which all beings are interlinked and placed on the scale. (3) The inner *dynamism*, which all through nature makes itself felt, under the apparent *mechanism* of its phenomena. (4) The profound *analogy* between the laws of the universe and of humanity.”—*Saisset*, ii. p. 33.

Note 9, page 79.—In the construction of Hegel no less than of the other *à priori* philosophers, *necessity* is still the *Deus ex machinâ*.

Note 10, page 79.—I have given, *infra*, Appendix B, copious extracts from Mr. Stirling’s elaborate work, which will throw considerable light, I trust, on the “Secret” of Hegel. Mr. Stirling, I may here observe, almost upbraids Hegel for his constant attempt to conceal his indebtedness to Kant.

Note 11, page 82.—Cf. Lewes, *Hist. of Phil.* p. 618, and Saisset, *Mod. Panth.* ii. 119.—The desperate efforts of deep

thinkers like Hegel to *reduce* and *fuse* the superhuman element, afford in themselves no inconsiderable support to the proof of a supernatural Being derived from "the general consent of mankind."

Note 12, page 82.—Cf. Saisset, *Mod. Pantheism*, ii. 36—*Translator's note*; and *supr.* Lecture ii. note 6.

Note 13, page 83.—Cf. Mill. — 'Mythical Interp. of the Gospels,' pp. 25 and 29, and "Aids to Faith."—*Essay* iv. 22, 23.

Note 14, page 84.—*Essays and Reviews*, pp. 81, 82, 88, 89.—The value of the method here recommended for the harmonizing of nature and Revelation by "a wider grasp of the one or a better balanced statement of the other," Dr. Williams seeks to illustrate by the following quotation from Mr. Mozley: "The doctrine of the fall, the doctrine of grace, the doctrine of the atonement, are grounded in the instincts of mankind."—Mozley's *Predestination*, ch. xi. p. 331. This is certainly turning the Calvinistic flank with a vengeance.

Note 15, page 84.—*Vide supra*, Lecture i. pp. 5, 6.

Note 16, page 85.—And again to the same effect: "I am blamed for making hypotheses; how does my opponent begin? With a hypothesis, the strangest of all, that of the logical notion, or the idea, to which he attributes the faculty of transforming itself by its nature into its contrary, and then of turning back and becoming itself again,—a thing that may be imagined of a living real being, but cannot be said of the simple logical notion, without the most absurd of fictions."—Quoted by Saisset. *Mod. Pantheism*. ii. 112, 113.

Note 17, page 86.—Dr. Williams, *Essays and Reviews*, p. 82.

Note 18, page 86.—A statement of this kind from such a man as Heine must be accepted with reserve; and the more so when he scruples not to make a somewhat similar charge against Kant. But it is not improbable that Hegel may have been afraid of shocking "exoteric prejudice" by a perfectly candid disclosure of his theistic views. After all, if the human mind is the ultimate realization of Deity in His completed fulness, what is the value of that undetermined abstraction with which the eternal process commences, which, according to Hegel's own

formula, is equivalent to nothing? Does it possess a single attribute, one single characteristic of what "vulgar prejudice" regards as Deity? Most assuredly not. And yet at the other end of the Hegelian series we find "a man divinized" perhaps, but certainly no superhuman God. And how is such a reduction of the superhuman element to be distinguished from Atheism? The charge of Atheism is such a harsh one, the thing itself so revolting to "vulgar prejudice," *i. e.*, to the common feeling of humanity, that I shrink from attributing it, even by implication, to any man who does not formally profess it. The following extract from Mr. Stirling will show, however, that one who has both the strongest sympathies with Hegelianism and the highest qualifications for estimating Hegel's views on such a point correctly, is constrained to admit the utter want of "subjectivity" in his Theodicy:—"The spiritual is higher than the external; the spiritual cannot be *externally* authenticated;" it is this position which gives Hegel his peculiar place as regards miracles. He does not oppose them, he admits the belief they would bring to sensuous men; but still he subordinates them. They are to him in a sensuous, external element. "Christ," he says, "himself rejects miracles as veritable criterium of truth. This is the main point of view, and what is to be held fast; attestation through miracles, as the impugning of the same, is a sphere which does not concern us; the testimony of the spirit is the true one." On which Mr. Stirling very candidly remarks: "The reader of Hegel is very apt to be haunted with this difficulty; what we have here for God is a sort of universal that has no expression of its own, that has an expression only through us; there is a life—the individual disappears;—the one, the universal alone is; but he is only through the individual, if the individual, in turn, is only through him; and even if the contingency of nature be but an externalisation of the Idea, it is independently there, and all-powerful on its own side. There can be no quiet heart on such a stage as this. Now it appears to us that the miraculous element contains the necessary resolution. &c." *Secret of Hegel*, vol. ii. p. 596.

Note 19, page 89.—On Strauss's description of Humanity as "the God made man—the child of the visible Mother, Nature,

and the invisible Father, Spirit,"—Dr. Mill gives the following interesting note: "This sentence is, in both its parts, thoroughly Indian. In the Sankhya or Catalogistic school of philosophy, the Eternal, self-existent and True, is termed PURUSHA, the Male, and is expressly denied the property of activity (the Wirklichkeit of Strauss); while the active principle originating the 24 æons (Intelligence, Individual Consciousness, &c.) is the Female MULAPRACRITI, or Radical Nature. In the more spiritual school, which asserts that all spirits or intelligences are but one,—the Eternal, the sole substance of them all, is termed either in the masculine ATMA, Spirit (der Geist), or in the neuter, BRAHMA, and is, as such, quiescent. When the universe is evolved from his substance, what combines with his creative power to *produce the illusion of diversity from him* is the female MAYA, who is identified in the Puranas with PRACRITI or Nature, and termed the Great Mother of the world."—Part i. s. 3, pp. 29, 30. Such conceptions are strikingly in accordance with those of Spinoza; but yet with him there is a sort of unconscious recognition of individual power, which became stronger and stronger, I think, in the later idealists (we know, *e. g.* how strenuously Fichte asserted the freedom of the Ego), until at last the *Purusha* was wholly absorbed into the *expressions* of the *Mulapracriti*. The reader will please observe that I only speak in the text of the Atheistic tendency of the Modern Pantheism. Dr. Mill, by the way, is quite mistaken in describing Spinoza as a disciple of the Cabbalists, whom Spinoza himself denounces as Charlatans.—See Mill, "*Mythical Interp.*," Appendix B.

Note 20, page 90.—Cf. supra, Lecture ii. p. 66. I subjoin a few sentences from the excommunication referred to in the Text. "By the sentence of the angels, by the decree of the saints, we anathematize, cut off, curse, and execrate Baruch Spinoza . . . with the cursing wherewith Elisha cursed the children; cursed be he by day and cursed by night . . . the Lord pardon him never; the wrath and fury of the Lord burn upon this man. . . . The Lord set him apart for destruction with all the curses of the firmament," &c. &c.

*Note 21, page 91.—*I should be sorry indeed to charge the authors of 'Essays and Reviews,' collectively or individually,

with holding the extreme views of Strauss, and, above all, with "atheistic tendencies." But I cannot forget that they have introduced the Neologian method to English readers, and commended it, as it were, by the high sanction of their names. And in acting thus they have incurred, I think, a very grave responsibility. Neology is such a *hazy* subject in itself, and the conceptions regarding it even among well-educated persons are so ill-defined, that I have made every effort to ascertain and portray its fundamental principle and legitimate tendencies. It is upon *these* that I judge it; it is in *these* that I discover its latent atheism; it is in *these* that I find my justification for pronouncing it most dangerous and insidious, as well as philosophically unsound. "Ἐν δὲ φάει καὶ ὀλεσσον," is the well-merited rebuke administered to the Essayists by Bishop Fitzgerald, and I cannot but think that they have hastily advocated the Neologian Theology without an adequate knowledge of its true nature and genuine affinities, and that to this cause is to be assigned at once the obscurity of which the Bishop complains, and the fact that such men as they should have fraternized, in ever so slight a degree, with the "extreme left" of the Hegelian school.

Note 22, page 91.—The 'unity' here referred to is, of course, the logical co-existence of the Finite and the Infinite Will, or Personality; the 'mean' consisting in the recognition of the *reality* of the two, notwithstanding their logical incompatibility.

Note 23, page 92.—"Εἰκὼ δ' ἐπινοεῖ κινήτῳ τινι αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι . . . ὃν δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν."—Plato, *Timæus*. xxxviii.

Note 24, page 93.—I allude to Butler's well-known analogy from the waste of seeds, &c. Mr. Barlow, in a recent work, reminds us that "so far as tenable at all, it bears upon eternal death, not eternal punishment."—*Essay on Eternal Punishment*, p. 69, note.

I venture to question the *truth* of the analogy, and further to assert that if true, it tends to subvert morality and natural piety. It seems untrue, for the comparison is instituted between things, *as far as it is concerned*, quite heterogeneous,—unconscious and conscious germs, physical and moral creations; the *involuntary* waste of the former (which, however, revive and bloom again under various other types) being yet alleged as a parallel for the

suicidal ruin of the latter.* This analogy then, so far as it holds, reduces moral agents to homogeneity with unconscious vegetables, and thus annihilates morality; it regards the former as beings only created to be eternally destroyed, on the same 'unaccountable' principle (or want of principle) that seeds are wasted (or destroyed) by Nature (= God), and thus annihilates natural piety.

Bishop Fitzgerald, with admirable ingenuity, represents Butler as *implying* that the destruction in the one case is *more unaccountable* than in the other. But this is beside the question. It is in the way of *direct analogy* that Butler alleges this waste of seeds, and not of *comparative unaccountableness*: and in so doing, he employs an illustration singularly well adapted to sustain the Pantheistic denial of the reality of human morality, of a conscious immortality for the finite being, and of a Personal God.

I do not think matters are mended much by Dr. Fitzgerald's quotation from Berkeley, who offers the truly Celtic solution, that a contempt for economy is "the correct thing" in so grand a personage as Nature. Cf. "Gather up the fragments that remain that nothing be lost."

Note 25, page 94.—This is, in fact, the radical illusion of all *à priori* constructions. Even supposing that we concede the ecstatic intuition by which their upholders profess to grasp undetermined Being, it yet remains to be demonstrated *why* this Being should ever have been 'differentiated,' 'externalized,' 'modified,' or whatever else the technical term employed may be. The ecstatic intuition ordinary intellects may not be competent to criticise of course, but they may at least claim to be satisfied with the *demonstrations* vouchsafed of the passage from the abstract to the concrete, and here Pantheism hopelessly breaks down. It can *never* account *à priori* for the genesis of concrete forms,—even be these forms delusions, illusions, externalizations, or what not,—and the irresistible inference is that they are known to the Pantheist by *à posteriori* experience,

* "The present and future ruin of so many moral agents *by themselves*" are Butler's words. This is clearly an attempt to avoid the impiety of describing Nature (= God) as wasting moral agents like seeds; but it is fatal to the suggested analogy.

an element which Pantheism absolutely banishes from the domain of Metaphysical Truth.

Note 26, page 94.—The fundamental idea of the phrase ‘Moral Governor’ necessitates *moral* imperfection in those governed; for it implies the bestowal of rewards and punishments in accordance with good or bad conduct; but to *deserve* either punishment or reward there must be a possibility (to say the least) of evil actions, and therefore imperfection in the agents.

Note 27, page 95.—“A more perfect world,” says Malebranche, “but one produced by ways less simple, would not have the impress of the Divine attributes so much as our own. *This is why* the world is filled with wicked men, monsters,” &c. (Cf. also the passage from his *Meditations Chretiennes*, viii. 22, quoted in a former note.) “It would seem,” rejoins Bayle, “that God has only created the world to cause his infinite knowledge of architecture and mechanics to be seen, without his attribute as good, and as the friend of virtue, having any part in the construction of this great work. This God would rather let the whole world perish than permit some atoms to go more quickly or more slowly than general laws require.” Leibnitz’ reply (from which I have quoted in the text) will be found in the *Essais de Théodicée*, part iii. 247.

Note 28, page 96.—An absolutely perfect universe is possible, no doubt, but it is not *compossible* (to borrow a happy coinage of Leibnitz) with moral freedom, or virtuous energy, according to our conception of those terms. Now one is almost tempted to speculate here, and enquire whether an imperfect universe *with* the possibility of virtuous effort, is not a better, nobler, and loftier creation than a perfect universe *without* it. In his edition of King’s ‘Discourse on Predestination,’ Archbishop Whately has criticised somewhat severely a similar theory; maintaining against Dr. King that “*we cannot perceive anything contradictory in the supposition of trial without evil.*” He further asserts that “the difficulty is not why men should have the power, but why they should have the will to do wrong, and why they actually do it.” pp. 108, *sq.* In these views I cannot concur. If there were no *will* or inclination to do wrong, there could certainly be no *virtue* in doing right. And our real difficulty, I

should say, is to conceive of virtue, or an attained perfection deserving of the name, in any Being *for whom it is eternally impossible to sin*. Cf. Coplestone on 'Necessity and Predestination," pp. 60, 61.

Note 29, page 97.—I think this view of humanity is gradually gaining ground, and I am glad to think it; not only because it is more pious (when we reflect by whom humanity was ultimately created) but also because it is more charitable. Although our Lord gives the strongest possible sanction to the fundamental precepts "judge not" and "condemn not,"—even the promise of eternal forgiveness,—yet are we ever prone to judge of a community, suppose, by the excesses of a few individuals, and of those individuals, again, by a moral standard which circumstances, in ninety-nine cases out of an hundred, may have rendered less attainable for them than for ourselves. Let every man think upon his own manifold imperfections with sorrow and contrition; he will thus be more prone to extenuate than exaggerate the imperfection of his neighbours, he will also avoid the mere frenzy of the Mozleian 'Regeneration.' Cf. *supra*. Lect. ii. note 5.

Note 30, page 97.—The conventional application, at the present day, of the epithet 'social' to a wide-spread evil sufficiently illustrates this statement.

It cannot be gainsaid that the requirements (hardly to be called *artificial*) of our social system tend to discourage, and in too many instances absolutely prohibit, that legitimate commerce of the sexes which Natural and Revealed Religion equally enjoin. Is it not a fact, for example, that marriage is strongly *discouraged*, to say the least, in our army and navy? Such a violation of her fundamental laws Nature, as a matter of course, punishes with unusual severity. And yet, when the very severity of her retribution recently forced upon the authorities the necessity of adopting some preventive measures calculated to mitigate the punishment, it seemed requisite to apologize through 'the leading journal' to British morality for such a procedure on the part of those in power. Here the real question for a moralist was, *not* whether it was justifiable to mitigate by State appliances certain penalties attaching to "the social evil," but whether the State

itself was justified, in the first instance, in placing a ban upon the legitimate intercourse of the sexes in the case of those under its immediate control.

Note 31, page 98.—Cf. Plato, *Phædo*, lxii. *sq.* I cannot help thinking that the various Election theories which have prevailed more or less in all religious systems, are mainly due to an unconscious attempt to *evade* the difficulty of the generation of the imperfect by the Perfect Being; the creation of the “lost many” being accounted for, or explained away, by the hypothesis that their co-existence was in some sort requisite in order to bring about the eternal happiness of the “elect few;” and the generation of the entire species thus rendered in some sort intelligible, and consistent with the attributes of God. This process of speculation culminated, perhaps, in Malebranche’s fanciful dogma that the finite world was ‘made worthy of God’ by the Incarnation.

Note 32, page 100.—Mr. Wilson’s shallow misconception of the opinions entertained by the “wise heathen” regarding the future state of the wicked is ably exposed by Dr. Salmon.—“Sermons on the Eternity of a Future Punishment,” note B, pp. 36, *sq.*

Note 33, page 100.—On F. Richter’s “Gospel of Eternal Death,” cf. “Aids to Faith,” iv. 23. My reference to Dr. Williams’ *candour* is illustrated by Gieseler’s statement that Richter was censured by many Hegelians, not for his doctrine itself, but for its publication,—“for *discovering a secret of the School.*”

Note 34, page 102.—Cf. Mansel’s “Bampton Lectures;” *passim*. It is legitimate perhaps for Mr. Mansel to charge Kant with inconsistency, but who more inconsistent than Mr. Mansel himself when he assigns to human morality a *phenomenal* value, and yet constantly asserts the *reality* of its only basis, the finite Will? The Calvinist is not chargeable with this. His error proceeds rather from taking account of the intellectual and emotional elements alone, to the exclusion of the moral. He therefore denies the reality of the finite Will. But the inevitable logical result of both systems is the destruction of all moral certainty; and if this be cut away, what *evidence* remains, I would ask, for the truth of Revelation?

Note 35, page 103.—If, as Mr. Mansel asserts, finite and infinite

morality are *heterogeneous*, I do not see how the inference stated in the Text can be evaded. But he seems to me to have been betrayed into a most extraordinary fallacy on this point. For it is surely a monstrous assumption that because 'absolute morality' is *unknown*, it is therefore different from finite, in kind as well as in degree. The latter being confessedly "a creation," as he terms it, of the former, the presumption would seem to lie exactly the other way. If they be *homogeneous*, it is hardly necessary to add that the fundamental dogma of Calvinism is *ipso facto* overthrown.

Note 36, page 104.—Cf. *John*, v. 27, and *Matthew*, ix. 5.

Note 37, page 105.—I am well aware that very different opinions are generally entertained regarding the event here referred to. I hope, however, I shall not be thought presumptuous in thus deriving from it a striking proof of the *fa'sity*, not the truth, of the predestinarian dogmatism upon the absolute indifference of a man's antecedent conduct in regard to his "call" to eternal life. To the woman taken in adultery our Lord vouchsafed a conditional pardon, surely from the conviction that some peculiarity in her circumstances sufficiently extenuated her offence. That significant act, moreover, was in exact accordance with his constant warnings against a hasty condemnation of one's neighbours, a judging "according to appearance." And so, I believe, he intended by this still more significant act to intimate to us that our future destiny shall not be decided by arbitrary election to privilege here and happiness hereafter, but by our actual conduct *under given circumstances*. From the sacred narrative itself we may legitimately infer, that had the pardoned man been placed under more favorable circumstances in early life, he would not have died a felon's death.

Note 38, page 106.—Cf. *Proverbs*, xxi. 16: "The man that wandereth out of the way of wisdom shall remain in the congregation of the dead." Lit. "in cætu *gigantum*;" the Hebrew 'rephaim' being always rendered by the LXX. γίγαντες, γηγενείς, τῑτῑνες, or ἄσεβεις; those "mighty men of old" whose violence, as we read in Genesis, was the immediate cause of the flood. The peculiar character of their violence—*sc.* their ravishing "the daughters of men," (*i. e.* of the weaker, in comparison with whom they are themselves styled "the sons of God") gives additional

significance to the following parallels : “The house [of a strange woman] inclineth unto death, and her paths unto *the dead*.” *Prov.* ii. 18, where the Hebrew again has “rephaim,” the LXX. “γγενῶν:” and, “He knoweth not that the dead (rephaim) are there, and that her guests are in the depths of Hell.” *Prov.* ix. 18. Cf. also: “Dead things are formed from under the waters, and the inhabitants thereof. Hell is naked before him,” &c.—*Job*, xxvi. 5. This version is almost unintelligible. The Vulgate renders however: “*Gigantes gemunt sub aquis, et qui habitant cum iis. Nudus est infernus*,” &c. the idea being equivalent to that in Proverbs, “Hell and destruction (abaddon) are before the Lord,” where the Jews understand *Gehenna* by Abaddon, just as R. Solomon gives “*in cœtu gehennæ*” as a gloss upon “*in cœtu gigantum*” in the passage first quoted. The passage from Isaiah further supports this view: “Hell from beneath is moved for thee [sc. for the fallen Lucifer, the king of Babylon] to meet thee at thy coming. It stirreth up *the rephaim* for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth. It hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations. All they shall speak, and say unto thee, Art thou also become weak as we?” &c., ch. xiv. 9, 10. See also *Ezekiel*, xxxii. 18, where *gibborim* is rendered ‘giants’ by the LXX. and *Peter*, Ep. ii. ch. ii. 5, 6, where we have the ἀσεβῆς of the LXX. twice mentioned in connexion with the Flood.

Note 29, page 106.—In the valley of Tophet occurred the destruction of Sennacherib’s impious host, (cf. *Isaiah*, ch. xxx. 31, 33) and its consequent pollution by dead bodies. Here too the horrible worship of Moloch was celebrated, on which account it was polluted by king Josiah, being made a receptacle for carcasses and other abominations, for the destruction of which perpetual fires were kept up. (Cf. “where their worm dieth not, and their fire is not quenched”). Here finally occurred the pollution predicted by Jeremiah, consequent on the massacre of the idolatrous Jews by the Babylonians: “For they shall bury in Tophet till there be no place. And the carcasses of this people shall be meat for the fowls of heaven, and the beasts of the field, and none shall fray them away.”—ch. vii. 33; cf. also ch. xix. 11, 12, 13. On this subject much interesting matter will be found in Mede’s Discourses, iii. and vi., from the latter of which,

indeed, both this note and the one immediately preceding have been mainly taken. I have already noticed the use made by our Lord of the terrible associations of "Hinnom's vale of slaughter" in describing (metaphorically) the future state of the wicked. It is curious that he should also have employed the somewhat inconsistent metaphor of cold, and outer darkness, to designate the doom of those excluded from "Abraham's bosom."

Note 40, page 70.—I trust this expression, "mockery of justice," will not be considered unnecessarily harsh. I would not have presumed to employ it, but for the constant and prominent ascription of justice *to our future Judge* by the inspired writers, and the impiety apparently involved in the Calvinistic hypothesis that the epithet cannot be understood in such passages in its natural (*i. e. to us* intelligible) sense.—Cf. *infr.* Lect. iv. note 12. When I say "*for us*, let it suffice, &c.," I beg it may be remembered that the Lecture was addressed to an intellectual and educated audience, to whom our Lord Himself, I am stedfastly convinced, would not have depicted the joys or terrors of a future state in the language of sensuous imagery, however powerful and impressive such appeals might be for those to whom "he spake in parables."

LECTURE IV.

Note 1, page 109.—*Action* is rather an indefinite term. The reference in the text is to the conscious, deliberate action of moral Being. In *physical* Being, I suppose that there is no such thing as *absolute* rest, and that action would be improperly described as its merely normal condition. But moral Being has its intervals of unconsciousness and repose. We have seen to what Spinoza reduces action;—the pure intellectual affirmation of adequate ideas. Such a conception legitimately identifies freedom with necessity, as *necessary* truths coerce, by their very

nature, intellectual assent. In such *action* man is about as impersonal as Mr. Babbage's calculating machine, and yet he possesses consciousness to a certain extent* in the process. Observing how logically Spinoza works out the principles of Descartes, I have ventured to suggest in the sequel *ago* for *cogito* in the famous Cartesian axiom, as a more comprehensive and truthful term; believing that in moral activity alone, as distinguished from animal or intellectual, we can find a real basis for the consciousness of Personality. For the healthy promotion of such activity, objects *ab extra* are indispensable; and in the enclosed *moral* element consists the true dignity of that pursuit of *power* alluded to in the text. Spinoza's opinion on this mode of action has been given above.—Lect. ii. p. 63. Hegel adopts to the full Spinoza's identification of freedom with necessity. "The moral man," he says, "has consciousness of his action as of something *necessary*, and thereby only is he *truly free*."—*Encyclopédie*, add. an. § 35.

Note 2, page 111.—This dictum of Jonathan Edwards is examined below, p. 116, *sq.*

Note 3, page 112. Cf. *Supra*. Lect. iii. pp. 88, 89.—We may at least assert that the subtlest exercise of metaphysical genius has failed to unify the two, and this is sufficient for my present argument. With those who deny necessary truths, and scoff at "intuitional Reason," I am not now concerned. "Necessity," writes Professor Fraser, "is an ambiguous term. We have *metaphysical* necessity, *i. e.*, in human reason; *logical* necessity, *i. e.*, in pure thought; and *physical* necessity, *i. e.*, founded on the experienced uniformity of the laws of nature."—*Essays in Philosophy*, p. 241, note.

Note 4, page 112.—By the very necessity of the causal judgment Reason inclines to absorb all finite personality in the Infinite Will, the Many in the One; and Pantheism, which pro-

* I use this qualification deliberately. I once heard a boy, who was at the time in a state of complete unconsciousness from a severe concussion of the brain, accurately going through several sums in arithmetic, at which he had been working some hours previously. This was an extreme case, but the experience of most people will supply, I have no doubt, instances not very dissimilar.

fessedly rejects Experience, exhibits in its failure the radical weakness of *this* process, feebly oscillating, as it ever does, between Atheism and Mysticism. The Positive Philosophy begins and ends with Experience, deducing therefrom the causal judgment itself; the tendency of *this* School is certainly not toward Mysticism.

Note 5, page 114.—Cf. Fenelon, *De l'existence de Dieu*: “Que vois-je dans toute la nature? Dieu, Dieu partout, et encore Dieu seul Vous engloutissez toute ma pensée; tout ce qui n'est point vous disparaît.”—Saisset, *Mod. Panth.* i. 7. Translator's note.

Note 6, page 114.—This will be at once conceded when we consider that Free-Will is the real basis of Personality; if there exists therefore no Will distinct from that of God, His *distinct* Personality is *ipso facto* (theoretically) subverted, and the *Deus immanens* of Pantheism seems our only legitimate conception.

Note 7, page 116.—I hope that due weight will be attached by the reader to the term ‘*à priori*’ in p. 115, line 10. I fully admit that ‘common sense refers every event to an antecedent cause.’ But what is the true meaning and force of the phrase ‘common sense’ as here employed? Does it not clearly involve and necessitate the idea of concrete experience? Now if this be so, a conception of causation purely *à priori* (apart, that is, from experience) is, even on my opponent's shewing, out of the question. But if concrete experience is thus essential to the causal judgment, then the entire weight of the theistic argument now under consideration depends upon the nature of that experience. Which do we mean? *internal* experience or *external*, real or phenomenal? Let us fix the issue steadily before us. Concrete experience forms the basis, lies at the very root of that grand theistic argument which fain would climb “the great world's altar-stairs that slope through darkness up to God.” Upon the nature of this fundamental element, then, inevitably depends the validity of the proof. What we have to determine, therefore, is *the essential character of the causal judgment in its relation to Experience*. Manifold and perplexing are the theories of metaphysicians regarding Causation, but the issue now before us is comparatively simple. We have, in fact, to choose between two

alternatives only. The one of these attributes the causal judgment wholly and solely to certain orderly sequences conveyed to the mind *from without* by the senses; the other finds its *origin* in the internal supersensuous authority of the finite Will over its own volitions. I ask my opponent again which of these alternatives he accepts. If the former, he is hopelessly committed to the sceptical conclusions of Hume, and what then becomes of his theistic proof? If the latter, the reality of the finite will is conceded, as a matter of course, and what then becomes of his dogmatic assertion that "the scheme of free will, by affording an exception to that dictate of common sense which refers every event to a cause, would destroy the proof, *à posteriori*, for the being of God"? I am here, be it remembered, only pressing this dilemma against my (Calvinistic) opponent; which of the two alternatives is the true one is another question altogether, to be argued upon a different ground, and against different antagonists. I hoped, indeed, to have discussed *this* question fully and formally, and thereby established to the best of my ability the truth of the latter alternative; but, the irrepressible length of such a discussion has compelled me, for the present at least, to abandon this intention, and content myself here with a few brief remarks in explanation of the hypothesis maintained in the Text. There are two extremes, it seems to me, to be avoided in theorising upon Causation—the Pantheistic method which rejects external Experience wholly, and the Positivist which accepts nothing else. I believe generally in intuitional Reason, but I also believe that its primary *data* are concrete, and that "it needs rather to be plumed with lead than feathers;" *i. e.*, that it requires to be chastened and informed by Experience. Applying this general doctrine to the question now before us, I would infer that the causal judgment encloses an intuitional, supersensuous element, by which it is essentially distinguished from the mere result of sense-perceived external sequences, but that this element is *not* the Pantheistic intuition of an Absolute, Infinite, Self-evolving *Causa Sui*, but the humble concrete intuition of a living, sentient, *active* self, the consciousness of which is so happily expressed in Lord Shaftsbury's phrase, "I take my being upon trust." I do not then seek, like Kant, to arrive at

the ontological knowledge of the soul across arbitrary reasonings and formal syllogisms, and then exhibit their fallacy; I accept my own existence as an immediate intuition of Reason, incapable alike of logical demonstration and logical refutation, and I find the essence of this existence to consist in an equally undemonstrable, equally irrefutable, causal power. I have now, therefore, as my fundamental intuition, a consciousness of initiative power, whereby I am able to control the direction of my own physical and mental movements, *and thus to account to myself*, in the last analysis, for the direction they actually take. This faculty of *self-reference* is, I am convinced, the primary datum, or rather the special elementary constituent of the causal judgment. It does not reveal to me the mystery of the causal nexus, but it is the ultimate ground of my necessary belief therein, and the foundation of all my subsequent causal judgments. But if the primary conception of causal-power be thus purely subjective, how, it will be asked, can the *à posteriori* theistic proof retain any real value? How, an objector may urge, does your theory escape the Pantheistic taint of Fichte's subjective Idealism? By a proper recognition, I reply, of the teachings of experience. I certainly commence with "the Personal I," as a real deliverance of Reason. But though all my knowledge, and especially my knowledge of causal-power *commences*, it certainly does not *end* with this Ego. On the contrary, Experience soon teaches me that my causal-power is *conditioned* in a thousand ways; that even in the direction of my mental operations it is subject to numberless alien influences, whose pressure I perforce assign to some cause-power, or powers, analogous to my own. Two *conditions* I perceive possessed of especial distinctness; for experience tells me that my initiative power is confined to a determinate sphere both in Space and in Time; and its teaching is precisely the same with regard to all sense-presentations. But in my *à priori* conception of cause-power—in the idea itself as given by intuitional Reason—in its primary revelation in consciousness—in its pure *à priori* apperception, apart from the chastenings and corrections of Experience—I can apprehend no such *conditions*; on the contrary, *given* causal-power, and Reason intuitively infers its absolute illimitability. And just in the

same way, *given* Time or Space, and Reason intuitively infers Eternity or Immensity. The initiative, but conditioned, *intuitionally-given* causal-power which constitutes the "personal Ego," thus encloses, or—to use a Platonic term—*reflects* the initiative, *unconditioned* causal-power, given *not logically* but intuitionally; and the latter stands in the same relation (assuredly no logical one) to my own, and the infinite number of analogous empirically-presented co-existent finite wills, as Eternity and Immensity to the interminable empirically-presented modes of illogically co-existent Time and Space.

If this analysis be correct, it is obvious that the whole force of the so-called *à posteriori* theistic *proof* depends upon the *reality* of the conditioned causal-power; and secondly, that both the conditioned and unconditioned cause-Power being necessary and kindred *intuitions* of Reason, and equally incapable of logical demonstration, the *logical* objection to their co-existence is invalid. To the logical faculty the Dualism is no doubt an offence. But it meets us in the co-existence of Time and Space with Immensity and Eternity, of finite with infinite, of perfect with imperfect Being, of a Creator with Creation, of the One with the Many, of God with nature. The Atheistic and the Mystic Schools may indeed pronounce either of the terms in this series of co-existents a mere *illusion*, but such an expedient is as unworthy of Philosophy as the parallel device of Pantheism, which "explains creation" by the no less *convenient* but no less arbitrary hypothesis of an *à priori necessity*. In each case the illusion and the necessity remain unexplained.

Let me state, in connexion with these remarks, that I have derived equal profit and pleasure from Professor Fraser's masterly Essays on "Scottish Metaphysics" and "The Insoluble Problem." He seems to me, however, to assign hardly sufficient *reality* to the finite causal power, when discussing the necessity of the causal judgment. See especially "The Insoluble Problem," pp. 242-4, where he apparently describes "the mental necessity which conducts us to the Transcendent Being or Power" as *independent* of "the intervention of finite beings and second causes," and in this way "the root of the only truly *necessary* causal judgment we can discover." This would seem

the legitimate inference from the following passage also (pp. 246-7), "Reason originally recognises real existence—whether finite or Transcendent—through a readier process than deductive or inductive reasoning. We call this recognition *perception* or *intuition* when it deals with the worlds of sense and self-consciousness; and *faith* when, in the causal judgment, Reason addresses itself to the Being regarded as mysteriously transcending our faculty for speculation. The function of *reasoning* is, in a manner, intermediate between Intuition and Faith." I confess I cannot reconcile the last sentence with the preceding nomenclature, which fixes the order, i. Reasoning, ii. Perception or Intuition, iii. Faith—the two latter being regarded as operations of *Reason* as distinguished from *reasoning*. But my objection now lies rather against the former division itself, which co-ordinates internal experience (= self-consciousness) with external (= sense-perception) in contradistinction to that "*Faith* that in the causal judgment addresses itself to Transcendent Being." I would co-ordinate self-consciousness with what Professor Fraser segregates as the special object of *Faith*, and regard both as supersensuous intuitions,—the one of conditioned, the other of unconditioned causal power. And I strongly insist that so far from the necessity of the causal judgment being independent of the intuition of self, it is to the essential element of causal-energy enclosed in that intuition that the very necessity itself is primarily due, and that in two ways. For the Ego, conscious of this transcendental causal energy, is compelled by such intuitive consciousness both to contemplate the ever-changing presentations of internal and external Experience under this peculiar relation, and, finding the latter, like itself, invariably limited and conditioned, to apprehend by an irresistible instinct a causal energy homogeneous, indeed, *quoad* POWER, but differing in *degree* as differ Eternity and Immensity from the momentarily realized subdivisions of Space and Time.

That Professor Fraser regards the causal judgment as, to use his own words, "prior to *all* experience,"—a specimen of "synthetic judgments *à priori*,"—will appear more plainly from a perusal of his 'Essay on Scottish Metaphysics,' especially

pp. 187, *sq.* I fear I shall myself be charged with inconsistency, in asserting on the one hand that 'a conception of causation purely *à priori* is out of the question,' and on the other that 'in my *à priori* conception of cause-power . . . I can apprehend no conditions.' In the former case, however, I only mean to assert the impossibility of conceiving cause-power as an abstract unconditioned notion *prior* to its concrete intuition in *internal* experience as the essential element of the conscious *Ego*; while in the latter I affirm that causal power, when thus primarily realized in the concrete intuition, is conceived as by its very nature unconditioned *prior* to and apart from the teachings of *external* experience. The difficulty of avoiding ambiguous expression arises from the extreme abstruseness of the subject. The lessons of experience have been learned long before men begin to reflect upon theories of causation. And even if this had not occurred to bias the direction of their analytic research, there would still remain an almost insuperable difficulty in apprehending causal-power apart from and prior to the conditions under which it is exercised.

Another defect, for which I trust the nature of my subject will also atone, is the assigning to Reason of certain Intuitions, as though Reason and intuitive reality were distinct entities, the one the source of the other. I believe, on the other hand, that there exists a subtle affinity between Knowing and Being, which at a certain infinitesimal point melts into a verbally undistinguishable identity; I believe that just at this point the illogically correlated intuitions of the conditioned and the unconditioned causal-powers blend in momentary fusion, and that the term 'Reason' is an inadequate but still the least objectionable verbal expression of their transcendental co-realization in the concrete consciousness. In this way, then, I would be understood, when I assert that it is the function of Reason to realize for man two co-existent verities—the Finite and the Infinite Being.

One word more. If it is difficult, on the one hand, so far to renounce the thralldom of external experience as to apprehend in causal-power the fundamental element of (to adopt Fichte's phraseology) the *relative* Ego, so is the difficulty great, on the

other hand, once this intuition has been realized, to *discern* it (*sc.* the relative Ego) from that absolute Ego—that unconditioned causal-power—its essential correlation with which is not logical nor demonstrable, but purely transcendental. Proportionately great is the difficulty of admitting the *reality* of the conditions which limit it, the *validity* of that (external) experience by which they are imposed. Now here we have displayed once more the subtle affinity of the *esse* and the *percipi*; I mean in this transcendental, this logically indiscernible relation of the conditioned and the unconditioned causal-power. It is, I am convinced, to the steadfast recognition of this affinity that Pantheism is indebted for the large sympathy her varied systems have ever enlisted among reflective men; it is in the exaltation of this affinity into an absolute and eternal identity, and the consequent contemptuous rejection of external Experience, that the radical vice of those systems is to be detected. And I will venture to add, that in the *non-recognition* of this affinity, in the attempt to invalidate intuitional truth by dialectic subtlety, to deify the so-called “Laws of Thought,” is to be found that opposite error which makes men shrink intuitively from the iconoclastic Scepticism of the Critical Philosophy.

Note 8, page 17.—It is just at this point that the vast importance is disclosed of the essential connexion between the intuitions of the conditioned and the unconditioned causal-powers. If they be not cognate, then that peculiar manifestation of moral obligation, by which the former is elevated above mere mechanical or intellectual agency, cannot be undeniably predicated of the latter, the *Personality* of God can no longer be asserted as an irresistible intuition of Reason.—*Cf. infra. Lect. vi. p. 172.*

Note 9, page 118.—This has been well expressed by Mr. Calderwood: “The upholder of Atheism will observe that we do not profess to *prove* the existence of a first Cause. We do not profess to *demonstrate* the fact. . . . We do not uphold the argument from design as a demonstration logically exact. . . . The creation of the universe is only a finite” [as far *i. e.* as we know] “manifestation of power, and from that we can never infer the Infinite.”—Quoted by Fraser, pp. 239, 240.

Note 10, page 120.—It must be remembered that I am here

arguing against those who profess, at least, a belief in final causes and the reality of experience. It is curious and suggestive to find, as we so frequently do, the life of a whole nation reflecting that of the individual. In this point of view the present condition of "young America" forms an interesting study. The ordeal, no doubt, is a severe one; analogous in some degree to that undergone by an over-petted headstrong boy when he first goes to school, yet likely to be attended, we may rest assured, with no less beneficial results to the national character. But how terribly, in the mean time, many individual members of the nation suffer!

Note 11, page 121.—I believe, however, that the actual is far less than the apparent inequality in such cases. The approval or disapproval of Conscience neutralizes it to an incalculable extent. Yet still enough remains to afford a very strong presumption—to say no more—that the present sphere of action for moral agents is not final. We, in our moral judgments, perforce regard the individual apart and alone, when we speak of what such and such conduct deserves; whereas no individual member of society can, as a matter of fact, act or suffer without influencing, or being influenced by, the actions or sufferings of others. Hence we crave a tribunal in which these alien influences shall be neutralized as the only one capable of fulfilling our ideal.

Note 12, page 123.—Perhaps the very strongest scriptural statement to this effect is to be found in the Epistle generally regarded as the strong-hold of the predestinarian theology.—Cf. *Romans*, ii. 6, and the string of references there. *Vide supra*, *Lect. iii. note 40.*

Note 13, page 125.—It may seem presumptuous to speak of the Divine *Conscience*, but few will deny that Deity reveals Himself in the Bible as acknowledging the obligation of the Moral Law, and between this conception and the Pantheistic I can discover no intermediate. The phrase 'a Personal God' is on the lips and in the hearts of all believers, but few take the trouble to attach any definite meaning to the epithet. Nor is it necessary, under ordinary circumstances, that they should. But the necessity is apparent and inevitable, when the divine Personality

forms, as in the present instance, the very ground of the entire controversy.

Note 14, page 126.—Intellectual activity or thinking power may be fairly regarded as *impersonal* in its essence. And to this I am inclined to attribute the legitimate development of the *cogito ergo sum*—true in itself, but not the whole truth—into the Theodicy of the *Ethica* on the one side, and the mysticism of Malebranche on the other. With moral freedom, and with it alone, comes in personal individuality; and it is the superadded activity of “a moral agent” that I design to express by the substitution of *ago* for *cogito* as the fundamental intuition of conscious existence.—*Cf. supra*, note 1.

Note 15, page 126.—I have already endeavoured to trace the radical meaning of the word Superstition. The great and only check upon the belief in a Personal God degenerating into Superstition seems to me to consist in the conception of Him as a Being who acts according to the intelligible principles of Right. All men know and understand that arbitrary favour in a judge is, in the last degree, immoral and wrong. Hence the Theodicy of the Calvinist is essentially immoral, and as open therefore to the charge of Superstition as that which led men in former days to offer up the fruit of their body for the sin of their soul, or which in our own day induces women to associate the saying of a mass with the release of a soul from Purgatory. The opposite, and far more dangerous extreme, is that which divests Deity of all moral attributes whatever. This it is which yields the Theodicy of Spinoza’s *Ethica*, and so far as it is *consistently* maintained, tends to subvert the very foundations of morality.

Note 16, page 127.—‘Scepticism’ is here employed, it may be well to observe, not as a synonym for Infidelity, but for that ‘Critical’ School which lays down as a fundamental dogma that “of the Being *and attributes* of God Philosophy *can tell us nothing*,” and finds in that dogma the determining “Limit of Religious Thought.”

Note 17, page 127.—I borrow this expressive and truly noble phrase from M. Saisset: “Losing sight of all this (*sc.* the stern uniformity of Nature’s laws) I only think of the power of God.

This is the impulse of the heart, this is prayer in its sublime spontaneousness and familiarity. . . . The human person concentrating all its powers into an act of love, is associated and subordinated to the Divine Person. The great mystery of existence—this mystery where pure reason is lost, where reasoning so often goes astray—*does not exist to the soul that has prayed.*”—*Mod. Pantheism*, ii. 190. (*Ninth Meditation*, ‘*Religion*’).

Note 18, page 128.

“He is a portion of the loveliness
Which once he made more lovely; he doth bear
His part, while the one Spirit’s plastic stress
Sweeps through the dull dense world, compelling there
All new successions to the forms they wear.”

Shelley, Adonais, xliii.

We have here, I believe, the nearest approach ever made by poor Shelley to the apprehension of “the One” as a Personal agency distinct from “the Many.”

Note 19, page 129.—I here refer to Calvin’s well-known “*Horibile decretum.*” This one epithet ‘speaks volumes’ on the Predestinarian Theodicy.

Note 20, page 131.—I differ, *toto cælo*, from Mr. Mansel’s opinion that Revelation, as such, is “regulative, not speculative.” Thus regarded Revelation is shorn of its peculiar glory. No doubt it does not solve the mystery of the Many and the One,—no doubt what it does disclose is of the most powerful practical value,—but its fundamental dogma,—the Incarnation and consequent Redemption of the Finite Being,—is in its primary aspect purely transcendental, and addressed to the speculative rather than the practical Reason. If my view is at all correct, that dogma is of the utmost importance as a solvent for *speculative* (not practical) difficulties. The solvent consists, of course, in the assurance of a future state, owing to the regeneration of the species by the sacrifice of Christ. But this great truth must be accepted by Faith, not probed and sifted by the Intellect;—accepted as a fact, but a fact mysterious and impenetrable.

When from this transcendental element in the Gospel scheme of Salvation I distinguish another as being ‘easy of apprehension,’ I wish it to be inferred, *not* that the finite initiative causal power is

intelligible *in se*, but that the moral law to which it owes allegiance is plain and simple, and the relation between wilful obedience or disobedience to it and the favour or disfavour of our future Judge, most easy of apprehension to every rational Being.

Note 21, page 133.—The illustration I have selected serves to indicate the fallacy which lurks in the application of scientific laws to transcendental truths. If one ball communicates a certain amount of motion to another, it suffers an exactly proportionate loss of motive power itself. Let us suppose, then, with the Calvinist, that the human will is as purely passive in the hands of Omnipotence as clay in the hands of the potter. Then the monstrous result must follow that the Divine Will *loses* the motive energy to good (or bad) which it communicates to the human. But between the Calvinistic hypothesis and the *reality* of the finite will there is no intermediate position, nor yet again between Spinoza's impersonal, universal, *free-necessity* (in which *all* moral agency is absorbed), and the Calvinistic hypothesis.

Note 22, page 133.—The fallacy of such an assumption may be detected in the very phrase, an "eternal decree." The term "decree" essentially involves antecedent deliberation; to speak of an *eternal* decree is therefore (logically) quite as absurd as to regard an initiative finite causal power co-existent with infinite or eternal fore-knowledge. Indeed it is no less (logically) absurd to speak of the *fore-knowledge* of an Eternal Being.

Note 23, page 134.—I have here followed in the main the Articles of the Synod of Dort, translated by Heylin from Tilenus in his "History of the Quinquarticular Controversy." Here is a specimen: "Such as have once received that grace by faith can never fall from it finally or totally, notwithstanding the most enormous sins they can commit."—*Art. v.* "On the certainty of Perseverance." I again refer to Dean Graves' admirable treatise on "Calvinistic Predestination."

Note 24, page 136.—General reflections on the nature of the Supreme Being may lead us (apart from Revelation), to *hope* for a future state in which the path of virtue (and its synonym happiness) may not be so difficult, nor that of vice so easy; and to

recognize, moreover, in the circumstances under which we now live and act, a requisite preparation for it. The teaching of experience would further lead us to infer (and how solemn and far-reaching is the lesson thus conveyed!) that every *wilful* act or thought of ours in this our probation state will *influence all our future existence* whether for good or evil. But this is a far different thing from affirming that absolute and eternal happiness or misery is the due requital for any possible degree of virtue or vice attainable under the conditions of our present state. And however natural, let me add, to the pious believer in a Personal God, may be this *hope*, a *supernatural* Revelation alone can give us *certainty* upon such a subject. We cannot demonstrate the necessity—physical or moral—for the *generation* of the imperfect Being. On the contrary it seems to us a contradiction. Much too, there is, to puzzle and distress us in the actual condition of the generated Being. Far less are we entitled to assert this *regeneration* of the imperfect Being, and its eternal existence under other conditions than those made known by experience. Such “life and immortality” was brought to light only by Jesus Christ. Many appear to anticipate an eternity of absolute perfection as their portion from the moment they cease, in Spinoza’s phrase, “to affirm the existence of the body.” A very little reflection will shew that such words are almost meaningless, except perhaps on the Pantheistic hypothesis of a *re-absorption* of the finite Being in the Infinite, which of course involves the loss of personal consciousness. On this subject the reader will find some noble passages of Leibnitz quoted by M. Saisset from the *Correspondence* first published by Grotefend in 1846, in which he maintains, with splendid zeal, the indestructibility of the individual moral (= personal) consciousness throughout eternity, and the consonant eternal Personality of God. “Truths,” as he well asserts, “with which the ancient philosophers were but very imperfectly acquainted; which Jesus Christ alone has expressed divinely well, and in a manner clear of apprehension to the lowest intellects; His gospel thus entirely changing the face of human affairs.” Saisset. *Mod. Pantheism*, i. 261, sq. “What,” adds M. Saisset, “can philosophy know of the happiness of the future life? Nothing definite, according to Leibnitz, for the

domain of reason does not extend so far. But reason *can* assure us that the state of the soul will not be one of immobility, of idle and barren contemplation. How can the soul lose its essence, which is activity, and its law, which is progress? And how, if it were finite and developed itself in time, could it attain and possess its eternal and infinite ideal? ‘No,’ says Leibnitz, ‘our happiness will never consist, and cannot consist, in a full enjoyment, where there would be nothing more to desire, and which could only stupefy the spirit, but in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections.’” Cf. with this Madame de Gasparin’s *Near and Heavenly Horizons*, ‘The Paradise we fear,’ ch. iv. p. 221.

On the existing prevalence of Universalist views Mr. Cazenove thus observes :—“The literature of an age is a part of its general tone. That, in our day, it often displays tendencies to Universalism, will hardly be denied. ‘It takes but little ingenuity,’ says the Bishop of Gloucester, ‘to trace it in many of the most popular literary productions of our own times. Poetry often scarcely masks it; many works of fiction seem almost written to give it currency.’ Our very fondness for light literature and the sentimentalism thereby engendered, though far from an unmixed evil, is of itself calculated to bias the mind against that which is stern and terrible.” Essay, pp. 63, 64. Cf. *supra*, Lect. i. note 1. The texts generally quoted by the Universalists are 1 Cor. xv. 22; Rom. v. 15, *sq.*; viii. 20, 21; Col. i. 19, 20; Eph. i. 10.

Note 25, page 137.—Cf. ‘Essays and Reviews,’ pp. 153, 154.

Note 26, page 138.—Cf. *supra*, Lect. i. p. 9, and the note there.

Note 27, page 138.—This is, I believe, the real danger to be apprehended from the ‘intellectualism’ of the day. No prudent man will attempt, I think, to *demonstrate* the subtle connexion between habitual private prayer and a higher moral tone; nor any more between a pious participation in the Eucharist, suppose, and a strengthening and refreshing of the moral nature. Neither can it be denied, again, that as prayer *may* degenerate into a Laverna-worship, so the spiritual ‘communion of the body and blood of Christ’ may be degraded to the mere perfunctory

sacrifice of Masses for the dead. But on the other hand, intellectualism tends directly to crush out the religious sentiment, to engender a callous indifference regarding the development of a man's spiritual nature, and, by thus confining the range of his conduct as a moral agent to his earthly, temporal, transient existence, to rob that agency of its true, intrinsic, eternal value. If our heavenly Father, then, has appointed and placed specially within our reach certain 'means of grace,' singularly calculated to elevate our *moral* through the medium of our *spiritual* nature, these men would seem to incur a grave responsibility indeed who neglect the *use* of such special privileges because of their undeniable liability to *abuse*.

LECTURE V.

Note 1, page 141.—On this 'strange illusion' of the Pantheist some admirable strictures will be found in M. Saisset's Essay, ii. p. 93, *sq.* I give one brief extract:—"A grain of corn germinates; a flower expands. This is a beautiful sight, yet these are but a gross and material development. I can conceive evolutions of a much higher order. The thought of genius germinates and expands in a superior intellect; a Newton conceives the system of the world. Here is the immanent cause; and unquestionably this spiritual fecundity of an intellect that seems to owe all to itself is the sublimest type of activity that man and the universe can produce. But does it follow that we have exhausted all possible forms of activity, and that we must attribute one of these to the Infinite Being? Evidently not. Immanent activity, producing its work within itself is certainly superior to transitive, and I admit that to conceive God as a power reduced to impress movement on independent and eternal corpuscles is to go back to the days of Anaxagoras; also, to represent God as a

skilful architect, as a great artist embellishing matter by the imprint of His ideas, is a symbol infinitely defective. But even the forms of immanent activity, though of a higher order, are imperfect forms which cannot be transformed into the absolute, eternal Being Newton himself is subject to a thousand external conditions; he must have the world to contemplate, and an instrument to calculate with. This is where the Pantheists deceive themselves; they cannot see that to assimilate God to the immanent activity of the Universe is to make of Him a being who develops himself, consequently an imperfect being, —is to fall infinitely below God. To act within one-self or without oneself are forms of finite [conditioned] activity. The language here is singularly expressive. Without—Within; these words suppose finite beings, limited in space and time, much more in the radical conditions of their existence. But God is the Infinite, Eternal, Perfect, Complete Being. Nothing finite then is properly without or within God; the imperfect and the Perfect Being cannot bear any mutual relation of such a kind as this.”

Note 2, page 142.—Cf. *supra*, Lect. iv. p. 115, *sq.*

Note 3, page 143.—The quotation is from A. H. Clough’s “Bothie of Toper-na-Fuosich.” The verses quoted are not consecutive in the original.

Note 4, page 144.—“The infliction of physical suffering, the permission of moral evil, the adversity of the good the partial distribution of moral and religious knowledge in the world,—these are facts which no doubt are reconcilable, we know not how, with the Infinite goodness of God; but which are certainly not to be explained on the supposition that its sole and sufficient type is to be found in the finite goodness of man.” Mansel, *Bamp. Lect.* Preface to Third Edition, p. xiv.

Note 5, page 145.—Not professing to understand the causal nexus, far less the relation between the absolute and the finite agency, I shall no more object to ascribe the actual working of the existing moral system to the *causal*-power of God, than I shall accept the phrase just quoted from Mr. Mansel—*permission* of moral evil by God—as one whit less objectionable than the direct ascription to His causal-power of the evil incident to, and

inseparable from, that moral system. But I will once more entreat my readers to remember, that by the moral constitution He has actually given us, we are *constrained*, as it were, to regard the good resulting from a successful struggle with evil as far higher, nobler, and more *real* than what may be assigned to pure spontaneity. If, moreover, *as a matter of fact*, our wilful conduct here shall influence our actual condition *throughout Eternity*, the speculative difficulty of the co-existence of the finite with the Infinite Will has for us no real value whatsoever. But in proportion to the *reality* attached to this difficulty is finite morality necessarily and most perilously *phenomenalized* in the systems both of the Predestinarian and the Pantheist.

Note 6, page 145.—Cf. *supra*, Lect. iii. pp. 94, *sq.*

Note 7, page 146.—We may indeed find various charitable excuses for a preacher who holds predestinarian views, and yet addresses men as if their future destiny depended in any wise upon themselves; but it is obvious that if that preacher were omniscient and infallible, no such excuse would hold good.

Note 8, page 148.—I say “according to analogy,” having already shown, as I hope, that unless we regard both internal and external experience as *an illusion*, we must admit that every man’s actual condition, at any moment in this life, has been determined to a certain definite extent by his own independent individual action; and, I may here add, that, so far as we can reasonably judge, every wilful deliberate act performed by a man has been similarly influenced by all his antecedent, and influences in its turn all his subsequent action. If, indeed, Spinoza is right, and all experience *is* an illusion,—“non est quod multa loquamur.”

Note 9, page 149.—Observe the words “in ever so slight a degree.” We must deal candidly with this perplexing question. There is great apparent inequality in the spiritual conditions of men here, and this arms the Predestinarian with, perhaps, his strongest weapon, for it seems to prove that God *is* a “respector of persons.” My object is to shew that in the future judgment we may find a solution for this contradiction between the express language of Revelation regarding God’s character and the appa-

rent teaching of experience. But we must be consistent. Once it is maintained that a man's privileges in time shall influence favourably "in ever so slight a degree," his destiny in eternity, then this our only possible solution (as I believe) completely fails. The Divine Justice must then be regarded as irreconcilable with the human conception of judicial equity; and therewith must be surrendered the very basis of the argument from *internal* evidence of the truth of Revelation. Then too, the supralapsarian dogma must unquestionably be preferred on the grounds of simplicity and straight-forward consistency; and such a vacillating theory as that, for example, borrowed by Whately from Faber, and adopted by Harold Browne, be rejected by candid minds as but a poor compromise at best, which leaves *the principle* of the doctrine untouched, and merely throws into the back-ground its more revolting and legitimate developments.

Note 10, page 150.—"To be baptized into," or "believe on, the name," is a phrase fairly illustrated by the Roman Catholic formula of adopting the rule of such and such a religious order. This is worth noticing, because the expression has been so often confounded with mere intellectual, or, perhaps, ecstatic assent. It involved far more than this. A proselyte admitted to Judaism by circumcision and baptism was bound to the observance of the whole Mosaic law (cf. *Gal. v. 3*). Analogously, a man professing belief in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and admitted by baptism to his "religious order," was *ipso facto* bound to obey his precepts in all things. In this way the doctrine of the Forerunner—or "baptism of John" as it is styled in the New Testament—becomes invested with a very deep significance; for its very essence consisted in the necessity for individual exertion, and the utter repudiation of all election privileges.

The *additional* obligation incurred by those baptized into the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost—a baptism designated by John himself as that "with the Holy Ghost and with fire"—has been well pointed out by Butler.

Note 11, page 152.—On Joel iii. 6, Jerome comments as follows:—"‘Filiis Juda et Jerusalem,’ nequaquam Israël et decem Tribuum, qui *usque hodie* in Medorum urbibus et montibus habitant." (He understands Joel's prediction, by the way, to refer

to the captivity by Vespasian and Titus.) The 'dwellers in Mesopotamia' probably represent the posterity of those who did not return after the seventy years' captivity in Babylon. How very numerous both these "dispersions" were in the apostolic age may be gathered incidentally from Agrippa's speech (given by Josephus) to dissuade the Jews from resisting the Roman power. Compare with this what Josephus states in the Preface to the *De Bel. Jud.*: 'Quod Judæi quidem cunctos, etiam qui trans Euphratem essent, *Gentiles suos* secum rebellaturos esse crediderant." This impression no doubt was mainly due to the solemn celebration by these far-spread "Gentiles" of the great Jewish Festivals at Jerusalem.

To the third Dispersion mentioned in the Text we may naturally assign the sojourners from Egypt, Libya and Rome. In the speech above referred to Agrippa says expressly, "Ὁὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης δῆμος, ὃ μὴ ἡμετέραν μοῖραν ἔχων." Cf. also the dedication of the Epistle of James and of the First Epistle of Peter; and the statement of James: "For Moses of old time hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the synagogues every Sabbath day."—*Acts* xv. 21. Consult on the subject of this note Mede's Discourse on *Acts* ii. 5.

Note 12, page 152.—1 Kings xvii. 20. Cf. also *Gen.* xxvii. 44, where the LXX. render οἰκησον.

Note 13, page 153.—*Vide Alford in loc.* This is an important point for my argument.

Note 14, page 153.—The Seven Noachic Precepts are given by Maimonides (*Hal. Melachim*, c. 9) who adds, "Whoever shall undertake the performance of the Precepts, lo! he is of the pious among the Gentiles, and hath a part in the life to come." Selden discusses this topic at considerable length, "*De Jure Natur.*" Lib. i. cap. 10, giving copious extracts from Rabbini-cal writers, which serve to illustrate the relation of these Noachic precepts to the law given at Sinai. These extracts also prove satisfactorily that in the judgment of the Talmudists the Precepts were not originally given, but only renewed (*instaurata*) after the flood; the "*Jus Noachidarum*" being a phrase equivalent in point of fact to the "*Jus Naturale*," or "*Universale*." Cf. Cuncæus, *De Rep. Heb.* i. 1, & ii. 19. The Precepts are given by

Maimonides under the following heads:—i. De cultu extraneo; ii. de Maledictione Numinis; iii. de Homicidio; iv. de revelatione Turpitudinum (impure coition); v. de Furto; vi. de Judiciis (civil polity); vii. de membro animalis viventis. He states expressly that the first six were given to man at the very beginning;—with which Selden compares Tertullian, *adversus Judæos*, cap. ii.—the seventh being intended simply to prohibit cruelty to the brute creation.

Selden decidedly repudiates the notion that these Precepts were employed in the admission of "Proselytes of Righteousness." From the numerous Rabbinical authorities which he quotes it would seem that Baptism, at that ceremony, was in one sense at least regarded as more important than circumcision itself; for not only was no one to be regarded as a Proselyte who was not baptized as well as circumcised, but for the validity of the former rite the presence of the Triumvirs was indispensable. Arrian, I may add, designates Proselytes by the term "*βεβαμμένοι*." *Diss. Epist.* ii. 9. To this Proselyte-Baptism the Jews think allusion may be found, *Ex.* xix. 10, 14; xxiv. 8; *Gen.* xxxv. 2. According to Witzius (*Econ. Fæd.* iv. 15) the Triumvirs are called Elohim in SS. Hence the significance of the record given by Matthew of our Lord's Baptism. It is noteworthy, too, that this solemn Proselyte-Baptism was performed *once only*. (Hence, by the way, the weakness of Tertullian's contrast between the one *lavacrum* of the Christian and the manifold *lavacra* of the Jew. *Lib. de Bap.* c. 15.) It was deemed effectual in the case of infants; and, lastly, if one baptized when adult subsequently apostalized, the rite could not be afterwards repeated for him. It was not performed until the scar of circumcision was fully healed. It is curious that Abraham himself is styled a Proselyte in reference to the covenant of circumcision, *Machzor*, part i. fol. 150 b. and 175. The *mental* conditions are thus designated by Maimonides: "Non ob vanitatem sæculi . . . [sed] ex amore sincero et integro corde et animo." How far the Emperor Nero (who is numbered among the Proselytes, *Germana Bab.* Gittin, cap. 5, 56.a.) fulfilled these conditions is somewhat doubtful. Kuinoel on *Matt.* iii. 6, quotes Plaut. *Aul.* iii. 6, 43; Macrob. *Sat.* iii. 1; Schol. on Soph. *Ajax*, 663, in

reference to Heathen baptismal purification. Such initiation gave the Proselytes a title to the name of Jew. This has been questioned, but the evidence of Josephus is decisive (*Originum*, xiii. 17); cf. also *Esther* viii. 17; and thus we are to understand St. Paul's "a Hebrew of the Hebrews."—*Phil.* iii. 5. It further bestowed *regeneration* and the gift of the Holy Spirit (*Jebam.* f. 62, 1; 92, 1, 22. a, 48. b; Lightfoot on *John* iii). Hence the Talmudists constantly assert that "a Proselyte from the moment of his proselytism was regarded as a new-born infant;" and again, "Whoever was related by blood to a Proselyte while he was a Gentile, is now plainly related to him thus no more." Cf. Maimon. *Jebam*, p. 982; Selden, *Ux. Heb.* ii. 18; also *Jos. Scalig.* in *Festum*, *verb.* "Postliminium," and the "naturalibus restituitur" in the case of a manumitted slave. We should never lose sight of these Jewish notions in connexion with such statements of our Lord as "If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother and wife . . . yea and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." "Except ye be converted, and become as little children," &c. "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God." On the last passage see *Lect.* vi. p. 192. Cf. the well-known passage of Tacitus:—"Nec quidquam prius imbuuntur, quam . . . parentes, liberos, fratres vilia habere."

Note 15, page 152.—This is the view adopted by Mede, in his learned Discourse on Acts, xvii. 4, where he gives the Seven Precepts, (with some trifling deviations) from the Talmud. Mede's argument is very ingenious, and certainly derives considerable support from the prohibitions actually specified (by a *σχήμα ἐνδείας* as he says) in the decision of the Council of Jerusalem; and Buxtorf, as Whitby admits, enumerates "fornication, pollutions of idols, things strangled, and blood," as things prohibited to the "Proselyte of the gate." But I believe that no one who reads Selden's painfully-elaborate discussion will admit the verbal accuracy of Mede's theory (however substantially correct) that the question to be decided by the First Council simply was, *to which class of Proselytes* the Gentile converts should belong.—Cf. next note.

The true reason for the prohibition of blood to the early Gentile converts is sufficiently suggested, I think, by St. Paul's admoni-

tion to the Corinthian Church.—*Lp.* i. ch. x. 16, *sq.* Cf., *Hor. Sat.* i. 8, 28. Sallust, *Cat.* ch. 22. &c. At the same time there is much to recommend the rabbinical explanation of the “*Membrum de vivo.*” For thus the Seven Precepts comprise our duty to God, to our neighbour, and to the brute creation. On the last head Christians (who hunt, fish, and shoot for “sport”) have something still perhaps to learn. Whichever way we understand the 7th Precept, it is most important to observe that it was unmistakeably a *moral* rather than a *positive* one. And thus the decision of the First Council is proved to have enjoined *as a matter of necessity* (ἐπ’ἀνάγκης) no *merely ceremonial* ordinance;—a point too often overlooked by controversialists.

Note 16, page 154.—Here I dissent from Selden, who seems to attribute too much weight to the opinions of Maimonides and the later Rabbis. Full support for the statement in the Text will be found in the Article on Proselytes, by the Rev. W. E. Alexander, who quotes from the Bab. Gemara the express statement that “no one is a Proselyte unless he be circumcised.” The Babylonian was compiled, A. D. 500, and was preferred by the Jews to the Jerusalem Talmud; the first permanent record of oral tradition having been made by R. Judah Hakkadosh, probably about A. D. 190. I regret that my Lectures were written before the publication of Smith’s “Dictionary of the Bible,” as Mr. Plumptre’s Article on Proselytes contains much valuable matter, taken principally from that by Leyrer in Herzog’s *Real-Encyclopädie*. The views he adopts coincide, however, in the main with those given in the Text. Thus he questions the formal division into Proselytes of Righteousness and Proselytes of the Gate; thinking it “doubtful whether it was ever more than a paper scheme [sc. of the later Rabbis] of what ought to be, disguising itself as having actually been.” But he falls into an unpardonable oversight in asserting that “the words ‘οἱ φοβούμενοι τὸν Θεόν,’ as well as the name ‘Proselytes,’ were confined to the circumcised.” To disprove such a statement the one instance of Cornelius is amply sufficient. He, we are told, was “ἐνσεβής καὶ φοβούμενος τὸν Θεὸν σὺν παντὶ τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ.” *Acts*, x. 2. In one passage of the Acts, indeed, we find σεβόμενοι employed as an epithet (and a very natural one) of προσήλυτοι, but the evidence

is abundant on the other hand that this word, and more frequently still the phrase "φοβούμενοι τὸν Θεόν" was *especially* employed to characterize a class, who, like Cornelius, were *not* circumcised.

Mr. Plumptre says elsewhere "The probability is, either that the terms (viz. οἱ φοβούμενοι, οἱ σεβόμενοι, ἄνδρες εὐλαβεῖς) were used generally of all converts, or, if with a specific meaning, were applied to the full Proselytes of Righteousness." Here there is a double error; these epithets being *specifically* applied to those who were *not* circumcised, and who therefore were not, *properly speaking*, Proselytes at all; (cf. especially Suetonius, *Domit.* xii.) The truth seems to be that the generic term in the O. T. was Gerim, which the E. V. commonly translates "strangers," and the LXX. sometimes προσήλυτοι, sometimes γειώραι. Of these some were circumcised, and others not (cf. *Ex.* xii. 48. *Numb.* ix. 14). The nomenclature varied, no doubt, at different eras, but in the N. T. the term προσήλυτος always, I think, implies circumcision,* and a consequent obligation to fulfil the ceremonial law, and so too with the Rabbinical writers as far down at least as A. D. 500. By Maimonides, however, the epithet "Proselytes of the Gate" was used to indicate the uncircumcised "Gerim." Thus the distinction "Proselytes of Righteousness" and "Proselytes of the Gate" is technically incorrect, so far, at all events, as the nomenclature of the N. T. is concerned, which designates the latter class as "οἱ φοβούμενοι τὸν Θεόν," and confines this designation to the uncircumcised; but, on the other hand, the distinct recognition of these two classes of synagogue-worshippers in the N. T. shews that the classification of Maimonides was *substantially* a valid one.

Note 17, page 156.—"Nec circumcidebatur ille, nec baptizabatur; sed admittebant eum veluti unum ex piis e Gentibus mundi."—Maim. *Halach Melach*, c. 14. Such were said by the Jewish Doctors, "intrare et tutam habere stationem sub alis Majestatis divinæ;" and this phrase of itself strongly (and independently) corroborates Mede's explanation of the famous "καὶ ἐπίστευσαν ὅσοι ἦσαν τεταγμένοι εἰς ζώην αἰώνιον," where the reference

* With the *possible* exception of the doubtful passage—Acts, xiii. 43—already alluded to.

is plainly to the *σεβόμενοι*—then “already in *procinctu* and in the posture to eternal life,” as Mede expresses it.

Note 18, page 156.—Cf. *Numb.* x. 29. *Judges* i. 16, iv. 11. 1 *Sam.* xv. 6. 2 *Kings*, x. 17-19. *Jer.* xxxv. See also Selden, ii. 3, *ad finem*.

Note 19, page 156.—Selden’s “*De Jure Naturali*” gives full information on these points. There is very little to be gleaned from Danz, Witzius, or Kuinoel. On the systematic proselytizing of the Jews in the apostolic age of Josephus, *B. J.* vii. 3. 3. *Ant.* xx. 2, ii. 20, xvii. 11. Something will be found also in Jahn, *Archæol.* iii. 315 (*not* 215), and Leusden, *Phil. Heb.* p. 142. Altling’s Dissertation I was unable to procure. Jahn attributes the proselytizing zeal of the Jews of the dispersion to their conviction that the age was now fast approaching when the true religion should be propagated everywhere.

Note 20, page 156.—*Mark*, xi. 17. “Πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν.” Where our translators have followed Beza. Cf. the E. V. of the original passage: “for mine house shall be called an house of prayer for all people.” *Isaiah*, lvi. 7. The 3rd verse of this chapter of Isaiah is peculiarly significant in connexion with the statement in the Text: “Neither let the son of the stranger that hath joined himself to the Lord speak, saying, The Lord hath utterly separated me from His people; neither let the eunuch say, Behold, I am a dry tree.” (cf. *Deut.* xxiii. 1, with *Acts*, viii. 27.) For Isaiah there “promiseth sanctification shall be general without respect of persons;” the evangelical Prophet thus indicating the true nature of the Messianic covenant. On the great extent to which the desecration of the outer court of the Temple was carried Burton (on *Matt.* xxi. 12) quotes from Josephus, “ἐκδοχείον κλεπτῶν, φονέων, ἀρπάγων τὸ ἱερόν γεγόνην.” *B. J.* vii. 11. The reproach, “a den of thieves,” is illustrated by the fact that the priests—probably from the most venal motives—would receive only the “shekels of the sanctuary” even after the general currency had been deteriorated, and with these the foreign worshippers, both Jews and Gentiles, were generally unprovided of course. This was a violation, too, of *Deut.* xxiii. 20. It may be well to add that this clearance of the Temple was effected twice by our Lord;—in the *first* year of His ministry, as recorded

by John, and again at His last Passover, when He came to consummate, by His sacrifice of Himself, the redemption of all mankind.

Note 21, page 157.—The superstition of the Jews was most strikingly revealed in the *non-moral* grounds upon which they built their hope of acceptance with God—viz., the merits of Abraham, the knowledge of the law, the covenant of circumcision, and external sacrifice. (cf. Lect. vi. p. 191.) Such was their election theory, and their animosity towards our Lord and His forerunner was mainly due to His steadfast opposition to such predestinarian dreams. In fact, the Predestinarianism of the Calvinist is but Judaism developing itself under another form, and somewhat different conditions,—the *ground-principle* of both systems being identical.

Note 22, page 157.—In considering the term “sanctification,” as ordinarily used by the New Testament writers, we should never lose sight of its primary meaning. God’s name—the “ἀκοινώνητον ὄνομα”—was holy, as He was a Deity apart and distinct,—*sui generis*, as it were. So we read, “among the Gods who is like unto Thee?” *Exod.* xv. 11. Cf. “Ἀγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου.” The Israelites, again, were holy as set apart from the idolatrous heathen; the Temple was holy, as consecrated to His service; Jerusalem, for a similar reason, was the holy city; and in the same sense Paul applies the epithet to those who were separated from others—whether Jews or Gentiles—as professing believers in Jesus Christ.* Cf. *Jer.* xx. 24. *Deut.* vii. 6, xiv. 2; xxvi. 18, 19. *Exod.* xxx. 31; where “holy” and “separated” are used as synonyms. There is a striking example of this identity in the case of the cities of refuge. Cf. “Thou shalt *separate* three cities;” *Deut.* xix. 2; with “They *sanctified* three cities, Kedesh,” &c., *Josh.* xx. 7; in the latter of which passages the LXX. render διέστειλαν, so familiar were they with the

* If “τὸ ἑαυτῶν σκεῦος” in 1 *Thess.* iv. 4, is best explained of “the weaker vessel,” the ἀγιασμός urged by the apostle will afford a happy illustration of the scriptural usage of the word, indicating, as it then must do, the sanctity of the marriage vow—the prohibition of adultery to the husband no less than the wife.

identity of the terms; while, on the other hand, the "separation" inculcated by the Nazarite or separatist vow in *Numbers*, vi., is repeatedly expressed in the Vulgate by *sanctificatio*. To give but one instance more: R. David Kimchi, commenting on *Isaiah*, lvi. 2 ("Blessed is the man that keepeth the Sabbath from polluting it"), says expressly: "To *sanctify* the Sabbath is to separate or distinguish it from other days." And in this sense Ezekiel speaks of the Sabbath as a sign given by God whereby the Israelites might know that they were sanctified to Him. Ch. xx. 12.

In this way alone can we understand such passages as, "For their sake I sanctify (ἁγιάζω) myself that they also may be sanctified through the truth." *John*, xvii. 19, *i. e.*, I consecrate myself as a special sacrifice, that my disciples may be consecrated to the ministry of Thy truth; where *ἵνα* is probably illative rather than final; and again: "Be not afraid of their terror. . . But sanctify the Lord God in your hearts." *1 Pet.* iii. 14, 15; *i. e.*, Dread not the idols of the heathen, but fear the one true God with all your hearts; and again: "Thou that abhorrest idols, dost thou commit sacrilege?" *Rom.* ii. 22; *i. e.*, Dost thou, while boasting of thy knowledge of the one true God, yet profane His temple?—the special reference being, not improbably, to the profanation so severely censured by our Lord.

These passages go far to prove that the word ἅγιοι, as used in the New Testament, refers to external segregation rather than internal holiness; and I have collected the above proofs (which might be multiplied with ease) because Archbishop Whately's statement to this effect has been somewhat hastily called in question. I rely principally, of course, on the texts relating to the sanctification of Deity by man, and of our Lord by His Father, as they, at least, seem capable of no other meaning. Much more, no doubt, will be required at the last day of men sanctified on earth by a special knowledge of God's truth, and who have obtained, as it were, the privilege of special access to Him through the Spirit; much more dreadful shall be their punishment if they "do despise to the Spirit of grace;" but to assert that they are holy *in a moral sense*, (or *sinless*, as Mr. Mozley would say), because of their sanctification to covenant privileges, is to repeat that Pharisaic error which is so directly

opposed to the spirit of Christianity and the explicit teaching of its founder and His Apostles.

It is from this point of view that Peter's vision obtains such emphatic significance. "Not so, Lord, for never did I eat anything *κοινὸν ἢ ἀκάθαρτον*," was his spontaneous exclamation as one of the *ἔθνη* or Israelites; "What God hath cleansed, that call not thou common," was the rebuke he received in reply. The proper force of *ἐκαθάρισεν* scarcely appears in our Translation. The aorist seems to mark the *one* great work performed *once for all* by Him whom the Father "sanctified and sent into the world" (*ἡγίασεν*) for that special purpose, just as its universal applicability is intimated in the *πάντα τὰ τετράποδα* of the vision.

It is obvious that if sanctification is taken to imply a making holy (supernaturally and arbitrarily) in a moral and spiritual sense, then the absolute sinlessness of all baptized Christians will be by far the most simple and consistent theory for the student of Revelation (cf. 1 *Cor.* vi. 11, where the sanctified are co-extensive with the baptized). And we shall then be constrained to adopt Mr. Mozley's canon of interpretation—that "Scripture is not afraid to contradict itself;" nay more—to admit that it is not afraid to contradict all experience and common sense, which equally sustain the dogma of the article: "But all we the rest, although baptized and born again in Christ, yet offend in many things; and if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."

Note 23, page 158.—The Temple had a synagogue attached (*Luke* ii. 46) where our Lord often addressed the people, and where the first Christians assembled daily (*Acts* ii. 46) in one of the halls annexed to the outer walls. 'Solomon's porch' was the eastern one in the court of the Gentiles. The money-dealers, &c., sat *within* this outer court. A stone balustrade, three cubits high, (or ten hands, according to Middoth), stood several steps higher up the mountain; also columns within this balustrade (*τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ*) with Greek and Latin inscriptions forbidding all heathens under pain of death to advance further. (*Josephus*, B. J. vi. 4.) Cf. *Acts* xxi. 28; *Rev.* xx. 15. Still higher up was a wall forty cubits high; on the other side was the court of the women, and fifteen steps higher up the main

entrance to the court of the men. Next to this was the court of the priests, separated by a balustrade one cubit high.

The Γυναικωνίτις contained four lazarettoes. Ugolino, '*Ant. Hebr.*' vols. 8, 9. Mede, '*Discourse on Mark xi. 17.*' Much interesting information will also be found in "Hooper on Lent," a little book well worthy of careful perusal.

I suppose it is hardly necessary to add, "that the mystery of the Gospel"—so long hidden from the Jews, hidden to this day from the Calvinists—consisted in the fact that the covenant of God in Christ embraced the entire human race.

Note 24, page 158.—Cf. *Ephesians*, ii. 11, *sq.* I feel convinced that my explanation of ἀθεοί in verse 12 is the correct one. "Without hope and without God" are mentioned as the characteristics of those alienated from the commonwealth of Israel and strangers to the covenant of promise, who are subsequently described as "those afar off,"—the very term employed by Peter in his address to the attendants at the feasts of the Passover and Pentecost,—and separated from the Holy place by the mid-wall of partition. "The hope" here alluded to was "the promise made by God to the fathers" of the resurrection from the dead. *Acts* xxvi. 6. It was this hope that induced "instant service of God night and day" by the 12 Tribes; the two ideas of "the God of the Jews," and "the hope of a resurrection of the just," *i. e.* in Pharisaic language, of the ἄγιοι or Israelites—being thus most intimately associated in the mind of a Jew, and by him restricted, of course, to the circumcised. It rests, at all events, with the opponents of this view to show how the language employed by Paul in this chapter could possibly be understood by those unfamiliar with the Temple services and arrangements (which were also carried out to a certain extent in the Synagogues), or that the Church at Ephesus did not consist in the main of those who had habitually worshipped there, and therefore *believed in* the God of the Jews, though they did not enjoy, until the sacrifice of Christ, the "προσαγωγή ἐν ἐνὶ πνεύματι" unto Him.

By ξένοι and πάροικοι, in verse 19, are doubtless to be understood the σεβόμενοι and circumscribed Proselytes respectively, who were now, in consequence of the great Atonement, admitted to

the full civic franchise (*συμπολιται*) of the *ἄγιοι* or Israelites, and as such admitted into the inner court (*οἰκεῖτοι*) of that Temple which, under the Theocracy, symbolized Christ and His Church. Cf. "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will build it up." On the "holiness" of the Israelites cf. *Ex.* xix. 6. *Lev.* xi. 44, 45. *Deut.* vii. 6. Relying on these and similar passages the later Jews called the Gentiles "unholy," or "profane." I have already mentioned that these Lectures were delivered before the publication of the Article on Proselytes in Smith's *Dict. of the Bible*. I therefore quote with additional satisfaction the following note from that article: "The significance of this passage (*Ez.* xlvii. 22) in its historical connexion with *Ps.* lxxxvii. [in which Psalm Ewald and De Witte see proof of a recent and extensive admission of Proselytes] and its spiritual fulfilment in the language of *St. Paul* (*Eph.* ii. 19 sq.) deserve a fuller notice than they have yet received."

Note 25, page 160.—*Acts* xxix. 9, where see Alford's note. We hear of Synagogues in *houses* in the Talmud, as of Churches in the New Testament. But the case of Tyrannus is exceptional, because *public worship* in the Synagogues is mentioned, as a rule, on the Sabbath only. Still the Jews unable to visit Jerusalem celebrated their festal days also in the Synagogues. Cf. Philo. ii 458, 630. And every Jew was bound to repeat certain passages [*Deut.* vi. 4–9; xi. 13–21; *Numb.* xv. 37–41] on Mondays and Thursdays as well as on the Sabbath in the Synagogues, or, if this was not practicable, in the market-place. The recitation of these passages produced, they said, in their minds, "the kingdom of God." Cf. Wetstein on *Matth.* vi. 5. We should remember that the apostles retained essentially *the same mode* of worship as that of the Synagogues, except that they added the celebration of the Eucharist: and it was only when excluded from the Synagogues that they held the evening service at some Christian's house. Cf. *Acts* xx. 7–11. On these topics I again beg to refer to Hooper's Discourse concerning Lent. Although at first there was frequent communion between the Jews and Christians, yet angry jealousy was excited in the Jews on seeing the Christian Temples filled with Gentile Proselytes, and most of the Bishops and Doctors (*e. g.* the most famous even in the second century,

J. Martyr, Irenæus, &c.) ignorant of Jewish learning, except what was derivable from the Greek Translation of the Scriptures. Such deficiency in Jewish lore was a serious drawback to the exegesis even of such able men as Chrysostom, Augustine, and Ambrose. For the LXX. is not a safe guide, and was without *general authority* even at Alexandria as long as Hebrew was understood there. This deficiency is still felt, and would be met to a considerable extent, I think, by the republication in a concise modern form of such works as that of Selden, to which I have so frequently referred.

Note 26, page 161.—Alford supports his interpretation by appropriate quotations from Chrysostom, Hesychius, Pausanias, &c. “Pre-eminently religious,” he might have added, is the sense given by the Syriac Version. With *διδασκαλικὸν στέρος* and *τὰ σεβάσματα* (verse 23) cf. “*τὸν φόβον αὐτῶν*,” 1 *Pet.* iii. 15; and “*πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν εὐσεβέστατα διακειμένους*,” Isocrat. *Panegy.* p. 208.

Note 27, page 161.—Cf. *Acts*, xvii. 1, 2.—The Talmudists say there was a synagogue wherever there were ten families. They are probably referred to in Psalm lxxiv. 8 (written B. C. 445, Ewald; 588, Tholuck). According to the Rabbis, the number in Jerusalem alone was about 470; cf. *Acts*, vi. 9. In Cæsarea prayers were offered up *in Greek*. (*Tal. Hierosol.*, Sota 7.) The Protestant “minister” = the synagogue “*legatus ecclesiæ*,” or “angel of the church,” who is not to be confounded with the *ἀρχισυνάγωγος*. The name *proseucha* was occasionally applied to the synagogue, but it properly referred to oratories outside those towns in which the erection of synagogues was forbidden. Cf. *Juv. Sat.* iii. 296. On the extraordinary number, not merely of circumcised Proselytes, but of “devout Gentiles,” who frequented the Temple and synagogues in the apostolic age, cf. Josephus, B. J. ii. 18; vii. 3, 3. *Ant.* ii. 20; 2; xvii. 11; xx. 2. That Paul’s manner in this was that of our Lord Himself appears at once from *Luke* iv. 16; *John*, xviii. 20; the only difference being that the Apostle did not confine his ministrations to the holy land, and the Proselytes and *Σεβόμενοι* dwelling there.

Note 28, page 162.—*Acts*, xiii. 16, 42, 48. See also *ch.* ix. 2, 20; xiii. 5; xvi. 14; xviii. 4; xxiv. 12; xxvi. 11.—The character of Paul’s address sufficiently proves that his Gentile hear-

ers were quite familiar with the Jewish Scriptures, cf. *ch.* xvii. 17; xv. 21.

Note 29, page 162.—Acts, xviii. 7, 19.—It seems evident that the wide-spread institution of synagogues tended to weaken sacerdotalism; and the account given us of “Saul the persecutor” would lead to the inference that they were regarded with a jealous eye by the priest-party at Jerusalem, as though constituting so many nurseries for the propagation of the new faith. The charge brought by the Jews against Paul (*ibid.* verse 13) after his stay of eighteen months in Corinth is worthy of notice: “Παρά τὸν νόμον οὗτος ἀναπείθει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σέβεσθαι τὸν Θεόν.” He is accused, *i. e.*, not of teaching the Gentiles to worship God, but of inducing those *already* σεβόμενοι (τοὺς ἀνθρώπους) to *disregard* the law, (ἀναπείθει.)

Note 30, page 164.—Cf. Matt. xiii. 12, sq.—Where the *abuse* of granted faculties is assigned as the reason of our Lord speaking in parables to the wilfully-ignorant, and illustrated by the quotation from *Is.* vi. 9, 10. The allusion in the Text is to the “ὃ δοκεῖ ἔχειν” of *Luke*, viii. 18, with which we may advantageously compare *Matt.* iii. 9: “Καὶ μὴ δόξητε λέγειν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, &c.,” where the Baptist solemnly warns the Jews that predestination apart from good works “had but a seeming and no real value.” In our physical organism a limb, if never used, will soon become *useless*, if not positively detrimental to the general frame; and the same great law holds good in our moral and spiritual organism no less.

LECTURE VI.

Note 1, page 167.—The successive allusions in this paragraph are, I need hardly say, to the theories of Hume, Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel.

Note 2, page 170.—Cf. sup. Lect iii., Note 5.—On this incongruity M. Saisset thus writes: “Kant asserts that the concept

of duty has a power of objectivity peculiar to itself, as it expresses that which should be done by every reasonable will, prescinding from the conditions of experience, and thus itself realizes its objects, since it always depends upon the will to remain faithful to duty. I answer that the concept of cause and that of substance are independent of sensible objects as well as the law of duty. Suppose, in fact, the universe annihilated,—these concepts preserve their own value; for it remains true that every effect implies a cause and every attribute a substance. These are hollow concepts, says Kant. Granted. But what can be more unreal than the notion of duty apart from beings endowed with will? Duty, urges Kant, not only rules over the moral world as the law of causality over the physical, but *constitutes* it. This distinction is at once false and subtle. Prescinding from moral beings, whose existence beyond, and externally to, ourselves experience alone teaches us, duty is nothing more than an abstraction without reality. All the refinements and subtleties which have been imagined to create a difference here only prove one thing, viz., that the sound sense and good conscience of Kant cannot be penned up within the system of abstractions and doubts in which the fear of metaphysics has led him to imprison himself.”—*Mod. Pantheism*, i. 306, 7.

Note 3, page 170.—See Sir W. Hamilton’s *Discussions on Phil. and Literature*, Appendix 1; “Conditions of the Thinkable.” See also Mansel’s *B. Lect.*, pp. 120, *sq.*, where we learn on the one hand that “we cannot be conscious of the Infinite,” and on the other that “we are compelled, by our religious consciousness, to believe in the existence of a Personal God.”

Note 4, page 171.—Cf. Mansel. *B. Lect.* viii., p. 244. This expedient of *Moral Miracles* springs of course from the principle that human morality rests “not upon the eternal laws which constitute God’s own absolute nature, but *the created laws* which He imposed at a certain time upon a particular portion of His creatures.” With a somewhat Celtic idea of “harmonious action,” Mr. Mansel adds, that these moral miracles “must, apparently, from the nature of the case, be isolated and of rare occurrence, *in order to unite harmoniously with the normal manifestations of God’s government of the world.*” He soon, however, dis-

cards this alien style, gravely assuring his readers in the ensuing paragraph, that "a permanent suspension of practical duties would be prejudicial to the cultivation of man's moral character."

As a practical illustration of the curious affinity occasionally discoverable between the Critical Philosophy and Spinozism, I quote here from Hagenbach: "He (Kant) seldom attended public worship, as he considered it, *according to his whole mode of thinking*, a mere incitement to morality. He, the educated man, believed that he no longer stood in need of it, while he insisted that the unthinking masses, who do not educate themselves, should make use of the institution of the Church."—*German Rationalism*, ch. xv., p. 214. Compare this, on the one hand, with Spinoza's theory, that the Bible is of advantage in promoting the phenomenal morality of the uneducated, but that here its value ends; and with Mr. Mansel's on the other, that its truths are regulative, not speculative.

Notes 5 and 6, page 172.—*Cf. supra*, Lect. iii., p. 114, *sq.* and the notes there. If the substance of his own soul, its simplicity, its unity, its spirituality, require to be formally demonstrated to a man, the Kantian parallogism no doubt holds good—viz., that *we assume* in the premisses as a subjective Ego what is in reality only a logical condition of the perception of phenomena, and then, in passing from the premisses to the conclusion, transform it into an objective, real, absolute Ego. On this M. Saisset well observes: "To reason for the purpose of finding the soul, is to admit that the soul does not perceive itself; it is to establish a factitious distinction between two *Egos*, the *Ego* of consciousness and that of reason; it is to raise an arbitrary barrier between them, which reasoning can never cross. In this point of view Kant is right. Psychology exists no more when there is no more an intuition of consciousness, which attains being, unity, and substance in their profoundest depths."—*Mod. Panth.* i., p. 288.

Note 7, page 173.—The reader will remember, I trust, that my great object has been to substantiate the reality of a *moral* being, in contradistinction to that purely *intellectual* conception of real being in which *all agency* is included by Spinoza.

If I am not immediately and intuitionally assured of my own existence as a *moral agent*, it is the supremest folly to speculate

on that of the Perfect Being. *His* existence, *His* attributes, are then to me equally matters of the most absolute indifference; to me, “τὸν οὐκ ὄντα μᾶλλον ἢ μηδενα.”

If, on the other hand, my existence and moral agency is an irrecusable *datum* of Reason, my very first concrete reality,—then *His* existence and attributes become a question of the deepest *practical* moment; then, too, they become *speculatively* certain to me.

To confine myself now to the latter point:—my fundamental reality is that of causal power, obliged by Duty; in this spontaneous revelation of Reason there are, primarily at least, no *physical* conditions; these are subsequently made known by external experience; and in being thus made known they serve to emphasize more strongly (in the way of contrast), the original intuition of unconditioned moral agency (Fichte’s absolute *ego*). But then, all the teaching of experience tends to prove that however positive the *intuition* of unconditioned causal power, the *ego* itself is apprehended as a causal power in such a decisively conditioned form, that the very term ‘absolute *ego*’ involves a contradiction. Thus it would appear that we have to apprehend a most difficult and fugitive mean between two extremes. To avoid, on the one hand, confounding our *positive* intuition of the existence of unconditioned causal power with the self-conscious, concrete, relative *ego*, (the error of Fichte and the Pantheists), a confusion which would fain identify Knowing and Being; to avoid, on the other hand, reducing that intuition to a mere logical *negation* of concrete existence (the Hamiltonian extreme), a reduction which would inevitably discharge of reality the idea of unconditioned causal power or Deity.

If my analysis of consciousness is correct—that it yields intuitionally not a mere concrete existence, but a *living, moral, causal power*, and that power in indissoluble association with unconditioned moral agency,—then the existence of the latter agency rests for me upon a basis equally real with that of my own existence, and beyond this I neither can go, nor do I desire to go. But I press strongly, for the reason assigned in the Text, the consciousness of self as a living, active, moral agent, short of which *personality* merges into the Pantheistic concatenation of

eternally-fixed finite modifications of substance,—the *real* into the phenomenal.

Those of my readers who have made this loftiest and noblest phase of THEOLOGY their study, will easily recognise the eclectic elements in the theistic proof I have attempted to give, and how far also it may lay claim to originality. I hope they will admit that in the prominence given to *moral causal power*, there is a neutralization to some extent of the Kantian objection to the usual ontological proofs, as involving a passage from the abstract to the concrete, from *the ideal* to the real.

Note 9, page 174.—*Cf. infra*, Appendix A.

Note 10, page 174.—The language of the Text will be thought very obscure, I fear. A reference to Mr. Mansel's Fourth Lecture may elucidate it, perhaps, to some extent. He there adds to the sense of dependence that of moral obligation, which compels us, he states, "*to assume* the existence of a moral Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right and wrong as constituted by the nature of that Deity." But then he further alleges that "the conception of this standard must fall far short of the reality," and derides as a fiction "the (Kantian) theory of an absolute autonomy of the Will; *i. e.* of an obligatory law resting on no basis but that of its own imperative character." And to the same effect in Lect. vii., he reduces (inferentially) "the moral sense to a mere form of the human consciousness, restricted in its operation to the field of the relative *and the phenomenal*;" (p. 206,) nay more, while admitting that "God did not *create* absolute morality, which were a blasphemy," he asserts that "God *did* create its human manifestation when he placed man in those circumstances by which the eternal principles are modified [eternal principles modified!] in relation to this present life" (p. 208). And he discloses the full force of this term "modified" in the subsequent statement that "the occasional suspension of human duties" does not involve "a violation of the immutable principles of morality itself."

These extracts suffice to show,—by their sharp antithesis of Infinite and finite Morality as an eternal reality on the one hand and a transient (heterogeneous) phenomenon on the other,—that the finite being (according to Mr. Mansel's principles) whose

very essence consists as we have seen, in a moral causal power,—is not a reality but a fleeting phenomenon; and yet this *phenomenal* being's sense of dependence and moral obligation is laid down as the sole basis of his belief in the existence of a *real* and eternal Being. In this way I would have the statement in the Text understood, that the *reality* of the basis of the Hamiltonian Theodicy “is reduced to the phenomenal by the very superstructure attempted to be reared upon it,” the *reality* of the superstructure being laid down in sharp antithesis to its *phenomenal* basis.

Note 11, page 175.—If my personal identity consists essentially in my moral consciousness, then, according to Mr. Mansel's views of human morality just referred to, and his still more express allegation that human and divine morality differ *in kind* no less than in degree,—it becomes quite obvious that my personality in Eternity cannot possibly be *identical* with my personality in Time.

Note 12, page 176.—It is hardly necessary to state from whom I borrow this noble conception of the Supreme Good.

Note 13, page 177.—No student of Revelation will stumble, I trust, at this description of Deity as “conscious of *kindred* right,” however much it may offend the Sceptical School.

Note 14, page 178.—Cf. *supra*, note 6.

Note 15, page 178.—I have already alluded to the strange fallacy involved in first pronouncing the absolute Being to be utterly incognizable, and then formally declaring His Morality heterogeneous to that of Man.

Note 16, page 181.—Cf. *supra*, Lect. iv. pp. 108, *sq.* To palliate failure on the plea of inauspicious circumstances is a very common and a very insidious error; generating discontent on the one hand, and *ignavia* on the other. Whatever our crude notions may be, the fact remains that the circumstances of no two men ever have been, or ever can be, for a single moment, precisely identical; to suppose that they can be made so, and that continuously, “by Act of Parliament,” seems to be the latent and radical vice in the political theories of the Socialist School.

Note 17, page 182.—I say *may* no longer necessitate them, because I should be most reluctant to dogmatize upon such a

subject, and indeed the *probability* would seem to be that a certain discipline, though of a different nature, will still remain. All I contend for on this point is, that the possession of privilege in Time (whether due to originally impressed character or subsequent circumstance) will not confer any advantage as regards the condition of any man in a future state of existence;—that the inequalities *there* will be due to the actual conduct of each under given conditions *here*, and only in so far as that action was independent and *free*.

Note 18, page 183.—On the “Sceptical cavils,” cf. *supra*, Lect. v. note 4. If exception be taken to my speaking of *the relation* of the Absolute cause to the finite, on the ground that the Absolute by its very nature excludes all relation, I reply, that I speak not of *logical* relation here, but of *the statements of the Bible* as to the co-existence of two distinct causal powers, standing in the same relation to each other in regard to man’s acceptance with God,—not logical but purely transcendental or “intuitional-rational,”—as that which in metaphysics subsists for Reason between the Infinite and the Finite, the Perfect and the imperfect Beings, or again between Space and Immensity, Time and Eternity.

Note 19, page 184.—*Cf. supra*, Lect. v. pp. 150, *sq.* On the persecution and obloquy with which the Jews, and *à fortiori* the Proselytes, were visited, cf. *Hor. Sat.* i. 4, 142. *Mart.* vii. 29, xii. 37. *Tac. Ann.* ii. 85. *Suet. Domit.* xii. Lightfoot, *Hor. Heb.* in *Matt.* xxiii. 5. Indeed the Proselytes and Σεβόμενοι had to encounter the sneers not only of the godless among their own countrymen, but also of the Jews themselves.

Note 20, page 186.—“There has been found a difficulty by some,” writes Dean Alford on *Acts*, x. 4, “in the fact that Cornelius’s works were received as well pleasing to God before he had justifying faith in Christ. But it is surely easy to answer, with Calvin and Augustine, ‘non potuisse orare Cornelium, nisi fidelis esset.’” It is easy surely; whether it is the act of an honest and sound commentator is a different question. I recommend to Dean Alford’s consideration the First Article of the *Synod of Dort*. It runs thus: “God, by an absolute decree, hath elected to salvation a very small number of men, *without any regard to their faith or obedience whatsoever*, and secluded from

saving grace all the rest of mankind, and appointed them by the same decree to eternal damnation, without any regard to their infidelity or impenitency." Also *Lambeth Articles*, No. vi. "A true believer, that is, one who is endued with a justifying faith, *is certified by the full assurance of faith*, that his sins are forgiven, and that he shall be everlastingly saved by Christ." The latter passage will fix for Dean Alford the Calvinistic meaning of the term "*fidelis*" in his quotation, and will enable him, I trust, to see how admirably that quotation reconciles the fundamental Article of the Synod of Dort with Acts, x. 4, "Thy prayers and thine alms came up for a memorial before God," and Acts, xi. 13, 14, "Send for Simon, who will tell thee words, whereby thou shalt be saved and all thy house."

The real point at issue, be it remembered, is whether Cornelius possessed or did not possess the technical "faith in Jesus Christ" when his good works were accepted as such by God. The object of Peter's "words" evidently was to prove that "Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ,—that He had been raised from the dead, and was appointed by God to be judge of all men,—that remission of sins would be obtained at His bar by every one who believed these things regarding Him, and that "*διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ*"—by acknowledging, *i. e.*, His authority as a teacher, and obeying His rule. (cf. ch. x. 37-43.) These facts Cornelius believed on Peter's authority; he heard them in consequence of his former good works; and the sincerity of his belief of the facts and consequent determination to conform to the religion or "rule" (*ῥογα*) of Christ was attested and *sealed* by the subsequent gift of the consecrating Spirit, even as in the case of the apostles themselves upon their belief.*

The sequence, then, in Cornelius's case is plain and unmistakable; first piety and good works, then a heaven-sent confirmation of the miraculous mission of Jesus Christ from the lips of an apostolic witness, and especially of the great doctrine of a

* "*Εἰ οὖν τὴν ἰσὺν ὥρεάν ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Θεὸς ὡς καὶ ἡμῖν πιστεύσασιν ἐπὶ τὸν Κύριον,*" &c. Acts, xi. 17; where the participle may be temporal, causal, illative, or concessive, according to the requirements of the context, but will not, of course, bear the sense assigned to it in the E. V.; cf. Scholfield *in loc.*

future judgment by Him, in which the *σεβομενοι* would be rewarded and the impious punished; then an acceptance by Cornelius of the truth of these, to him, good tidings (cf. ch. xv. 7); then the gift of the Spirit (enabling him to speak with other tongues), in attestation of the sincerity of his belief that Jesus of Nazareth was indeed the anointed of God, and to be obeyed as his future judge; and lastly, his baptism in the name or religion of Christ. If any one, with this simple and natural record of what actually occurred placed before him by the sacred historian, still prefers to adopt the Calvinistic "sequence," I can only say, "*ἀγνοεῖτω.*"

Note 21, page 188.—"Subterfuge" is a hard word, yet its applicability will be recognized, I think, by any candid reader of Alford's note (*ut alia omittam*) on *Acts*, x. 34, where Peter's solemn and deliberate statement, "Of a truth I believe that God is no respecter of persons, but, on the contrary (*ἀλλά*), in every nation, he that feareth Him ('ὁ φοβούμενος αὐτόν,' the technical designation of non-circumcised worshippers), and worketh righteousness, is accepted by Him," is reduced to mean that such men "*have no extraneous hindrance, such as circumcision, placed in their way to Christ!*" And again, "The question solved in Peter's mind by recent events was that of the admissibility of men of all nations into the Church of Christ. *In this sense only* had he received any information as to the *acceptableness* of men of all nations before God." (The italics are Alford's). To estimate the unfairness of this criticism, we must remember how, while Peter was doubting what the full import of his vision was, and the inferences legitimately derivable from it, the messengers from Cornelius arrived, and told him they had been sent by one "*δίκαιος καὶ φοβούμενος τὸν Θεόν,*" in consequence of a heavenly vision vouchsafed to him; we must remember that in that vision Cornelius' piety and righteousness had been expressly assigned as the cause of the blessing to be conferred; we must remember, finally, that *δεκτός* does not mean "admissible to favour," and that it does mean "accepted" or "acceptable." (Cf. *Luke*, iv. 24; *Phil.* iv. 18). When Alford adds: "It is clearly unreasonable to suppose Peter to have meant that *each heathen's natural light and moral purity would render him acceptable in the sight of God;*

for, if so, why should he have proceeded to preach Christ to Cornelius, or indeed *any more at all?*" (the italics are his own) he betrays a strange ignorance of the import of the term "*φοβούμενος τὸν Θεόν*" in the Book which he professes to expound; and he also *exaggerates* the force of the word *δεκτός* as grossly as he had before unduly extenuated it, forgetting apparently the significance of our Lord's words: "Thou art not far from the kingdom of God," and the numberless other indications the Bible affords that the work of the Spirit in the heart is relative, not absolute, conducive, not coercive, gradual, not spasmodic,—that "the path of the just is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day." On the *κοινοῦ* and *ἐκαθάρισεν* of Peter's vision, cf. *supra*, Lect. v. Note 22.

Note 22, page 189.—The only other passage, I believe, in which this significant epithet, *καρδιογνώστης*, occurs is *Acts*, i. 24, where the election of Matthias to the apostolic office is ascribed to the decision of that great Being who only "knoweth the hearts" of all men. When Calvinistic divines absolutely resolve the piety and good works of men like Cornelius into the action of "*God's preventing grace*," (cf. Alford on *Acts*, x. 35), it would be well to state candidly whether they are prepared to accept the Pantheistic theory, that human morality is purely phenomenal, and the moral quality of human actions a chimerical illusion. If not prepared to go this length (which, among other disadvantages, immediately assigns to necessity, or Deity, whatever actually occurs), they may fairly be called upon to state with some degree of precision where human responsibility begins and ends. Their theory apparently is that man, as such, has a power to do good or to do evil, but that, as a matter of fact, whenever he does good, it is God that acts and not he; whenever he does evil, it is he that acts and not God; that his evil actions, moreover, are the result of the depraved nature he inherited from Adam, "who was the son of God." When Scripture, then, speaks of a future judgment, in which a man shall be rewarded by God for the good deeds done in the body, and punished for the evil, are we to infer that God *will reward Himself* for the good He has done in the shape of certain divinized men, and punish certain other men for the evil which they, or rather the

depraved natures they have involuntarily received from Him, may have committed? This is a point of the very last importance as regards our determination of the character assigned by Revelation to human morality. If such be indeed the teaching of the Bible, then the Pantheist may triumphantly quote Scripture in support of his reduction of human morality to a phenomenal illusion; then, too, the Neologian may with more consistency than ever deny the doctrine of a conscious immortality for the finite beings whose moral agency is pronounced by Scripture itself to be thus purely phenomenal and *unreal*.

The materialistic and Pantheistic tendencies which characterize so emphatically the present age, seem equally to call for some unambiguous and authoritative declaration as to the actual teaching of the Bible upon this vitally important question.

Note 24, page 190.—These questions are ably discussed by Alford; *Gr. Test.* vol. ii. *Prolegomena*, ch. ii. 1, 2, 3. I cannot, however, assent to his inference from *Rom.* xv. 20. If my views are correct, we can readily understand why Gentiles (*i. e.*, not *heathens*, but *σεβόμενοι*, who frequented the synagogues and the Jewish Feasts) should form so large a majority in a Church founded at so very early a period, beside determining the much more important question of the precise object with which the Epistle was written. I have never been able to find any satisfactory reason assigned for the fact that St. Paul, in writing to a Church confessedly composed for the most part of *Gentiles*, (cf. Alford, *loco cit.*) *i. e.*, of those generally regarded as converts from *heathenism*, should devote so large a space to assailing the peculiar error of the *Jew*. For this cause, if for none other, I trust the solution proposed in the text may meet with some degree of approval.

The due recognition of the *Σεβόμενοι* illustrates, and is in its turn illustrated by 1 *Pet.* v. 13. "The *jointly-elected* (*i. e.*, composed of simultaneously converted Jews and Gentiles) Church in Babylon saluteth you—*i. e.*, (as we gather from the dedication) the *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι διασπορᾶς* of Asia Minor. The influence of the Jews at Rome about this time is sufficiently proved by the fact of their having had a majority at the elections. The orders for their banishment from Italy by Tiberius, and from

Rome by Claudius, were not finally executed. Cf. Tac. *Ann.* ii. 85. Suet. in *Tib.* and *Claudius*.

Note 25, page 191.—Cf. Jahn. *Archæol.* iii. § 319, who refers to Jos. *Ant.* xvii. 2, 4; *B. J.* ii. 8, 4. Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho.* Rom. i.—xi.; *Heb.* x. 1–18. See also *Psalms* xlvii. 4; cxxxv. 4; *Is.* xli. 8–16; *Jer.* xxx. 10; l. 20; *Amos* viii. 7. (In the quotation from *Is.* xlv. 17, 25, I have written ‘Abraham’ by mistake for ‘Israel,’ but the error is immaterial). It is hardly to be wondered at that the Jews of old should have so grievously erred in the sense they assigned to these passages, when we observe the facility with which they are similarly appropriated by the Calvinistic School of the present day. The language of the Pharisees recorded in *John* vii. 49, indicates the blessedness they attached to “a knowledge of the law.”

Note 26, page 191.—The term “Repentance” has been so terribly “used up” in the Romish controversy, that its signification in the N. T. is not always immediately discernible. The sense I have here attached to it, however, seems to be, in the main, that in which “the Forerunner” employs it. We have seen what were the prevalent notions among the Jews—and especially the Pharisees—as to their covenant relations with God. When John then sees the multitudes (*Luke* iii. 7), and especially the Pharisees and Sadducees (*Matt.* iii. 7), coming to his baptism, he addresses them as “a generation of vipers,” by this strong expression throwing contempt on their claims to salvation as descendants of Abraham; and next he warns them that, not *this*, but the bringing forth of good fruits was the true test of fitness in the “children of the Kingdom” (cf. *Matt.* viii. 12). It is important to observe, that when his converts ask for further instruction as to the nature of these good fruits, anchorite though he was, his precepts were of the simplest and most practical kind (*Luke* iii. 13, 14); thereby further shewing the necessity to the Pharisees of Repentance, in the sense I have assigned to it, as a prerequisite for covenant-relations with God in Christ; these simple duties being precisely what our Lord upbraids them for neglecting. In the baptism of John, therefore, or “baptism of repentance,” as it is sometimes called, there was nothing of ecstatic intuition, or arbitrary and supernatural “conversion;” on the

contrary, he requires the candidates for his baptism to give up at once and for ever, their superstitious notions about arbitrary election to privileges, and to perform the duties of their several callings with integrity, and thus does he "prepare the way of the Lord." Compare with this *Luke* xv. 7, 10, where the repentant sinner is contrasted by our Lord with the "righteous" Pharisee.

Taking *μετάνοια* in this sense—as implying, i. e. a change of mind regarding the grounds of man's acceptance with God, and a consequent acknowledgement of sinfulness and recognition of the necessity for good works, as opposed to the "dead works of the Law,"—we shall be better able, I think, to discover a consistent meaning for the preposition in the "*τὴν εἰς τὸν Θεὸν μετάνοιαν καὶ πίστιν τὴν εἰς τὸν Κύριον*" (*Acts* xx. 21), mentioned by Paul as the great doctrine, which, notwithstanding the insidious opposition of the Jews, he "testified" without reserve both to the Jews and Greeks. The only account Alford gives of *εἰς* in this passage, is the extremely satisfactory one that it seems to be a Pauline usage. With the meaning I attach to *μετάνοια*, all difficulty disappears, the sense being: "the change of mind in reference to God," (cf. his allusion to John's "baptism of *μετάνοια*" and its object, ch. xix. 4,) as the first requisite, and "belief in reference to Jesus Christ" as the second, for all who would become partakers of the near approaching "Kingdom of Heaven." (We have seen already that the Pharisees imagined the public recitation of certain texts produced in their minds "the Kingdom of God.") "Faith in reference to Jesus Christ," or Faith of which He was the object, will thus be a parallel expression for baptism *εἰς ὄνομα τοῦ Υἱοῦ*, a formula implying an acknowledged obligation on the part of the baptized to obey His precepts—to quote our Lord's own words when commissioning his apostles, "*τηρεῖν πάντα ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην ὑμῖν.*"* (cf. *εἰς τὸν Μωσὴν ἐβαπτίσαντο*)—the preposition conveying something of *ethical*

* That such is the true fundamental import of baptism *εἰς ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου*, seems evident from 2 *Tim.* iii. 19: "*Ὁ μέντοι στερεὸς θεμέλιος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔστηκεν, ἔχων τὴν σφραγίδα ταύτην, Ἐγὼ Κύριος τοῦς ὄντας αὐτοῦ, καὶ Ἀποστήτω ἀπὸ ἀδικίας πᾶς ὁ ὀνομάζων τὸ ὄνομα Κυρίου.*" Cf. also verse 25.

relation; the very force, I may add, assigned to it by Alford on *Acts* xxvi. 6. These two prerequisites, then, *μετάνοια* and *πίστις*, are mutually connected; a change of mind as to the value of covenant privileges and external service apart from personal holiness, preparing the heart for faith with regard to Jesus Christ; and this faith referring primarily to the facts of our Lord's Deity, sacrificial atonement, Resurrection from the dead, and second coming to judge the world (cf. *Acts* xvii. 30, 31: "*πίστιν παρασχών πᾶσιν*—sc. of His being about to judge the world *in righteousness*,—" *ἀναστήσας αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν*"), and secondly, exhibiting both the sincerity of the *μετάνοια*, and its own vitality, in not "neglecting so great salvation," but yielding, on the contrary, a heart-felt obedience to the doctrine He had delivered,—in the rejection, *i. e.*, by His disciples, of the perverted morality and formal righteousness of Judaism, and the adoption of His spiritual "rule of life" instead.

The proclaiming of such doctrine was doubly offensive to the Pharisees. It robbed them in every way of their fancied privileges; and again, it inculcated the necessity for far higher sacrifices, far deeper self-denial, far more essential purity, than they deemed requisite for "the elect." Hence, in his speech to Agrippa, Paul states that he preached to the Jews to repent, and to turn to God *by performing works conformable to such repentance* (*πράσσοντας ἄξια τῆς μετανοίας ἔργα*), and that *on this account* (*ἐνεκα τούτων*), the Jews seized him in the temple, and sought to slay him.

They could not, or would not believe in the necessity of the Saviour's death for the salvation of "the elect," *i. e.*, the Israelites, or "saints;" as little could they comprehend the Gospel-mystery, *i. e.*, that that great sacrifice extended potentially and equally to all mankind; still less would they recognise as requisite for themselves, whose salvation they regarded as already *assured by the fact of their election*, that performance of all that He commanded them enjoined by our Lord as the true test of discipleship (*John* xvi. 8, 10, 14). Thus, though they had a zeal for God, it was not "*κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν*." "The god of this world had blinded their eyes," "blindness in part had happened unto them," and so our Lord "who willeth not that any should perish, but come

to repentance," sends Paul to turn them from darkness to light, from the power of Satan to God, that they might receive [what they fancied they already possessed as "the elect"] forgiveness of sins and an inheritance among the saints, "πίσται τῇ εἰς ἐμέ." And so Paul again exhorts Timothy still to instruct them, however reluctant, "if haply God may give them μετάνοιαν εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας." Compare, above all, upon this fundamental error of the Jews, *Rom.*, ch. ii. where their extraordinary delusions as to the superiority of election-privileges to integrity of life are set forth with unmistakeable clearness, and reprobated with uncompromising severity. It is at once melancholy and instructive to observe the revival of such delusions, under a different form, in the Church of Christ Himself.

It will be remembered, that in the above observations I am far indeed from wishing to ignore that godly sorrow which the children of God must ever feel when convicted of any sin, and which in its turn leads to a "μετάνοια ἀμεταμέλητος" regarding such sin;* I have been merely endeavouring to fix the meaning of the word μετάνοια as used by the Forerunner, and to infer therefrom its probable sense as used by St. Paul. On its usage by the latter, cf. also *Heb.* vi. 1, where it is immediately connected with a repudiation of those "dead works" on which the Jews relied as a sufficient atonement for their occasional transgressions, and with a sounder "πίστις εἰς Θεόν." In *ch.* xii. 17, of the same Ep. the *spiritual* meaning ordinarily attached to it is, of course, wholly inadmissible.

Once a man recognizes as his "rule of life" the spiritual doctrine of our blessed Lord, a feeling of "self-righteousness" will become the very last, I suppose, which he can possibly harbour. And in proportion to the exclusion of this feeling will be the value attached by him to the great doctrine of the Atonement.

Note 27, page 192.—*John* iii. 1–21. It will be observed that the criterion asserted by our Lord in this passage, as elsewhere, is strictly practical. See especially vs. 19, 20, 21.

Note 28, page 193.—*Luke* vii. 29, 30. Here the people and the publicans are contrasted with the Pharisees and the νομικοί.

* Cf. Bengel on 2 *Cor.* vii. 10.

The latter rejected God's counsel with regard to them (*εἰς ἑαυτοὺς*) in rejecting the baptism of John; the former, having accepted that baptism, gladly* acknowledged THE JUSTICE OF GOD. The woes pronounced by our Lord against the *νομικοί* give us the best clue to the meaning of this difficult passage. Their doctrine plainly was that a knowledge of the law was one of the essentials to salvation, and the key to that knowledge they maliciously withheld (*John* vii. 49; *Luke* xi. 52). John, on the other hand, instead of imposing intolerable burdens, inculcated the discharge of simple and homely duties as the passport for those who would enter into the kingdom of Heaven. John's baptism, or doctrine, was in such strict accordance, then, with man's natural piety and sense of justice, that on hearing it sanctioned by the Lord Himself, "all the people and the publicans JUSTIFIED GOD."

I am persuaded that the quotation in the Text from *Rom.* iii. 26 bears a kindred meaning, though I candidly confess I can find no authority in favour of such an explanation. From the signal importance of the passage, not only in reference to the human apprehension of the Divine attribute of JUSTICE, but also in its bearing upon the disputed doctrines of the Epistle, I am anxious to state here upon what grounds I differ from the ordinary interpretation. To do this satisfactorily I must take a rapid survey of the preceding argument.

The Apostle commences (chap. i. 15) by hinting delicately that the church at Rome needed some further information regarding the true nature of the Gospel (the probable reason for which I have stated in the Text). Of this Gospel he is not ashamed, for it is the power of God to salvation to *everyone* who believes, both Jew and Greek. To both Jew and Greek, for in it the JUSTICE of God is revealed (is proved, *i.e.*, to be *equal*, and without respect of persons or nations) *ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν*. [Of the exact meaning of these words I am not at all sure, but they obviously bear a general reference to belief in, and consequent obedience to the commands of Jesus Christ, which, as we have seen, is *technically expressed* in the New Testament by *πίστις εἰς Κύριον*]. And this

* "The common people heard him gladly."—*Mark* xii. 37.

great truth has been testified by the Jewish prophets themselves, for “the just ἐκ πίστεως shall live.”* The Gospel discloses the equal Justice of God, for His wrath is revealed *in it* (= ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ) in the doctrine of a future judgment by Jesus Christ (cf. v. 16), against all impiety and iniquity of men who suppress His truth by iniquitous conduct. [I here follow Alford. But Slade’s explanation has much to recommend it. Cf. Donaldson’s note on Soph. Ant. 598.—“τεὰν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν Ὑπερβασία κατὰσχοι;” who quotes: “μή τιν’ ὑπερβασίην κατέχων, from *Theognis*, 745.] To bring this fact home to the Jews, the Apostle then describes the *iniquity* of the heathen world, and emphatically ascribes it to their *impiety*, and wilful rejection of the *true knowledge* of God. (Cf. *John* xvii. 29.) To this the Jew would be only too ready to agree, boasting as he ever did of his Knowledge of God and the law. Securing such an important admission, then, the apostle most skilfully and powerfully retorts upon the Jew, that so far from being justified by his knowledge of God and the law, he was utterly ἀναπολόγητος, for in the very act of judging the Gentile, he condemned himself, disclosing the groundlessness of his hope of salvation on the score of his knowledge of God, for the iniquity of the Gentile originated *in his losing the true knowledge of God*, the obvious inference being that the true knowledge of God had been equally lost by the Jew, in that he was guilty of the very same crimes.† [This point in the argument seems to have been wholly overlooked by commentators.] “Now we know,” proceeds St. Paul, “that the judgment of God is, as *truth* [*i. e.*, His true nature], demands (κατ’ ἀλήθειαν) against those that do such things; and thinkest thou, that while doing such things *thou* shalt escape? or despisest thou God’s goodness and forbearance, not knowing (ἀγνοῶν, with which cf. ch. i. 21) that His goodness leads thee εἰς μετάνοιαν;—[*i. e.*, apparently, that

* Cf. *Gal.* iii. 11, where the same quotation is made; the Apostle’s object being to show that the Galatians were “bewitched” in supposing any special Gospel-privilege to attach to Judaism, “all who had been baptized into Christ having put on Christ,” without distinction of nation, condition or sex.—Verses 22–29.

† On the perverted morality of the Jewish zealots, cf. Whitby on *Rom.* ii. and especially the extracts from Josephus, *B. J.* vii. 30, 34.

God's gracious object in still delaying the second coming of Christ to judge the world was to give the Jews additional time for repentance and faith. Cf. 2 Peter iii. 4.]—and by such corrupt and wilful ignorance [on Israel's *ignorance of God*, cf., by all means, ch. x. 19–21] treasurest up for thyself—like the impious and profligate Gentile—wrath on the day of wrath and *revelation of the just judgment of God* [these words surely fix for us the meaning of “δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν,” ch. i. 17, cf. *infra*, verse 16*] who will render to each man as *his deeds require* (κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ); to those who disobey *the truth*, and obey *iniquity*, whether *Jew or Greek*, indignation and wrath; but glory, honour and peace to every one who has faith in Christ, [or, as he here expresses it, “who habitually and sedulously does (τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ) what is right”] whether he be Jew or Gentile. For there is no respect of persons with God. For not *the hearers* of the law are just with God, but the *doers* of the law shall be justified (cf. *James* i. 22). And so *all* who sinned, whether possessed of the Mosaic law or not, shall be equally condemned on the day when God shall judge by Jesus Christ the hearts of men *as my Gospel proclaims, or requires* (κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου), [for the assurance of a future judgment given by the death and resurrection of Christ, cf. *Acts* xvii. 31, for its universality and even justice, ch. xii. 10, 12, 13]. But if thou, a Jew in name, reposing on thy knowledge of God and His truth which is, no doubt, faithfully delineated in the law, if thou, I say, dost profess on such grounds to teach the Gentile (ἔτερον), why not teach thyself? [compare with this our Lord's reproof to Nicodemus]. Why by thy habitual transgression is the name of God dishonoured, and even blasphemed among the Gentiles? [cf., *infra*, iii. 23]. The grounds of thy confidence are vain indeed. For he is a Jew who is one in heart [“ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ,” cf.

* Alford explains δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ to mean here, “not righteousness as an attribute of God, but righteousness *flowing from and acceptable to Him*, which is unfolded in the Gospel, and the more, the more we believe.” The italics are his own. He supports this explanation by a long “dogmatic” note of De Wette, in which the unfortunate phrase, by some mysterious and wonderful process, eventually appears as an equivalent for “cheerfulness of conscience, attained through faith.”

supra, “Κρινεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὰ κρυπτά,”] not in name; who is circumcised in spirit not in the way of external ordinance, [“ἐν γράμματι,” which gives us the true meaning of “διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς παραβάτην νόμου” in verse 27] whose praise is not from men, but from that Judge who seeth in secret.” The conclusion being thus established against the Jew, that the principle of the future judgment by Jesus Christ, *as now revealed in the Gospel*, shall be that of internal and individual merit or demerit, not of external and national privilege, the question naturally arises, “What then is the advantage of the Jews, what the benefit of circumcision?” “Their principal advantage,” Paul replies, “consisted in their being entrusted with the oracles of God, for they had thus the special opportunity of being made wise unto salvation; and surely if some notwithstanding failed to believe in Christ, their unbelief shall not annul the faithfulness of God” [*i. e.*, probably, the partial failure of the Jewish covenant in spiritualizing the Jews, cannot fairly be ascribed to God, or their consequent punishment lessen our confidence in His justice]. “If then, the iniquity of the Jews, instead of annulling actually confirms (συνίστησιν) the broad and equal justice of God [δικαιοσύνην, with which cf. the preceding verse: “That thou mayest be pronounced just—δικαιωθῇς—in thy decrees;” the reference being, as before, unmistakeably to His judicial integrity at the last day] shall we possibly (μὴ) say that the God who punishes His covenant people for such iniquity is *unjust* in so doing? It would be as impious and absurd to advocate as a Gospel maxim, ‘Let us do evil that good may come.’ [The τὴν ὁργὴν of verse 5 plainly refers to the revelations of the Gospel regarding a future judgment for *all* sinners, alluded to ch. i. 18, and ii. 5, 8.] “What then? Have the Jews, as such, any plea of privilege to urge before the bar of God? * None whatever. Their own scriptures prove that they are liable to His judgment, (ὀπόδικοι) and so far from their ‘knowledge of the law’ exempting them from the curse of sin [cf. “this people which knoweth not the

* I incline to think that this is the least objectionable mode of understanding προεχόμεθα. It is possible, however, that here, as in verse 8, Paul identifies himself with the Christians, not the Jews.

law are cursed,"] it only increases their responsibility, for *it* gives a familiar knowledge of sin. [Cf. *John* xv. 22 with xvi. 8–11.] None therefore shall be justified in His sight by the works of the Jewish law [the righteousness required by which Paul tells us elsewhere he, "the chiefest of sinners," had himself perfectly fulfilled]. But *now*, in the new covenant with *all* mankind, the broad and equal justice of God has been plainly disclosed, attested [as he had previously shewn] by 'the law and the prophets,' [= the Jewish Scriptures] God's *equal* justice, as it extends to *all* who habitually do what is good, [or, as he here expresses it, "who believe"] FOR UNDER IT THERE IS NO DISTINCTION whatever of class or nation (*οὐ γάρ ἐστιν διαστολή*). All have been proved sinners alike, ALL fail of glorifying God." [This seems to be the meaning of *τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ*. Cf. "when they knew God, they glorified Him not as God," ch. i. 21; also *Gal.* i. 24; 2 *Thess.* i. 10, 12; 1 *Pet.* iv. 11; and the special charge that God's name was blasphemed among the Gentiles by those who boasted of their knowledge of Him and His Law, ch. ii. 24]. "It is not then by the knowledge of God or the Law that man can be justified before God. The confessed unrighteousness of those enjoying that privilege would prove the Judge *unjust* if he pronounced them just upon such grounds. Those who seek justification must turn from Moses to the Mediator of a better covenant, quite distinct [*χωρὶς νόμου*] from the former; a covenant made on equal terms with all mankind, who are justified in God's sight, not by the works of the law [whose performance, as we have seen was practically compatible with gross immorality] but by the one sacrifice of Christ,—a scheme of justification which God has *now promulgated*, on account of His long-suffering connivance at past transgressions [of those, to wit, who had not in former generations been "commanded to repent," and told of a future judgment by Jesus Christ. On this passage cf., by all means, *Acts* xvii. 30, 31, and especially: "*πίστω παρασχὼν πᾶσιν ἀναστήσας αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν*,"] with a view to prove His broad and equal justice* to all mankind in this the fulness of

* Here at length the true meaning of "*δικαιοσύνη τοῦ Θεοῦ*" is recognised by Alford. See his note on ch. iii. 26. The A. V. of *διὰ τὴν πᾶρεσιν*—"for

time (*ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ*), this universal means of justification having been graciously (*δωρεάν*) provided by Him, with the view to His being truly JUST TO ALL while justifying the believer in Jesus (*εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ.*)"

Such I believe to be the true meaning of this passage. The ordinary interpretation; viz. that God is enabled by the sacrifice of Christ to be just, although He by arbitrary selection (*i. e.* unjustly), pronounces some sinners just, seems to have arisen from a general misconception of the drift of St. Paul's argument, and a special misapprehension of the meaning of "*μετάνοια εἰς τὸν Θεὸν καὶ πίστις εἰς τὸν Κύριον*," it being forgotten that the former doctrine was primarily directed against the predestinarian delusions of the covenant-people, and that the latter is a synonym, or nearly so, for 'baptism in the name of Christ,' the "fundamental and steadfast significance" of which is given by the Apostle himself in a verse already quoted: "Let every one that NAMETH THE NAME OF CHRIST DEPART FROM INIQUITY." Hence the inconsistent and (exegetically) grotesque meanings attached to '*δικαιοσύνη τοῦ Θεοῦ*,' hence too the reduction of 'Faith in Christ' to what Alford here designates "the subjective means of appropriation of the propitiation (!)" The free grace of God consisted in the more than neutralization of Adam's disobedience, and all the sinful imperfection it entailed, by the perfect obedience and voluntary sacrifice of the Sinless One; a sacrifice which enabled a God of Justice to "connive at" the transgressions of former generations (whether Jewish or Gentile) as far as they were due to a vitiated nature, or ignorance of "the Truth as it is in Jesus." (Cf. *ch. iii. 25* with *Acts xvii. 30, 31.**) Hence in the present passage Paul speaks of ALL MEN *being justified freely by God's grace*; and with equal precision—*ch. v. 12, sq.*—of the sin and condemnation and death which had extended to all, (with a seeming injustice in the case of those ignorant of the law,—*verse 13*,—or who had not been as culpable as Adam—*verse 14*)

the remission," is calculated to mislead; and the more so because of *Acts ii. 38*, where "*εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν*" is correctly rendered by the same phrase.

* I find that Mr. Jowett adopts nearly the same view, and suggests the same illustration, of the meaning of "*διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν*" in this passage.

having been counteracted, and more than counteracted, by the gracious, or voluntary sacrifice of Christ. "For if by the offence of the one the many died (*ἀπέθανον*), much more God's grace and the gift by grace, the grace, viz. of the one man, Jesus Christ, abounded (*ἐπερίσσευσεν*) to (= superabundantly extended to) the many. Yea, not as by one when he sinned (or, 'owing to his sin') are we to measure that gracious gift; for the judgment (*i.e.* the liability to punishment) arose from one (when he sinned, or 'owing to his sin') entailing, or tending to, (*εἰς*) condemnation (of him and all his posterity), but the gracious gift from many offences (of his posterity) entailing, or tending to, (*εἰς*) the rectification or neutralization of such offences (*δικαίωμα*, which Aristotle, an impartial witness at all events, expressly defines "*τὸ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἀδικήματος*." *Eth. Nicom.* vi. 10) For if by the offence of the one, death reigned (*ἐβασίλευσεν*) by the one, much more shall the recipients of this more abundant grace and freely-given righteousness reign in life by the one, Jesus Christ. Consequently then, as by one offence [judgment extended] to all men to (*εἰς*) condemnation, so also by one rectification of that offence (*δικαίωματος*) [the free-gift extended] to all men to (*εἰς*) a life-giving justification. For precisely as (*ὡσπερ*) by the disobedience of the one man the many were made sinners (*i.e.*, as Chrysostom explains, and the context apparently requires, *ὑπεύθυνοι κολάσει*) so also by the obedience of the one the many shall be [sc. on the day of judgment] accounted righteous."

Thus does the Apostle establish the broad and equal justice of God by the doctrine of the Atonement, extending (potentially) to ALL who suffered by Adam's sin; and in the very process disproves the charge of injustice, or want of faithfulness (*πίστις*) toward His covenant-people, who with a truly Calvinistic injustice imagined themselves, by virtue of that covenant, entitled to 'irrespective' justification and eternal life. Nay more, that very knowledge of the law, which they regarded as one of their justifying privileges, increased their culpability, rendering them in a still higher degree "*ὑπόδικοι τῷ Θεῷ*." "For the law entered that the transgression might abound." . . . [Whether *ἵνα* be taken here as final or illative affects the argument in no degree]. But then, the just equipoise, or equal justice of God, is here also

maintained, for if sin thus abounded, yet grace much more abounded."

It is only becoming to use all possible caution and moderation when dealing with an argument which has been so thoroughly and intensely studied, and so variously understood by professed critics. With extreme diffidence, therefore, I here repeat, in a more compendious form, the opinion I have expressed in the Text. Taking into account the general drift of the Epistle, and the special errors combatted in it, I believe our legitimate deduction to be, that the obedience of the second Adam superabundantly neutralized both the original disobedience of the first Adam, and the depravity resulting therefrom to his descendants; that it is thus proclaimed to be the grand *ἐπανόρθωμα* of the sins, both original and actual, of the Imperfect Being;* that by virtue of it the Judge can and will pronounce men just at the last day in regard to those sins committed involuntarily or in ignorance (cf. *Acts* xvii. 30, 31, with *Rom.* iii. 25); that it has also obtained "gifts for men"—*i. e.*, higher Spiritual help than they otherwise could have enjoyed. Now there are obviously two extremes to which the Apostle's doctrine may be pushed. The one, the Universalist, which holds that all men shall be absolutely justified at the last day; the other, the Calvinistic, that the merits of the atonement shall be absolutely restricted to a few. By absolutely, I mean, in both instances, "irrespectively" of their own moral agency on earth. Both these extremes appear to me to contradict the general teaching of the Epistle. The Universalist, because of Paul's solemn denunciation of a future judgment, in which some shall be visited with indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish; the Calvinistic, because he attributes that punishment to a God who is no respecter of persons,—who, however He may connive at sins of ignorance or irresponsible weakness, in the Gospel commands every man to repent,—to forsake the Jewish delusion of arbitrary election, and to obey that "law of faith" which involves obedience to the

* How it can be so I cannot remotely conjecture, the regeneration of the imperfect species being to me as inscrutable as its generation by the Perfect Being.

teaching of Christ,—*i. e.*, the “doing of that which is good,” the “walking in the steps of Abraham,” the “bringing forth of fruits meet for repentance.”

The Universalist, I candidly admit, may urge against this view the Apostle’s unconditional statement that all men shall be justified freely at the last day by the sacrifice of Christ, and others of a similar kind; the Calvinist, the equally unconditional declaration that whom God foreknew he predestinated, in contrast with others, to be conformed to the image of His Son. But neither of these statements, if interpreted unconditionally, can by any exercise of ingenuity be reconciled either with the other, or with those numerous passages which assert the freedom of man to accept or reject the proffered salvation. It seems therefore the most candid exegesis to accept these latter passages *as supplying the requisite condition* for the harmonizing of the others, and therefore to infer that while the mysterious sacrifice of Christ sufficiently, yea more than sufficiently, atoned for all the sins, *both actual and original*, of Adam and his posterity, *and obtained for them the gift of the Holy Spirit*, yet the benefit thereof in the last great day of account shall be confined to those who, hearing the true nature of God in the Gospel message, obeyed from the heart the doctrine therein delivered; and those who, *not* having heard that message, yet obeyed the law of God so far as it was otherwise known to them, and their natural depravity allowed.

This, I may further state, is the only view of the Atonement (as far as my poor judgment goes) which recognizes the world-wide extent of the *opus operatum* on the one side, and the reality of the human personality on the other. If the accepting or rejecting so great a salvation rests ultimately with the moral agent, then, no doubt, the Pantheistic difficulty meets us of a finite co-existing with an Infinite Will, and man seems to arrogate to himself an initiative causal power; if however, on the other hand, man does *not* possess this power,—if the finite will is an illusion,—then not only does the Pantheistic difficulty remain (as we have seen) still unsolved, but some shocking consequences irresistibly ensue. For then the Revelation of a future judgment by Jesus Christ, inseparably associated by St. Paul with the fun-

damental truths of Christianity, becomes—what I would rather not express in words.

Note 29, page 193.—This is a point upon which nearly all commentators are agreed. All the Apostle was concerned to prove was that the claim to sinlessness, no matter by whom urged, was groundless.

Note 30, page 194.—*Rom.* viii. 30. The sense of the word “glorified” here is sufficiently determined by a comparison of *ch.* ix. 4. See Bp. Browne, *Expos.* xxxix. *Articles*, p. 430.

Note 31, page 194.—Cf. *James*, ii. 31.

Note 32, page 195.—It was obviously the Apostle’s intention to refute the Jewish objectors thus from the very Scriptures on the possession of which they relied so much as a proof of the favour of Jehovah.

Note 33, page 196.—Cf. the following note of Alford on *Rom.* iii. 23, 24 (“for all sinned, being justified freely by God’s grace”). “δικαιοῦμενοι agrees with πάντες without any ellipsis. It is not necessary, in the interpretation, that the subjects of πάντες and δικαιοῦμενοι should be in matter of fact strictly commensurate: ‘all have sinned, all are (must be, *if justified*) justified freely, &c.’” The italics are his own. More objectionable, if possible, is his comment on *Rom.* v. 19, *sq.* Such (apparent) disingenuousness seems to justify the following severe criticism of an able writer: “Alford’s comment upon this verse is, from a logical point of view, perfectly outrageous. . . . He charges the Apostle with having deliberately employed a grave logical fallacy, in a treatise confessedly argumentative.”—*Essay on Eternal Punishment* by the Rev. W. Barlow, F. T. C. D., p. 77, *note*.

I have exemplified the statement in the Text from Alford, not because his method of dealing with such passages is at all singular, but mainly because of the well-earned authority his commentary enjoys, and partly, too, because from the “Dean of Canterbury” better things might have been expected.

Note 34, page 197.—I would impress once more upon my readers the prominent part in the Gospel message held by the doctrine of a *future judgment*. If this judgment, then, is to be a reality, men must be, to a certain definite extent, free agents.

Note 35, page 197.—Cf. *supra*, Lect. i. p. 29, *sq.*

Note 36, page 198.—That there are *intellectual* difficulties in the Gospel Scheme, and especially in the doctrine of a Personal God, very few will be bold enough to deny. But we have seen, I think, that whatever the value, and how real soever the force, of Spinoza's "intellectual cognition" may be *in its own sphere*, there is yet a problem which has completely baffled it; that it is *not* an universal solvent; that it leaves unreduced and unfused the still co-existent Infinite and Finite.

Note 37, page 199.—Pantheism, rejecting Experience, pronounces the moral and emotional constituents of man to be unreal and illusory. But then Pantheism is itself convicted of the most transparent self-delusion in attempting thus to disallow the claims of Experience, and deny the reality of her *data*, whether internal or external.

Note 38, page 199.—Speculative opinions are of no real value or importance to a man except as tending to influence his practice. The true practical tendency of such a system as Neology can be best (if not solely) ascertained by tracing it back to its first principles. The ethically perilous character of these principles in the present day it would be difficult indeed to exaggerate.

Note 39, page 199.—Cf. 2 *Tim.* ii. 14–20. Here, be it remembered, occurs the verse which I have quoted more than once (*supra*, note 28), in illustration of the real meaning of "baptism," or "faith, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ." The prevalent incredulity as to the doctrine of the resurrection implying a future *judgment* with the consequent necessity for *all men*—whether Jews or Gentiles—to depart from iniquity, is sharply reproved by St. Peter also in his 2nd Ep. ch. iii. 4, 7.

Note 40 and 41, page 200.—The extracts here given are from the Westminster Review. The former, I believe, I may assign to Mr. George Long. I regret much that I have not the Number at hand to refer to.

Note 42.—I do not believe that there can be for man a thought more solemn than this. To know the awful responsibility with which he has been charged; to feel that as a sound once gene-

rated never dies—echoed for ever and for ever through “the illimitable volumes of æther,”—so a wilful act, desire, imagination, perishes not, but leaves its eternal impress upon the moral organism. To me this seems to be the teaching of Scripture, as it is undoubtedly the analogical teaching of Experience. To others Scripture appears to teach that the present life of man is but a meaningless and phenomenal episode, the mere hypocrisy of a predestined drama, its $\eta\theta\eta$ as its $\mu\tilde{\nu}\theta\omicron\varsigma$ alike the arbitrary creations of the Eternal Poet. Which of these views is the true one shall not, I suppose, be known before the coming of that “great and notable day of the Lord,” when the secrets of all hearts shall be revealed.

Note 43, page 202.—The generation and regeneration of the imperfect Being by the Perfect are to me corresponding mysteries. When regarded as such, and further as (potentially) co-extensive, we may perhaps find some clue toward their apprehension in the possession by the imperfect Being of distinct and real cause-power. For we can readily apprehend the necessity to virtue (in its true sense) of trial, which again necessitates—to our apprehension—not alone free will but also the possibility of not exercising that will aright, *i. e.* an imperfect nature. Granting then that in the very essence of virtue there is involved the possibility of sin, we can dimly conjecture the reason for the generation of man with an imperfect and sin-generating nature, and thus again for his regeneration by the free and unmerited mercy of “the Redeemer of the World.”

If, on the other hand, man has no distinct causal power, no moral freedom, then indeed his creation is not a kosmos but a chaos.

Note 44, page 202.—We might almost describe the functions of “Faith” in its New Testament usage as threefold—intellectual, moral, and emotional. By the first it assents upon adequate evidence to the objective truth of transcendental facts, such as the Resurrection and the Atonement; by the second it adopts as a rule of life the precepts of the Risen Lord and future Judge; by the third it attains a closer and still increasing union and communion with Him. But then the operation of these three functions is mutual and interpenetrating.

Shall I be thought presumptuous in ascribing most of the bitter fruits of theological controversy to the radical error of dogmatically asserting the absolute supremacy of some one of these three Functions?—of dissevering these essentially interwoven elements somewhat as Kant dissociated the homogeneous constituents of human reason?

APPENDIX A.

Extract from M. Saisset's criticism of the Hamiltonian Theodicy.

—*Modern Pantheism*, vol. ii. 66, sq.

As a general thesis, as truly God is incomprehensible in His essence, so truly He is accessible in His manifestations. I ascend to Him from the bosom of my own imperfections; and knowing that all that is real and positive in the imperfect being has its reason in the Perfect Being, it is enough for me to conceive aright the communicable powers of the Divine nature, to conceive them in all their plenitude under the forms of immensity and eternity. But, I am told, this is just what cannot be done. You forget that the human mind can conceive nothing that is not in space and time; therefore, to say that the attributes of God must be conceived under the form of immensity and eternity, is to say that they are in fact inconceivable. I acknowledge that space and time are the forms of imperfect existence, that is why reason can only conceive it under this double condition; but I say, that reason has other objects, that while imposing on all the beings in the universe the laws of time and space, she acknowledges herself independent of them. The proper objects of reason may be characterized as universality, eternity, and infinity, so that to submit reason and its objects to the laws of space and time, is to deny reason and truth. Can we not conceive mathematical truths, and moral truths, as eternal and universal? Do we not know that before there were men injustice was an evil, and justice a good, as before there were circles the radii of a circle were equal? You will say that I, who think these things, think them in time, that if geometry be eternal, the geometrician is not so. True, but the privilege of this geometrician of a day, is to conceive distinctly eternity from the bosom of time; is to place himself beyond the finite by the contemplation of universal truths; is to

perceive above the universe, beyond time and space, the divine type of the Eternal Geometrician.

If it be said that we cannot understand an active intelligence which is not subject to the conditions of time, I deny it. Thought in man, no doubt, is prevision, is recollection, is to reason, to reflect, to abstract, to pay tribute to time in every way. But these are only discursive operations, that is to say, means of assisting the weakness of our intuition. The essential of reason is intuition *sui conscia*. To see and to be aware that we see, is the type of knowledge, is the divine model of which human thought is a feeble image. Thought in itself is then independent. Not only it has nothing in it repugnant to the nature of God, but it expresses, with a singular precision and clearness, the incomparable perfection, and the radiant beauty of that nature.

At this rate, I am asked, if human reason can transport into God all that there is of real and positive in imperfect beings, why choose this and reject that? Why not transport into God extension and duration, time and space, which are also surely something? I reply that time and space are not real things, but ideal things; and as to duration and extension, I do not dispute that they are founded in reality, but they must not be confounded with the effective properties of beings. They have only an accidental and relative value, the proof of which is, that they cannot be thought as absolute. When you conceive time as absolute you must cut off its succession, and so destroy it. On the contrary, when you conceive thought as absolute, you only take away its limits; you conceive it as a perfect intuition, that is to say, in all the purity of its essence.

Hear Hamilton and his disciples, they will tell you that the law of thought and being is determination, and consequently, negation and relation. A thing only exists on one condition, which is to be so and so, and to be conceived in such and such a relation with him who thinks. Thence it follows, that every thinkable object must contain some negation, for, in order to be this, it cannot be that—some difference, for in order to have such a property, it must differ from that which has quite another property—and some relation, for, in order that I may think of

an object, it must be present and within my reach. This being established, the Absolute, by its very definition, is unthinkable and impossible; in fact, the Absolute is that which eludes all negation, all difference, and all relation. If I do not mistake, the whole system of these reasonings rests on an error common to scepticism and Pantheism, which formerly misled, and still deceives, many a superior mind. This error consists in imagining that every determination is a negation. '*Omnis determinatio negatio est,*' says Hamilton after Spinoza. Nothing can be falser or more arbitrary than this principle. It arises from the confusion of two things essentially different, namely, the limits of a being, and its determinative and constitutive characteristics. I am an intelligent being, and my intelligence is limited; these are two facts equally certain. The possession of intelligence is the constitutive characteristic of my being, which distinguishes me from the brute being. The limitation imposed on my intellect, which can only see a small number of truths at a time, is my limit, and this is what distinguishes me from the Absolute Being, from the Perfect Intelligence which sees all truths at a single glance. That which constitutes my imperfection is not, certainly, my being intelligent; therein, on the contrary, lies the strength, the richness, and the dignity of my being. What constitutes my weakness and my nothingness is, that this intelligence is enclosed in a narrow circle. Thus, inasmuch as I am intelligent, I participate in being and perfection; inasmuch as I am only intelligent within certain limits, I am imperfect. It follows from this very simple analysis that determination and negation, far from being identical, differ from each other as much as being and nothing. According as a being has more or less determinations, qualities, and specific characteristics, it occupies a rank more or less elevated in the scale of existence. Thus, in proportion as you suppress qualities and determinations, you sink from the animal to the vegetable, from the vegetable to brute matter. On the other hand, exactly in proportion as the nature of beings is complicated, in proportion as their bodies are encircled with new functions and organs, as their intellectual and moral faculties begin to be displayed, as more delicate senses are added to their grosser senses, to sensation, memory, to memory, imagination,

then the superior faculties, reasoning, and reason, and will, you rise nearer and nearer to man, the most complicated being, the most determined and the most perfect in creation.

Now let us hear our sceptics. They say the Absolute excludes all limits, and consequently all determination. I reply, the Absolute has no limits, it is true, that is to say, that His being and the powers that are in Him are full, complete, infinite, and eternal; but far from these determinations limiting His being, they characterise and constitute it.

Does not every determination, say they, imply relation? By no means. If you call determination that which in imperfect beings belongs to their original limitation, such as their duration, their material figure, their distance, I agree that these determinations are relative, and that an absolute duration, an absolute extension, an absolute distance are contradictory ideas; but if you come to intrinsic characters, to the constitutive qualities of beings—such as thought and activity, there is nothing here which implies a limit or a boundary—nothing, consequently, which is repugnant to the nature of the Absolute.

What, says Hamilton, is not the Absolute one, and does not thought imply diversity? Does it not suppose the difference between the subject which thinks and the object thought? not to mention several other conditions. I reply, you confound the real unity of God with the abstract unity of your imaginary Absolute. Doubtless, thought—living thought, real thought—implies the difference of subject and object. In this manner there is diversity in the divine thought; but this variety does not exclude unity, for in God the subject and the object are identical. A perfect being who thinks himself is not one in the sense of the unity of abstraction. He lives, he revolves upon himself; he has in him a sort of spiritual motion. But as this consciousness that the Perfect Being possesses, this contemplation that He enjoys, supposes no separation between the subject and the object, no disproportion, no interval, no effort, no succession; there is nothing in it opposed to the most rigorous unity. Hamilton proceeds: You agree that the essential condition of thought is the distinction of the subject and the object. The subject lays itself down on one side as the one who thinks,

and it is opposed to the object which is thought. It follows that the Absolute escapes the grasp of the human mind; for the human mind thinking the Absolute, as the subject places itself outside it, and as the object places it in opposition to itself. Thus it destroys the Absolute. I grant that when a man thinks about God he makes himself distinct from Him, but to make oneself distinct from Him is not to be separated from Him. I think God as different from myself; that is not to think Him as finite, as limited by me, or relative to me. I think God as other than myself, but as the reason of my being. I distinguish myself from Him, but, at the same time, I link myself to Him.

You tell me that Schelling has admitted the absurdity of such an intuition, that he has confessed that the notion of the Absolute under the condition of consciousness, is a contradiction, and that the only method of knowing the Absolute is to be oneself absorbed into it. I give you up the intellectual intuition of Schelling and the Absolute of the Pantheists, which is an undetermined Absolute. I admit that such an Absolute is in contradiction with the fundamental law of thought and being, that it is unthinkable to the human mind and to itself. But then, this is but a vain abstraction, not the determined God, not the living God, who is intelligence, truth, and the eternal consciousness of thought.

You triumph when you see M. Schelling compelled, in order to justify his idea of the absolute, to invoke some strange ecstatic intuition, and to fall into a wild mysticism. But you are hastening yourself to an extremity quite as dangerous, quite as far from common sense. For after having proved that the Absolute, such as you understand Him, is indeterminable, you conclude that he is absolutely unintelligible. What does this conclusion signify? In plain words it signifies that the notion of God is absurd. You begin by telling us that the human mind must believe in something unconditioned and Absolute, that the existence of God is consequently certain, that common sense has a reason for being religious, that all religions have their foundation in truth, and now you will tell us that human thought can only think the relative, that the relative only can exist and be thought,

and that all determination of the Absolute is contradictory. Then, not only all the philosophical systems that have tried to explain God have stopped below their ideal, but the ideal itself is a wild chimera. Not only every religious symbol is incomplete and insufficient, but every religious symbol is an extravagance. We may no longer say that human kind makes to itself symbols of God more or less pure; the very idea of a religious symbol is a contradiction; consequently all religion is false and chimerical. Besides, how are we to estimate the value of these different symbols? There must be a criterion. You say that the symbols of one religion are infinitely richer than those of another—nobler, more expressive, more poetical. Poetical, that is just the word; you make religion an affair of the imagination. But the judge of poetry has his eye fixed on the ideal of the beautiful; you, on the contrary—critics without a criterion—have no fixed rule to measure the beautiful any more than the good; and you are obliged to say at last that truth in matters of religion, as in matters of art, and in every order of thought, is not made for man. Then what means that divine origin, that superior destiny, which you attribute to it? The words divine and heavenly have no sense from your lips. They only call up an illusion, and, if you are right, the best service one could do to humanity would be to cure it of this illusion once for all. What is emptier than an investigation which knows that it is objectless? What more fragile than a love without hope? There is, you say, an exquisite pleasure in the search, and, besides, we need not trouble ourselves, men will be always sufficiently curious to persist in it. Yes, as long as they are believing, as long as they are persuaded that truth and goodness are not illusions. As soon as you shall have persuaded them of this, they will sink into unconsciousness and torpor.

APPENDIX B.

Extracts from J. H. STIRLING'S "Secret of Hegel."

I.

Bestimmen is to supply voice to what had previously had none. Hegel's *Bestimmung* is, then, a sort of naming of Adam; it is a process of logical determination, in which concrete determinateness, or determinate concretion, grows and grows in organized complexity up from absolute abstract indeterminateness, or from absolutely indeterminate abstraction, to a consummate Absolute.

To Hegel what is, is Thought; and the *life* of Thought can only be logical Determination, or the distinguishing (*differentiating*) of indefinite abstraction (the *beginning* of Thought) into ultimate concrete definiteness (the *end* of Thought) by means of the operation of the faculties of Thought (simple Apprehension, Judgment and Reason), to the resolution of the *Begriff* (the *an sich*, the indefinite *Universal*), through the *Ur-theil* (the *Für sich*, the separation into *particulars*, into *many*, as against *one*), and the production of the *Schluss* (the concrete *singular*), which is the *all* of Thought, Thought elevated into its ultimate and complete concretion as the absolute Subject (which, again, is the ultimate *An und für sich*). This is a very complete expression for the industry of Hegel. . . *Bestimmen*, then, is to *be-voice*, *articulate*, *discern into the implied constitutive variety*. . . It is the reverse of generalization; instead of evolving a *summun genus*, it involves a *species infima*, or rather an *individuum*—not, indeed, *infimum*, but *summun*. The one abstracts from *difference* and holds by *identity*; the other abstracts from *identity* and holds by *difference*. *Bestimmen* is thus to produce, not logical extension, but logical comprehension (*Inhalt*), logical determination; it adds *differentiæ* or significates. *Bestimmtheit* is a *differentiatum*, *specificatum*, *qualifi-*

catum; . . . and, in the text before us, definiteness, tangibility, recognizableness, and that is always due to Quality.

Being, *Seyn*, must have no sense of personality attached to it, as is so common in England; nor, indeed, any sense of anything. The *common* element in the whole chaos of everything that *is*, is Being. *Seyn* in Germany (often in Hegel himself) means the abstraction of *sensuous Isness*; but here it is more general; it is the quality of *Isness*, *pur et simple*. . . In short, Being, as Being, must be seen to be a solid simple without inside, outside, centre or sides; it is to be taken *an ihm selber*, absolutely abstractly; it is just the unit into which all variety, being reflected, has disappeared; it is the *an sich* of such variety.

Immediate, *Unmittelbar*, means *directly present*. Being, then, is just what is indefinitely immediate to us.

Essentity, *Wesen*, is inner or true, or noumenal Being, as opposed to outer, sensuous, phenomenal Being. It is the *principle* of what *is* or *shows*—*Inbeing* or *Principal Being*. . . Absolutely abstract Being seems self-substantial, and awakens no thought of a *whence* or *what*; it is thus free from any determination which it might receive by being related to Essence; in this absolute generalization, indeed, *Seyn* and *Wesen* have coalesced and become indistinguishable.

In itself (*an sich*) means *in itself* virtually, *impliciter* or potentially; the *δύναμις* of Aristotle. . . . *An sich* implies potential latency. *An ihm selber*, irrespective selfness, self-dependant overtiness; *an ihm* such overtiness connected with, and equivalent to, such latency.

There-Being, or *Here-Being*, is the translation of *Daseyn*. *Existence* might have answered here, but that it is reserved by Hegel for a much later finding. . . . A German means by *Daseyn* this mortal sojourn; Hegel, the scientific abstract thought employed in such a phrase;—the quality of sublunarity, definite existentiality, with a (thus) implied reference to other or others;—the quasi-permanent moment of Being that manifests itself between *Coming to be* and *Ceasing to be*.

Being-for-self is the literal rendering of *Fürsichseyn*. It means the reference of all the constituents of an individuality, of a personality, of a self, to that self's punctual unity. It is the focus

in the draught of the whole huge whirlpool—that whereby its Many are One. . . *Für sich* is the Latin *per se*, and something more. . . By *Fürsichseyn*, then, we are to understand a being *by* one's own self, and *for* one's own self.—Vol. i. pp. 2-8.

II.

The speculations peculiar to Hume generally, and more especially those which bear on Causality, constitute the *Grundlage*, the mother-matter, of the products of Kant.

Now, in the relation of Causality there are two factors—the antecedent and the consequent; the cause and the effect.

Take any cause by itself and examine it *d priori*, and it will remain self-identical only; any mean of transition to another—to aught else—is undiscoverable. Nor are we any wiser should we investigate the matter *d posteriori*; that the effect follows the cause we see; but *why* it follows—the precise mean of the nexus, the exact and single copula—this we see not at all. Causality is thus evidently parallel with *Matters of Fact*, and cannot pretend to the same authority as what again are called *Relations of Ideas*. That a straight line is the shortest possible from any *here* to any *there*, I *see* to be universally and necessarily true—from Relations of Ideas; but that wood burns and ice melts I see to be true only as Matters of Fact, which *are* so, but *might*, so far as any reason for the state of the fact is concerned, be otherwise. . . . Causality, then, as presenting itself always in Matters of Fact, and as exhibiting, neither *d priori* nor *d posteriori*, any relation of ideas, cannot claim any authority of necessity. Why, then, on seeing a cause do I anticipate an effect, and *vice versa*? I can find no ground for my anticipation but *custom*, or the *association* of things in *expectation* which I have found once or more *associated in fact*; for so habitual becomes the association that even *once* may be found at times to suffice. Thus far Hume.

Now Kant steps in and says, this nexus suggested by Hume, between a cause and its effect, is of a subjective nature only; it is in me, not in them; and consequently inadequate to the facts. That this unsupported paper falls to the ground—the reason of

this is not in me surely, but in the objects themselves; and the reason of my expectation to find the same connexion of events is not due to something I find in myself, but to something I find in them. True, I cannot detect the *objective* copula; true, I have before me only contingent matter, or matters of fact; nevertheless the nexus is such that mere custom is inadequate to explain it. It introduces an element of *invariability*, and custom evidently cannot reach so far as that; so that the question remains, why are the objects invariably connected in one expectation? why is the relation of causality as necessary and as universal in its validity as any axiom of mathematics, as any one of those very Relations of Ideas from which it has but this moment been expressly excluded? *Every change (effect) has its cause*; this is a truth of no merely probable nature; we say, indeed, we see that cork floats, but it might not; but we cannot say we see that change has its cause, but it might not; on the contrary, we feel, we know, that change *must* have its cause, and that *always*. Now, the source of this universality and necessity plainly cannot be any mere subjective condition of ourselves, any mere anticipation through habit. . . Apodictic matter, impossible *à posteriori*, must be *à priori*, and *à priori*, too, different from that of Hume. He had talked, indeed, of examining a cause *à priori* in search of its effect, but this *à priori* is *à priori* only as regards the effect; any knowledge thus gained would be the result of experience, and, as such, *à posteriori*. The true *à priori* must be anterior to *all* experience, and plainly must lie elsewhere than in sensation. Now, it is this *elsewhere than in sensation* that gives the clue to the possibility of an element of necessity *subjective* as in us, but of an *objective* VALIDITY, and of an *objective* RÔLE. . . The contributions of sensation are wholly subjective in this sense, that they are incapable of communication and of comparison. Those of the understanding bring their own evidence; an evidence the same to all of us; it can be universally communicated, universally compared. Now, a validity of this nature may be correctly named *objective*, for it is *independent of every subject*. *A priori* principles, then, will be peculiar to the understanding only; *subjective* in that they have their source in the mind, in us, but *objective*, in that they possess a universal and

necessary validity independent of every subject; and objective, perhaps, also in this, that though subjective *in origin*, they yet, as possessing an objective rôle, present themselves *with* and *in* objects *in every event of actual experience*. Thus we can see the possibility of an apodictic element, both pure and mixed. The whole business was opened, in fact, when we opposed sensuous affection to intellectual function, and assigned the *à posteriori* to the one, the *à priori* to the other.

This very sentence, indeed, is the key to German Philosophy; it is a single expression for the operations as well of Kant as of Hegel. German Philosophy, as we all know, begins with the question: How are synthetic judgments *à priori* possible? To this Kant's answer—and the answer is his system—is, Intellectual Function with the *à priori* sensuous forms, or sensuous *species*—Space and Time; Hegel's—implying in his case a system also—Intellectual Function alone. (Note.—The antithesis of *matters of fact* and *relations of ideas* is virtually identical with that of *sensuous affection* and *intellectual function*. Hume shut himself out from relations of ideas by erroneously seeing (in Causality, &c.) matters of fact only. Kant was driven by the *evidence* or peculiar *validity* of causality to what was *in effect* relations of ideas. Hegel, *in effect*, has only cleared relations of ideas into their *system*; that crystal skeleton which—the whole *truth* of the concrete, of sensuous affection, of matters of fact,—underlies and supports the same. Of this, so to speak, invisible skeleton Causality is but one of the bones.

But a difficulty remains. “Assuming the function of Reason and Consequent to be the mental archetype of Causality, how are we to connect it with contingent matter, and reduce it into a relation which—*within* us as Reason and Consequent—comes to us actually from *without* in the shape of innumerable real causes and effects? This most important—so suggestive to Hegel—of Kant's industry is wholly unknown in England. By Sir W. Hamilton, Kant's theory is relegated to that class which names Causality only a special and peculiar mental principle and nothing more. Of the deduction of the principle from the very structure of the mind itself, and of the laborious succession of links whereby it is demonstrated to add itself *to* outward facts

and come back to us *with* the same, there is not one word in Hamilton. No *Ahnung*, not even a *boding* of the true state of the case seems ever to have dawned upon him. It is amusing to observe the self-assured Sir William fooling himself to the top of his bent, with his sharp distinctions and well-poised divisions about Kant violating the law of parsimony, postulating a new and express principle, while *he*, &c. &c. !!! Hamilton, however, introduces into his own theory (!) a certain relativity of Time, which (but with some claim to coherency and sense) belongs to the theory of Kant also. . . In fact, the desire to incorporate an inner law with outer bodies—especially in such a reference as Causality—necessarily led Kant to a consideration of Space and Time; the result being that Space and Time, though *perceptive* objects, and so far *sensuous*, were *d priori*, and so far intellectual—appertinent to the mind itself. And thus there was *d priori* or native to the mind, not only function, but affection; thus function had affection in its clutch; thus Unity had a Many on which to exercise its energy. An *à priori* schema was thus formed, into which matter from without (empirical, *i. e.*, or *à posteriori*) had to fit itself, to the eventual production of the formed, of the rational, of the regulated—universal context of Experience. . . . In the end, the affections of sense [unsystematized and contingent] were found to be construed *into* the formed universe *through* the *à priori* perceptive spectra, and *under* the synthetic energy of the various functions of apperception. Lastly, the various syntheses of these functions were named Categories.

Causality then is but a function of apperception, externalized into and coming back to us from, or with, actual outer objects, through the media, sensuous but *à priori*, or *à priori* but sensuous, of Space and Time. Now observe what the world has become! It is now wholly in us; but we to it are quite formal; we are but the subjectivity that actualizes it into life; *it* is function and affection, *it* is the *matter* within us. Abstracting from ourselves then, this matter of function and affection remains, and the world is this: There are intellectual syntheses (Categories), there are Space and Time, there are empirical Affections. But, narrowly looked at—and this is a consequence, though by himself never observed, of Kant's own industry—

empirical affections, as well as Space and Time, are but externalizations of the Categories, are but outwardly what the Categories are inwardly. The Categories, then, are truly *what is*; the essence of the universe; in them we have to look for the ultimate principles, and the ultimate principle of everything that is. Here Hegel received the torch from the hands of Kant, and proceeds to carry it further. *Intellectual Function* is the secret then. It would almost seem as if the work of Hegel and Kant were but a new analysis of the human mind, an identification of this mind and its constituent elements with, their enlargement to, the mind and elements of God; so that creation should be seen to be but the external counterpart of these, its external archetype and archetypes. And though the uninitiated must go deeper into details, he will do well to remember that the ultimate proposition of Hegel seems to be this: *To know all the Functions which affections obey, and to demonstrate the presence of the former everywhere in the latter, would be to know the Absolute, and to complete Philosophy.*

Of the four capital Titles, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality, Hegel regards the first three as objective and material, the last as subjective and formal. The subjectivity which Modality thus involves, appears a higher stage, and he scrutinizes the objective categories first. In Kant they are deficient in an *architectonic* oneness, we instinctively refuse to accept them as the inner and genetic archetypes of all that is. Could we, however, trace them up to their necessary source, and retrace them into all their ramifications, we should have the crystal of the universe, God and the thoughts of God before the birth of time or a single finite intelligence, or even entity. The universe would simply be Thought, in its two reciprocal sides, inner and outer. *Philosophy would then be Logic*, for to it the all of things would then be reduced. Nay, Logic would be the Absolute, Logic would supplant and replace Theology itself. The chaos presented in this universe to ordinary intelligence would shapingly collapse into the law and order of a single life—an intelligible life—a life in which we should severally participate, *modally*. *The Substance, Attribute, and Modus of Spinoza would thus be realized*, would thus have flesh on their bones, and be alive and

actual. . . . In Kant the one of the Categories is Apperception, Judgment; but Judgment is only a single moment of Logic; two others remain—Simple Apprehension and Reason; and of these Kant has wholly disregarded the former, and partially the latter. But man, so far as he is a Spirit, is created in the likeness of God. And Logic is the crystal of man's thought, and therefore of the thought of God, and therefore also of that universe which is but the *realization*, the other side, of God's thought. If then Logic be the principle of all, we cannot disregard Simple apprehension, that *moment* we must take account of, as well as the other two. But, further, the three moments must be fused organically into a concrete unit, the Absolute itself. Here we must guard against approaching too nearly to the Kantian stand-point. He held by Apperception and a *subjective idealism*. He postulated an elsewhere, which, received into our organs, only so and so affected us owing to the constitution peculiar, not to it (the elsewhere, the thing-in-itself) but, to them (the organs). Knowledge thus can be only phenomenal. But we eliminate subjectivity in the first instance, and in the three objective Categories discover *what is*. Hence we cannot *begin* with Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, for these, as named, concern subjectivity. [involve *primâ facie* a subjective element?] Quantity, Quality, and Relation, are indeed objective, and all things submit to their forms. But the moments of Logic in the form of moments are too subjective to serve a similar purpose; in such form they seem alien to things, and will not answer *as a beginning* though they constitute the true rhythm of all things. Now the Kantian Categories are plainly the result of generalisation; and he himself calls them notions, *Stammbegriffe*, root-notions. What we want, then, is an ultimate generalization, a notion of notions, a final abstraction *to coincide in results* with the logical movement (which we have seen to be the fundamental principle) and to *constitute the first form* of the logical pulse.

But the Categories are, so to speak, *concrete* abstractions; Relation, *e. g.* possesses substance, causality, reciprocity; and so of the others. The ultimate notion, then, must have a filling of its own, and that the universal of the others. Now, the

words *identity* and *diversity* can be used to describe the first two moments of the matter of *all* the Titles. Under Relation, *e. g.* *Substance* is but the supporting *identity* of the all of things, while *Causality* is but the *difference* in this identity—implying invariably the first and the second, the one and the other. Nay, in the *Titles* themselves, not alone in their *moments*, a like relation is discoverable. The Quality of anything is just its own identity, the Quantity its own difference. The cabbage is just its own identity (and this lies in its quality), but its growth from day to day (Quantity) constitutes its difference. (Here we see that Kant is wrong in placing Quantity before Quality—the latter being the inner reality, the former but the outer difference). In identity and diversity then, we have wider universals for the first two moments of all the Kantian triads. And the relation of the third moment in each of these triads to the first and second suggest the third moment for the Hegelian. To take the same example, Reciprocity or communion seems to contain in its one virtue both that of Substantiality and that of Causality. These Kantian triads, again, have been derived from certain Logical triads which also manifest the same property. Disjunctive, *e. g.* involves a virtue at once Categorical and Hypothetic. The third moment, then, is always related to the first and second, and a closer inspection of the relation between the latter shows it to be one of contrariety and opposition; causality, for instance, involves reference to dependence or deviation, and that is the opposite of substantiality. Quality, again, as inner is opposed to Quantity as outer. The three moments are thus always interconnected as Yes, No, and Both. This movement of identity, opposition, and reconciliation of both in a new identity is plainly the Notion of Notions, or *the* Notion. And quite as plainly does it coincide with the logical Movement. The same relation but repeats itself in the triad Simple Apprehension, Judgment and Reason (*Begriff*, *Urtheil*, *Schluss*); Judgment always says No to the awards of Sense, while Reason reconciles them in a new and higher truth. What we see throughout the Universe is but the logical movement repeating itself in various forms.

We now have clearly ascertained both the principle and its

proper pulse. But how are we to set it in action to the production of a system? In the Categories we have seen so many triads, whose moments collapse, in each instance, into a trinity (trinity). Let us but find the first trinity, and the sequence of trinities ought to flow spontaneously and rhythmically up to the ultimate trinity, which is the consummation of the whole, and then our task is complete.

Hegel found a clue to this in perceiving that the process is one of Logical Determination, where, necessarily, the First is the absolute abstraction, and the last the absolute conviction. Again, both of these will be but forms of the absolute principle, the notion, which—quantitatively named, but with a qualitative force—is the reciprocal unity, or the tautological reciprocity of universality, particularity, and singularity. Here then we have the type of the system; the First the absolute universal, the Last the absolute singular, and the Middle the absolute particular. Hegel must find accordingly the most abstract universal identity (*the genus*), the most abstract universal difference, (*the differentia*), and the most abstract universal community of identity and difference (*the species*), or however else we may name the many-named constituent moments of the Notion.

Kant tells us* that “there are two stems of human knowledge, *which arise perhaps from a common root*, as yet unknown to us, namely, Sense and Understanding; through the former objects are *given*, through the latter *thought*.” The Hegelian system is simply the co-ordination and unification of Sense and Intellect, or Sensations and Ideas (Notions), as being the one outwardly what the other is inwardly, and each the necessary reciprocal counterpart of the other. Now Kant expressly states as Categories *Daseyn* and *Nichtseyn*, and it was not difficult for Hegel (now that the Logical movement had been *realized*) to see that Being and non-being were sub-categories of Quality (which, as we have seen, is antecedent to Quantity) and that this very sub-category, *Seyn*, was itself the most abstract quality conceivable. But *Seyn* being this abstractest notion of all, his *beginning* was found. Though *the* Notion constituted *the prin-*

* K. of P. R. Introduction, *sub finem*.

ciple, he could not make the Notion in the form of Notion the beginning. The Notion itself must begin, and that under the form of *its own first moment—universality, identity, or an sich, &c.* Appearing thus, it could appear only as *the primal indefiniteness that is*—and that is pure Being. What is—call it the World, the Notion, God—if it began, could only begin in absolute indefiniteness. A beginning implies that there at once *is* and *is not*, for which the only name is pure Being,—what is, but as yet absolutely indefinitely. This is the true *Begriff* of the *Vorstellung*—primordial Chaos. A *fundamen*, a *ὑλη*, a *Grundlage*, a mother-matter, is always postulated by the *Vorstellung*; but this postulate translated into the language of thought proper, amounts to *the indefiniteness that is*, or pure Being.

But if pure Being be the first, according to the law of the Notion its own opposite, or non-Being, must be the second, and the third must be a new simple that concretely contains both,—*species* of which the first is the *genus*, the second the *differentia*; but this here is just *Werden*, for every Becoming at once *is* and *is not*, or is at once Being and non-Being. Here, then, is the first Triad, the absolutely germinal cell; we cannot go beyond the absolute *indefiniteness* that at once *is* and *is not*, but *becomes*. A *substrate* is thus doubly unnecessary. In the first place it is with Logic we are concerned, with thoughts only, not things. Thought is, and Thought is all that is (the Notion) and the first form was indefiniteness, but an indefiniteness that still was. Secondly, there actually *is*, of this there can be no doubt; there is the Sun, the belts of Saturn, Barclay's porter and what not; well the beginning of all that—if ever there was a beginning—must have been in an *indefinite one, i. e.* in pure Being. Hegel thus discovered the Notion itself, and also the absolutely initial form, not only of that Notion, but even of the facts around us as any peasant may see them!

Again, from the *realization* of Logic, it followed that Logic would be the vital pulse in every sphere, and history itself would present in its process only a development of Logic. Hegel finds this fully verified, and that in a special degree in the history of Logic itself. The earliest logicians accordingly he found to be engaged with Seyn, Nichtseyn, Werden, &c. Nay, more won-

derful still the process was verified up to his own times, for *the Notion* itself only emerged *an sich* (the Moment of Simple Apprehension) in Kant, became *für sich* or differentiated in Fichte and Schelling (the moment of *Ur-theil*) and transformed itself to *an und für sich* (the Moment of *Schluss*) in Hegel (!!!).

Whatever is, *is*, or is Being; that is, Being is common to everything. In this abstraction we are plainly freed from any question of an inner principle whence this Being might arise. Indefinite Being brings with it no such want; as the *materia communis* it is felt to be this principle itself. Being is just indefinitely What is; and as we know there is a—definitely What is,—we know that what indefinitely is, is just the *fundamen* and *tout-ensemble* of all that definitely is.

An sich is perhaps the best term for the initial identity or indefinite potentiality, which, if a beginning is required at all, must be attached as beginning to the Notion. . . . But, obeying the law of What is, *identity* must pass into *difference*, Simple apprehension must become judgment, the *Begriff* must sunder its be-gripped-ness into the *part*-ing (*Ur-theil*), the *an sich* must awake into *Für sich*. [This last term seems to be here inconsistently employed for “the Second moment of the universal pulse.”] . .

Nothing can only be defined as the absence of all distinguishableness, and this absence of every recognisable *discrimen* is just the absence of all particularity, and this again but the abstraction from all particularity—pure Being. Pure Seyn .∴ can be no otherwise defined than pure Nichts; they are absolutely identical. It is bootless to say nothing is nothing, but Being is something; Being is not more something than Nothing is. We admit Nothing to exist; we talk of Nothing, and of perceiving Nothing; *i. e.*, Nothing is the abstraction from every *discrimen* of particularity. But an abstraction from does not involve a destruction of any *discrimina*; they all still exist; in Nothing we have simply withdrawn into indefiniteness. This nothing, then, of ours, still implies the formed or definite world. And this is precisely the value of pure Being. In both Thought, for the nonce, has turned its back upon its own *discrimina*: for Thought is all that is, and its *discrimina* are but its own. What *is*—what *actu* is—in point of fact is—is neither one nor the

other; but everything that is, is a σύνολον, a composite, of both . . . We cannot handle Being here and Nothing there, as we might this stone or that wood; yet, both stone and wood are composites of Being and Nothing. They *are*—i. e., they participate in Being. But the stone is *not* the wood, the wood is not the stone; each, therefore, if it *is*, also is *not*. And, again, neither is for two consecutive moments the same; each is but a Werden, a Becoming. A day will come when both will have disappeared—their existence being but a momentarily changing process This, then, is the truth of Being and Nothing; neither *is*, what *is* is only their union, and that is Becoming; for Becoming is Nothing passing into Being, or Being passing into Nothing.

But while Being and Nothing are thus absolutely identical, they are still absolutely different. In Being, Thought is *willingly*, in Nothing *unwillingly*, in abstraction from all particularity.

Thought is well-pleased to find itself in Being; but in indefiniteness (Nothing) it is uneasy, craves to see and know its own *discrimina*; and this evolution of Thought's own self to Thought's own self, what is it but the Universe? Thus it is that Thought remains not indefinite, but presses forward, according to its own rhythm, to the revelations of History and Experience. And here we have a curt formula for Hegel's phrase: "Reason making itself *für sich* that which it is *an sich*."

Observe here that the second moment of the one throb, (corresponding to the Ur-theil) is one of pain. The evolution of existence is but the Absolute in travail. Daseyn is but a continual birth—and birth is pain. Hence, infer that in life, as life, repose cannot be found; but only in elevation over the finite particulars which emerge, or rather in their reference to that affirmation of which they are but the Negative . . . That there should be pain in Nothing, then, and that this pain should be the fount of movement we can now understand. The difference between being and Nothing is that the one is the *implication of*, the other the *abstraction from* all particularity. And thus, though the *middle* is always the same (for this middle is the *matter held*, and that is *indefiniteness*, and precisely *identical* indefiniteness, *implication of* is the same *Inhalt* as *abstraction from* all particularity) yet

the extremes differ. For Being and Nothing are, as it were, two-sided. In one side Being is nothing; in the other—definite existence being always involved—it is Being, and so with Nothing. In short each constitutes the middle and the extremes just specified, but in the former the one extreme is accentuated, in the latter the other.

III.

An accurate insight into the Kantian Categories, has taught us, that all that is is but a *form* of the one logical throb, which is the Notion. The *substantiality* of the outer world is no legitimate stumbling-block here. Thought is the organic whole of its own discrimina, and these exist in mutually-reciprocal inner and outer consubstantial spheres. Substantiality refers to matter, solidity, &c. But, closely viewed, all this means only individualization or self-reference; to Thought its own discrimina *are*: this is self-reference—self-reference is Being. If Thought distinguishes its own discrimina from itself, then they *are*; but when they also *outwardly* are, then the self-reference has grown substantial, the phenomena seem but isolated self-substantial immediates. But not a whit more substantial are they on this account than the inner. Nay, the inner is the genuine substantiality; they themselves but transitory forms, a prey to the contingency of the Notion in externality to its own self.

The *Notion's* first forms then, however *formal* they may seem, are the *actual* First Natural causality itself is but the Notion,—the Notion, however, in a peculiar sphere; and to the notion it must submit, as from it, indeed, it derives all its virtue.

Once for all, the triad Being, Non-being, Becoming, is the tortoise of the Universe. The earliest Begriff (Seyn) parts itself into the earliest Urtheil (Nichts), and resumes itself (Reason is the Ver-nunft, from ver-nehmen=transsumere) in the new one of the earliest Schluss (Werden) To subjective Thought, Being is an absolutely necessary idea; and to objective Thought, equally necessary, for before our existence could be—and our

existence is—Being must have been thought. But in either case, the further process of transition to Nothing and to Becoming, is also necessary Thought is the *prius* of all; and these, Being, non-Being, &c., are the absolutely necessary categories that underlie Existence.

But we must remember that after all we are concerned not with *genesis* (in the sense of creative-power) but with *generalization* abstraction. There is a subjective logic in which we learn of terms, syllogisms, &c.; there ought also to be an objective logic to tell us of the secret criteria which we apply to objects, the levers by which we grasp and characterize them. Such do exist, but we know them not. A complex or complement, *e. g.* is brought to us; at first an unintelligible mass, we, to understand it, beset it, transfix it, supply it with categories. Rather, what it was has disappeared; it is now a simple congeries of categories. The whole mass and matter has been converted into Thought. What is *true* in the object is these levers and criteria. What is left, or what we opine in it, is nothing as against Thought, against the thought, *i. e.* into which it has been transformed. Cause, effect, relation, essence, &c., these are the secret criteria or levers we employ. To discover and explain all these is the business of the logic of Hegel. That logic, if a complete co-articulated system of these, must just be, in simple truth, the crystal of the universe The Materialist is a man that will have no nonsense, see you; he will recognize facts only; even when he has struck each fact, like a pin-cushion, so full of the needles and pins of his own brain that nothing but these any longer shows, *he actually believes himself to be still contemplating the fact.* He is the sport, in fact, of a thousand invisible little imps within him. Unknown to him the Logic of Hegel is all there within his skull. But here is the difference. From Hegel it issues pure, systematic, as it is; from the Materialist in that miscellaneous mess (Gebräu), named by Hegel *raisonnement*, blindly, rhapsodically, not as it is but as it is *opined*—about *causes, conditions, &c.*

One word more:—In dealing with objects we use sundry distinctions; objects *obey* them. It might be well, then, to know them, and their system, if they have one. Of every object we

say, *e. g.*, that it *is*. The pen *is*, the paper *is*, &c. Now the pen is the pen, &c., but what is the *is*? By it we determine them; *they* obey *it*. Let us examine it then *for itself*. Every one will admit that what is *is*. Let him give what meaning he likes to this What,—mind, suppose, matter, space, time—this meaning he can with ease withdraw. But the *Is* he cannot possibly withdraw. It is impossible to realize to Thought that there can possibly be an absolute void, for even a void itself must be withdrawn did we desire to effect an absolute *non-is*. *There is, is, or Isness*, is an absolutely necessary thought, then,—necessary and universal,—a category—the first category.

Now there is here no wish to go out of Logic. We are only concerned with Being or Isness as a thought. And this is the beginning of our objective Logic. This principle of determination, Is or Being, is a thought, necessary and universal, a necessary ingredient in all thought and all characterisation by thought. Of everything in this Universe we must say it *is*; yes, but equally we must say it is *not*. This *is* copper, it is *not* silver, &c. In our apprehension of an object, affirmation possesses not one whit more truth, reality, necessity, than negation. *Non-is*, then, and *is* are necessary correlatives, absolutely inseparable in every act of determination, and determination constitutes the nature of the operation of every function we possess—sense, understanding, &c.

Being and Nothing, then, are inseparably present in every concrete; and here in utter abstraction, they unite and are the same. View either separately, and, even as you view, it passes into the other. Think abstract Nothing, it (cannot be thought without the thought of, and so) introduces Being. Think abstract Being, it (is characterless and so) introduces Nothing. But Nothing passing into Being is organization; Being passing into Nothing is disease; and both are becoming. Becoming, then, is that in which both Being and Nothing are contained in unity. In every single case of Becoming this constitution is accurately displayed. And there is no single object which has not received the determination of these, each of these, indissolubly-connected thoughts. Nor does any object receive such determination from us; it possesses it in itself; it has received it from God; it has been so *thought* by God—created by God on and according to

these Thoughts, Being, Nothing, and Becoming. These thoughts are out there—without us—in the Universe, and in here—within us—in the Universe; necessary pressures or compressures moulding the all of things. They are three of God's thoughts in the making of the Universe.

We have no business but with the world we know. What is, is Thought. This is the absolute. But an absolute distinguished in itself. *This we know*; and also that the indefinite implies the definite, as the latter the former. In this Here of Thought Sensation is the phenomenal First—or Sensation is what is most eminently *an sich*. The Notion as in Sensation, then, is the first part of Logic, or Simple *apprehension*—*just as it has always been*. But on the Being—the satisfaction, fulness and faith—of simple apprehension there always follows the Nothing—the dissatisfaction, emptiness, doubt—of understanding (Judgment); Under this *Ordeal*, the Ur-theil, the Begriff sunders from its substantiality into the strife of the differences.

But neither has Nothing any distinction in it. Thought in presence of Nothing can abstract from it only Being. Being and Nothing are inseparable; wherever there is thought, there is distinction; and wherever there is distinction, there *is* and there is *not*. Even in resorting to Being as Being it is only Nothing we encounter. Nothing is the fruitful womb in which all is—the Negative round on which we hang our Positive.

But this third reflexion, that Nothing is returned to Being, implies, like the former, its own gain. Nothing gone into Being is Becoming. (This is not meant for a theory of generation; what we have here are thoughts only; matter as such belongs not to Logic). This third reflexion is Reason. The things separated are here brought together in a Schluss. Judgment stated a difference. Reason has here reconciled identity and difference into a new identity,—into the quasi-fixed moment of Daseyn, which lies between Origin and Decease." Pp. 61, sq.

IV.

"Being is simply *presence* absolutely indefinite—equally *nothing*, but a *seen* nothing. What is, has been, and ever will be. We

are in presence of the Infinite. Nay, this Infinite as much is *not*, as it *is*. The *is* to the *was* is another, the *was* is *not*. Unchanged identity exists not even in a dream. The *is*, to know itself,—even to continue itself—must *other* itself, must become *not*. Not, not, not, are the links of the circle of Identity. By them only is Identity preserved. Truly to think these thoughts, truly to think Identity and Diversity, but—*sub specie æterni*—is, in ultimate result, to develope the System of Hegel.

The Hegelian *notions* are parallel to the myths of all concrete History; Chaos is Seyn, Creation is Daseyn, Christianity (Vision, Love, Submission—Intelligence, Union with God, Immortality) is Fürsichseyn. And this series is but Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason; the one, single, and sole-existent logical throb!" Vol. ii. pp. 537, *sq.*

V.

"It probably occurred to Hegel that *the concrete notion* was the common object of search to Kant, Fichte, Schelling and himself. Kant named what he wanted an *à priori synthetic judgment*, (a mental inference independent of experience) which amounts to a principle the *sameness* of which was already *multiple*, and this as determined by pure reason independently of experience, *i. e.*, as self-determined. Fichte aimed at the same thing in his synthesis, which was to be the *one* of thesis and antithesis, the last, too, being a process as spontaneous, *à priori*, and necessary as the second. Schelling, again, gave direct name to the operations of Kant and Fichte, when he spoke of the identity of identity and non-identity. Lastly, Hegel perceived that this very principle was the principle as well of the concrete and actual. There *was* this actual world; hence *the First* had been no bare abstract identity; it must have at once and from the beginning contained difference,—have been a concrete, *i. e.*, a *one* at once of identity and difference. Nay, such was the actual constitution of every single entity in the universe. How did I know that door or this shutter? The *difference* of each was simply the *identity* of each, each was only and nothing but its for-other reflected into in-itself, its dif-

ference reflected into its identity, or (as even ancient Logic holds in its way, of *definition—Bestimmung*) its *Differentia* reflected into its *Genus*. . . Again, to *perceive* was to *think*, and to think was to *identify difference*.

An union of opposites was thus the one concrete fact—the one abstract quest of Kant and the rest. The desideratum, then, was not, as in common thought, abstract identity, but pure negativity; for a one that is through opposites, or an identity supported on *different*s, that *is* through these, can be no otherwise named. What is pointed at is but the *concrete reciprocity of a disjunctive sphere*, where each is no less itself than it is the other. Nay, you cannot *signalize* the one without *implicating* the other. If the one *moment* of the *antithesis* is *explicit*, the *other* is always at the same time correspondingly *implicit*. Reciprocity has been the bottom consideration of all modern Philosophy, and in just such reciprocity it began. Hume closed his inquiry by concluding that Causality was not necessary, because it was matter of fact; Kant, with a sort of reciprocating reversal, opened his by inferring Causality not to be matter of fact, because it was necessary.

This perception led to Kant's conclusion that there must be *inferences* in us quite *à priori*, and apart from all reference to sensible facts. This single thought of Kant it was that Hegel gazed into its ultimate abstraction, or ultimate life—the *concrete notion*, the primitive and original radical of the huge universe. He saw, too, that the intent of this notion was not confined to intellect proper, but repeated itself in perception as well; for an act of perception to Kant is this, that only by the universal is the particular converted into the singular. And this singular, which to Kant was a *phenomenon*, as *σύνολον* of variety of unknown thing from without, and of unity of known categorical universal from within (*affection* brought by *function* into focus), became a noumenon to Hegel, the actually existent concrete, the only reality and truth. To find the primordial form of this singular was to find also the system of Hegel.

If God is a spirit and thinks, if God created the universe *on* thought; in other words, if thought is what is, then all is reducible to thought, and logic (or *λόγος*, if you prefer it) is the name

of the whole. Idealism is this; the Inhalt of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason, is identical with these its forms; Perception with Intellect; Affection with Function; Object with Subject. *What is* is the "intuitus originarius," the anschauender Verstand, the one absolute Spirit—God.

A beginning would not be difficult to find; for a beginning would require to be such simply as it is in thought, thought being all. Any outward principle would at once presuppose and leave unexplained both Space and Time. A *single* outward principle changing itself into thought, or indeed at all, is inconceivable. A beginning externally is absolutely impossible. The materialist, it is true, may admit this, but he must at least admit also, that a beginning *may* be thought. If, however, a beginning *may* be thought, it *must* be thought only so and so. That is, as Hegel shows, the beginning must be both absolutely *First* and *Incompound*. Now, pure Being alone corresponds to this description, and this is all that Hegel requires; from this, by simple watching, the whole universe ascends; into this it rounds, taking up into itself the inconceivable *Firstness* and *Incompoundness*; for if a Beginning *must* be absolutely First and absolutely Incompound, just as much it *can* be neither. That "what is" is the concrete notion explains this." Vol. ii. p. 514, *sq.*

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
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